collateral source rule (Washington) · Go Syfert
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collateral source rule in Washington

45 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2024 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (32)

CaseFollowedCited
Johnson v. Weyerhaeuser Co.green
wash · 1998 · cited in 10 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2000–2024
2 sentences

2024As 2 Our Supreme Court has reiterated that “in Johnson, 134 Wn.2d at 804 , . . . we held that a plaintiff may ‘waive the protections of the collateral source rule by opening the door to evidence of collateral benefits’” and that “even if collateral source evidence is relevant, in order to be admissible, such relevance must not be outweighed by the unfair influence this evidence would likely have had on the jury.

2018The 'rule is designed to prevent the wrongdoer from benefitting from third-party payments.' " (quoting Cox v. Lewiston Grain Growers, Inc., 86 Wash.App. 357 , 375, 936 P.2d 1191 (1997) ) ); see also Johnson v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 134 Wash.2d 795 , 798, 953 P.2d 800 (1998) ("In the context of personal injury actions, the collateral source rule has been the rule in Washington for 85 years." (citing Boeke v. Int'l Paint Co., 27 Wash.App. 611 , 618, 620 P.2d 103 (1980) ("We agree that the rule of strict exclusion represents the better view.") ) ). ¶ 32 While Jefferson Transit agrees with the general

310
Mazon v. Krafchickgreen
wash · 2006 · cited in 5 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2011–2024
2 sentences

2024See Diaz v. State, 175 Wn.2d 457, 465 , 285 P.3d 873 (2012) (“The collateral source rule ensures that the fact finder will not reduce the plaintiff’s award because the plaintiff has received compensation from a third party.” (citing Mazon, 158 Wn.2d at 452 )). 10 discussed below, because Strout failed to present an adequate record of the proceeding, Strout fails to make the necessary showing.

2012Id. ¶17 RCW 7.70.080 replaces the collateral source rule in medical malpractice cases, as we explained in Adcox v. Children’s Orthopedic Hospital & Medical Center, 123 Wn.2d 15, 40 , 864 P.2d 921 (1993).

35
Diaz v. Stategreen
wash · 2012 · cited in 3 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2014–2024
2 sentences

2024See Diaz v. State, 175 Wn.2d 457, 465 , 285 P.3d 873 (2012) (“The collateral source rule ensures that the fact finder will not reduce the plaintiff’s award because the plaintiff has received compensation from a third party.” (citing Mazon, 158 Wn.2d at 452 )). 10 discussed below, because Strout failed to present an adequate record of the proceeding, Strout fails to make the necessary showing.

2024See Diaz v. State, 175 Wn.2d 457, 465 , 285 P.3d 873 (2012) (“The collateral source rule ensures that the fact finder will not reduce the plaintiff’s award because the plaintiff has received compensation from a third party.” (citing Mazon, 158 Wn.2d at 452 )). 10 discussed below, because Strout failed to present an adequate record of the proceeding, Strout fails to make the necessary showing.

33
Mahler v. Szucsred
wash · 1998 · cited in 3 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2010–2012
2 sentences

2012See, e.g., Hamm, 151 Wn.2d at 319-20 (insurer’s retention of right to pursue subrogation from tortfeasor does not eliminate obligation to pay proportional share of legal expenses for reimbursement of PIP benefits); Winters, 144 Wn.2d at 876 (reimbursement provisions of policy permit insurer to recover PIP benefits from money the insured collects from the tortfeasor, not withstanding absence of viable subrogation claim against tortfeasor); see also Mahler, 135 Wn.2d at 411-18 (discussing subrogation principles in relation to insurer’s right to reimbursement). ¶23 Next, Safeco asserts that the c

2010(Emphasis omitted.) [8] The collateral source rule is the "`well settled rule in tort actions that a party has a cause of action notwithstanding the payment of his loss by an insurance company.'" Mahler, 135 Wash.2d at 412 n. 4, 957 P.2d 632 (quoting Consol.

