collateral source rule (South Dakota) · Go Syfert
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collateral source rule in South Dakota

8 South Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1975–2009 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by South Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (21)

CaseFollowedCited
Papke v. Harbertgreen
sd · 2007 · cited in 2 South Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2008–2009
2 sentences

2008While reiterating our settled law "that plaintiffs are entitled to recover the reasonable value of their medical services, and what constitutes a reasonable value for those services is a jury question[,]" we held that the collateral source rule applies to Medicare "write offs" such that the jury's determination of the reasonable value of medical services shall begin with the amount of medical service billed, before any Medicare "write off." Id. ¶ 78, 738 N.W.2d at 535 .

2008While reiterating our settled law “that plaintiffs are entitled to recover the reasonable value of their medical services, and what constitutes a reasonable value for those services is a jury question[,]” we held that the collateral source rule applies to Medicare “write offs” such that the jury’s determination of the reasonable value of medical services shall begin with the amount of medical service billed, before any Medicare “write off.” Id. ¶ 78, 738 N.W.2d at 535 .

12
Moore v. Kluthe & Lane Ins. Agency, Inc.green
sd · 1975 · cited in 2 South Dakota opinions naming this issue, 1997–2007
2 sentences

2007Moore, 89 S.D. at 434 , 234 N.W.2d at 269 . [¶80.] Although the collateral source rule has a common law origin, and we have consistently applied the rule in a variety of tort cases, our Legislature has intervened to partially limit its scope with respect to medical malpractice “special” damages. 23 See SDCL 21-3-12.

2007Moore, 89 S.D. at 434 , 234 N.W.2d at 269 . [¶80.] Although the collateral source rule has a common law origin, and we have consistently applied the rule in a variety of tort cases, our Legislature has intervened to partially limit its scope with respect to medical malpractice “special” damages. 23 See SDCL 21-3-12.

12
Jurgensen v. Smithgreen
sd · 2000 · cited in 1 South Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
2 sentences

2009In a special concurrence, then Chief Justice Miller explained: "Because [the plaintiff's] testimony was not shown to be false or misleading, no exception to the collateral source rule was warranted or worthy of consideration." Id. ¶ 36, 611 NW2d at 444 (Miller, C.J., concurring specially).

2009In a special concurrence, then Chief Justice Miller explained: “Because [the plaintiffs] testimony was not shown to be false or misleading, no exception to the collateral source rule was warranted or worthy of consideration.” Id. ¶ 36, 611 N.W.2d at 444 (Miller, C.J., concurring specially).

11
Rose v. via Christi Health System, Inc.green
kan · 2003 · cited in 1 South Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007Bynum v. Magno, 106 Hawai'i 81 , 101 P.3d 1149, 1155 (2004) (Medicare/Medicaid write offs are akin to gratuitous services and therefore recoverable); Arthur v. Catour, 345 Ill.App.3d 804 , 281 Ill.Dec. 243 , 803 N.E.2d 647, 650 (2004) (limiting recovery to amount paid “confers a significant benefit” to the defendant, “contrary to the collateral source” rule); Rose v. Via Christi Health System, Inc., 276 Kan. 539 , 78 P.3d 798, 806 (2003) (“[b]ecause health care providers voluntarily contract with Medicare ... the benefit of the write-offs should be attributed to the Medicare participant rather

2007This is because “[t]he law does not differentiate between the nature of the benefits, so long as they did not come from the defendant or a person acting for him.” 19 Id. [¶ 72.] In accordance with the intent of the collateral source rule and section 920A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, multiple courts have further held that write offs are akin to gratuitous payments or are a benefit contracted for by the plaintiff through insurance coverage and are therefore recoverable. 20 The Kansas Supreme Court, in particular, compared Medicare to private insurance because “Medicare benefits are purc

11
Bozeman v. Stategreen
la · 2004 · cited in 1 South Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007Bozeman v. State, 879 So.2d 692, 699 (La.2004) (recognizing that Medicare and private insurance write offs are recoverable, but not Medicaid write offs); Esposito v. O’Hair, 886 A.2d 1197, 1204 (R.I.2005) (statute abrogating collateral source rule in medical malpractice cases does not apply to Medicaid). [¶ 68.] Applied as a rule of evidence, the collateral source rule prohibits defendants from offering proof of collateral source benefits received by the plaintiff, independent of the tortfeasor, which compensate the plaintiff, in whole or in part, for his or her injury.

