45 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. Weyerhaeuser Co.green2 sentences2024As 2 Our Supreme Court has reiterated that “in Johnson, 134 Wn.2d at 804 , . . . we held that a plaintiff may ‘waive the protections of the collateral source rule by opening the door to evidence of collateral benefits’” and that “even if collateral source evidence is relevant, in order to be admissible, such relevance must not be outweighed by the unfair influence this evidence would likely have had on the jury. 2018The 'rule is designed to prevent the wrongdoer from benefitting from third-party payments.' " (quoting Cox v. Lewiston Grain Growers, Inc., 86 Wash.App. 357 , 375, 936 P.2d 1191 (1997) ) ); see also Johnson v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 134 Wash.2d 795 , 798, 953 P.2d 800 (1998) ("In the context of personal injury actions, the collateral source rule has been the rule in Washington for 85 years." (citing Boeke v. Int'l Paint Co., 27 Wash.App. 611 , 618, 620 P.2d 103 (1980) ("We agree that the rule of strict exclusion represents the better view.") ) ). ¶ 32 While Jefferson Transit agrees with the general | 3 | 10 |
Mazon v. Krafchickgreen2 sentences2024See Diaz v. State, 175 Wn.2d 457, 465 , 285 P.3d 873 (2012) (“The collateral source rule ensures that the fact finder will not reduce the plaintiff’s award because the plaintiff has received compensation from a third party.” (citing Mazon, 158 Wn.2d at 452 )). 10 No. 84883-6-I/11 discussed below, because Strout failed to present an adequate record of the proceeding, Strout fails to make the necessary showing. 2012See Mazon v. Rrafchick, 158 Wn.2d 440, 452 , 144 P.3d 1168 (2006). | 3 | 5 |
Diaz v. Stategreen2 sentences2024See Diaz v. State, 175 Wn.2d 457, 465 , 285 P.3d 873 (2012) (“The collateral source rule ensures that the fact finder will not reduce the plaintiff’s award because the plaintiff has received compensation from a third party.” (citing Mazon, 158 Wn.2d at 452 )). 10 No. 84883-6-I/11 discussed below, because Strout failed to present an adequate record of the proceeding, Strout fails to make the necessary showing. 2024See Diaz v. State, 175 Wn.2d 457, 465 , 285 P.3d 873 (2012) (“The collateral source rule ensures that the fact finder will not reduce the plaintiff’s award because the plaintiff has received compensation from a third party.” (citing Mazon, 158 Wn.2d at 452 )). 10 No. 84883-6-I/11 discussed below, because Strout failed to present an adequate record of the proceeding, Strout fails to make the necessary showing. | 3 | 3 |
Johnson v. Weyerhaeuser Co.green2 sentences2018The 'rule is designed to prevent the wrongdoer from benefitting from third-party payments.' " (quoting Cox v. Lewiston Grain Growers, Inc., 86 Wash.App. 357 , 375, 936 P.2d 1191 (1997) ) ); see also Johnson v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 134 Wash.2d 795 , 798, 953 P.2d 800 (1998) ("In the context of personal injury actions, the collateral source rule has been the rule in Washington for 85 years." (citing Boeke v. Int'l Paint Co., 27 Wash.App. 611 , 618, 620 P.2d 103 (1980) ("We agree that the rule of strict exclusion represents the better view.") ) ). ¶ 32 While Jefferson Transit agrees with the general 2018The 'rule is designed to prevent the wrongdoer from benefitting from third-party payments.' " (quoting Cox v. Lewiston Grain Growers, Inc., 86 Wash.App. 357 , 375, 936 P.2d 1191 (1997) ) ); see also Johnson v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 134 Wash.2d 795 , 798, 953 P.2d 800 (1998) ("In the context of personal injury actions, the collateral source rule has been the rule in Washington for 85 years." (citing Boeke v. Int'l Paint Co., 27 Wash.App. 611 , 618, 620 P.2d 103 (1980) ("We agree that the rule of strict exclusion represents the better view.") ) ). ¶ 32 While Jefferson Transit agrees with the general | 2 | 9 |