23
Sepich v. Department of Labor & Industriesgreen
wash · 1969 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
2 sentences

1998In such actions, however, the collateral source rule continues to have application. [4] Although the trial court's review is under the de novo standard, the "trial court is not permitted to receive evidence or testimony other than, or in addition to, that offered before the Board or included in the record filed by the Board." Sepich v. Department of Labor & Indus., 75 Wash.2d 312, 316 , 450 P.2d 940 (1969); see RCW 51.52.115. "[E]ven though the trial court may rule independently on evidentiary questions, as an appellate tribunal, it can only pass upon those matters that have first been present

1998In such actions, however, the collateral source rule continues to have application. [4] Although the trial court's review is under the de novo standard, the "trial court is not permitted to receive evidence or testimony other than, or in addition to, that offered before the Board or included in the record filed by the Board." Sepich v. Department of Labor & Indus., 75 Wash.2d 312, 316 , 450 P.2d 940 (1969); see RCW 51.52.115. "[E]ven though the trial court may rule independently on evidentiary questions, as an appellate tribunal, it can only pass upon those matters that have first been present

22
Wheeler v. Catholic Archdiocesered
washctapp · 1992 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
2 sentences

1998Wheeler v. Catholic Archdiocese, 65 Wash.App. 552, 570-71 , 829 P.2d 196 (1992) ("[w]orkers' compensation benefits include compensation for lost wages; they literally take the place of damages in a personal injury action against any employer, which damages would include lost wages"), *803 rev'd on other grounds, Wheeler v. Catholic Archdiocese, 124 Wash.2d 634 , 880 P.2d 29 (1994).

1998Wheeler v. Catholic Archdiocese, 65 Wn.

22
Heath v. Seattle Taxicab Co.green
wash · 1913 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
2 sentences

1998See Heath v. Seattle Taxicab Co., 73 Wash. 177, 186 , 131 P. 843 (1913); Ciminski v. SCI Corp., 90 Wn.2d 802, 804-05 , 585 P.2d 1182 (1978).

1998See Heath v. Seattle Taxicab Co., 73 Wash. 177, 186 , 131 P. 843 (1913); Ciminski v. SCI Corp., 90 Wn.2d 802, 804-05 , 585 P.2d 1182 (1978).

22
Lange v. Raefgreen
washctapp · 1983 · cited in 4 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1990–2010
2 sentences

2010Id.

2010Lange v. Raef, 34 Wn.

14
Cox v. Spanglergreen
wash · 2000 · cited in 3 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2017–2023
2 sentences

2023See Cox v. Spangler, 141 Wn.2d 431, 439 , 5 P.3d 1265 (2000).

2023See Cox v. Spangler, 141 Wn.2d 431, 439 , 5 P.3d 1265 (2000).

13
Boeke v. International Paint Co.green
washctapp · 1980 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1992–2018
2 sentences

2018The 'rule is designed to prevent the wrongdoer from benefitting from third-party payments.' " (quoting Cox v. Lewiston Grain Growers, Inc., 86 Wash.App. 357 , 375, 936 P.2d 1191 (1997) ) ); see also Johnson v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 134 Wash.2d 795 , 798, 953 P.2d 800 (1998) ("In the context of personal injury actions, the collateral source rule has been the rule in Washington for 85 years." (citing Boeke v. Int'l Paint Co., 27 Wash.App. 611 , 618, 620 P.2d 103 (1980) ("We agree that the rule of strict exclusion represents the better view.") ) ). ¶ 32 While Jefferson Transit agrees with the general

2018The 'rule is designed to prevent the wrongdoer from benefitting from third-party payments.' " (quoting Cox v. Lewiston Grain Growers, Inc., 86 Wash.App. 357 , 375, 936 P.2d 1191 (1997) ) ); see also Johnson v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 134 Wash.2d 795 , 798, 953 P.2d 800 (1998) ("In the context of personal injury actions, the collateral source rule has been the rule in Washington for 85 years." (citing Boeke v. Int'l Paint Co., 27 Wash.App. 611 , 618, 620 P.2d 103 (1980) ("We agree that the rule of strict exclusion represents the better view.") ) ). ¶ 32 While Jefferson Transit agrees with the general

12
Putman v. Wenatchee Valley Medical Centergreen
wash · 2009 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
2 sentences

