collateral source rule in Massachusetts

2018"In terms of operation, the collateral source rule has both a substantive aspect that relates to the law of damages, and an evidentiary component that governs what types of evidence may be admitted in evidence at trial." Law v. Griffith , 457 Mass. 349 , 355, 930 N.E.2d 126 (2010). 7 This case relates to the substantive aspect of the rule as it concerns whether the rule applies to an offset of insurance proceeds paid to Bunker Hill as Gilbody's homeowner insurer.

2018"In terms of operation, the collateral source rule has both a substantive aspect that relates to the law of damages, and an evidentiary component that governs what types of evidence may be admitted in evidence at trial." Law v. Griffith , 457 Mass. 349 , 355, 930 N.E.2d 126 (2010). 7 This case relates to the substantive aspect of the rule as it concerns whether the rule applies to an offset of insurance proceeds paid to Bunker Hill as Gilbody's homeowner insurer.

2010See Goldstein v. Gontarz, supra at 809 (information about plaintiff’s receipt of insurance or other compensation for his injury is legally irrelevant because, under collateral source rule, “outside source” compensation does not reduce defendant’s liability; evidence of such compensation not admissible because “jurors might be led by the irrelevancy” to reduce or deny recovery).

1998The Appellate Division rejected the defendant’s contention that the collateral source rule precludes the introduction in evidence of PIP benefits paid, see Gold stein v. Gontarz, 364 Mass. 800, 808-814 (1974), and held that evidence of PIP benefits are both relevant and admissible at a bench trial.

2003The rationale for the collateral source rule — "that if there is to be a ‘windfall,’ such benefit should accrue to the injured party rather than to the wrongdoer," Jones v. Wayland, 374 Mass. 249, 262 (1978)—would be absurd if the rule applied only to benefits that must be reimbursed.

1997The Supreme Judicial Court determined that the collateral source rule was inapplicable in a situation where “the party not responsible for the injury [i.e. the town] has established a fund to be drawn on in the event of liability to another person.” Id.

2018"The rationale behind this so-called 'collateral source rule' is that receipt of such income does not lawfully reduce the plaintiffs' damages, 'yet jurors might be led by the irrelevancy to consider plaintiffs' claims unimportant or trivial or to refuse plaintiffs' verdicts or reduce them, believing that otherwise there would be unjust double recovery.' " Scott v. Garfield , 454 Mass. 790 , 800-801, 912 N.E.2d 1000 (2009), quoting Corsetti v. Stone Co ., 396 Mass. 1 , 17, 483 N.E.2d 793 (1985). 8 The Boyles also raised a claim for violation of G.

1992For a case involving prejudice to the plaintiff, see Torre v. Harris-Seybold Co., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 660, 665 (1980). (“Th[e] insinuation of the existence of a possible collateral source of recovery [absent prior approval by the judge] . . . is squarely condemned by our cases [citations omitted].”) For an important exception to the collateral source rule see Corsetti v. Stone Co., 396 Mass. 1, 16-20 (1985).

2010Id. at 801 . 8 See Wills v. Foster, 229 Ill. 2d 393, 419-420 (2008) (plaintiff entitled to recover reasonable value of medical services regardless of whether plaintiff has private insurance or is covered by government program; defendant was not permitted to introduce in evidence amount paid by Medicare or Medicaid, as such evidence would violate collateral source rule, and plaintiff’s recovery was not limited to amount actually paid by Medicare or Medicaid in full settlement of bills).

2009See Wills v. Foster, 229 Ill. 2d 393, 410 (2008) (citing cases from twelve jurisdictions supporting conclusion that “vast majority of courts to employ a reasonable-value approach hold that the plaintiff may seek to recover the amount originally billed by the medical provider”). 4 Some of these courts have concluded (as the judge did here) that any discount off of the charges submitted by a medical provider afforded to a plaintiff (or his health care insurer) is itself a form of benefit or compensation provided by a collateral source — either the medical provider or the insurer through its disc

2018"The rationale behind this so-called 'collateral source rule' is that receipt of such income does not lawfully reduce the plaintiffs' damages, 'yet jurors might be led by the irrelevancy to consider plaintiffs' claims unimportant or trivial or to refuse plaintiffs' verdicts or reduce them, believing that otherwise there would be unjust double recovery.' " Scott v. Garfield , 454 Mass. 790 , 800-801, 912 N.E.2d 1000 (2009), quoting Corsetti v. Stone Co ., 396 Mass. 1 , 17, 483 N.E.2d 793 (1985). 8 The Boyles also raised a claim for violation of G.

2010See Scott v. Garfield, supra at 803 (Cordy, J., concurring).

2015Fust v. Francois, 913 S.W.2d 38, 47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995), citing Washington v. Barnes Hosp., 897 S.W.2d 611, 619 (Mo. 1995).

2000Damages in our tort system are compensatory not punitive.” Id.

