collateral source rule in Mississippi

2011In Mississippi, the collateral-source rule states that “[c]ompensation or indemnity for the loss received by plaintiff from a collateral source, wholly independent of the wrongdoer, as from insurance, cannot be set up by the [defendant] in mitigation or reduction of damages.” Coker v. Five-Two Taxi Serv., 211 Miss. 820, 826 , 52 So.2d 356, 357 (1951).

2011In Mississippi, the collateral-source rule states that “[c]ompensation or indemnity for the loss received by plaintiff from a collateral source, wholly independent of the wrongdoer, as from insurance, cannot be set up by the [defendant] in mitigation or reduction of damages.” Coker v. Five-Two Taxi Serv., 211 Miss. 820, 826 , 52 So.2d 356, 357 (1951).

2009Bank of Miss. v. Butler, 517 So.2d 507, 511-12 (Miss.1987) (citations omitted).

1999See McCollum v. Franklin, 608 So.2d 692, 695 (Miss.1992) (holding collateral source doctrine precludes defendant in automobile accident from cross examining plaintiff as to whether plaintiff has received insurances proceeds, including plaintiffs heath insurance); McCary v. Caperton, 601 So.2d 866, 868 (Miss.1992) (holding that no exception to the collateral source doctrine existed to allow evidence that plaintiff was engaged in an insurance scam attempting to collect insurance proceeds for injuries she never received); Eaton v. Gilliland, 537 So.2d 405, 408 (Miss. 1989) (holding that defendant

2009See Busick, 856 So.2d at 309 (citing, e.g., McCollum v. Franklin, 608 So.2d 692, 695 (Miss.1992); Eaton v. Gilliland, 537 So.2d 405, 408 (Miss.1989); Cent.

1999See McCollum v. Franklin, 608 So.2d 692, 695 (Miss.1992) (holding collateral source doctrine precludes defendant in automobile accident from cross examining plaintiff as to whether plaintiff has received insurances proceeds, including plaintiffs heath insurance); McCary v. Caperton, 601 So.2d 866, 868 (Miss.1992) (holding that no exception to the collateral source doctrine existed to allow evidence that plaintiff was engaged in an insurance scam attempting to collect insurance proceeds for injuries she never received); Eaton v. Gilliland, 537 So.2d 405, 408 (Miss. 1989) (holding that defendant

2009See Busick, 856 So.2d at 309 (citing, e.g., McCollum v. Franklin, 608 So.2d 692, 695 (Miss.1992); Eaton v. Gilliland, 537 So.2d 405, 408 (Miss.1989); Cent.

1999See McCollum v. Franklin, 608 So.2d 692, 695 (Miss.1992) (holding collateral source doctrine precludes defendant in automobile accident from cross examining plaintiff as to whether plaintiff has received insurances proceeds, including plaintiffs heath insurance); McCary v. Caperton, 601 So.2d 866, 868 (Miss.1992) (holding that no exception to the collateral source doctrine existed to allow evidence that plaintiff was engaged in an insurance scam attempting to collect insurance proceeds for injuries she never received); Eaton v. Gilliland, 537 So.2d 405, 408 (Miss. 1989) (holding that defendant

2009The circuit judge, however, denied Robinson Property’s request, relying upon McCary v. Caperton, 601 So.2d 866 (Miss.1992), and held that there was no impeachment exception to the collateral-source rule. ¶ 12.

2009The circuit judge, however, denied Robinson Property's request, relying upon McCary v. Caperton, 601 So.2d 866 (Miss. 1992), and held that there was no impeachment exception to the collateral-source rule. ¶ 12.

2009See Busick, 856 So.2d at 309 (citing, e.g., McCollum v. Franklin, 608 So.2d 692, 695 (Miss.1992); Eaton v. Gilliland, 537 So.2d 405, 408 (Miss.1989); Cent.

2009See Busick, 856 So.2d at 309 -10 (citing, e.g., Warren v. Ballard, 266 Ga. 408 , 467 S.E.2d 891, 893 (1996); Corsetti v. Stone Co., 396 Mass. 1 , 483 N.E.2d 793, 801 (1985); Evans v. Wilson, 279 Ark. 224 , 650 S.W.2d 569, 570 (1983); Hack v. State Farm Mut.

