collateral source rule in Kansas

2010In Rose v. Via Christi Health System, Inc., 276 Kan. 539 , 78 P.3d 798 (2003) ( Rose I ), modified on rehearing 279 Kan. 523 , 113 P.3d 241 (2005) ( Rose II ) a majority of this court picked up on the theme stated in Wentling and approvingly drew from Judge, now Chief Judge, Rulon's dissenting opinion in Bates to state: "The purpose of the collateral source rule is to prevent the tortfeasor from escaping from the full liability resulting from his or her actions by requiring the tortfeasor to compensate the injured party for all of the harm he or she causes, not just the injured party's net los

2010In Rose v. Via Christi Health System, Inc., 276 Kan. 539 , 78 P.3d 798 (2003) ( Rose I ), modified on rehearing 279 Kan. 523 , 113 P.3d 241 (2005) ( Rose II ) a majority of this court picked up on the theme stated in Wentling and approvingly drew from Judge, now Chief Judge, Rulon's dissenting opinion in Bates to state: "The purpose of the collateral source rule is to prevent the tortfeasor from escaping from the full liability resulting from his or her actions by requiring the tortfeasor to compensate the injured party for all of the harm he or she causes, not just the injured party's net los

2010In Allman , this court denied the admission of evidence of financial resources available to minor plaintiffs resulting from their father's death, stating "[a]s the definition illustrates[,] the collateral source rule is merely a species of the relevancy doctrine." 233 Kan. at 789 , 667 P.2d 296 .

2010In Allman , this court denied the admission of evidence of financial resources available to minor plaintiffs resulting from their father's death, stating "[a]s the definition illustrates[,] the collateral source rule is merely a species of the relevancy doctrine." 233 Kan. at 789 , 667 P.2d 296 .

2007These reforms are described in detail in Samsel v. Wheeler Transport Services, Inc., 246 Kan. 336, 339-340 , 789 P.2d 541 (1990), overruled in part on other grounds Bair v. Peck, 248 Kan. 824 , 811 P.2d 1176 (1991), and include, among other things, establishment of the Health Care Stabilization Fund and medical malpractice screening panels, shortening of the statute of limitations on medical malpractice, changes to the collateral source rule, and damages caps.

2007These reforms are described in detail in Samsel v. Wheeler Transport Services, Inc., 246 Kan. 336, 339-340 , 789 P.2d 541 (1990), overruled in part on other grounds Bair v. Peck, 248 Kan. 824 , 811 P.2d 1176 (1991), and include, among other things, establishment of the Health Care Stabilization Fund and medical malpractice screening panels, shortening of the statute of limitations on medical malpractice, changes to the collateral source rule, and damages caps.

2010Specifically in the private insurance context, such as the case now before us, we have held: "The reasons generally given for the [collateral source] rule are that the contract of insurance and the subsequent conduct of the insurer and insured in relation thereto are matters with which the wrongdoer has no concern and which do not affect the measure of his liability." (Emphasis added.) Rexroad, 192 Kan. at 354-55 , 388 P.2d 832 .

2010Specifically in the private insurance context, such as the case now before us, we have held: "The reasons generally given for the [collateral source] rule are that the contract of insurance and the subsequent conduct of the insurer and insured in relation thereto are matters with which the wrongdoer has no concern and which do not affect the measure of his liability." (Emphasis added.) Rexroad, 192 Kan. at 354-55 , 388 P.2d 832 .

2010Rose I, 276 Kan. at 546 -47 (citing Candler Hosp. v. Dent, 228 Ga. App. 421 , 491 S.E.2d 868 [1997]; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Frierson, 818 So. 2d 1135, 1140 [Miss. 2002]; Brown v. Van Noy, 879 S.W.2d 667 [Mo. App. 1994]).

2010Rose I, 276 Kan. at 546-47 , 78 P.3d 798 (citing Candler Hosp. v. Dent, 228 Ga.App. 421 , 491 S.E.2d 868 (1997); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Frierson, 818 So.2d 1135, 1140 (Miss.2002); Brown v. Van Noy, 879 S.W.2d 667 (Mo.App.1994)).

2010App.2d 93 , 115 P.3d 165 (2005), and Johnson v. Baker, 11 Kan.App.2d 274 , 719 P.2d 752 (1986), the Court of Appeals acknowledged that the collateral source rule also applies to gratuitous payments.

2010App.2d 93 , 115 P.3d 165 (2005), and Johnson v. Baker, 11 Kan.App.2d 274 , 719 P.2d 752 (1986), the Court of Appeals acknowledged that the collateral source rule also applies to gratuitous payments.

2003The collateral source rule does not *556 apply to the illusory `charge' of $96,500.91 since that amount was not paid by any collateral source." 564 Pa. at 164-65 .

2003The collateral source rule does not apply to the illusory `charge' of $96,500.91 since that amount was not paid by any collateral source." 564 Pa. at 165 . *531 Similarly, the Georgia Court of Appeals in Candler Hosp. v. Dent, 228 Ga. App. 421 , 491 S.E.2d 868 (1997), applied the collateral source rule to portions of the medical bills paid by Medicare but allowed the hospital a credit for those amounts written off: "[I]n the event that the plaintiff recovers a special verdict that awards damages for medical expenses previously written off by the defendant, the defendant is entitled to a set-of

2018The panel then found that Foveaux v. Smith , 17 Kan.

