17 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. Loeschergreen2 sentences2016“The collateral source rule, if applied to an action based on breach of contract, would violate the contractual damage rule that no one shall profit more from the breach of an obligation than from its full performance.” Id. at 223 (quotation omitted). 2003Under the collateral-source rule, “in general, * * * compensation received from a third party will not diminish recovery against a wrongdoer.” Hubbard Broad., Inc. v. Loescher, 291 N.W.2d 216, 222 (Minn.1980). | 4 | 4 |
Buck v. Schneidergreen2 sentences2009See Kahnke v. Green, 695 N.W.2d 148, 151-52 (Minn.App.2005) (finding that subrogation rights were asserted in a timely fashion when the plaintiff raised the subrogation rights at the collateral-source hearing); Buck v. Schneider, 413 N.W.2d 569, 571 (Minn.App.1987) (finding that the plaintiff asserted subrogation rights “by stating, in response to the court’s order requiring the parties to submit evidence of collateral sources, and in responses to discovery requests, that he had been assigned those rights”). 1995In determining the applicability of the collateral source rule under slightly different circumstances we have held: Because the primary purpose of this statute is to prevent double recoveries, no deduction is allowed where subrogation rights are asserted “to ensure that the amount of collateral sources deducted from the award is the amount to which the plaintiff is actually entitled, and does not include amounts plaintiff must ultimately pay over to a subrogee.” Imlay v. City of Lake Crystal, 453 N.W.2d 326, 334 (Minn.1990) (citing Buck v. Schneider, 413 N.W.2d 569, 572 (Minn.App.1987)). | 3 | 4 |
Hueper v. Goodrichgreen2 sentences2010The collateral-source rule applies in a variety of contexts, including “insurance proceeds, employment benefits, gifts of money or medical services, welfare benefits or tax advantages.” Hueper v. Goodrich, 314 N.W.2d 828, 830 (Minn.1982) (medical services provided free of charge); see, e.g., Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Ins. 2010The collateral-source rule applies in a variety of contexts, including "insurance proceeds, employment benefits, gifts of money or medical services, welfare benefits or tax advantages." Hueper v. Goodrich, 314 N.W.2d 828, 830 (Minn.1982) (medical services provided free of charge); see, e.g., Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Ins. | 2 | 4 |
Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Insurance Companygreen2 sentences2010Co., 296 Minn. 181, 188-89 , 207 N.W.2d 348, 352-53 (1973) (insurance); Local 1140, Int’l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. 2010Co., 296 Minn. 181, 188-89 , 207 N.W.2d 348, 352-53 (1973) (insurance); Local 1140, Int’l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. | 2 | 2 |
Imlay v. City of Lake Crystalgreen2 sentences1995In determining the applicability of the collateral source rule under slightly different circumstances we have held: Because the primary purpose of this statute is to prevent double recoveries, no deduction is allowed where subrogation rights are asserted “to ensure that the amount of collateral sources deducted from the award is the amount to which the plaintiff is actually entitled, and does not include amounts plaintiff must ultimately pay over to a subrogee.” Imlay v. City of Lake Crystal, 453 N.W.2d 326, 334 (Minn.1990) (citing Buck v. Schneider, 413 N.W.2d 569, 572 (Minn.App.1987)). 1991Imlay v. City of Lake Crystal, 453 N.W.2d 326, 331 (Minn.1990). | 2 | 2 |
Mitchell v. Haldargreen2 sentences2010Lopez v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 212 Ariz. 198 , 129 P.3d 487, 495 (2006); see also Mitchell v. Haldar, 883 A.2d 32, 40 (Del.2005); Brown v. Van Noy, 879 S.W.2d 667, 676 (Mo.Ct.App.1994) (“[T]he fact that the expenses were ‘taken care of by Medicare is not materially different than expenses paid by insurance or paid in part by insurance with part ‘written off pursuant to a contract or agreement between the medical provider and the insurance company.”). 2010Lopez v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 212 Ariz. 198 , 129 P.3d 487, 495 (2006); see also Mitchell v. Haldar, 883 A.2d 32, 40 (Del.2005); Brown v. Van Noy, 879 S.W.2d 667, 676 (Mo.Ct.App. 1994) ("[T]he fact that the expenses were `taken care of' by Medicare is not materially different than expenses paid by insurance or paid in part by insurance with part `written off' pursuant to a contract or agreement between the medical provider and the insurance company."). | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Van Noygreen2 sentences2010Lopez v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 212 Ariz. 198 , 129 P.3d 487, 495 (2006); see also Mitchell v. Haldar, 883 A.2d 32, 40 (Del.2005); Brown v. Van Noy, 879 S.W.2d 667, 676 (Mo.Ct.App.1994) (“[T]he fact that the expenses were ‘taken care of by Medicare is not materially different than expenses paid by insurance or paid in part by insurance with part ‘written off pursuant to a contract or agreement between the medical provider and the insurance company.”). 2010Lopez v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 212 Ariz. 198 , 129 P.3d 487, 495 (2006); see also Mitchell v. Haldar, 883 A.2d 32, 40 (Del.2005); Brown v. Van Noy, 879 S.W.2d 667, 676 (Mo.Ct.App. 1994) ("[T]he fact that the expenses were `taken care of' by Medicare is not materially different than expenses paid by insurance or paid in part by insurance with part `written off' pursuant to a contract or agreement between the medical provider and the insurance company."). | 1 | 1 |
Koffman v. Leichtfussgreen2 sentences2010Hoffman v. Leichtfuss, 246 Wis.2d 31 , 630 N.W.2d 201, 210 (2001). 2010Hoffman v. Leichtfuss, 246 Wis.2d 31 , 630 N.W.2d 201, 210 (2001). | 1 | 1 |