2014See, e. g., Diaz, 175 Wn.2d at 470 -71 ( RCW 7. 70. 080 is unconstitutional where it conflicts with ER 408, prohibiting the admission of evidence of settlements); Putman, 166 Wn.2d at 982 -85 ( RCW 7. 70. 150 is unconstitutional because its requirement that plaintiffs file a certificate of merit with medical malpractice claims conflicts with pleading requirements in CR 8 and CR 11); Waples v. Yi, 169 Wn.2d 152 , 158 -61, 234 P. 3d 187 2010 ) ( RCW 7. 70. 100( 1) conflicts with CR 3( a) and is unconstitutional because it requires an additional step to commence a civil action in medical malpract

2014See, e.g., Diaz, 175 Wn.2d at 470-71 (RCW 7.70.080 is unconstitutional where it conflicts with ER 408, prohibiting the admission of evidence of settlements); Putman, 166 Wn.2d at 982-85 (RCW 7.70.150 is unconstitutional because its requirement that plaintiffs file a certificate of merit with medical malpractice claims conflicts with pleading requirements in CR 8 and CR 11); Waples v. Yi, 169 Wn.2d 152, 158-61 , 234 P.3d 187 (2010) (RCW 7.70.100(1) conflicts with CR 3(a) and is unconstitutional because it requires an additional step to commence a civil action in medical malpractice cases); Stat

12
Honey v. Davisgreen
wash · 1997 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
2 sentences

1998We reject the notion that subrogation principles trump the collateral source rule. [5] See discussion in Honey v. Davis, 131 Wash.2d 212, 222-25 , 930 P.2d 908 , 937 P.2d 1052 (1997) (Talmadge, J., concurring). [6] For instance, "until 1958 the subrogation clauses that were included in the standard forms for automobile insurance specifically were not applicable to medical payments coverages." ROBERT E.

1998We reject the notion that subrogation principles trump the collateral source rule. [5] See discussion in Honey v. Davis, 131 Wash.2d 212, 222-25 , 930 P.2d 908 , 937 P.2d 1052 (1997) (Talmadge, J., concurring). [6] For instance, "until 1958 the subrogation clauses that were included in the standard forms for automobile insurance specifically were not applicable to medical payments coverages." ROBERT E.

12
State v. Williamsgreen
wash · 1997 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
2 sentences

1998We reject the notion that subrogation principles trump the collateral source rule. [5] See discussion in Honey v. Davis, 131 Wash.2d 212, 222-25 , 930 P.2d 908 , 937 P.2d 1052 (1997) (Talmadge, J., concurring). [6] For instance, "until 1958 the subrogation clauses that were included in the standard forms for automobile insurance specifically were not applicable to medical payments coverages." ROBERT E.

1998See discussion in Honey v. Davis, 131 Wn.2d 212, 222-25 , 930 P.2d 908 , 937 P.2d 1052 (1997) (Talmadge, J., concurring).

12
Spokane County v. Stategreen
wash · 1998 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
11
Winters v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurancegreen
wash · 2001 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
11
Hamm v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurancegreen
wash · 2004 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
11
Evans v. Wilsongreen
ark · 1983 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
11
Alvin Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corporation, Engine Division, and Andre J. Lambert, Defendantsyellow
ca7 · 1986 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
11
Tilly v. John Doegreen
washctapp · 1987 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
11
Smith v. United Statesgreen
ca3 · 1978 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
11
Kastanis v. Educational Employees Credit Uniongreen
wash · 1994 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
11
Canova v. National Labor Relations Boardgreen
ca9 · 1983 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
11
Earl K. Phillips and Carrie Phillips v. The Western Company of North Americagreen
ca5 · 1992 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994
11
United States v. William H. Price, Jr.green
ca4 · 1961 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993
11
Rick E. Clark, & Cross-Appellee v. Burlington Northern, Inc., a Corporation, & Cross-Appellantgreen
ca8 · 1984 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993
11
Alan R. Folkestad, and Cross-Appellee v. Burlington Northern, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, and Cross-Appellantgreen
ca9 · 1987 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993
11
Allen v. Exxon Shipping Co.green
med · 1986 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993
11
Brice v. National RR Passenger Corp.green
mdd · 1987 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1993–1993
11
Lyons v. Freeborggreen
wash · 1940 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1991–1991
11
Budd v. Nixenred
cal · 1971 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1987–1987
11
Yarrington v. Thornburggreen
del · 1964 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1983–1983
11
Coyne v. Campbellgreen
ny · 1962 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1978–1978
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (30)

CaseCitedYears
Ciminski v. SCI CORPORATION green
wash · 1978
2 sentences

2024Our Supreme Court has noted that, with regard to the collateral source rule, 6 [t]his Court has long held that “payments, the origin of which is independent of the tort-feasor, received by a plaintiff because of injuries will not be considered to reduce the damages otherwise recoverable.” Ciminski v. SCI Corp., 90 Wn.2d 802, 804 , 585 P.2d 1182 (1978).