2007Calva-Cerqueira v. United States, 281 F.Supp.2d 279, 295-96 (D.D.C.2003) (“collateral source rule permits the plaintiff to recover all of his medical costs, regardless of any written-off amounts”); Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Anderson, 334 Ark. 561 , 976 S.W.2d 382, 383 (1998) (“gratuitous or discounted medical services are a collateral source”); Baptist Healthcare Systems, Inc. v. Miller, 177 S.W.3d 676, 684 (Ky.2005) (“Medicare benefits are governed by the collateral source rule”); Bozeman, 879 So.2d at 699 ; Esposito, 886 A.2d at 1199-203 ; Covington v. George, 359 S.C. 100 , 597 S.E.2d

11
Lindholm v. Hassangreen
sdd · 2005 · cited in 1 South Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
1 sentence

2007Bynum v. Magno, 106 Hawai'i 81 , 101 P.3d 1149, 1155 (2004) (Medicare/Medicaid write offs are akin to gratuitous services and therefore recoverable); Arthur v. Catour, 345 Ill.App.3d 804 , 281 Ill.Dec. 243 , 803 N.E.2d 647, 650 (2004) (limiting recovery to amount paid “confers a significant benefit” to the defendant, “contrary to the collateral source” rule); Rose v. Via Christi Health System, Inc., 276 Kan. 539 , 78 P.3d 798, 806 (2003) (“[b]ecause health care providers voluntarily contract with Medicare ... the benefit of the write-offs should be attributed to the Medicare participant rather

11
Brown v. Van Noygreen
moctapp · 1994 · cited in 1 South Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
1 sentence

2007This is because “[t]he law does not differentiate between the nature of the benefits, so long as they did not come from the defendant or a person acting for him.” 19 Id. [¶ 72.] In accordance with the intent of the collateral source rule and section 920A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, multiple courts have further held that write offs are akin to gratuitous payments or are a benefit contracted for by the plaintiff through insurance coverage and are therefore recoverable. 20 The Kansas Supreme Court, in particular, compared Medicare to private insurance because “Medicare benefits are purc

11
Esposito v. O'HAIRgreen
ri · 2005 · cited in 1 South Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007Bozeman v. State, 879 So.2d 692, 699 (La.2004) (recognizing that Medicare and private insurance write offs are recoverable, but not Medicaid write offs); Esposito v. O’Hair, 886 A.2d 1197, 1204 (R.I.2005) (statute abrogating collateral source rule in medical malpractice cases does not apply to Medicaid). [¶ 68.] Applied as a rule of evidence, the collateral source rule prohibits defendants from offering proof of collateral source benefits received by the plaintiff, independent of the tortfeasor, which compensate the plaintiff, in whole or in part, for his or her injury.

2007Calva-Cerqueira v. United States, 281 F.Supp.2d 279, 295-96 (D.D.C.2003) (“collateral source rule permits the plaintiff to recover all of his medical costs, regardless of any written-off amounts”); Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Anderson, 334 Ark. 561 , 976 S.W.2d 382, 383 (1998) (“gratuitous or discounted medical services are a collateral source”); Baptist Healthcare Systems, Inc. v. Miller, 177 S.W.3d 676, 684 (Ky.2005) (“Medicare benefits are governed by the collateral source rule”); Bozeman, 879 So.2d at 699 ; Esposito, 886 A.2d at 1199-203 ; Covington v. George, 359 S.C. 100 , 597 S.E.2d

