collateral source rule in Ohio

2013Proposition of Law No. 4: The Ninth District’s decision requiring that evidence of “write-offs” of medical bills be supported by expert testimony is in direct conflict with this court’s decision in Jaques v. Manton, 125 Ohio St.3d 342 , 2010-Ohio- 1838, 928 N.E.2d 434 , and has, consequently, redefined the collateral source rule as set forth by this court. {¶ 42} We now address each in turn.

2013Proposition of Law No. 4: The Ninth District’s decision requiring that evidence of “write-offs” of medical bills be supported by expert testimony is in direct conflict with this court’s decision in Jaques v. Manton, 125 Ohio St.3d 342 , 2010-Ohio-1838 , 928 N.E.2d 434 , and has, consequently, redefined the collateral source rule as set forth by this court. {¶ 42} We now address each in turn.

2018Ferrell v. Summa Health Sys. , 165 Ohio App.3d 110 , 2005-Ohio-5944 , 844 N.E.2d 1233 , ¶ 8 (9th Dist.). {¶ 53} Generally, "the collateral-source rule allows plaintiffs to seek recovery of the reasonable value of medical services without consideration of [or offsets for] payments made on their behalf by insurance." Id. at ¶ 9, citing Robinson v. Bates , 160 Ohio App.3d 668 , 2005-Ohio-1879 , 828 N.E.2d 657 , ¶ 83 (5th Dist.).

2018Ferrell v. Summa Health Sys. , 165 Ohio App.3d 110 , 2005-Ohio-5944 , 844 N.E.2d 1233 , ¶ 8 (9th Dist.). {¶ 53} Generally, "the collateral-source rule allows plaintiffs to seek recovery of the reasonable value of medical services without consideration of [or offsets for] payments made on their behalf by insurance." Id. at ¶ 9, citing Robinson v. Bates , 160 Ohio App.3d 668 , 2005-Ohio-1879 , 828 N.E.2d 657 , ¶ 83 (5th Dist.).

2017Buchman did so by noting that R.C. 2744.05(B) does not "abrogate that aspect of the collateral source rule which provides that the 'receipt of [collateral] benefits is not to be admitted in evidence, or otherwise disclosed to the jury.' " Id. at 270 , 652 N.E.2d 952 , quoting Pryor v. Webber , 23 Ohio St.2d 104 , 109, 263 N.E.2d 235 (1970). {¶ 19} We are persuaded that R.C. 2744.05(B) requires a post-trial hearing in which the trial judge is authorized to hear additional evidence.

2017Buchman did so by noting that R.C. 2744.05(B) does not "abrogate that aspect of the collateral source rule which provides that the 'receipt of [collateral] benefits is not to be admitted in evidence, or otherwise disclosed to the jury.' " Id. at 270 , 652 N.E.2d 952 , quoting Pryor v. Webber , 23 Ohio St.2d 104 , 109, 263 N.E.2d 235 (1970). {¶ 19} We are persuaded that R.C. 2744.05(B) requires a post-trial hearing in which the trial judge is authorized to hear additional evidence.

2007No. 1, 142 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1661 (“H.B. 1”), which sought to change civil-justice and insurance law to alleviate another “insurance crisis.” See Sorrell v. Thevenir (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 415 , 419–420, 633 N.E.2d 504 . {¶ 14} In Sorrell, we examined one facet of this law, R.C. 2317.45, which placed a significant limitation on the collateral-source rule adopted in Pryor v. Webber (1970), 23 Ohio St.2d 104 , 52 O.O.2d 395 , 263 N.E.2d 235 .

2007No. 1, 142 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1661 (“H.B. 1”), which sought to change civil-justice and insurance law to alleviate another “insurance crisis.” See Sorrell v. Thevenir (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 415 , 419–420, 633 N.E.2d 504 . {¶ 14} In Sorrell, we examined one facet of this law, R.C. 2317.45, which placed a significant limitation on the collateral-source rule adopted in Pryor v. Webber (1970), 23 Ohio St.2d 104 , 52 O.O.2d 395 , 263 N.E.2d 235 .