2024Our Supreme Court has noted that, with regard to the collateral source rule, 6 [t]his Court has long held that “payments, the origin of which is independent of the tort-feasor, received by a plaintiff because of injuries will not be considered to reduce the damages otherwise recoverable.” Ciminski v. SCI Corp., 90 Wn.2d 802, 804 , 585 P.2d 1182 (1978).

161983–2024
Stone v. City of Seattle green
wash · 1964
2 sentences

1996Ciminski v. SCI Corp., 90 Wn.2d 802, 804 , 585 P.2d 1182 (1978); Stone v. City of Seattle, 64 Wn.2d 166, 172 , 391 P.2d 179 (1964).

1996Ciminski v. SCI Corp., 90 Wn.2d 802, 804 , 585 P.2d 1182 (1978); Stone v. City of Seattle, 64 Wn.2d 166, 172 , 391 P.2d 179 (1964).

51978–1996
Wheeler v. Catholic Archdiocese of Seattle green
wash · 1994
2 sentences

1998Wheeler v. Catholic Archdiocese, 65 Wash.App. 552, 570-71 , 829 P.2d 196 (1992) ("[w]orkers' compensation benefits include compensation for lost wages; they literally take the place of damages in a personal injury action against any employer, which damages would include lost wages"), *803 rev'd on other grounds, Wheeler v. Catholic Archdiocese, 124 Wash.2d 634 , 880 P.2d 29 (1994).

1998Wheeler v. Catholic Archdiocese, 65 Wash.App. 552, 570-71 , 829 P.2d 196 (1992) ("[w]orkers' compensation benefits include compensation for lost wages; they literally take the place of damages in a personal injury action against any employer, which damages would include lost wages"), *803 rev'd on other grounds, Wheeler v. Catholic Archdiocese, 124 Wash.2d 634 , 880 P.2d 29 (1994).

41996–1998
Hayes v. Trulock green
washctapp · 1988
2 sentences

1994This collateral source rule holds true even if the benefits are payable to the plaintiff because of the defendant’s actionable conduct. *87 Hayes v. Trulock, 51 Wn.

1994App. 795 , 755 P.2d 830 , review denied, 111 Wn.2d 1015 (1988) as support for her argument that the collateral source rule applies in this case to prevent an offset.

41991–1994
Maziarski v. Bair green
washctapp · 1996
2 sentences

2010See id.; Maziarski, 83 Wash.App. at 841 n. 8, 924 P.2d 409 ("[The collateral source rule] does not apply here because, as noted in the text, the payments in issue here come from [the tortfeasor's] PIP coverage, and such coverage is a fund created by her.").

2010See id.; Maziarski, 83 Wash.App. at 841 n. 8, 924 P.2d 409 ("[The collateral source rule] does not apply here because, as noted in the text, the payments in issue here come from [the tortfeasor's] PIP coverage, and such coverage is a fund created by her.").

32010–2019
Adcox v. Children's Orthopedic Hospital & Medical Center green
wash · 1993
2 sentences

2014Ctr., 123 Wn.2d 15, 40 , 864 P.2d 921 (1993) (“RCW 7.70.080 replaces the common law’s collateral source rule” (emphasis added)).

2014Ctr., 123 Wn.2d 15, 40 , 864 P.2d 921 (1993) (“RCW 7.70.080 replaces the common law’s collateral source rule” (emphasis added)).

32012–2014
Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. Moore green
wash · 1951
2 sentences

2010Freightways v. Moore, 38 Wash.2d 427, 430 , 229 P.2d 882 (1951)).

2010Freightways v. Moore, 38 Wash.2d 427, 430 , 229 P.2d 882 (1951)).

31993–2010
Washington Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. Mullins green
washctapp · 1991
2 sentences

2004The collateral source rule is applied to prevent the wrongdoer from receiving a benefit from payments made by a source "wholly independent of the tortfeasor." Mullins, 62 Wash. App. at 886 , 816 P.2d 61 .