Mazon v. Krafchickgreen2 sentences2012See Mazon v. Rrafchick, 158 Wn.2d 440, 452 , 144 P.3d 1168 (2006). 2012Id. ¶17 RCW 7.70.080 replaces the collateral source rule in medical malpractice cases, as we explained in Adcox v. Children’s Orthopedic Hospital & Medical Center, 123 Wn.2d 15, 40 , 864 P.2d 921 (1993). | 2 | 4 |
Mahler v. Szucsgreen2 sentences2012See, e.g., Hamm, 151 Wn.2d at 319-20 (insurer’s retention of right to pursue subrogation from tortfeasor does not eliminate obligation to pay proportional share of legal expenses for reimbursement of PIP benefits); Winters, 144 Wn.2d at 876 (reimbursement provisions of policy permit insurer to recover PIP benefits from money the insured collects from the tortfeasor, not withstanding absence of viable subrogation claim against tortfeasor); see also Mahler, 135 Wn.2d at 411-18 (discussing subrogation principles in relation to insurer’s right to reimbursement). ¶23 Next, Safeco asserts that the c 2010(Emphasis omitted.) [8] The collateral source rule is the "`well settled rule in tort actions that a party has a cause of action notwithstanding the payment of his loss by an insurance company.'" Mahler, 135 Wash.2d at 412 n. 4, 957 P.2d 632 (quoting Consol. | 2 | 3 |
Sepich v. Department of Labor & Industriesgreen2 sentences1998In such actions, however, the collateral source rule continues to have application. [4] Although the trial court's review is under the de novo standard, the "trial court is not permitted to receive evidence or testimony other than, or in addition to, that offered before the Board or included in the record filed by the Board." Sepich v. Department of Labor & Indus., 75 Wash.2d 312, 316 , 450 P.2d 940 (1969); see RCW 51.52.115. "[E]ven though the trial court may rule independently on evidentiary questions, as an appellate tribunal, it can only pass upon those matters that have first been present 1998In such actions, however, the collateral source rule continues to have application. [4] Although the trial court's review is under the de novo standard, the "trial court is not permitted to receive evidence or testimony other than, or in addition to, that offered before the Board or included in the record filed by the Board." Sepich v. Department of Labor & Indus., 75 Wash.2d 312, 316 , 450 P.2d 940 (1969); see RCW 51.52.115. "[E]ven though the trial court may rule independently on evidentiary questions, as an appellate tribunal, it can only pass upon those matters that have first been present | 2 | 2 |
| Wheeler v. Catholic Archdiocesegreen | 2 | 2 |
Heath v. Seattle Taxicab Co.green2 sentences1998See Heath v. Seattle Taxicab Co., 73 Wash. 177, 186 , 131 P. 843 (1913); Ciminski v. SCI Corp., 90 Wash.2d 802, 804-05 , 585 P.2d 1182 (1978). 1998See Heath v. Seattle Taxicab Co., 73 Wash. 177, 186 , 131 P. 843 (1913); Ciminski v. SCI Corp., 90 Wash.2d 802, 804-05 , 585 P.2d 1182 (1978). | 2 | 2 |
Lange v. Raefgreen2 sentences2010Lange v. Raef, 34 Wn. 2010Id. | 1 | 4 |
Cox v. Spanglergreen2 sentences2023See Cox v. Spangler, 141 Wn.2d 431, 439 , 5 P.3d 1265 (2000). 2018However, in Cox , we held that even if collateral source evidence is relevant, in order to be admissible, such relevance must not be outweighed by the unfair influence this evidence would likely have had on the jury. 141 Wash.2d at 441, 5 P.3d 1265 , 22 P.3d 791 . ¶ 37 Here, Gilmore's sons testified that these financial struggles adversely affected his mental health and personal life: He, well, wasn't able to work as soon as the collision happened. | 1 | 3 |
Cox v. Spanglergreen2 sentences2023See Cox v. Spangler, 141 Wn.2d 431, 439 , 5 P.3d 1265 (2000). 2017Cox v. Spangler, 141 Wn.2d 431, 439 , 5 P.3d 1265 (2000). | 1 | 2 |