2018The doctrine of stare decisis recognizes that " 'once a point of law has been established by a court, that point of law will generally be followed by the same court and all courts of lower rank in subsequent cases where the same legal issue is raised.' " Crist v. Hunan Palace, Inc. , 277 Kan. 706 , 715, 89 P.3d 573 (2004). *499 The Court of Appeals recited Risley's position to be that "the KAIRA seeks to prevent a double recovery by the accident victim to protect the PIP carrier, rather than the tortfeasor, and, in a manner similar to the collateral source rule, the KAIRA does not grant the to

2018The doctrine of stare decisis recognizes that " 'once a point of law has been established by a court, that point of law will generally be followed by the same court and all courts of lower rank in subsequent cases where the same legal issue is raised.' " Crist v. Hunan Palace, Inc. , 277 Kan. 706 , 715, 89 P.3d 573 (2004). *499 The Court of Appeals recited Risley's position to be that "the KAIRA seeks to prevent a double recovery by the accident victim to protect the PIP carrier, rather than the tortfeasor, and, in a manner similar to the collateral source rule, the KAIRA does not grant the to

2010Such a `limitation' on the plaintiff's damages contravenes the view of the collateral source rule." (Emphasis added.) 302 Wis.2d at 135-36 , 736 N.W.2d 1 .

2010Such a `limitation' on the plaintiff's damages contravenes the view of the collateral source rule." (Emphasis added.) 302 Wis.2d at 135-36 , 736 N.W.2d 1 .

2010App.2d 93 , 115 P.3d 165 (2005), and Johnson v. Baker, 11 Kan.App.2d 274 , 719 P.2d 752 (1986), the Court of Appeals acknowledged that the collateral source rule also applies to gratuitous payments.

2010For example, the Zak *221 panel held that "the collateral source rule applies to payments received gratuitously as well as those received as a result of an obligation." 34 Kan.App.2d at 106 , 115 P.3d 165 (citing Johnson v. Baker, 11 Kan.App.2d 274 , 719 P.2d 752 (1986)).

2010We observe, however, that in Lewark v. Parkinson, 73 Kan. 553, 555-56 , 85 P. 601 (1906), we indicated that an injured plaintiff may seek recovery for nursing services provided gratuitously by family members.

2010We observe, however, that in Lewark v. Parkinson, 73 Kan. 553, 555-56 , 85 P. 601 (1906), we indicated that an injured plaintiff may seek recovery for nursing services provided gratuitously by family members.

2010The Wisconsin Supreme Court observed that this argument had been rejected by the South Carolina Supreme Court in Covington v. George, 359 S.C. 100, 104 , 597 S.E.2d 142 (2004): "The South Carolina Supreme Court evaluated an argument similar to [defendant's].

2010The Wisconsin Supreme Court observed that this argument had been rejected by the South Carolina Supreme Court in Covington v. George, 359 S.C. 100, 104 , 597 S.E.2d 142 (2004): "The South Carolina Supreme Court evaluated an argument similar to [defendant's].

2010In Pape , this court used the collateral source rule to hold that it was improper for a defendant to offer evidence that a surviving spouse in a wrongful death action had remarried, characterizing such evidence as "highly speculative" on the claimed justification that it showed mitigation of damages, and adding there was no justification "to depart from our long recognition of the collateral source rule. . . ." 231 Kan. at 447, 647 P.2d 320 .

2010Aumand, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 91 ; Goble, 848 So. 2d at 410 ; Wills, 229 Ill. 2d at 418 ; Covington, 359 S.C. at 104-05 ; Leitinger, 302 Wis. 2d at 134-36 .

2010Aumand, 611 F.Supp.2d at 91 ; Goble, 848 So.2d at 410 ; Wills, 229 Ill.2d at 418 , 323 Ill.Dec. 26 , 892 N.E.2d 1018 ; Covington, 359 S.C. at 104-05 , 597 S.E.2d 142 ; Leitinger, 302 Wis.2d at 134-36 , 736 N.W.2d 1 .

2010Adamson v. Bicknell Most recently, the Court of Appeals considered the collateral source rule and write-offs in Adamson v. Bicknell, 41 Kan.App.2d 958 , 207 P.3d 265 (2009), rev. granted March 31, 2010.

2010Adamson v. Bicknell Most recently, the Court of Appeals considered the collateral source rule and write-offs in Adamson v. Bicknell, 41 Kan.App.2d 958 , 207 P.3d 265 (2009), rev. granted March 31, 2010.

2010Aumand, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 91 ; Goble, 848 So. 2d at 410 ; Wills, 229 Ill. 2d at 418 ; Covington, 359 S.C. at 104-05 ; Leitinger, 302 Wis. 2d at 134-36 .

2010Aumand, 611 F.Supp.2d at 91 ; Goble, 848 So.2d at 410 ; Wills, 229 Ill.2d at 418 , 323 Ill.Dec. 26 , 892 N.E.2d 1018 ; Covington, 359 S.C. at 104-05 , 597 S.E.2d 142 ; Leitinger, 302 Wis.2d at 134-36 , 736 N.W.2d 1 .