2004The collateral source rule is applied to prevent the wrongdoer from receiving a benefit from payments made by a source “wholly independent of the tortfeasor.” Mullins, 62 Wn.

31999–2004
Waples v. Yi green
wash · 2010
2 sentences

2014See, e.g., Diaz, 175 Wn.2d at 470-71 (RCW 7.70.080 is unconstitutional where it conflicts with ER 408, prohibiting the admission of evidence of settlements); Putman, 166 Wn.2d at 982-85 (RCW 7.70.150 is unconstitutional because its requirement that plaintiffs file a certificate of merit with medical malpractice claims conflicts with pleading requirements in CR 8 and CR 11); Waples v. Yi, 169 Wn.2d 152, 158-61 , 234 P.3d 187 (2010) (RCW 7.70.100(1) conflicts with CR 3(a) and is unconstitutional because it requires an additional step to commence a civil action in medical malpractice cases); Stat

2014See, e.g., Diaz, 175 Wn.2d at 470-71 (RCW 7.70.080 is unconstitutional where it conflicts with ER 408, prohibiting the admission of evidence of settlements); Putman, 166 Wn.2d at 982-85 (RCW 7.70.150 is unconstitutional because its requirement that plaintiffs file a certificate of merit with medical malpractice claims conflicts with pleading requirements in CR 8 and CR 11); Waples v. Yi, 169 Wn.2d 152, 158-61 , 234 P.3d 187 (2010) (RCW 7.70.100(1) conflicts with CR 3(a) and is unconstitutional because it requires an additional step to commence a civil action in medical malpractice cases); Stat

22014–2014
Mazon v. Krafchick green
washctapp · 2005
2 sentences

2006Mazon v. Krafchick, 126 Wash.App. 207, 220-21 , 108 P.3d 139 (2005).

2006Mazon v. Krafchick, 126 Wn.

22006–2006
Johnson v. Weyerhaeuser Co. red
washctapp · 1997
2 sentences

1998The Court of Appeals reasoned that because "juries in industrial insurance appeals do not determine the amount of damages, the risk that evidence of collateral benefits will be used to improperly reduce damages is slight." Johnson, 84 Wash.App. at 718-19 , 930 P.2d 331 .

1998The Court of Appeals reasoned that because “juries in industrial insurance appeals do not determine the amount of damages, the risk that evidence of collateral benefits will be used to improperly reduce damages is slight.” Johnson, 84 Wn.

21998–1998
Franks v. Department of Labor & Industries green
wash · 1950
2 sentences

1998In Franks v. Department of Labor & Indus., 35 Wn.2d 763 , 215 P.2d 416 (1950), we recognized that the fact finder in workers’ compensation proceedings is highly susceptible to prejudice when evidence of monetary figures is brought before it.

1998In Franks v. Department of Labor & Indus., 35 Wn.2d 763 , 215 P.2d 416 (1950), we recognized that the fact finder in workers’ compensation proceedings is highly susceptible to prejudice when evidence of monetary figures is brought before it.

21998–1998
Xieng v. Peoples National Bank green
wash · 1993
2 sentences

1996Wheeler v. Catholic Archdiocese, 124 Wn.2d 634, 640 , 880 P.2d 29 (1994); Xieng v. Peoples Nat’l Bank, 120 Wn.2d 512, 523 , 844 P.2d 389 (1993); Ciminski v. SCI Corp., 90 Wn.2d 802, 804 , 585 P.2d 1182 (1978).

1996Wheeler v. Catholic Archdiocese, 124 Wn.2d 634, 640 , 880 P.2d 29 (1994); Xieng v. Peoples Nat’l Bank, 120 Wn.2d 512, 523 , 844 P.2d 389 (1993); Ciminski v. SCI Corp., 90 Wn.2d 802, 804 , 585 P.2d 1182 (1978).

21994–1996
Bowman v. Whitelock neutral
washctapp · 1986
2 sentences

1996Wheeler v. Catholic Archdiocese, 124 Wn.2d 634, 640 , 880 P.2d 29 (1994); Bowman v. Whitelock, 43 Wn.

1987Ciminski v. SCI Corp., 90 Wn.2d 802, 804 , 585 P.2d 1182 (1978); Bowman v. Whitelock, 43 Wn.