11
Covington v. Georgegreen
sc · 2004 · cited in 1 South Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007Calva-Cerqueira v. United States, 281 F.Supp.2d 279, 295-96 (D.D.C.2003) (“collateral source rule permits the plaintiff to recover all of his medical costs, regardless of any written-off amounts”); Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Anderson, 334 Ark. 561 , 976 S.W.2d 382, 383 (1998) (“gratuitous or discounted medical services are a collateral source”); Baptist Healthcare Systems, Inc. v. Miller, 177 S.W.3d 676, 684 (Ky.2005) (“Medicare benefits are governed by the collateral source rule”); Bozeman, 879 So.2d at 699 ; Esposito, 886 A.2d at 1199-203 ; Covington v. George, 359 S.C. 100 , 597 S.E.2d

2007Calva-Cerqueira v. United States, 281 F.Supp.2d 279, 295-96 (D.D.C.2003) (“collateral source rule permits the plaintiff to recover all of his medical costs, regardless of any written-off amounts”); Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Anderson, 334 Ark. 561 , 976 S.W.2d 382, 383 (1998) (“gratuitous or discounted medical services are a collateral source”); Baptist Healthcare Systems, Inc. v. Miller, 177 S.W.3d 676, 684 (Ky.2005) (“Medicare benefits are governed by the collateral source rule”); Bozeman, 879 So.2d at 699 ; Esposito, 886 A.2d at 1199-203 ; Covington v. George, 359 S.C. 100 , 597 S.E.2d

11
Arthur v. Catourgreen
illappct · 2004 · cited in 1 South Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007Bynum v. Magno, 106 Hawai'i 81 , 101 P.3d 1149, 1155 (2004) (Medicare/Medicaid write offs are akin to gratuitous services and therefore recoverable); Arthur v. Catour, 345 Ill.App.3d 804 , 281 Ill.Dec. 243 , 803 N.E.2d 647, 650 (2004) (limiting recovery to amount paid “confers a significant benefit” to the defendant, “contrary to the collateral source” rule); Rose v. Via Christi Health System, Inc., 276 Kan. 539 , 78 P.3d 798, 806 (2003) (“[b]ecause health care providers voluntarily contract with Medicare ... the benefit of the write-offs should be attributed to the Medicare participant rather

2007Bynum v. Magno, 106 Hawai'i 81 , 101 P.3d 1149, 1155 (2004) (Medicare/Medicaid write offs are akin to gratuitous services and therefore recoverable); Arthur v. Catour, 345 Ill.App.3d 804 , 281 Ill.Dec. 243 , 803 N.E.2d 647, 650 (2004) (limiting recovery to amount paid “confers a significant benefit” to the defendant, “contrary to the collateral source” rule); Rose v. Via Christi Health System, Inc., 276 Kan. 539 , 78 P.3d 798, 806 (2003) (“[b]ecause health care providers voluntarily contract with Medicare ... the benefit of the write-offs should be attributed to the Medicare participant rather

11
Baptist Healthcare Systems, Inc. v. Millergreen
ky · 2005 · cited in 1 South Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007Calva-Cerqueira v. United States, 281 F.Supp.2d 279, 295-96 (D.D.C.2003) (“collateral source rule permits the plaintiff to recover all of his medical costs, regardless of any written-off amounts”); Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Anderson, 334 Ark. 561 , 976 S.W.2d 382, 383 (1998) (“gratuitous or discounted medical services are a collateral source”); Baptist Healthcare Systems, Inc. v. Miller, 177 S.W.3d 676, 684 (Ky.2005) (“Medicare benefits are governed by the collateral source rule”); Bozeman, 879 So.2d at 699 ; Esposito, 886 A.2d at 1199-203 ; Covington v. George, 359 S.C. 100 , 597 S.E.2d