2003E.g., McCollum v. Franklin, 608 So.2d 692, 695 (Miss.1992) (holding collateral source doctrine precludes defendant in automobile accident from cross-examining plaintiff as to whether plaintiff has received insurances proceeds, including plaintiffs health insurance); Eaton v. Gilliland, 537 So.2d 405, 408 (Miss.1989) (holding that defendant's attempted elicitation of evidence of insurance proceeds paid with respect to the accident by a collateral source could have been prejudicial and confusing, further the jury could have been left with the impression that the plaintiff was attempting to impro

1999See McCollum v. Franklin, 608 So.2d 692, 695 (Miss.1992) (holding collateral source doctrine precludes defendant in automobile accident from cross examining plaintiff as to whether plaintiff has received insurances proceeds, including plaintiffs heath insurance); McCary v. Caperton, 601 So.2d 866, 868 (Miss.1992) (holding that no exception to the collateral source doctrine existed to allow evidence that plaintiff was engaged in an insurance scam attempting to collect insurance proceeds for injuries she never received); Eaton v. Gilliland, 537 So.2d 405, 408 (Miss. 1989) (holding that defendant

2011However, we recognize that “[t]he collateral[-]source rule applies only when the indemnity or compensation is for the same injury for which damages are sought.” Baugh, 767 So.2d at 272 (¶ 11).

2006Baugh v. Alexander, 767 So.2d 269, 272 (¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App.2000).

2009See Ethridge v. Goyer Co., 241 Miss. 333, 338 , 131 So.2d 188 (1961) (evidence of collateral-source payments not permitted even “to contradict testimony that the plaintiff gave in the trial ... ”).

2009See Ethridge v. Goyer Co., 241 Miss. 333, 338 , 131 So.2d 188 (1961) (evidence of collateral-source payments not permitted even “to contradict testimony that the plaintiff gave in the trial ... ”).

2009See Busick, 856 So.2d at 309 -10 (citing, e.g., Warren v. Ballard, 266 Ga. 408 , 467 S.E.2d 891, 893 (1996); Corsetti v. Stone Co., 396 Mass. 1 , 483 N.E.2d 793, 801 (1985); Evans v. Wilson, 279 Ark. 224 , 650 S.W.2d 569, 570 (1983); Hack v. State Farm Mut.

2009See Busick, 856 So.2d at 309 -10 (citing, e.g., Warren v. Ballard, 266 Ga. 408 , 467 S.E.2d 891, 893 (1996); Corsetti v. Stone Co., 396 Mass. 1 , 483 N.E.2d 793, 801 (1985); Evans v. Wilson, 279 Ark. 224 , 650 S.W.2d 569, 570 (1983); Hack v. State Farm Mut.

2009See Busick, 856 So.2d at 309 -10 (citing, e.g., Warren v. Ballard, 266 Ga. 408 , 467 S.E.2d 891, 893 (1996); Corsetti v. Stone Co., 396 Mass. 1 , 483 N.E.2d 793, 801 (1985); Evans v. Wilson, 279 Ark. 224 , 650 S.W.2d 569, 570 (1983); Hack v. State Farm Mut.

2009See Busick, 856 So.2d at 309 -10 (citing, e.g., Warren v. Ballard, 266 Ga. 408 , 467 S.E.2d 891, 893 (1996); Corsetti v. Stone Co., 396 Mass. 1 , 483 N.E.2d 793, 801 (1985); Evans v. Wilson, 279 Ark. 224 , 650 S.W.2d 569, 570 (1983); Hack v. State Farm Mut.

2009See Busick, 856 So.2d at 309 -10 (citing, e.g., Warren v. Ballard, 266 Ga. 408 , 467 S.E.2d 891, 893 (1996); Corsetti v. Stone Co., 396 Mass. 1 , 483 N.E.2d 793, 801 (1985); Evans v. Wilson, 279 Ark. 224 , 650 S.W.2d 569, 570 (1983); Hack v. State Farm Mut.