Boeke v. International Paint Co.green2 sentences2018The 'rule is designed to prevent the wrongdoer from benefitting from third-party payments.' " (quoting Cox v. Lewiston Grain Growers, Inc., 86 Wash.App. 357 , 375, 936 P.2d 1191 (1997) ) ); see also Johnson v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 134 Wash.2d 795 , 798, 953 P.2d 800 (1998) ("In the context of personal injury actions, the collateral source rule has been the rule in Washington for 85 years." (citing Boeke v. Int'l Paint Co., 27 Wash.App. 611 , 618, 620 P.2d 103 (1980) ("We agree that the rule of strict exclusion represents the better view.") ) ). ¶ 32 While Jefferson Transit agrees with the general 2018The 'rule is designed to prevent the wrongdoer from benefitting from third-party payments.' " (quoting Cox v. Lewiston Grain Growers, Inc., 86 Wash.App. 357 , 375, 936 P.2d 1191 (1997) ) ); see also Johnson v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 134 Wash.2d 795 , 798, 953 P.2d 800 (1998) ("In the context of personal injury actions, the collateral source rule has been the rule in Washington for 85 years." (citing Boeke v. Int'l Paint Co., 27 Wash.App. 611 , 618, 620 P.2d 103 (1980) ("We agree that the rule of strict exclusion represents the better view.") ) ). ¶ 32 While Jefferson Transit agrees with the general | 1 | 2 |
Putman v. Wenatchee Valley Medical Center, PSgreen2 sentences2014See, e.g., Diaz, 175 Wn.2d at 470-71 (RCW 7.70.080 is unconstitutional where it conflicts with ER 408, prohibiting the admission of evidence of settlements); Putman, 166 Wn.2d at 982-85 (RCW 7.70.150 is unconstitutional because its requirement that plaintiffs file a certificate of merit with medical malpractice claims conflicts with pleading requirements in CR 8 and CR 11); Waples v. Yi, 169 Wn.2d 152, 158-61 , 234 P.3d 187 (2010) (RCW 7.70.100(1) conflicts with CR 3(a) and is unconstitutional because it requires an additional step to commence a civil action in medical malpractice cases); Stat 2014See, e. g., Diaz, 175 Wn.2d at 470 -71 ( RCW 7. 70. 080 is unconstitutional where it conflicts with ER 408, prohibiting the admission of evidence of settlements); Putman, 166 Wn.2d at 982 -85 ( RCW 7. 70. 150 is unconstitutional because its requirement that plaintiffs file a certificate of merit with medical malpractice claims conflicts with pleading requirements in CR 8 and CR 11); Waples v. Yi, 169 Wn.2d 152 , 158 -61, 234 P. 3d 187 2010 ) ( RCW 7. 70. 100( 1) conflicts with CR 3( a) and is unconstitutional because it requires an additional step to commence a civil action in medical malpract | 1 | 2 |
Mahler v. Szucsgreen2 sentences2012Id.; see also Mahler v. Szucs, 135 Wn.2d 398 , 412 n.4, 957 P.2d 632 , 966 P.2d 305 (1998). 2010(Emphasis omitted.) [8] The collateral source rule is the "`well settled rule in tort actions that a party has a cause of action notwithstanding the payment of his loss by an insurance company.'" Mahler, 135 Wash.2d at 412 n. 4, 957 P.2d 632 (quoting Consol. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Williamsgreen2 sentences1998See discussion in Honey v. Davis, 131 Wn.2d 212, 222-25 , 930 P.2d 908 , 937 P.2d 1052 (1997) (Talmadge, J., concurring). 1998We reject the notion that subrogation principles trump the collateral source rule. [5] See discussion in Honey v. Davis, 131 Wash.2d 212, 222-25 , 930 P.2d 908 , 937 P.2d 1052 (1997) (Talmadge, J., concurring). [6] For instance, "until 1958 the subrogation clauses that were included in the standard forms for automobile insurance specifically were not applicable to medical payments coverages." ROBERT E. | 1 | 2 |
Honey v. Davisgreen2 sentences1998See discussion in Honey v. Davis, 131 Wn.2d 212, 222-25 , 930 P.2d 908 , 937 P.2d 1052 (1997) (Talmadge, J., concurring). 1998We reject the notion that subrogation principles trump the collateral source rule. [5] See discussion in Honey v. Davis, 131 Wash.2d 212, 222-25 , 930 P.2d 908 , 937 P.2d 1052 (1997) (Talmadge, J., concurring). [6] For instance, "until 1958 the subrogation clauses that were included in the standard forms for automobile insurance specifically were not applicable to medical payments coverages." ROBERT E. | 1 | 2 |