Lopez v. Safeway Stores, Inc.green2 sentences2010Lopez v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 212 Ariz. 198 , 129 P.3d 487, 495 (2006); see also Mitchell v. Haldar, 883 A.2d 32, 40 (Del.2005); Brown v. Van Noy, 879 S.W.2d 667, 676 (Mo.Ct.App.1994) (“[T]he fact that the expenses were ‘taken care of by Medicare is not materially different than expenses paid by insurance or paid in part by insurance with part ‘written off pursuant to a contract or agreement between the medical provider and the insurance company.”). 2010Lopez v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 212 Ariz. 198 , 129 P.3d 487, 495 (2006); see also Mitchell v. Haldar, 883 A.2d 32, 40 (Del.2005); Brown v. Van Noy, 879 S.W.2d 667, 676 (Mo.Ct.App.1994) (“[T]he fact that the expenses were ‘taken care of by Medicare is not materially different than expenses paid by insurance or paid in part by insurance with part ‘written off pursuant to a contract or agreement between the medical provider and the insurance company.”). | 1 | 1 |
Kahnke v. Greengreen1 sentence2009See Kahnke v. Green, 695 N.W.2d 148, 151-52 (Minn.App.2005) (finding that subrogation rights were asserted in a timely fashion when the plaintiff raised the subrogation rights at the collateral-source hearing); Buck v. Schneider, 413 N.W.2d 569, 571 (Minn.App.1987) (finding that the plaintiff asserted subrogation rights “by stating, in response to the court’s order requiring the parties to submit evidence of collateral sources, and in responses to discovery requests, that he had been assigned those rights”). | 1 | 1 |
Dean v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co.green1 sentence2008Dean, 535 N.W.2d at 344 (“[B]oth the collateral source rule and the UIM provisions were meant to avoid double recovery.”). | 1 | 1 |
Patent Scaffolding Co. v. William Simpson Construction Co.green2 sentences1980Co., 256 Cal.App.2d 506, 511 , 64 Cal.Rptr. 187, 191 (1967): The collateral source rule is, punitive; contractual damages are compensatory. *223 The collateral source rule, if applied to an action based on breach of contract, would violate the contractual damage rule that no one shall profit more from the breach of an obligation than from its full performance. 1980Co., 256 Cal.App.2d 506, 511 , 64 Cal.Rptr. 187, 191 (1967): The collateral source rule is, punitive; contractual damages are compensatory. *223 The collateral source rule, if applied to an action based on breach of contract, would violate the contractual damage rule that no one shall profit more from the breach of an obligation than from its full performance. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. American States Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence2008The Dean court acknowledges that it considers the limited issue of whether “an automobile accident liability insurance payment from an underinsured tortfeasor triggers the collateral source rule in a claim for [UIM] benefits when the claimant is partially at fault.” Id. at 343 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Stout v. AMCO Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence2004In Stout , the court held that a claimant may assert a claim against a no-fault carrier for the full amount of medical expenses incurred by the claimant regardless of whether that amount was subsequently reduced as a result of collateral transactions involving the claimant’s health insurer. 645 N.W.2d at 113 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Duluth Steam Cooperative Ass'n v. Ringsred
green
1 sentence2003Ringsred, 519 N.W.2d at 217 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Bartosch v. Lewison
green
2 sentences1997Today, the court adopts the exception to the collateral source rule set out by the court of appeals in Bartosch v. Lewison, 1 413 N.W.2d 530 (Minn.App.1987), and holds that a defendant may rebut a plaintiffs claim of financial destitution by presenting evidence of collateral source payments received by the plaintiff. 1997Today, the court adopts the exception to the collateral source rule set out by the court of appeals in Bartosch v. Lewison , [1] 413 N.W.2d 530 (Minn.App.1987), and holds that a defendant may rebut a plaintiff's claim of financial destitution by presenting evidence of collateral source payments received by the plaintiff. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Austin v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
green
2 sentences1994Two years later, in Austin , we cited our decision in Kersting and rejected nearly the same argument that the collateral source rule required offsetting an arbitration award by the amount the injured party received through workers' compensation. 486 N.W.2d at 459 . 1994Two years later, in Austin , we cited our decision in Kersting and rejected nearly the same argument — that the collateral source rule required offsetting an arbitration award by the amount the injured party received through workers’ compensation. 486 N.W.2d at 459 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Folstad v. Eder
green
1 sentence1993Thus, if the subrogated damages have been separated out of Krutsch’s action, there is no need to apply the collateral source rule.' See id. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Kersting v. Royal-Milbank Insurance
green
2 sentences1992This court rejected the same argument in Kersting v. Royal-Milbank Ins., 456 N.W.2d 270 (Minn.App.1990). 1992We recognized in Kersting, 456 N.W.2d at 274 , that there were competing public policies which would have been furthered by requiring the trial court to apply the collateral source rule to arbitration awards. [Appellant] argues that the policy against double recovery is violated if the arbitration award is not modified in this case. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Dahlin v. Kron
green
2 sentences1982To the extent Dahlin v. Kron, 232 Minn. 312 , 45 N.W.2d 833 (1950), suggests otherwise, it should not be followed. 1982To the extent Dahlin v. Kron, 232 Minn. 312 , 45 N.W.2d 833 (1950), suggests otherwise, it should not be followed. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.