collateral source rule in West Virginia

2025Va. 435, 446 , 307 S.E.2d 603, 615 (1983), the SCAWV explained that [s]imply put, the collateral source rule excludes payments from other sources to plaintiffs from being used to reduce damage awards imposed upon culpable defendants.

2020“Injured plaintiffs should not have to forego the collateral source rule merely to recover prejudgment interest.” Syllabus Point 13, Ilosky v. Michelin Tire Corp., 172 W.

2014“The collateral source rule normally operates to preclude the offsetting of payments made by health and accident insurance companies or other collateral sources as against the damages claimed by the injured party.” Syllabus Point 7, Ratlief v. Yokum, 167 W.Va. 779 , 280 S.E.2d 584 (1981). 4.

2014“The collateral source rule normally operates to preclude the offsetting of payments made by health and accident insurance companies or other collateral sources as against the damages claimed by the injured party.” Syllabus Point 7, Ratlief v. Yokum, 167 W.Va. 779 , 280 S.E.2d 584 (1981). 4.

2014Power Co., 145 W.Va. 478 , 115 S.E.2d 129 (1960) (“The amount of compensation received for injury or death from the Workmen’s Compensation Fund is not a proper subject for a remittitur in an action by the injured person, or the administrator of his estate in case of death, against a third party responsible for his injury or death.”); Syllabus Point 3, Jones v. Laird Found., Inc., 156 W.Va. 479 , 195 S.E.2d 821 (1973) (“Workmen’s Compensation benefits for an original work related injury and for aggravation of an original injury, or for a care in selecting a physician and treatment administered

2014Power Co., 145 W.Va. 478 , 115 S.E.2d 129 (1960) (“The amount of compensation received for injury or death from the Workmen’s Compensation Fund is not a proper subject for a remittitur in an action by the injured person, or the administrator of his estate in case of death, against a third party responsible for his injury or death.”); Syllabus Point 3, Jones v. Laird Found., Inc., 156 W.Va. 479 , 195 S.E.2d 821 (1973) (“Workmen’s Compensation benefits for an original work related injury and for aggravation of an original injury, or for a care in selecting a physician and treatment administered

1996We do remind the trial court of the application of the collateral source rule in West Virginia in Jones v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 145 W.Va. 478, 488 , 115 S.E.2d 129, 134-35 (1960) (stating that while it is well settled that a partial satisfaction of the injured plaintiff by one joint tort-feasor is a satisfaction, pro tan-to, as to all, "it is inapplicable where a plaintiff has received compensation from a collateral source such as ... [workers’] compensation benefits, accident and health insurance, or otherwise").

1996We do remind the trial court of the application of the collateral source rule in West Virginia in Jones v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 145 W.Va. 478, 488 , 115 S.E.2d 129, 134-35 (1960) (stating that while it is well settled that a partial satisfaction of the injured plaintiff by one joint tort-feasor is a satisfaction, pro tan-to, as to all, "it is inapplicable where a plaintiff has received compensation from a collateral source such as ... [workers’] compensation benefits, accident and health insurance, or otherwise").

2014For example, in Graco, Inc. v. CRC, Inc. of Texas, 47 S.W.3d 742 (Tex.App.2001), a plaintiff was injured by a hydraulic ram machine.

2014Graco, 47 S.W.3d at 745 .

2014See also, Syllabus Point 4, Johnson by Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 190 W.Va. 236 , 438 S.E.2d 28 (1993) (“The collateral source rule operates to preclude the offsetting of uninsured or underinsured benefits since the benefits are the result of a contractual arrangement which is independent of the tortfeasor[.]”). 31 Syllabus Point 3, Mercer v. Ott, 78 W.Va. 629 , 89 S.E. 952 (1916) (“Where a workman is killed by an accident arising in the course of and resulting from his employment, and a tort-feasor other than his employer is responsible therefor, the right to compensation from the workm

2014See also, Syllabus Point 4, Johnson by Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 190 W.Va. 236 , 438 S.E.2d 28 (1993) (“The collateral source rule operates to preclude the offsetting of uninsured or underinsured benefits since the benefits are the result of a contractual arrangement which is independent of the tortfeasor[.]”). 31 Syllabus Point 3, Mercer v. Ott, 78 W.Va. 629 , 89 S.E. 952 (1916) (“Where a workman is killed by an accident arising in the course of and resulting from his employment, and a tort-feasor other than his employer is responsible therefor, the right to compensation from the workm

2014In re Briggs, 143 B.R. 438, 463-64 (Bankr.