21987–1996
Reese v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. yellow
wash · 1987
2 sentences

1994In Reese v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 107 Wn.2d 563 , 731 P.2d 497 (1987) the court stated in dictum that the amount of workers’ compensation benefits received by a party prevailing on its employment discrimination claim can be deducted from damages wherever necessary to prevent double recovery.

1992No Washington case has resolved the question whether workers' compensation benefits fall within the collateral source rule in a suit against one's employer. 5 In Reese, 107 Wn.2d at 574 , the cotut stated in dictum that if the appellant employees prevail on their handicap discrimination claims, the amount of workers' compensation benefits they received can be deducted from damages wherever necessary to prevent double recovery.

21992–1994
Sutton v. Shufelberger green
washctapp · 1982
2 sentences

1991Sutton v. Shufelberger, 31 Wn.

1987See, e.g., Ciminski (Medicare benefits); Stone v. Seattle, 64 Wn.2d 166 , 391 P.2d 179 (1964) (social security and veterans pension benefits); Sutton v. Shufelberger, 31 Wn.

21987–1991
Matsyuk v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. green
wash · 2012
2 sentences

2019Co., 173 Wn.2d 643, 657 , 272 P.3d 802 (2012)(quoting Maziarski v. Bair, 83 Wn. App. 835 , 841 n.8, 924 P.2d 409 (1996)).

2019Co., 173 Wn.2d 643, 657 , 272 P.3d 802 (2012)(quoting Maziarski v. Bair, 83 Wn. App. 835 , 841 n.8, 924 P.2d 409 (1996)).

12019–2019
State v. Gefeller yellow
wash · 1969
12018–2018
State v. McDonald green
wash · 2001
12018–2018
Cox v. Lewiston Grain Growers, Inc. green
washctapp · 1997
12018–2018
State v. Gresham green
wash · 2012
12014–2014
Clark v. Luepke green
wash · 1992
11996–1996
Wynn v. Estate of Holmes green
oklacivapp · 1991
11996–1996
Clark v. Luepke green
washctapp · 1991
11996–1996
Ford Motor Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission green
scotus · 1982
11994–1994
Xieng v. Peoples National Bank green
washctapp · 1991
11992–1992
Meyer v. Dempcy green
washctapp · 1987
11992–1992
Britton v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America green
wash · 1985
11991–1991
Kirtland & Packard v. Superior Court green
calctapp · 1976
11987–1987
Rich v. Campbell green
wash · 1931
11978–1978

Statutes the citing opinions construe

WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 7.70.080 (8) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 51.04.010 (6) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 4.22.070 (5) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.030 (5) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 48.01.030 (4) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 51.24.020 (4) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 2.06.040 (3) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 4.84.330 (3) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180 (3) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 51.24.030 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 140 (1967–2026) IL 105 (1973–2026) LA 99 (1977–2026) TX 89 (1969–2026) OH 65 (1966–2023) GA 62 (1970–2025) PA 55 (1971–2024) NY 53 (1962–2026) CO 52 (1971–2026) FL 52 (1968–2026) MO 47 (1968–2023) WI 46 (1972–2026) WA 45 (1978–2024) NJ 42 (1968–2025) VA 38 (1986–2023) AZ 37 (1967–2025) CT 34 (1970–2021) SC 32 (1967–2025) MD 28 (1968–2022) AL 28 (1977–2025) MI 28 (1973–2019) DE 24 (1964–2026) MA 24 (1974–2024) MS 24 (1981–2023) AR 23 (1972–2017) KS 22 (1982–2019) WV 22 (1973–2025) IA 21 (1974–2026) NM 20 (1974–2024) TN 19 (1994–2025) KY 18 (1974–2025) NC 18 (1982–2021) MN 17 (1980–2016) ME 17 (1978–2022) RI 16 (1966–2013) IN 15 (1971–2015) OK 15 (1977–2023) OR 15 (1972–2026) NV 13 (1996–2026) VT 11 (1983–2024) AK 10 (1967–2022) HI 10 (1999–2025) UT 10 (1997–2026) DC 10 (1978–2024) NE 9 (1989–2018) MT 9 (1972–2000) SD 8 (1975–2009) WY 7 (1986–2002) NH 6 (1980–2018) ND 4 (1978–1999) ID 4 (1979–1991)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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