collateral source rule in Oregon

1989Indeed, in Seibel v. Liberty Homes, Inc., 305 Or 362 , 752 P2d 291 (1988), the Supreme Court applied the rule to preclude a reduction in the defendant employer’s liability by the Social Security disability benefits received by the plaintiff after the employer had breached the employment contract.

1989Indeed, in Seibel v. Liberty Homes, Inc., 305 Or 362 , 752 P2d 291 (1988), the Supreme Court applied the rule to preclude a reduction in the defendant employer’s liability by the Social Security disability benefits received by the plaintiff after the employer had breached the employment contract.

2026Id. at 236 ; Mann, 329 Or App at 288-89 .

2026Id. at 236 ; Mann, 329 Or App at 288-89 .

2026He notes that, to the contrary, some of the documents the state presented to support its view that Cite as 350 Or App 786 (2026) 793 she incurred the charges stated, “this is not a bill.” The state argues that White’s reliance on the collateral source rule shows that a victim may recover the costs associated with a tortfeasor’s wrongdoing satisfied by a third party regardless of whether the victim must repay those third-party bene- fits.

2026He notes that, to the contrary, some of the documents the state presented to support its view that Cite as 350 Or App 786 (2026) 793 she incurred the charges stated, “this is not a bill.” The state argues that White’s reliance on the collateral source rule shows that a victim may recover the costs associated with a tortfeasor’s wrongdoing satisfied by a third party regardless of whether the victim must repay those third-party bene- fits.

2011Gragg, 217 Or App at 348 ; see also White, 347 Or at 243 (holding that “ORS 31.580(2) prohibited [the] defendant from proving to the jury the benefits that [the] plaintiff received from Medicare — the satisfaction of his obligations to his providers by both payment and ‘write-offs’ ”).

2009The court noted, as this court did in Cary, 169 Or. at 28-29 , 127 P.2d 126 , and Reinan, 270 Or. at 213 , 527 P.2d 256 , that the policy behind the collateral source rule—"that the wrongdoer should not benefit from the expenditures made by the injured party or take advantage of contract or other relations that may exist between the injured party and third persons," Wills, 229 Ill.2d at 413 , 323 Ill.Dec. 26 , 892 N.E.2d at 1030 (citation and emphasis omitted)—militated a result in which the plaintiff could claim the full value of the medical treatment: "Clearly, another relationship between a

2009The court noted, as this court did in Cary, 169 Or at 28-29 , and Reinan, 270 Or at 213 , that the policy behind the collateral source rule — “that the wrongdoer should not benefit from the expenditures made by the injured party or take advantage of contract or other relations that may exist between the injured party and third persons,” Wills , 229 I112d at 413, 892 NE2d at 1030 (citation and emphasis omitted) — militated a result in which the plaintiff could claim the full value of the medical treatment: “Clearly, another relationship between an injured plaintiff and a third party could be a

2007Specifically, defendant argues that Oregon law permits a party to inteiject evidence of insurance coverage into a trial to show the bias or interest of a witness, see Rigelman v. Gilligan, 265 Or 109 , 506 P2d 710 (1973), and that other states relying on that same principle have permitted defendants to introduce evidence of insurance to impeach a plaintiffs testimony that he paid his medical bills himself.

2007Specifically, defendant argues that Oregon law permits a party to inteiject evidence of insurance coverage into a trial to show the bias or interest of a witness, see Rigelman v. Gilligan, 265 Or 109 , 506 P2d 710 (1973), and that other states relying on that same principle have permitted defendants to introduce evidence of insurance to impeach a plaintiffs testimony that he paid his medical bills himself.