2009See Busick, 856 So.2d at 309 -10 (citing, e.g., Warren v. Ballard, 266 Ga. 408 , 467 S.E.2d 891, 893 (1996); Corsetti v. Stone Co., 396 Mass. 1 , 483 N.E.2d 793, 801 (1985); Evans v. Wilson, 279 Ark. 224 , 650 S.W.2d 569, 570 (1983); Hack v. State Farm Mut.

2003Co. v. Courtney, 393 So.2d 1328, 1332-33 (Miss.1981) (holding that under the collateral source rule, a tortfeasor is not entitled to have the damages for which he is liable reduced by proving that an injured party has received compensation from a collateral source wholly independent of the tortfeasor).

2002Co. v. Courtney, 393 So.2d 1328, 1332-33 (Miss. 1981) (holding that under the collateral source rule, a tortfeasor is not entitled to have the damages for which he is liable reduced by proving that an injured party has received compensation from a collateral source wholly independent of the tortfeasor).

2001See Bennett v. Haley, 132 Ga.App. 512 , 208 S.E.2d 302 (1974); Cates v. Wilson, 321 N.C. 1 , 361 S.E.2d 734, 737 (1987); Ellsworth v. Schelbrock, 235 Wis.2d 678 , 611 N.W.2d 764, 767 (2000).

2001See Bennett v. Haley, 132 Ga.App. 512 , 208 S.E.2d 302 (1974); Cates v. Wilson, 321 N.C. 1 , 361 S.E.2d 734, 737 (1987); Ellsworth v. Schelbrock, 235 Wis.2d 678 , 611 N.W.2d 764, 767 (2000).

2001See Bennett v. Haley, 132 Ga.App. 512 , 208 S.E.2d 302 (1974); Cates v. Wilson, 321 N.C. 1 , 361 S.E.2d 734, 737 (1987); Ellsworth v. Schelbrock, 235 Wis.2d 678 , 611 N.W.2d 764, 767 (2000).

2001See Bennett v. Haley, 132 Ga.App. 512 , 208 S.E.2d 302 (1974); Cates v. Wilson, 321 N.C. 1 , 361 S.E.2d 734, 737 (1987); Ellsworth v. Schelbrock, 235 Wis.2d 678 , 611 N.W.2d 764, 767 (2000).

2001See Bennett v. Haley, 132 Ga.App. 512 , 208 S.E.2d 302 (1974); Cates v. Wilson, 321 N.C. 1 , 361 S.E.2d 734, 737 (1987); Ellsworth v. Schelbrock, 235 Wis.2d 678 , 611 N.W.2d 764, 767 (2000).

2001See Bennett v. Haley, 132 Ga.App. 512 , 208 S.E.2d 302 (1974); Cates v. Wilson, 321 N.C. 1 , 361 S.E.2d 734, 737 (1987); Ellsworth v. Schelbrock, 235 Wis.2d 678 , 611 N.W.2d 764, 767 (2000).

2011In other words, “a tortfeasor cannot use the moneys of others (insurance companies, gratuitous gifts, etc.) to reduce the cost of its own wrongdoing.” Brandon HMA, Inc., 809 So.2d at 618 . ¶ 24.

2009In other words, “a tortfeasor cannot use the moneys of others (insurance 10 companies, gratuitous gifts, etc.) to reduce the cost of its own wrongdoing.” Brandon HMA, Inc., 809 So. 2d at 618 . ¶24.

2016To the extent that federal law is informative on the matter, Mississippi’s interpretation of the collateral-source rule has been recognized and applied by the Fifth Circuit, Johnson v. Cenac Towing Inc., 544 F.3d 296, 304-05 (5th Cir. 2008), and acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court, The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302, 310-11 (1876). ¶11.

2016To the extent that federal law is informative on the matter, Mississippi's interpretation of the collateral-source rule has been recognized and applied by the Fifth Circuit, Johnson v. Cenac Towing Inc. , 544 F.3d 296 , 304-05 (5th Cir. 2008), and acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court, The Atlas , 93 U.S. 302 , 310-11, 23 L.Ed. 863 (1876). ¶ 11.