2007Calva-Cerqueira v. United States, 281 F.Supp.2d 279, 295-96 (D.D.C.2003) (“collateral source rule permits the plaintiff to recover all of his medical costs, regardless of any written-off amounts”); Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Anderson, 334 Ark. 561 , 976 S.W.2d 382, 383 (1998) (“gratuitous or discounted medical services are a collateral source”); Baptist Healthcare Systems, Inc. v. Miller, 177 S.W.3d 676, 684 (Ky.2005) (“Medicare benefits are governed by the collateral source rule”); Bozeman, 879 So.2d at 699 ; Esposito, 886 A.2d at 1199-203 ; Covington v. George, 359 S.C. 100 , 597 S.E.2d

11
Smithers v. C & G Custom Module Haulinggreen
vaed · 2000 · cited in 1 South Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
1 sentence

2007Further, the court held that the collateral source rule was not implicated because no collateral source paid the “illusory ‘charge.’ ” Id.; see also Smithers v. C & G Custom Module Hauling, 172 F.Supp.2d 765, 777-78 ; Dyet, 81 P.3d at 1239-40 ; Kastick, 292 A.D.2d at 799 , 738 N.Y.S.2d 631 . [¶ 78.] In South Dakota, it is well settled that plaintiffs are entitled to recover the reasonable value of their medical services, and what constitutes a reasonable value for those services is a jury question.

11
Robinson v. Batesgreen
ohioctapp · 2005 · cited in 1 South Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007This is because “[t]he law does not differentiate between the nature of the benefits, so long as they did not come from the defendant or a person acting for him.” 19 Id. [¶ 72.] In accordance with the intent of the collateral source rule and section 920A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, multiple courts have further held that write offs are akin to gratuitous payments or are a benefit contracted for by the plaintiff through insurance coverage and are therefore recoverable. 20 The Kansas Supreme Court, in particular, compared Medicare to private insurance because “Medicare benefits are purc

2007This is because “[t]he law does not differentiate between the nature of the benefits, so long as they did not come from the defendant or a person acting for him.” 19 Id. [¶ 72.] In accordance with the intent of the collateral source rule and section 920A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, multiple courts have further held that write offs are akin to gratuitous payments or are a benefit contracted for by the plaintiff through insurance coverage and are therefore recoverable. 20 The Kansas Supreme Court, in particular, compared Medicare to private insurance because “Medicare benefits are purc

11
Brandon HMA, Inc. v. Bradshawgreen
miss · 2001 · cited in 1 South Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
1 sentence

2007Bynum v. Magno, 106 Hawai'i 81 , 101 P.3d 1149, 1155 (2004) (Medicare/Medicaid write offs are akin to gratuitous services and therefore recoverable); Arthur v. Catour, 345 Ill.App.3d 804 , 281 Ill.Dec. 243 , 803 N.E.2d 647, 650 (2004) (limiting recovery to amount paid “confers a significant benefit” to the defendant, “contrary to the collateral source” rule); Rose v. Via Christi Health System, Inc., 276 Kan. 539 , 78 P.3d 798, 806 (2003) (“[b]ecause health care providers voluntarily contract with Medicare ... the benefit of the write-offs should be attributed to the Medicare participant rather

11
Peterson, Ex Rel. Peterson v. Burnsgreen
sd · 2001 · cited in 1 South Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007Second, contrary to the collateral source rule, in a medical malpractice action, where a plaintiff seeks an award of special damages, the Legislature has made admissible evidence that “is relevant to prove that any such special damages were paid for or are payable by, in whole or in part, insurance which is not subject to subrogation and which was not purchased privately, in whole or part ... or were paid for, or are payable by, in whole or in part, state or federal governmental programs not subject to subrogation.” SDCL 21-3-12. [¶ 65.] In Knowles v. United States, we observed that by treatin

