17 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Werner v. Lanegreen2 sentences2022The price reduction resulting from the write-off is a benefit analogous to the free medical care in Werner, 393 A.2d at 1335 , which should inure to Plaintiff under the collateral source rule. 2016The collateral source rule provides that, "if a plaintiff is compensated in whole or in part for his damages by some source independent of the tortfeasor, he is still permitted to have a full recovery against the tortfeasor." Werner v. Lane, 393 A.2d 1329, 1335 (Me. 1978). | 10 | 10 |
Potvin v. Seven Elms, Inc.green2 sentences1995The applicable law governing the instant case was clearly stated by the Court in Potvin v. Seven Elms, Inc., 628 A.2d 115 (Me.1993): We have previously held that under the collateral source rule, a plaintiff who has *676 been compensated in whole or in part for his damages by a source independent of the tortfeasor is nevertheless entitled to a full recovery against the tortfeasor. 1995The applicable law governing the instant ease was clearly stated by the Court in Potvin v. Seven Elms, Inc., 628 A.2d 115 (Me.1993): We have previously held that under the collateral source rule, a plaintiff who has been compensated in whole or in part for his damages by a source independent of the tortfeasor is nevertheless entitled to a full recovery against the tortfeasor. | 5 | 5 |
Albert E. DAVIDSON, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant, Appellantgreen1 sentence2014S.M.F. <][ 43 9 .) Under federal law, an SSDI beneficiary who also receives workers' compensation benefits under state law cannot receive more than 80% of her "average current earnings." 10 42 U.S.C. § 424a(a)(5) (2013); see also Davidson v. Sullivan, 942 F.2d 90, 92 (1st Cir. 1991) ("Where an individual receives both worker's compensation benefits and social security benefits, the total benefits received may not exceed eighty percent of his predisability income.") 8 Plaintiff argues the collateral source rule prevents the court from considering the SSDI payments. | 1 | 1 |
Hoitt v. Hallgreen2 sentences2004The collateral source doctrine provides that “a plaintiff who has received compensation for her damages from sources independent of the tortfeasor remains entitled to a full recovery.” Hoitt v. Hall, 661 A.2d 669, 673 (Me.1995). 2004The collateral source doctrine provides that “a plaintiff who has received compensation for her damages from sources independent of the tortfeasor remains entitled to a full recovery.” Hoitt v. Hall, 661 A.2d 669, 673 (Me.1995). | 1 | 1 |
Stubbs v. Bartlettgreen1 sentence1987Werner v. Lane, 393 A.2d 1329, 1335-36 (Me.1978); Stubbs v. Bartlett, 478 A.2d 690, 694 (Me.1984); Maine Human Rights Commission v. Department of Corrections, 474 A.2d 860, 870 (Me.1984). | 1 | 1 |
Maine Human Rights Commission Ex Rel. Kellman v. Department of Correctionsgreen1 sentence1987Werner v. Lane, 393 A.2d 1329, 1335-36 (Me.1978); Stubbs v. Bartlett, 478 A.2d 690, 694 (Me.1984); Maine Human Rights Commission v. Department of Corrections, 474 A.2d 860, 870 (Me.1984). | 1 | 1 |
Daniels v. Celestegreen2 sentences1978See Daniels v. Celeste, 303 Mass. 148 , 21 N.E.2d 1 , 128 A.L.R. 682 (1939); McKay v. Town of West Seneca, 51 A.D.2d 373 , 381 N.Y.S.2d 892 (1976). 4 Among the various rationales advanced in support of the collateral source rule, we find the foregoing most persuasive: “The philosophy underlying the Collateral Source Rule seems to be that either the injured party or the tortfeasor is going to receive a windfall, if a part of the pecuniary loss is paid for by an outside *1336 source and that it is more just that the windfall should inure to the benefit of the injured party than that it should ac 1978See Daniels v. Celeste, 303 Mass. 148 , 21 N.E.2d 1 , 128 A.L.R. 682 (1939); McKay v. Town of West Seneca, 51 A.D.2d 373 , 381 N.Y.S.2d 892 (1976). 4 Among the various rationales advanced in support of the collateral source rule, we find the foregoing most persuasive: “The philosophy underlying the Collateral Source Rule seems to be that either the injured party or the tortfeasor is going to receive a windfall, if a part of the pecuniary loss is paid for by an outside *1336 source and that it is more just that the windfall should inure to the benefit of the injured party than that it should ac | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Grover v. Boise Cascade Corp.