Honey v. Davisgreen2 sentences1998See discussion in Honey v. Davis, 131 Wn.2d 212, 222-25 , 930 P.2d 908 , 937 P.2d 1052 (1997) (Talmadge, J., concurring). 1998We reject the notion that subrogation principles trump the collateral source rule. [5] See discussion in Honey v. Davis, 131 Wash.2d 212, 222-25 , 930 P.2d 908 , 937 P.2d 1052 (1997) (Talmadge, J., concurring). [6] For instance, "until 1958 the subrogation clauses that were included in the standard forms for automobile insurance specifically were not applicable to medical payments coverages." ROBERT E. | 1 | 2 |
| Winters v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hamm v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurancegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Spokane Co. v. State Ex Rel. Co. Comrs.green | 1 | 1 |
| Evans v. Wilsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tilly v. John Doegreen | 1 | 1 |
| cluster 419685green | 1 | 1 |
| Alvin Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corporation, Engine Division, and Andre J. Lambert, Defendantsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Earl K. Phillips and Carrie Phillips v. The Western Company of North Americagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kastanis v. Educational Employees Credit Uniongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brice v. National RR Passenger Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Allen v. Exxon Shipping Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Rick E. Clark, & Cross-Appellee v. Burlington Northern, Inc., a Corporation, & Cross-Appellantgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Alan R. Folkestad, and Cross-Appellee v. Burlington Northern, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, and Cross-Appellantgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. William H. Price, Jr.green | 1 | 1 |
| Lyons v. Freeborggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Budd v. Nixenred | 1 | 1 |
| Yarrington v. Thornburggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Coyne v. Campbellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ciminski v. SCI CORPORATION
green
2 sentences2024Our Supreme Court has noted that, with regard to the collateral source rule, 6 No. 84883-6-I/7 [t]his Court has long held that “payments, the origin of which is independent of the tort-feasor, received by a plaintiff because of injuries will not be considered to reduce the damages otherwise recoverable.” Ciminski v. SCI Corp., 90 Wn.2d 802, 804 , 585 P.2d 1182 (1978). 2024Our Supreme Court has noted that, with regard to the collateral source rule, 6 No. 84883-6-I/7 [t]his Court has long held that “payments, the origin of which is independent of the tort-feasor, received by a plaintiff because of injuries will not be considered to reduce the damages otherwise recoverable.” Ciminski v. SCI Corp., 90 Wn.2d 802, 804 , 585 P.2d 1182 (1978). | 16 | 1983–2024 |
Stone v. City of Seattle
green
2 sentences1996Ciminski v. SCI Corp., 90 Wn.2d 802, 804 , 585 P.2d 1182 (1978); Stone v. City of Seattle, 64 Wn.2d 166, 172 , 391 P.2d 179 (1964). 1996Ciminski v. SCI Corp., 90 Wn.2d 802, 804 , 585 P.2d 1182 (1978); Stone v. City of Seattle, 64 Wn.2d 166, 172 , 391 P.2d 179 (1964). | 5 | 1978–1996 |
Wheeler v. Catholic Archdiocese of Seattle
green
2 sentences1998Wheeler v. Catholic Archdiocese, 65 Wash.App. 552, 570-71 , 829 P.2d 196 (1992) ("[w]orkers' compensation benefits include compensation for lost wages; they literally take the place of damages in a personal injury action against any employer, which damages would include lost wages"), *803 rev'd on other grounds, Wheeler v. Catholic Archdiocese, 124 Wash.2d 634 , 880 P.2d 29 (1994). 1998Wheeler v. Catholic Archdiocese, 65 Wash.App. 552, 570-71 , 829 P.2d 196 (1992) ("[w]orkers' compensation benefits include compensation for lost wages; they literally take the place of damages in a personal injury action against any employer, which damages would include lost wages"), *803 rev'd on other grounds, Wheeler v. Catholic Archdiocese, 124 Wash.2d 634 , 880 P.2d 29 (1994). | 4 | 1996–1998 |