2007Second, contrary to the collateral source rule, in a medical malpractice action, where a plaintiff seeks an award of special damages, the Legislature has made admissible evidence that “is relevant to prove that any such special damages were paid for or are payable by, in whole or in part, insurance which is not subject to subrogation and which was not purchased privately, in whole or part ... or were paid for, or are payable by, in whole or in part, state or federal governmental programs not subject to subrogation.” SDCL 21-3-12. [¶ 65.] In Knowles v. United States, we observed that by treatin

11
Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Andersongreen
ark · 1998 · cited in 1 South Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007Calva-Cerqueira v. United States, 281 F.Supp.2d 279, 295-96 (D.D.C.2003) (“collateral source rule permits the plaintiff to recover all of his medical costs, regardless of any written-off amounts”); Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Anderson, 334 Ark. 561 , 976 S.W.2d 382, 383 (1998) (“gratuitous or discounted medical services are a collateral source”); Baptist Healthcare Systems, Inc. v. Miller, 177 S.W.3d 676, 684 (Ky.2005) (“Medicare benefits are governed by the collateral source rule”); Bozeman, 879 So.2d at 699 ; Esposito, 886 A.2d at 1199-203 ; Covington v. George, 359 S.C. 100 , 597 S.E.2d

2007Calva-Cerqueira v. United States, 281 F.Supp.2d 279, 295-96 (D.D.C.2003) (“collateral source rule permits the plaintiff to recover all of his medical costs, regardless of any written-off amounts”); Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Anderson, 334 Ark. 561 , 976 S.W.2d 382, 383 (1998) (“gratuitous or discounted medical services are a collateral source”); Baptist Healthcare Systems, Inc. v. Miller, 177 S.W.3d 676, 684 (Ky.2005) (“Medicare benefits are governed by the collateral source rule”); Bozeman, 879 So.2d at 699 ; Esposito, 886 A.2d at 1199-203 ; Covington v. George, 359 S.C. 100 , 597 S.E.2d

11
Acuar v. Letourneaugreen
va · 2000 · cited in 1 South Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007Bynum v. Magno, 106 Hawai'i 81 , 101 P.3d 1149, 1155 (2004) (Medicare/Medicaid write offs are akin to gratuitous services and therefore recoverable); Arthur v. Catour, 345 Ill.App.3d 804 , 281 Ill.Dec. 243 , 803 N.E.2d 647, 650 (2004) (limiting recovery to amount paid “confers a significant benefit” to the defendant, “contrary to the collateral source” rule); Rose v. Via Christi Health System, Inc., 276 Kan. 539 , 78 P.3d 798, 806 (2003) (“[b]ecause health care providers voluntarily contract with Medicare ... the benefit of the write-offs should be attributed to the Medicare participant rather

2007Bynum v. Magno, 106 Hawai'i 81 , 101 P.3d 1149, 1155 (2004) (Medicare/Medicaid write offs are akin to gratuitous services and therefore recoverable); Arthur v. Catour, 345 Ill.App.3d 804 , 281 Ill.Dec. 243 , 803 N.E.2d 647, 650 (2004) (limiting recovery to amount paid “confers a significant benefit” to the defendant, “contrary to the collateral source” rule); Rose v. Via Christi Health System, Inc., 276 Kan. 539 , 78 P.3d 798, 806 (2003) (“[b]ecause health care providers voluntarily contract with Medicare ... the benefit of the write-offs should be attributed to the Medicare participant rather

11
Calva-Cerqueira v. United Statesgreen
dcd · 2003 · cited in 1 South Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007Calva-Cerqueira v. United States, 281 F.Supp.2d 279, 295-96 (D.D.C.2003) (“collateral source rule permits the plaintiff to recover all of his medical costs, regardless of any written-off amounts”); Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Anderson, 334 Ark. 561 , 976 S.W.2d 382, 383 (1998) (“gratuitous or discounted medical services are a collateral source”); Baptist Healthcare Systems, Inc. v. Miller, 177 S.W.3d 676, 684 (Ky.2005) (“Medicare benefits are governed by the collateral source rule”); Bozeman, 879 So.2d at 699 ; Esposito, 886 A.2d at 1199-203 ; Covington v. George, 359 S.C. 100 , 597 S.E.2d