green
2 sentences2019An error is obvious only when it "constitutes such a serious injustice that reversal is necessary because we could not in good conscience let the judgment stand." Coyne v. Peace , 2004 ME 150 , ¶ 14, 863 A.2d 885 . [¶22] The collateral source doctrine typically precludes the admission of evidence of workers' compensation because "a plaintiff who has received compensation for [his] damages from sources independent of the tortfeasor remains entitled to a full recovery [from the tortfeasor]." Grover v. Boise Cascade Corp. , 2004 ME 119 , ¶ 24, 860 A.2d 851 (quotation marks omitted). 2019An error is obvious only when it "constitutes such a serious injustice that reversal is necessary because we could not in good conscience let the judgment stand." Coyne v. Peace , 2004 ME 150 , ¶ 14, 863 A.2d 885 . [¶22] The collateral source doctrine typically precludes the admission of evidence of workers' compensation because "a plaintiff who has received compensation for [his] damages from sources independent of the tortfeasor remains entitled to a full recovery [from the tortfeasor]." Grover v. Boise Cascade Corp. , 2004 ME 119 , ¶ 24, 860 A.2d 851 (quotation marks omitted). | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Coyne v. Peace
green
2 sentences2019An error is obvious only when it "constitutes such a serious injustice that reversal is necessary because we could not in good conscience let the judgment stand." Coyne v. Peace , 2004 ME 150 , ¶ 14, 863 A.2d 885 . [¶22] The collateral source doctrine typically precludes the admission of evidence of workers' compensation because "a plaintiff who has received compensation for [his] damages from sources independent of the tortfeasor remains entitled to a full recovery [from the tortfeasor]." Grover v. Boise Cascade Corp. , 2004 ME 119 , ¶ 24, 860 A.2d 851 (quotation marks omitted). 2019An error is obvious only when it "constitutes such a serious injustice that reversal is necessary because we could not in good conscience let the judgment stand." Coyne v. Peace , 2004 ME 150 , ¶ 14, 863 A.2d 885 . [¶22] The collateral source doctrine typically precludes the admission of evidence of workers' compensation because "a plaintiff who has received compensation for [his] damages from sources independent of the tortfeasor remains entitled to a full recovery [from the tortfeasor]." Grover v. Boise Cascade Corp. , 2004 ME 119 , ¶ 24, 860 A.2d 851 (quotation marks omitted). | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Commonwealth v. Silver
green
1 sentence2008Werner v. Lane, 393 A. 2d 1239 (Me. 1978). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Claim of McKay v. Town of West Seneca
green
2 sentences1978See Daniels v. Celeste, 303 Mass. 148 , 21 N.E.2d 1 , 128 A.L.R. 682 (1939); McKay v. Town of West Seneca, 51 A.D.2d 373 , 381 N.Y.S.2d 892 (1976). 4 Among the various rationales advanced in support of the collateral source rule, we find the foregoing most persuasive: “The philosophy underlying the Collateral Source Rule seems to be that either the injured party or the tortfeasor is going to receive a windfall, if a part of the pecuniary loss is paid for by an outside *1336 source and that it is more just that the windfall should inure to the benefit of the injured party than that it should ac 1978See Daniels v. Celeste, 303 Mass. 148 , 21 N.E.2d 1 , 128 A.L.R. 682 (1939); McKay v. Town of West Seneca, 51 A.D.2d 373 , 381 N.Y.S.2d 892 (1976). 4 Among the various rationales advanced in support of the collateral source rule, we find the foregoing most persuasive: “The philosophy underlying the Collateral Source Rule seems to be that either the injured party or the tortfeasor is going to receive a windfall, if a part of the pecuniary loss is paid for by an outside *1336 source and that it is more just that the windfall should inure to the benefit of the injured party than that it should ac | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Acme-Evans Co. v. Schnepf
green
2 sentences1978Without characterizing its ruling as an application of the collateral source rule, this Court in a tort action for injuries to his minor child has permitted recovery by the father of the reasonable value of necessary nursing services rendered gratuitously by the mother, quoting with approval the language of Acme-Evans Co. v. Schnepf, 105 Ind.App. 475 , 15 N.E.2d 742 (1938): “ ‘If [plaintiff] is fortunate enough to secure the services of his wife in treating the injuries of their minor son, rather - than employing one who is not a member of the family and thus obligating himself to pay for such 1978Without characterizing its ruling as an application of the collateral source rule, this Court in a tort action for injuries to his minor child has permitted recovery by the father of the reasonable value of necessary nursing services rendered gratuitously by the mother, quoting with approval the language of Acme-Evans Co. v. Schnepf, 105 Ind.App. 475 , 15 N.E.2d 742 (1938): “ ‘If [plaintiff] is fortunate enough to secure the services of his wife in treating the injuries of their minor son, rather - than employing one who is not a member of the family and thus obligating himself to pay for such | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Wells v. Minneapolis Baseball & Athletic Ass'n
green
2 sentences1978Accord: Wells v. Minneapolis B. & A. Ass’n, 122 Minn. 327 , 142 N.W. 706 , 46 L.R.A.,N.S., 606, Ann.Cas.1914D, 922 (1913). 1978Accord: Wells v. Minneapolis B. & A. Ass’n, 122 Minn. 327 , 142 N.W. 706 , 46 L.R.A.,N.S., 606, Ann.Cas.1914D, 922 (1913). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Johnson v. Rhuda
green
2 sentences1978Without characterizing its ruling as an application of the collateral source rule, this Court in a tort action for injuries to his minor child has permitted recovery by the father of the reasonable value of necessary nursing services rendered gratuitously by the mother, quoting with approval the language of Acme-Evans Co. v. Schnepf, 105 Ind.App. 475 , 15 N.E.2d 742 (1938): “ ‘If [plaintiff] is fortunate enough to secure the services of his wife in treating the injuries of their minor son, rather - than employing one who is not a member of the family and thus obligating himself to pay for such 1978Without characterizing its ruling as an application of the collateral source rule, this Court in a tort action for injuries to his minor child has permitted recovery by the father of the reasonable value of necessary nursing services rendered gratuitously by the mother, quoting with approval the language of Acme-Evans Co. v. Schnepf, 105 Ind.App. 475 , 15 N.E.2d 742 (1938): “ ‘If [plaintiff] is fortunate enough to secure the services of his wife in treating the injuries of their minor son, rather - than employing one who is not a member of the family and thus obligating himself to pay for such | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Moulton v. Groveton Papers Co.
green
2 sentences1978For the pros and cons respecting the rule, turn to Moulton v. Groveton Papers Company, 114 N.H. 505 , 323 A.2d 906 (1974). 1978For the pros and cons respecting the rule, turn to Moulton v. Groveton Papers Company, 114 N.H. 505 , 323 A.2d 906 (1974). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.