2014In re Briggs, 143 B.R. 438, 463-64 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1992).

1984In Ratlief v. Yokum, W.Va., 280 S.E.2d 584, 589-90 (1981), we discussed the collateral source rule at some length and concluded in Syllabus Point 7: "The collateral source rule normally operates to preclude the offsetting of payments made by health and accident insurance companies or other collateral *610 sources as against the damages claimed by the injured party." We held in Jones v. Laird Foundation, Inc., 156 W.Va. 479 , 195 S.E.2d 821 (1973), that the collateral source rule applies to workmen's compensation benefits and cannot be used to reduce damages.

1984In Ratlief v. Yokum, W.Va., 280 S.E.2d 584, 589-90 (1981), we discussed the collateral source rule at some length and concluded in Syllabus Point 7: "The collateral source rule normally operates to preclude the offsetting of payments made by health and accident insurance companies or other collateral *610 sources as against the damages claimed by the injured party." We held in Jones v. Laird Foundation, Inc., 156 W.Va. 479 , 195 S.E.2d 821 (1973), that the collateral source rule applies to workmen's compensation benefits and cannot be used to reduce damages.

2015See Kessee v. General Refuse Service, Inc., 216 W.Va. 199 , 604 S.E.2d 449 (2004) (holding that the circuit court’s error in permitting the defendant in a deliberate intent action to introduce evidence that the plaintiff’s beneficiary received social security benefits as a result of her husband’s death, in violation of the collateral source rule, did not warrant setting aside the jury verdict for the defendant because the jury found against the plaintiff on liability and never reached the issue of damages.) Petitioner’s final assignment of error is that the circuit court erred by refusing peti

2015See Kessee v. General Refuse Service, Inc., 216 W.Va. 199 , 604 S.E.2d 449 (2004) (holding that the circuit court’s error in permitting the defendant in a deliberate intent action to introduce evidence that the plaintiff’s beneficiary received social security benefits as a result of her husband’s death, in violation of the collateral source rule, did not warrant setting aside the jury verdict for the defendant because the jury found against the plaintiff on liability and never reached the issue of damages.) Petitioner’s final assignment of error is that the circuit court erred by refusing peti

2020Va. 583, 584 , 413 S.E.2d 404, 405 (1991) (“Prejudgment interest, according to West Virginia Code § 56–6–31 (1981) and the decisions of this Court interpreting that statute, is not a cost, but is a form of compensatory damages intended to make an injured plaintiff whole as far as loss of use of funds is concerned.”). 37 on medical expenses to Ms. Ankrom because her disability benefits covered those expenses—then we would advantage Wal-Mart, disadvantage Ms. Ankrom, and frustrate the purpose of the collateral source doctrine.

2014Virtually all of these payments and services are inadmissible for mitigation purposes.”). 42 Loncar v. Gray, 28 P.3d 928, 933 (Alaska 2001) (“The collateral source rule ‘exclud[es] evidence of other compensation on the theory that such evidence would affect the jury’s judgment unfavorably to the plaintiff on the issues of liability and damages.’ Under this rule, the superior court appropriately excluded Medicaid evidence at the beginning of the trial.”); Wills v. Foster, 229 Ill.2d 393, 418-19 , 892 N.E.2d 1018, 1033 (2008) (Where plaintiff was a recipient of Medicaid and Medicare, “the fact t

2014Loncar v. Gray, 28 P.3d 928, 933 (Alaska 2001) ("The collateral source rule 'exclud[es] evidence of other compensation on the theory that such evidence would affect the jury's judgment unfavorably to the plaintiff on the issues of liability and damages.’ Under this rule, the superior court appropriately excluded Medicaid evidence at the beginning of the trial.”); Wills v. Foster, 229 Ill.2d 393, 418-19 , 323 Ill.Dec. 26 , 892 N.E.2d 1018, 1033 (2008) (Where plaintiff was a recipient of Medicaid and Medicare, "the fact that the collateral source was the government instead of a private insurance

2014Co., 220 F. 35, 37-38 (4th Cir. 1914) (“When an action is brought against a wrongdoer, he is not entitled to have the damages consequent upon the commission of his wrongful act reduced by proving that the plaintiff has received compensation for the loss from a collateral source wholly independent of himself. . . . [T]he court below erred in permitting the defendant to prove that the mother of the decedent received the sum of $2,500 [life] insurance on account of the death of her son.”). 29 Syllabus Point 7, Ratlief v. Yokum, 167 W.Va. 779 , 280 S.E.2d 584 (1981) (“The collateral source rule no