2007Calva-Cerqueira v. United States, 281 F.Supp.2d 279, 295-96 (D.D.C.2003) (“collateral source rule permits the plaintiff to recover all of his medical costs, regardless of any written-off amounts”); Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Anderson, 334 Ark. 561 , 976 S.W.2d 382, 383 (1998) (“gratuitous or discounted medical services are a collateral source”); Baptist Healthcare Systems, Inc. v. Miller, 177 S.W.3d 676, 684 (Ky.2005) (“Medicare benefits are governed by the collateral source rule”); Bozeman, 879 So.2d at 699 ; Esposito, 886 A.2d at 1199-203 ; Covington v. George, 359 S.C. 100 , 597 S.E.2d

11
Bynum v. Magnogreen
haw · 2004 · cited in 1 South Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007
2 sentences

2007Bynum v. Magno, 106 Hawai'i 81 , 101 P.3d 1149, 1155 (2004) (Medicare/Medicaid write offs are akin to gratuitous services and therefore recoverable); Arthur v. Catour, 345 Ill.App.3d 804 , 281 Ill.Dec. 243 , 803 N.E.2d 647, 650 (2004) (limiting recovery to amount paid “confers a significant benefit” to the defendant, “contrary to the collateral source” rule); Rose v. Via Christi Health System, Inc., 276 Kan. 539 , 78 P.3d 798, 806 (2003) (“[b]ecause health care providers voluntarily contract with Medicare ... the benefit of the write-offs should be attributed to the Medicare participant rather

2007This is because “[t]he law does not differentiate between the nature of the benefits, so long as they did not come from the defendant or a person acting for him.” 19 Id. [¶ 72.] In accordance with the intent of the collateral source rule and section 920A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, multiple courts have further held that write offs are akin to gratuitous payments or are a benefit contracted for by the plaintiff through insurance coverage and are therefore recoverable. 20 The Kansas Supreme Court, in particular, compared Medicare to private insurance because “Medicare benefits are purc

11
Younts v. Baldor Elec. Co. Inc.green
ark · 1992 · cited in 1 South Dakota opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
2 sentences

2000It has been often stated that “[w]hen a party testifies about his or her financial condition in a false or misleading manner, ... he or she opens the door for the introduction of evidence which might otherwise be inadmissible under the collateral source rule.” See id. (citing Peters v. Pierce, 308 Ark. 60 , 823 S.W.2d 820 (1992); York v. Young, 271 Ark. 266 , 608 S.W.2d 20 (1980)). [¶38.] In Younts , Younts brought a products liability action against Baldor Electric Company because a defective motor in an exercise machine caused a fire that substantially damaged Younts tanning salon and exerci

2000It has been often stated that “[w]hen a party testifies about his or her financial condition in a false or misleading manner, ... he or she opens the door for the introduction of evidence which might otherwise be inadmissible under the collateral source rule.” See id. (citing Peters v. Pierce, 308 Ark. 60 , 823 S.W.2d 820 (1992); York v. Young, 271 Ark. 266 , 608 S.W.2d 20 (1980)). [¶38.] In Younts , Younts brought a products liability action against Baldor Electric Company because a defective motor in an exercise machine caused a fire that substantially damaged Younts tanning salon and exerci

11
Evans ex rel. Evans v. Pennsylvania Railroadgreen
ded · 1957 · cited in 1 South Dakota opinions naming this issue, 1976–1976
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (12)

CaseCitedYears
Degen v. Bayman green
sd · 1976
2 sentences

2007Applying the collateral source rule, the Court held “that where the victim of a [tortfeasor] receives gratuitous medical services from a source wholly independent of the [tortfeasor] the value of gratuitous medical services may not be deducted from the verdict for overall medical care received.” Id. at 411 , 241 N.W.2d at 709 . [¶ 62.] We used the collateral source rule based on our holding in Moore v. Kluthe & Lane Ins.