Hayes v. Trulock
green
2 sentences1994This collateral source rule holds true even if the benefits are payable to the plaintiff because of the defendant’s actionable conduct. *87 Hayes v. Trulock, 51 Wn. 1994App. 795 , 755 P.2d 830 , review denied, 111 Wn.2d 1015 (1988) as support for her argument that the collateral source rule applies in this case to prevent an offset. | 4 | 1991–1994 |
Maziarski v. Bair
green
2 sentences2010See id.; Maziarski, 83 Wash.App. at 841 n. 8, 924 P.2d 409 ("[The collateral source rule] does not apply here because, as noted in the text, the payments in issue here come from [the tortfeasor's] PIP coverage, and such coverage is a fund created by her."). 2010See id.; Maziarski, 83 Wash.App. at 841 n. 8, 924 P.2d 409 ("[The collateral source rule] does not apply here because, as noted in the text, the payments in issue here come from [the tortfeasor's] PIP coverage, and such coverage is a fund created by her."). | 3 | 2010–2019 |
Adcox v. Children's Orthopedic Hospital & Medical Center
green
2 sentences2014Ctr., 123 Wn.2d 15, 40 , 864 P.2d 921 (1993) (“RCW 7.70.080 replaces the common law’s collateral source rule” (emphasis added)). 2014Ctr., 123 Wn.2d 15, 40 , 864 P.2d 921 (1993) (“RCW 7.70.080 replaces the common law’s collateral source rule” (emphasis added)). | 3 | 2012–2014 |
Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. Moore
green
2 sentences2010Freightways v. Moore, 38 Wash.2d 427, 430 , 229 P.2d 882 (1951)). 2010Freightways v. Moore, 38 Wash.2d 427, 430 , 229 P.2d 882 (1951)). | 3 | 1993–2010 |
Washington Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. Mullins
green
2 sentences2004The collateral source rule is applied to prevent the wrongdoer from receiving a benefit from payments made by a source “wholly independent of the tortfeasor.” Mullins, 62 Wn. 2004The collateral source rule is applied to prevent the wrongdoer from receiving a benefit from payments made by a source "wholly independent of the tortfeasor." Mullins, 62 Wash. App. at 886 , 816 P.2d 61 . | 3 | 1999–2004 |
Waples v. Yi
green
2 sentences2014See, e.g., Diaz, 175 Wn.2d at 470-71 (RCW 7.70.080 is unconstitutional where it conflicts with ER 408, prohibiting the admission of evidence of settlements); Putman, 166 Wn.2d at 982-85 (RCW 7.70.150 is unconstitutional because its requirement that plaintiffs file a certificate of merit with medical malpractice claims conflicts with pleading requirements in CR 8 and CR 11); Waples v. Yi, 169 Wn.2d 152, 158-61 , 234 P.3d 187 (2010) (RCW 7.70.100(1) conflicts with CR 3(a) and is unconstitutional because it requires an additional step to commence a civil action in medical malpractice cases); Stat 2014See, e. g., Diaz, 175 Wn.2d at 470 -71 ( RCW 7. 70. 080 is unconstitutional where it conflicts with ER 408, prohibiting the admission of evidence of settlements); Putman, 166 Wn.2d at 982 -85 ( RCW 7. 70. 150 is unconstitutional because its requirement that plaintiffs file a certificate of merit with medical malpractice claims conflicts with pleading requirements in CR 8 and CR 11); Waples v. Yi, 169 Wn.2d 152 , 158 -61, 234 P. 3d 187 2010 ) ( RCW 7. 70. 100( 1) conflicts with CR 3( a) and is unconstitutional because it requires an additional step to commence a civil action in medical malpract | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Waples v. Yi
green