2014Co., 220 F. 35, 37-38 (4th Cir. 1914) (“When an action is brought against a wrongdoer, he is not entitled to have the damages consequent upon the commission of his wrongful act reduced by proving that the plaintiff has received compensation for the loss from a collateral source wholly independent of himself. . . . [T]he court below erred in permitting the defendant to prove that the mother of the decedent received the sum of $2,500 [life] insurance on account of the death of her son.”). 29 Syllabus Point 7, Ratlief v. Yokum, 167 W.Va. 779 , 280 S.E.2d 584 (1981) (“The collateral source rule no

2014This is a recovery for their value and not the expenditures actually made or obligations incurred.45 A majority of jurisdictions that have considered this question hold that a plaintiff can present to the jury the amount that a health care provider initially billed for the services necessarily rendered, and not merely amounts that were later paid.46 The 44 McConnell v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., ___ F.Supp.2d ___, ___, 2014 WL 464799 *4 (D.

2014The term “collateral source” derives from language used in 1870, in Harding v. Town of Townshend, 43 Vt. 536, 538 (1870) (“The policy of insurance is collateral to the remedy against the defendant, and was procured solely by the plaintiff and at his expense, and to the procurement of which the defendant was in no way contributory.”). 7 damage awards imposed upon culpable defendants.”10 The collateral source rule protects payments made to or benefits conferred upon an injured party from sources other than the tortfeasor by denying the tortfeasor any corresponding offset or credit against the in

2014The term “collateral source” derives from language used in 1870, in Harding v. Town of Townshend, 43 Vt. 536, 538 (1870) (“The policy of insurance is collateral to the remedy against the defendant, and was procured solely by the plaintiff and at his expense, and to the procurement of which the defendant was in no way contributory.”). 7 damage awards imposed upon culpable defendants.”10 The collateral source rule protects payments made to or benefits conferred upon an injured party from sources other than the tortfeasor by denying the tortfeasor any corresponding offset or credit against the in

2014Hirschberg, Collateral Source Rule: Receipt of Public or Private Pension as Affecting Recovery Against a Tortfeasor, 75 A.L.R.2d 885 (1961). 41 Baptist Healthcare Sys., Inc. v. Miller, 177 S.W.3d 676, 682-83 (Ky. 2005) (“It is improper to reduce a plaintiff’s damages by payments for medical treatment (continued . . .) 15 benefits received from the original tortfeasor, the tortfeasor’s agent, or a joint tortfeasor reduce a tort defendant’s liability.”43 We turn now to the specific question at hand: does the collateral source rule protect the amounts discounted from the plaintiff’s medical bill

2014Baptist Healthcare Sys., Inc. v. Miller, 177 S.W.3d 676, 682-83 (Ky.2005) ("It is improper to reduce a plaintiff's damages by payments for medical treatment under a health insurance policy if the premiums were paid by the plaintiff or a third party other than the tortfeasor____ Medicare benefits are governed by the collateral source rule and are treated the same as other types of medical insurance.”); Brown v. Van Noy, 879 S.W.2d 667, 676 (Mo.Ct.App.1994) (plaintiff permitted to admit evidence of medical expense paid or “written off” as part of Medicare coverage because it "is not materially d

2014The concern here is that the trier of fact may use that evidence improperly to deny the plaintiff the full recovery to which he is entitled.”); Proctor v. Castelletti, 112 Nev. 88, 90 , 911 P.2d 853, 854 (1996) (adopting a per se rule barring admission of collateral source payments into evidence for any purpose; “Collateral source evidence inevitably prejudices the jury because it greatly increases the likelihood that a jury will reduce a plaintiff’s award of damages because it knows the plaintiff is already receiving compensation.”). 10 conclude that plaintiff sustained no damages for which h

2014The concern here is that the trier of fact may use that evidence improperly to deny the plaintiff the full recovery to which he is entitled.”); Proctor v. Castelletti, 112 Nev. 88, 90 , 911 P.2d 853, 854 (1996) (adopting a per se rule barring admission of collateral source payments into evidence for any purpose; “Collateral source evidence inevitably prejudices the jury because it greatly increases the likelihood that a jury will reduce a plaintiff’s award of damages because it knows the plaintiff is already receiving compensation.”). 10 conclude that plaintiff sustained no damages for which h