2007Applying the collateral source rule, the Court held “that where the victim of a [tortfeasor] receives gratuitous medical services from a source wholly independent of the [tortfeasor] the value of gratuitous medical services may not be deducted from the verdict for overall medical care received.” Id. at 411 , 241 N.W.2d at 709 . [¶ 62.] We used the collateral source rule based on our holding in Moore v. Kluthe & Lane Ins.

21997–2007
Swift & Company v. Gutierez green
idaho · 1954
2 sentences

2007In Moore , we adopted the collateral source rule enunciated by the Idaho Supreme Court: “Total or partial compensation received by an injured party from a collateral source, wholly independent of the wrongdoer, does not operate to reduce the damages recoverable from the wrongdoer.” Id. (citation omitted).

1975We recognize the succinct statement of the collateral source rule by the Supreme Court of Idaho, Swift & Company v. Gutierez, 1954 , 76 Idaho 82 , 277 P.2d 559 , as the correct statement of the rule.

21975–2007
Matter of Certif. of Questions of Law green
sd · 1996
2 sentences

2007Second, contrary to the collateral source rule, in a medical malpractice action, where a plaintiff seeks an award of special damages, the Legislature has made admissible evidence that “is relevant to prove that any such special damages were paid for or are payable by, in whole or in part, insurance which is not subject to subrogation and which was not purchased privately, in whole or part ... or were paid for, or are payable by, in whole or in part, state or federal governmental programs not subject to subrogation.” SDCL 21-3-12. [¶ 65.] In Knowles v. United States, we observed that by treatin

2007Second, contrary to the collateral source rule, in a medical malpractice action, where a plaintiff seeks an award of special damages, the Legislature has made admissible evidence that “is relevant to prove that any such special damages were paid for or are payable by, in whole or in part, insurance which is not subject to subrogation and which was not purchased privately, in whole or part ... or were paid for, or are payable by, in whole or in part, state or federal governmental programs not subject to subrogation.” SDCL 21-3-12. [¶ 65.] In Knowles v. United States, we observed that by treatin

12007–2007
Dyet v. McKinley green
idaho · 2003
1 sentence

2007Further, the court held that the collateral source rule was not implicated because no collateral source paid the “illusory ‘charge.’ ” Id.; see also Smithers v. C & G Custom Module Hauling, 172 F.Supp.2d 765, 777-78 ; Dyet, 81 P.3d at 1239-40 ; Kastick, 292 A.D.2d at 799 , 738 N.Y.S.2d 631 . [¶ 78.] In South Dakota, it is well settled that plaintiffs are entitled to recover the reasonable value of their medical services, and what constitutes a reasonable value for those services is a jury question.

12007–2007
Iannello v. Allstate Insurance neutral
nyappdiv · 2002
1 sentence

2007Further, the court held that the collateral source rule was not implicated because no collateral source paid the “illusory ‘charge.’ ” Id.; see also Smithers v. C & G Custom Module Hauling, 172 F.Supp.2d 765, 777-78 ; Dyet, 81 P.3d at 1239-40 ; Kastick, 292 A.D.2d at 799 , 738 N.Y.S.2d 631 . [¶ 78.] In South Dakota, it is well settled that plaintiffs are entitled to recover the reasonable value of their medical services, and what constitutes a reasonable value for those services is a jury question.