2002Assn . (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 236 , 581 N.E.2d 529 . {¶ 12} The collateral source rule in a sense permits double recovery to a plaintiff, and is an exception to the general rule that compensatory damages are only intended to make the plaintiff whole after a loss.

2002Assn . (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 236 , 581 N.E.2d 529 . {¶ 12} The collateral source rule in a sense permits double recovery to a plaintiff, and is an exception to the general rule that compensatory damages are only intended to make the plaintiff whole after a loss.

2009It argues that when the collateral source rule is applied in this case, the fact that damages were paid pursuant to the policy is irrelevant and, as such, genuine issues of material fact regarding causation and damages exist that preclude summary judgment. 2 {¶ 24} The “collateral source rule * * * has been defined as ‘the judicial refusal to credit to the benefit of the wrongdoer money or services received in reparation of the injury caused which emanates from sources other than the wrongdoer.’ ” Hutchings v. Childress, 119 Ohio St.3d 486 , 2008-Ohio-4568 , 895 N.E.2d 520, ¶ 30 , quoting Pryo

2009It argues that when the collateral source rule is applied in this case, the fact that damages were paid pursuant to the policy is irrelevant and, as such, genuine issues of material fact regarding causation and damages exist that preclude summary judgment. 2 {¶ 24} The “collateral source rule * * * has been defined as ‘the judicial refusal to credit to the benefit of the wrongdoer money or services received in reparation of the injury caused which emanates from sources other than the wrongdoer.’ ” Hutchings v. Childress, 119 Ohio St.3d 486 , 2008-Ohio-4568 , 895 N.E.2d 520, ¶ 30 , quoting Pryo

2008Anesthesia Servs., P.A. (1985), 237 Kan. 503 , 515 , 701 P.2d 939 , quoting 3 Minzer, Nates, Kimball, Axelrod Goldstein, Damages in Tort Actions (1984) 17-5, Section 17.00.

2008Anesthesia Servs., P.A. (1985), 237 Kan. 503 , 515 , 701 P.2d 939 , quoting 3 Minzer, Nates, Kimball, Axelrod Goldstein, Damages in Tort Actions (1984) 17-5, Section 17.00.

2008Westfield is also correct that the collateral source rule does not directly apply in a UM case, because UM benefits arise as a matter of contract law, not tort law. "[T]he legal basis for recovery under the uninsured motorist coverage of an insurance policy is contract and not tort." Kraly v. Vannewkirk (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 627 , 632 , 635 N.E.2d 323 .

2008Westfield is also correct that the collateral source rule does not directly apply in a UM case, because UM benefits arise as a matter of contract law, not tort law. "[T]he legal basis for recovery under the uninsured motorist coverage of an insurance policy is contract and not tort." Kraly v. Vannewkirk (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 627 , 632 , 635 N.E.2d 323 .

2000Id. at 53 , 550 N.E.2d at 527-528 .

2000Id. at 53 , 550 N.E.2d at 527-528 .

1995R.C. 2744.05(B) “abrogates the collateral source rule as to municipalities.” Vogel, supra, 57 Ohio St.3d at 97 , 566 N.E.2d at 160 .

1995R.C. 2744.05(B) “abrogates the collateral source rule as to municipalities.” Vogel, supra, 57 Ohio St.3d at 97 , 566 N.E.2d at 160 .

1991In Pryor v. Webber (1970), 23 Ohio St. 2d 104, 109 , 52 O.O. 2d 395, 398, 263 N.E. 2d 235, 239 , this court stated that a purpose of the collateral source rule was epitomized in Wolfe v. Whipple (1969), 112 Ill.

1991App. 2d 255, 267 , 251 N.E. 2d 77, 82 , wherein it was observed: “* * * The entire theory of the collateral source rule is to keep the jury from learning anything about the collateral income so that it will not .influence the decision of the jury. * * *” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2744.05(B) achieves this purpose, without allowing double recov ery, by requiring disclosure of benefits from collateral sources “to the court,” not to the jury.

1989Levy v. Coon (1964), 11 Ohio App.2d 200 , 40 O.O.2d 367 , 229 N.E.2d 747 (collateral source rule well settled in Ohio and applicable to workers’ compensation claims).