2000See also Bird v. Norpac Foods, Inc., 325 Or 55, 67, 69-70 , 934 P2d 382 (1997) (legislature may alter the collateral source rule, and ORS 18.510 provides a means for obtaining an offset for collateral benefits received); McKee Electric Co. v. Carson Oil Co., 70 Or App 1, 8 , 688 P2d 1360 (1984), affd 301 Or 339 , 723 P2d 288 (1986) (collateral source rule embodies the principle that “a negligent defendant is liable *355 for reasonably foreseeable consequential damages attributable to its negligence, and it is generally true that a defendant cannot escape that liability because the injured part

2000See also Bird v. Norpac Foods, Inc., 325 Or 55, 67, 69-70 , 934 P2d 382 (1997) (legislature may alter the collateral source rule, and ORS 18.510 provides a means for obtaining an offset for collateral benefits received); McKee Electric Co. v. Carson Oil Co., 70 Or App 1, 8 , 688 P2d 1360 (1984), affd 301 Or 339 , 723 P2d 288 (1986) (collateral source rule embodies the principle that “a negligent defendant is liable *355 for reasonably foreseeable consequential damages attributable to its negligence, and it is generally true that a defendant cannot escape that liability because the injured part

2000See also Bird v. Norpac Foods, Inc., 325 Or 55, 67, 69-70 , 934 P2d 382 (1997) (legislature may alter the collateral source rule, and ORS 18.510 provides a means for obtaining an offset for collateral benefits received); McKee Electric Co. v. Carson Oil Co., 70 Or App 1, 8 , 688 P2d 1360 (1984), affd 301 Or 339 , 723 P2d 288 (1986) (collateral source rule embodies the principle that “a negligent defendant is liable *355 for reasonably foreseeable consequential damages attributable to its negligence, and it is generally true that a defendant cannot escape that liability because the injured part

2000See also Bird v. Norpac Foods, Inc., 325 Or 55, 67, 69-70 , 934 P2d 382 (1997) (legislature may alter the collateral source rule, and ORS 18.510 provides a means for obtaining an offset for collateral benefits received); McKee Electric Co. v. Carson Oil Co., 70 Or App 1, 8 , 688 P2d 1360 (1984), affd 301 Or 339 , 723 P2d 288 (1986) (collateral source rule embodies the principle that “a negligent defendant is liable *355 for reasonably foreseeable consequential damages attributable to its negligence, and it is generally true that a defendant cannot escape that liability because the injured part

1989Stanfield v. Loccoarce, 284 Or 651, 665 , 588 P2d 1271 (1978); Shore v. Livengood, 234 Or 280 , 381 P2d 492 (1963); Restatement (Second) Torts, § 920A(2), comments b and c (1965).

1989Stanfield v. Loccoarce, 284 Or 651, 665 , 588 P2d 1271 (1978); Shore v. Livengood, 234 Or 280 , 381 P2d 492 (1963); Restatement (Second) Torts, § 920A(2), comments b and c (1965).

1989Stanfield v. Loccoarce, 284 Or 651, 665 , 588 P2d 1271 (1978); Shore v. Livengood, 234 Or 280 , 381 P2d 492 (1963); Restatement (Second) Torts, § 920A(2), comments b and c (1965).

1989Stanfield v. Loccoarce, 284 Or 651, 665 , 588 P2d 1271 (1978); Shore v. Livengood, 234 Or 280 , 381 P2d 492 (1963); Restatement (Second) Torts, § 920A(2), comments b and c (1965).

1978In the present case, the technicians who administered the tests worked under the supervision of plaintiffs psychologist, and the tests were described as "highly standardized procedures.” 13 Since the test recorde were properly admitted, it follows that there weis an adequate foundation for the testimony of plaintiffs psychologist. 14 In Dickson v. Hollinger, 262 Or 113 , 115 n. 1, 496 P2d 912 (1972), we noted the growing criticism of the collateral source rule.

1978In the present case, the technicians who administered the tests worked under the supervision of plaintiffs psychologist, and the tests were described as "highly standardized procedures.” 13 Since the test recorde were properly admitted, it follows that there weis an adequate foundation for the testimony of plaintiffs psychologist. 14 In Dickson v. Hollinger, 262 Or 113 , 115 n. 1, 496 P2d 912 (1972), we noted the growing criticism of the collateral source rule.

1972Co., 238 Or 106, 114-115 , 393 P2d 651 (1964). ① Affirmed. ① We are not unaware of the growing criticism of the collateral source rule.

1972Co., 238 Or 106, 114-115 , 393 P2d 651 (1964). ① Affirmed. ① We are not unaware of the growing criticism of the collateral source rule.