2 sentences2014See, e.g., Diaz, 175 Wn.2d at 470-71 (RCW 7.70.080 is unconstitutional where it conflicts with ER 408, prohibiting the admission of evidence of settlements); Putman, 166 Wn.2d at 982-85 (RCW 7.70.150 is unconstitutional because its requirement that plaintiffs file a certificate of merit with medical malpractice claims conflicts with pleading requirements in CR 8 and CR 11); Waples v. Yi, 169 Wn.2d 152, 158-61 , 234 P.3d 187 (2010) (RCW 7.70.100(1) conflicts with CR 3(a) and is unconstitutional because it requires an additional step to commence a civil action in medical malpractice cases); Stat 2014See, e. g., Diaz, 175 Wn.2d at 470 -71 ( RCW 7. 70. 080 is unconstitutional where it conflicts with ER 408, prohibiting the admission of evidence of settlements); Putman, 166 Wn.2d at 982 -85 ( RCW 7. 70. 150 is unconstitutional because its requirement that plaintiffs file a certificate of merit with medical malpractice claims conflicts with pleading requirements in CR 8 and CR 11); Waples v. Yi, 169 Wn.2d 152 , 158 -61, 234 P. 3d 187 2010 ) ( RCW 7. 70. 100( 1) conflicts with CR 3( a) and is unconstitutional because it requires an additional step to commence a civil action in medical malpract | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Mazon v. Krafchick
green
2 sentences2006Mazon v. Krafchick, 126 Wash.App. 207, 220-21 , 108 P.3d 139 (2005). 2006Mazon v. Krafchick, 126 Wn. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Johnson v. Weyerhaeuser Co.
neutral
2 sentences1998The Court of Appeals reasoned that because "juries in industrial insurance appeals do not determine the amount of damages, the risk that evidence of collateral benefits will be used to improperly reduce damages is slight." Johnson, 84 Wash.App. at 718-19 , 930 P.2d 331 . 1998The Court of Appeals reasoned that because "juries in industrial insurance appeals do not determine the amount of damages, the risk that evidence of collateral benefits will be used to improperly reduce damages is slight." Johnson, 84 Wash.App. at 718-19 , 930 P.2d 331 . | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Franks v. Department of Labor & Industries
green
2 sentences1998In Franks v. Department of Labor & Indus., 35 Wash.2d 763 , 215 P.2d 416 (1950), we recognized that the factfinder in workers' compensation proceedings is highly susceptible to prejudice when evidence of monetary figures is brought before it. 1998In Franks v. Department of Labor & Indus., 35 Wash.2d 763 , 215 P.2d 416 (1950), we recognized that the factfinder in workers' compensation proceedings is highly susceptible to prejudice when evidence of monetary figures is brought before it. | 2 | 1998–1998 |
| Xieng v. Peoples National Bank green | 2 | 1994–1996 |
| Bowman v. Whitelock neutral | 2 | 1987–1996 |
| Reese v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. green | 2 | 1992–1994 |
| Sutton v. Shufelberger green | 2 | 1987–1991 |
| Matsyuk v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Gefeller green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. McDonald green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Cox v. Lewiston Grain Growers, Inc. green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Gresham green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Mazon v. Krafchick neutral | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Clark v. Luepke green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Clark v. Luepke green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Wynn v. Estate of Holmes green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Ford Motor Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Xieng v. Peoples National Bank green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Meyer v. Dempcy green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Britton v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Kirtland & Packard v. Superior Court green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Rich v. Campbell green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.