1967In Levy v. Coon (1964), 11 Ohio App. 2d 200 , this court considered the application of the collateral source doctrine to workmen \s compensation awards.

2019Ginn, 2017-Ohio-4370 at ¶ 19 .

2018Ferrell v. Summa Health Sys. , 165 Ohio App.3d 110 , 2005-Ohio-5944 , 844 N.E.2d 1233 , ¶ 8 (9th Dist.). {¶ 53} Generally, "the collateral-source rule allows plaintiffs to seek recovery of the reasonable value of medical services without consideration of [or offsets for] payments made on their behalf by insurance." Id. at ¶ 9, citing Robinson v. Bates , 160 Ohio App.3d 668 , 2005-Ohio-1879 , 828 N.E.2d 657 , ¶ 83 (5th Dist.).

2018Ferrell v. Summa Health Sys. , 165 Ohio App.3d 110 , 2005-Ohio-5944 , 844 N.E.2d 1233 , ¶ 8 (9th Dist.). {¶ 53} Generally, "the collateral-source rule allows plaintiffs to seek recovery of the reasonable value of medical services without consideration of [or offsets for] payments made on their behalf by insurance." Id. at ¶ 9, citing Robinson v. Bates , 160 Ohio App.3d 668 , 2005-Ohio-1879 , 828 N.E.2d 657 , ¶ 83 (5th Dist.).

2018However, for political subdivisions, the offset is mandatory; " 'the amount of the benefits shall be deducted from any award against a political subdivision recovered by that claimant.' " Jones, 2017-Ohio-7329 , 89 N.E.3d 633 , ¶ 7, quoting R.C. 2744.05(B)(1). {¶ 54} "The purpose of R.C. 2744.05(B) is to permit recovery by injured persons for torts committed by political subdivisions while at the same time conserving the fiscal resources of those political entities." Galanos v. Cleveland , 70 Ohio St.3d 220 , 221, 638 N.E.2d 530 (1994), citing Menefee v. Queen City Metro , 49 Ohio St.3d 27 , 5

2018However, for political subdivisions, the offset is mandatory; " 'the amount of the benefits shall be deducted from any award against a political subdivision recovered by that claimant.' " Jones, 2017-Ohio-7329 , 89 N.E.3d 633 , ¶ 7, quoting R.C. 2744.05(B)(1). {¶ 54} "The purpose of R.C. 2744.05(B) is to permit recovery by injured persons for torts committed by political subdivisions while at the same time conserving the fiscal resources of those political entities." Galanos v. Cleveland , 70 Ohio St.3d 220 , 221, 638 N.E.2d 530 (1994), citing Menefee v. Queen City Metro , 49 Ohio St.3d 27 , 5

2018Ctr. , 2017-Ohio-7329 , 89 N.E.3d 633 (" Jones "). *519 {¶ 40} Jones considered the question of offsets against damages required by R.C. 2744.05(B)(1), and the collateral source rule that applies to political subdivisions, such as Social Security and Medicaid per R.C. 2744.05(C)(1).

2018Ctr. , 2017-Ohio-7329 , 89 N.E.3d 633 (" Jones "). *519 {¶ 40} Jones considered the question of offsets against damages required by R.C. 2744.05(B)(1), and the collateral source rule that applies to political subdivisions, such as Social Security and Medicaid per R.C. 2744.05(C)(1).

2018However, for political subdivisions, the offset is mandatory; " 'the amount of the benefits shall be deducted from any award against a political subdivision recovered by that claimant.' " Jones, 2017-Ohio-7329 , 89 N.E.3d 633 , ¶ 7, quoting R.C. 2744.05(B)(1). {¶ 54} "The purpose of R.C. 2744.05(B) is to permit recovery by injured persons for torts committed by political subdivisions while at the same time conserving the fiscal resources of those political entities." Galanos v. Cleveland , 70 Ohio St.3d 220 , 221, 638 N.E.2d 530 (1994), citing Menefee v. Queen City Metro , 49 Ohio St.3d 27 , 5