2014We reject this tenuous distinction, because the law is clear that the collateral source rule Bynum v. Magno, 101 P.3d at 1157 ; Covington v. George, 359 S.C. at 103-05 , 597 S.E.2d at 144-45 ; Calva-Cerqueira v. United States, 281 F.Supp.2d 279, 295-96 (D.D.C. 2003); Brandon HMA, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 809 So. 2d 611, 618 (Miss. 2001) (and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Frierson, 818 So.2d 1135, 1140 (Miss. 2002)); Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 246 Wis.2d 31, 48-49 , 630 N.W.2d 201, 210 (2001); Olariu v. Marrero, 248 Ga.App. 824, 825 , 549 S.E.2d 121, 123 (2001); Acuar v. Letourneau, 260 Va. 180, 192 , 531 S.E.

2014We reject this tenuous distinction, because the law is clear that the collateral source rule Bynum v. Magno, 101 P.3d at 1157 ; Covington v. George, 359 S.C. at 103-05 , 597 S.E.2d at 144-45 ; Calva-Cerqueira v. United States, 281 F.Supp.2d 279, 295-96 (D.D.C. 2003); Brandon HMA, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 809 So. 2d 611, 618 (Miss. 2001) (and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Frierson, 818 So.2d 1135, 1140 (Miss. 2002)); Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 246 Wis.2d 31, 48-49 , 630 N.W.2d 201, 210 (2001); Olariu v. Marrero, 248 Ga.App. 824, 825 , 549 S.E.2d 121, 123 (2001); Acuar v. Letourneau, 260 Va. 180, 192 , 531 S.E.

2014We reject this tenuous distinction, because the law is clear that the collateral source rule Bynum v. Magno, 101 P.3d at 1157 ; Covington v. George, 359 S.C. at 103-05 , 597 S.E.2d at 144-45 ; Calva-Cerqueira v. United States, 281 F.Supp.2d 279, 295-96 (D.D.C. 2003); Brandon HMA, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 809 So. 2d 611, 618 (Miss. 2001) (and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Frierson, 818 So.2d 1135, 1140 (Miss. 2002)); Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 246 Wis.2d 31, 48-49 , 630 N.W.2d 201, 210 (2001); Olariu v. Marrero, 248 Ga.App. 824, 825 , 549 S.E.2d 121, 123 (2001); Acuar v. Letourneau, 260 Va. 180, 192 , 531 S.E.

2014We reject this tenuous distinction, because the law is clear that the collateral source rule Bynum v. Magno, 101 P.3d at 1157 ; Covington v. George, 359 S.C. at 103-05 , 597 S.E.2d at 144-45 ; Calva-Cerqueira v. United States, 281 F.Supp.2d 279, 295-96 (D.D.C. 2003); Brandon HMA, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 809 So. 2d 611, 618 (Miss. 2001) (and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Frierson, 818 So.2d 1135, 1140 (Miss. 2002)); Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 246 Wis.2d 31, 48-49 , 630 N.W.2d 201, 210 (2001); Olariu v. Marrero, 248 Ga.App. 824, 825 , 549 S.E.2d 121, 123 (2001); Acuar v. Letourneau, 260 Va. 180, 192 , 531 S.E.

2014Virtually all of these payments and services are inadmissible for mitigation purposes.”). 42 Loncar v. Gray, 28 P.3d 928, 933 (Alaska 2001) (“The collateral source rule ‘exclud[es] evidence of other compensation on the theory that such evidence would affect the jury’s judgment unfavorably to the plaintiff on the issues of liability and damages.’ Under this rule, the superior court appropriately excluded Medicaid evidence at the beginning of the trial.”); Wills v. Foster, 229 Ill.2d 393, 418-19 , 892 N.E.2d 1018, 1033 (2008) (Where plaintiff was a recipient of Medicaid and Medicare, “the fact t

2014Virtually all of these payments and services are inadmissible for mitigation purposes.”). 42 Loncar v. Gray, 28 P.3d 928, 933 (Alaska 2001) (“The collateral source rule ‘exclud[es] evidence of other compensation on the theory that such evidence would affect the jury’s judgment unfavorably to the plaintiff on the issues of liability and damages.’ Under this rule, the superior court appropriately excluded Medicaid evidence at the beginning of the trial.”); Wills v. Foster, 229 Ill.2d 393, 418-19 , 892 N.E.2d 1018, 1033 (2008) (Where plaintiff was a recipient of Medicaid and Medicare, “the fact t