12007–2007
Kastick v. U-Haul Co. green
nyappdiv · 2002
1 sentence

2007Further, the court held that the collateral source rule was not implicated because no collateral source paid the “illusory ‘charge.’ ” Id.; see also Smithers v. C & G Custom Module Hauling, 172 F.Supp.2d 765, 777-78 ; Dyet, 81 P.3d at 1239-40 ; Kastick, 292 A.D.2d at 799 , 738 N.Y.S.2d 631 . [¶ 78.] In South Dakota, it is well settled that plaintiffs are entitled to recover the reasonable value of their medical services, and what constitutes a reasonable value for those services is a jury question.

12007–2007
Ronson v. Talesnick green
njd · 1999
2 sentences

2006Along those lines, the court stated that “[a] blanket prohibition against the recovery of IRS interest under the circumstances presented is not reconcilable with one of the underlying policies of the collateral source rule that a tortfeasor should not benefit from the ingenuity of a harmed plaintiff.” Id. at 355 .

2006Along those lines, the court stated that “[a] blanket prohibition against the recovery of IRS interest under the circumstances presented is not reconcilable with one of the underlying policies of the collateral source rule that a tortfeasor should not benefit from the ingenuity of a harmed plaintiff.” Id. at 355 .

12006–2006
Theodore P. Moses v. Union Pacific Railroad, Appellee/appellant v. Mid-South Milling Company green
ca8 · 1995
2 sentences

2000When counsel argues that his client has been fighting for three years to make ends meet, but is not looking for sympathy, what else would they be looking for when “fighting for three years to make ends meet” is not an element of the jury instruction on damages. [¶ 43.] The majority states that the reasoning behind the collateral source rule is to eliminate “the danger that the jury may be inclined to ... reduce [the plaintiffs] damage award, when it learns that the plaintiffs loss is entirely or partially covered.” See Moses, 64 F.3d at 416 .

2000When counsel argues that his client has been fighting for three years to make ends meet, but is not looking for sympathy, what else would they be looking for when "fighting for three years to make ends meet" is not an element of the jury instruction on damages. [¶ 43.] The majority states that the reasoning behind the collateral source rule is to eliminate "the danger that the jury may be inclined to ... reduce [the plaintiff's] damage award, when it learns that the plaintiff's loss is entirely or partially covered." See Moses, 64 F.3d at 416 .

12000–2000
Peters v. Pierce green
ark · 1992
12000–2000
Atkins v. Stratmeyer green
sd · 1999
2 sentences

2000In fact, we said such information is admissible where it is “vital to establish the amount of damages.” Id., ¶ 14, 600 N.W.2d at 897 .

2000In fact, we said such information is admissible where it is "vital to establish the amount of damages." Id., ¶ 14, 600 N.W.2d at 897 .

12000–2000
York v. Young green
ark · 1980
2 sentences

2000It has been often stated that “[w]hen a party testifies about his or her financial condition in a false or misleading manner, ... he or she opens the door for the introduction of evidence which might otherwise be inadmissible under the collateral source rule.” See id. (citing Peters v. Pierce, 308 Ark. 60 , 823 S.W.2d 820 (1992); York v. Young, 271 Ark. 266 , 608 S.W.2d 20 (1980)). [¶38.] In Younts , Younts brought a products liability action against Baldor Electric Company because a defective motor in an exercise machine caused a fire that substantially damaged Younts tanning salon and exerci

2000It has been often stated that “[w]hen a party testifies about his or her financial condition in a false or misleading manner, ... he or she opens the door for the introduction of evidence which might otherwise be inadmissible under the collateral source rule.” See id. (citing Peters v. Pierce, 308 Ark. 60 , 823 S.W.2d 820 (1992); York v. Young, 271 Ark. 266 , 608 S.W.2d 20 (1980)). [¶38.] In Younts , Younts brought a products liability action against Baldor Electric Company because a defective motor in an exercise machine caused a fire that substantially damaged Younts tanning salon and exerci

12000–2000
Gersick v. Shilling green
calctapp · 1950
11975–1975

Where else courts name it

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Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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