2016To the extent that federal law is informative on the matter, Mississippi’s interpretation of the collateral-source rule has been recognized and applied by the Fifth Circuit, Johnson v. Cenac Towing Inc., 544 F.3d 296, 304-05 (5th Cir. 2008), and acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court, The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302, 310-11 (1876). ¶11.

2016To the extent that federal law is informative on the matter, Mississippi's interpretation of the collateral-source rule has been recognized and applied by the Fifth Circuit, Johnson v. Cenac Towing Inc. , 544 F.3d 296 , 304-05 (5th Cir. 2008), and acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court, The Atlas , 93 U.S. 302 , 310-11, 23 L.Ed. 863 (1876). ¶ 11.

2023Va. 1993) (holding that “the collateral source rule operates to preclude the offsetting of uninsured or underinsured benefits since the benefits are the result of a contractual arrangement which is independent of the tortfeasor”); Est. of Rattenni v. Grainger, 379 S.E.2d 890, 890 (S.C. 1989) (finding “no persuasive reason to 3 Accord McDermott Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 219 (1994) (recognizing that “making tortfeasors pay for the damage they cause can be more important than preventing overcompensation”). 8 distinguish underinsurance proceeds from other insurance proceeds that are subject t

2023Va. 1993) (holding that “the collateral source rule operates to preclude the offsetting of uninsured or underinsured benefits since the benefits are the result of a contractual arrangement which is independent of the tortfeasor”); Est. of Rattenni v. Grainger, 379 S.E.2d 890, 890 (S.C. 1989) (finding “no persuasive reason to 3 Accord McDermott Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 219 (1994) (recognizing that “making tortfeasors pay for the damage they cause can be more important than preventing overcompensation”). 8 distinguish underinsurance proceeds from other insurance proceeds that are subject t

2023In Hairston v. Harward, 821 S.E.2d 384, 385 (N.C. 2018), the Supreme Court of North Carolina considered whether a “trial court erred by crediting a payment made to plaintiff . . . under his own [UM] coverage against the amount of the judgment that plaintiff obtained against defendant . . . arising from a motor vehicle collision.” In initially appealing the decision, the opposing parties submitted the same arguments we consider here: the plaintiff asserted that the trial court’s ruling “violated the collateral source rule”; the defendant-tortfeasor argued that under common law 6 principles, a p

2023In Hairston v. Harward, 821 S.E.2d 384, 385 (N.C. 2018), the Supreme Court of North Carolina considered whether a “trial court erred by crediting a payment made to plaintiff . . . under his own [UM] coverage against the amount of the judgment that plaintiff obtained against defendant . . . arising from a motor vehicle collision.” In initially appealing the decision, the opposing parties submitted the same arguments we consider here: the plaintiff asserted that the trial court’s ruling “violated the collateral source rule”; the defendant-tortfeasor argued that under common law 6 principles, a p

2011See Wright v. Royal Carpet Servs., 29 So.3d 109, 115 (¶ 14) (Miss.Ct.App.2010) (When evidence of compensation from an independent source is introduced for a purpose other than to mitigate damages, the collateral-source rule is not violated.).

2011See Wright v. Royal Carpet Servs., 29 So.3d 109, 115 (¶ 14) (Miss.Ct.App.2010) (When evidence of compensation from an independent source is introduced for a purpose other than to mitigate damages, the collateral-source rule is not violated.).

2010Geske, 945 So.2d at 434 (¶ 18) (citing Burr v. Miss.

2008However, more recent cases contain language seemingly suggesting that evidence introduced for purposes other than to reduce the monetary award for the plaintiff, such as impeachment, is properly admitted.” 11 substantial weight of the evidence so that justice requires that a new trial be granted.” Id. at 727 (citing Jesco, Inc. v. Whitehead, 451 So. 2d 706, 714 (Miss. 1984) (Robertson, J., specially concurring)). ¶20.

2002In his brief, Dr. Eckman relies upon Martindale v. Wilbanks, 744 So.2d 252, 254 (Miss. 1999), for his proposition that “prior inconsistent statements made in connection with insurance claims are properly admissible for impeachment matters.” In Martindale, a mother filed suit against Wilbanks for injuries sustained by her minor child and herself in a motor vehicle accident.