2018However, for political subdivisions, the offset is mandatory; " 'the amount of the benefits shall be deducted from any award against a political subdivision recovered by that claimant.' " Jones, 2017-Ohio-7329 , 89 N.E.3d 633 , ¶ 7, quoting R.C. 2744.05(B)(1). {¶ 54} "The purpose of R.C. 2744.05(B) is to permit recovery by injured persons for torts committed by political subdivisions while at the same time conserving the fiscal resources of those political entities." Galanos v. Cleveland , 70 Ohio St.3d 220 , 221, 638 N.E.2d 530 (1994), citing Menefee v. Queen City Metro , 49 Ohio St.3d 27 , 5

2017Id. at 281 Kan. at 1306 , 136 P.3d 428 . {¶ 42} We believe that a setoff in the amount of $315,000, the amount paid to settle the subrogation claim, strikes the appropriate balance between the collateral source rule and the principle that a plaintiff should not receive more than one recovery for the same set of damages.

2017Id. at 281 Kan. at 1306 , 136 P.3d 428 . {¶ 42} We believe that a setoff in the amount of $315,000, the amount paid to settle the subrogation claim, strikes the appropriate balance between the collateral source rule and the principle that a plaintiff should not receive more than one recovery for the same set of damages.

2017Id. {¶ 18} The collateral source rule is the judicial refusal to credit to the benefit of the wrongdoer money or services received by a plaintiff from an independent third party.

2017Id. {¶ 15} Dr. Ginn contends Stonecreek Dental committed the intentional *85 tort of tortious interference with contract; therefore, the trial court's decision that the collateral source rule did not apply allowed Stonecreek Dental to enjoy the benefits received by its intentional interference without being subject to liability.

2017Id. at 900 ; see also Goodrich Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins.

2010Appellant contends that this was in violation of the trial court’s own order precluding references to Appellant’s collateral sources of recovery as well as a violation of Ohio’s collateral source rule, as stated in Pryor v. Webber (1970), 23 Ohio St.2d 104 , 213 N.E.2d 235 . {¶50} The collateral source rule generally pertains to evidence concerning damages.

2010Id.

2010(No. 2009-0820 — Submitted January 26, 2010 — Decided May 4, 2010.) APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, No. L-08-1096, 2009-Ohio-1468 . __________________ O’DONNELL, J.

2010No. L-08- 7 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 1096, 2009-Ohio-1468, ¶ 9 .

2009While there is "no rigid rule against overcompensation," McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde (1994), 511 U.S. 202 , 219 , 114 S.Ct. 1461 , 128 L.Ed.2d 148 (giving the example of the collateral source rule), windfalls are disfavored.

2009While there is "no rigid rule against overcompensation," McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde (1994), 511 U.S. 202 , 219 , 114 S.Ct. 1461 , 128 L.Ed.2d 148 (giving the example of the collateral source rule), windfalls are disfavored.

2009Appellees cited Shealy v. Campbell (1985), 20 Ohio St.3d 23 , 20 OBR 210, 485 N.E.2d 701 , in which the Supreme Court of Ohio held, “An insurance company, which pays the entire amount of a judgment pursuant to a policy issued to an insured tortfeasor and thereafter becomes subrogated to that claim, is the sole real party in interest in a subsequent action brought against a joint tortfeasor for contribution pursuant to R.C. 2307.31(C).” Id. at syllabus. {¶ 17} In its reply memorandum, appellant pointed out that Shealy remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to substitute the subr

2009Appellees cited Shealy v. Campbell (1985), 20 Ohio St.3d 23 , 20 OBR 210, 485 N.E.2d 701 , in which the Supreme Court of Ohio held, “An insurance company, which pays the entire amount of a judgment pursuant to a policy issued to an insured tortfeasor and thereafter becomes subrogated to that claim, is the sole real party in interest in a subsequent action brought against a joint tortfeasor for contribution pursuant to R.C. 2307.31(C).” Id. at syllabus. {¶ 17} In its reply memorandum, appellant pointed out that Shealy remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to substitute the subr