2003See Shea v. Rettie, 287 Mass. 454, 458 (1934) (court applied collateral source rule to disability income payments which the plaintiff was entitled to receive under his employment contact because there was no common relationship between the employer and the defendant who had caused the plaintiffs injury).

1985In Shea v. Rettie, supra at 458 , the court applied the collateral source rule to disability income payments which the plaintiff, a police officer, was entitled to receive under his employment contract with the city.

2024P' ship, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 848 , 857 n.10 (2011) (emphasis added), quoting Fitzgerald v. Expressway Sewerage Constr., Inc., 177 F.3d 71, 73 (1st Cir. 1999).

2018Compare also Overton v. United States , 619 F.2d 1299 , 1306 (8th Cir. 1980) ("The rule permits recovery against a wrongdoer for the full amount of damages even though the plaintiff is also compensated from a different source (such as an insurance company) which is 'wholly independent' of the wrongdoer and whose payment is therefore collateral to his"); Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist ., 2 Cal. 3d 1 , 6, 84 Cal.Rptr. 173 , 465 P.2d 61 (1970).

2015See notes 5 through 7, supra. Awards of counsel fees and expenses to trustees and others rendering services to the trust “generally lie in the discretion of the Probate Court.” Chase v. Pavear, 383 Mass. at 371 .

2015Fust v. Francois, 913 S.W.2d 38, 47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995), citing Washington v. Barnes Hosp., 897 S.W.2d 611, 619 (Mo. 1995).

2015Specifically, pursuant to G.L.c. 231, §60G(a), a defendant may, as here, move for a post-verdict hearing to offer evidence in regard to the. amount of damages awarded a plaintiff for medical costs and expenses incurred prejudgment which the defendant claims were “replaced, compensated or indemnified” by a collateral source, such as health or disability insurance. 2 If any such awarded damages duplicate those collateral benefits, the statute requires the judge to “reduce the award by the amount of the benefits, less the amount the plaintiff paid to secure such benefits, through premiums and the

2012Morea v. Cosco, Inc., 422 Mass. 601, 603 (1996).

2009See Leitinger v. DBart, Inc., 302 Wis. 2d 110, 149-150 (2007) (“collateral source rule began as a substantive rule of damages,” but has since “taken on an evi-dentiary character”).

2009See, e.g., Bennett v. Haley, 132 Ga. App. 512, 523-524 (1974); Arthur v. Catour, 216 Ill. 2d 72, 98 (2005) (McMorrow, C.J., dissenting); Covington v. George, 359 S.C. 100, 104 (2004); Leitinger v. DBart, Inc., supra. While a number of courts that have considered the question have ruled that the discounted amounts actually paid are not relevant to or admissible on the issue of the reasonableness of the medical expenses that the plaintiff can recover, there is an increasing number that disagree.

2009In this era of increased insurance protection, the collateral source rule has “allowed plaintiffs to effectuate double and even triple recovery as a result of injuries received by them.” Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 583 (1977).

2009See, e.g., Bennett v. Haley, 132 Ga. App. 512, 523-524 (1974); Arthur v. Catour, 216 Ill. 2d 72, 98 (2005) (McMorrow, C.J., dissenting); Covington v. George, 359 S.C. 100, 104 (2004); Leitinger v. DBart, Inc., supra. While a number of courts that have considered the question have ruled that the discounted amounts actually paid are not relevant to or admissible on the issue of the reasonableness of the medical expenses that the plaintiff can recover, there is an increasing number that disagree.

2009See Stanley v. Walker, 906 N.E.2d 852, 858 (Ind. 2009).

2009The issue presented in this case concerns a tension among the collateral source rule, the right of an injured plaintiff to recover only his reasonable medical expenses, and the right of a defendant to challenge those expenses when relying on medical bills that bear little relationship to the amount actually paid for the care received, irrespective of who made the payment. 2 The issue is one of considerable controversy in both the courts and State Legislatures around the country. 3 A majority of the courts that have considered the issue have concluded “that plaintiffs are entitled to claim and

2009See Robinson v. Bates, 112 Ohio St. 3d 17, 22 (2006).

2009See, e.g., Bennett v. Haley, 132 Ga. App. 512, 523-524 (1974); Arthur v. Catour, 216 Ill. 2d 72, 98 (2005) (McMorrow, C.J., dissenting); Covington v. George, 359 S.C. 100, 104 (2004); Leitinger v. DBart, Inc., supra. While a number of courts that have considered the question have ruled that the discounted amounts actually paid are not relevant to or admissible on the issue of the reasonableness of the medical expenses that the plaintiff can recover, there is an increasing number that disagree.

2008See, e.g., Bynum v. Magno, 101 P.3d 1149, 1157 (Haw. 2004); Baptist Healthcare Systems, Inc. v. Miller, 177 S.W.3d 676, 683-84 (Ky. 2005); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Frierson, 818 So.2d 1135, 1139-40 (Miss. 2002); Papke v. Harbert, 738 N.W.2d 510, 536 (S.D. 2007).