2014We reject this tenuous distinction, because the law is clear that the collateral source rule Bynum v. Magno, 101 P.3d at 1157 ; Covington v. George, 359 S.C. at 103-05 , 597 S.E.2d at 144-45 ; Calva-Cerqueira v. United States, 281 F.Supp.2d 279, 295-96 (D.D.C. 2003); Brandon HMA, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 809 So. 2d 611, 618 (Miss. 2001) (and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Frierson, 818 So.2d 1135, 1140 (Miss. 2002)); Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 246 Wis.2d 31, 48-49 , 630 N.W.2d 201, 210 (2001); Olariu v. Marrero, 248 Ga.App. 824, 825 , 549 S.E.2d 121, 123 (2001); Acuar v. Letourneau, 260 Va. 180, 192 , 531 S.E.

2014We reject this tenuous distinction, because the law is clear that the collateral source rule Bynum v. Magno, 101 P.3d at 1157 ; Covington v. George, 359 S.C. at 103-05 , 597 S.E.2d at 144-45 ; Calva-Cerqueira v. United States, 281 F.Supp.2d 279, 295-96 (D.D.C. 2003); Brandon HMA, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 809 So. 2d 611, 618 (Miss. 2001) (and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Frierson, 818 So.2d 1135, 1140 (Miss. 2002)); Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 246 Wis.2d 31, 48-49 , 630 N.W.2d 201, 210 (2001); Olariu v. Marrero, 248 Ga.App. 824, 825 , 549 S.E.2d 121, 123 (2001); Acuar v. Letourneau, 260 Va. 180, 192 , 531 S.E.

2014See also, Syllabus Point 4, Johnson by Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 190 W.Va. 236 , 438 S.E.2d 28 (1993) (“The collateral source rule operates to preclude the offsetting of uninsured or underinsured benefits since the benefits are the result of a contractual arrangement which is independent of the tortfeasor[.]”). 31 Syllabus Point 3, Mercer v. Ott, 78 W.Va. 629 , 89 S.E. 952 (1916) (“Where a workman is killed by an accident arising in the course of and resulting from his employment, and a tort-feasor other than his employer is responsible therefor, the right to compensation from the workm

2014See also, Syllabus Point 4, Johnson by Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 190 W.Va. 236 , 438 S.E.2d 28 (1993) (“The collateral source rule operates to preclude the offsetting of uninsured or underinsured benefits since the benefits are the result of a contractual arrangement which is independent of the tortfeasor[.]”). 31 Syllabus Point 3, Mercer v. Ott, 78 W.Va. 629 , 89 S.E. 952 (1916) (“Where a workman is killed by an accident arising in the course of and resulting from his employment, and a tort-feasor other than his employer is responsible therefor, the right to compensation from the workm

2014We reject this tenuous distinction, because the law is clear that the collateral source rule Bynum v. Magno, 101 P.3d at 1157 ; Covington v. George, 359 S.C. at 103-05 , 597 S.E.2d at 144-45 ; Calva-Cerqueira v. United States, 281 F.Supp.2d 279, 295-96 (D.D.C. 2003); Brandon HMA, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 809 So. 2d 611, 618 (Miss. 2001) (and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Frierson, 818 So.2d 1135, 1140 (Miss. 2002)); Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 246 Wis.2d 31, 48-49 , 630 N.W.2d 201, 210 (2001); Olariu v. Marrero, 248 Ga.App. 824, 825 , 549 S.E.2d 121, 123 (2001); Acuar v. Letourneau, 260 Va. 180, 192 , 531 S.E.

2014We reject this tenuous distinction, because the law is clear that the collateral source rule Bynum v. Magno, 101 P.3d at 1157 ; Covington v. George, 359 S.C. at 103-05 , 597 S.E.2d at 144-45 ; Calva-Cerqueira v. United States, 281 F.Supp.2d 279, 295-96 (D.D.C. 2003); Brandon HMA, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 809 So. 2d 611, 618 (Miss. 2001) (and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Frierson, 818 So.2d 1135, 1140 (Miss. 2002)); Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 246 Wis.2d 31, 48-49 , 630 N.W.2d 201, 210 (2001); Olariu v. Marrero, 248 Ga.App. 824, 825 , 549 S.E.2d 121, 123 (2001); Acuar v. Letourneau, 260 Va. 180, 192 , 531 S.E.