16 Rhode Island opinions name it 2 courts 1966–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Moniz v. Providence Chain Co.green2 sentences2005Ill Analysis A. The Common Law Collateral Source Rule “The collateral source rule is a well-established principle of Rhode Island law.” Moniz v. Providence Chain Co., 618 A.2d 1270, 1271 (R.I.1993). 2000Moniz v. Providence Chain Co., 618 A.2d 1270, 1271 (R.I.1993). | 3 | 3 |
Gelsomino v. Mendoncagreen2 sentences2004Collateral Source Statute The collateral source rule is a common-law doctrine that "mandates that evidence of payments made to an injured party from sources independent of a tort-feasor are inadmissible and shall not diminish the tort-feasors' liability to the plaintiff." Gelsomino v. Mendonca, 723 A.2d 300 , 301 (R.I. 1999). 2004THE COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE The collateral source rule is a common-law doctrine that "mandates that evidence of payments made to an injured party from sources independent of a tort-feasor are inadmissible and shall not diminish the tort-feasors' liability to the plaintiff." Gelsomino v. Mendonca, 723 A.2d 300 , 301 (R.I. 1999). | 1 | 5 |
Oddo v. Cardigreen2 sentences2001This doctrine “mandates that evidence of payments made to an injured party from sources independent of a tort-feasor are inadmissible and shall not diminish the tort-feasor’s liability to the plaintiff. * * * ‘The rationale of this rule is *888 that the injured person is entitled to be made whole, since it is no concern of the tort-feasor that someone else completely unconnected with the tort-feasor has aided his victim * * *,’ and the ‘wrongdoer, responsible for injuring the plaintiff, should not receive [this] windfall.’” Gelsomino v. Mentioned, 723 A.2d 300, 301 (R.I.1999) (quoting Oddo v. 1969I. 578, 218 A.2d 373 , we held that the collateral source rule is to be given a comprehensive application. | 1 | 3 |
Soucy v. Martingreen2 sentences2013The city maintained that, “[t]o a layman, that raises a suspicion that the plaintiff was interested in remaining out of work for the summer, and the fact she received Worker’s [sic] Compensation benefits during that time made it more tenable for her to do so.” After offering Soucy v. Martin, 121 R.I. 651 , 402 A.2d 1167 (1979), and Bookbinder v. Rotando, 109 R.I. 346 , 285 A.2d 387 (1972), to support its contention that “the [c]ourt is not bound by the Collateral Source Rule to prohibit any mention of [the benefits],” the city requested that the court “take a wait-and-see approach” to determin 2013The city maintained that, “[t]o a layman, that raises a suspicion that the plaintiff was interested in remaining out of work for the summer, and the fact she received Worker’s [sic] Compensation benefits during that time made it more tenable for her to do so.” After offering Soucy v. Martin, 121 R.I. 651 , 402 A.2d 1167 (1979), and Bookbinder v. Rotando, 109 R.I. 346 , 285 A.2d 387 (1972), to support its contention that “the [c]ourt is not bound by the Collateral Source Rule to prohibit any mention of [the benefits],” the city requested that the court “take a wait-and-see approach” to determin | 1 | 2 |
Votolato v. Merandigreen1 sentence2001See id. at 461-62 . | 1 | 1 |
Aldcroft v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.green2 sentences2000However, as with the WCA, the remedy provided for in the IOD statute must be exclusive.”); with Aldcroft v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 106 R.I. 311, 316-17 , 259 A.2d 408, 412-13 (1969) (“it is our opinion that if, in enacting § 45-19-1 [the IOD statute], the legislature had intended to abrogate the collateral source rule, it would have said so in express terms”). 2000However, as with the WCA, the remedy provided for in the IOD statute must be exclusive.”); with Aldcroft v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 106 R.I. 311, 316-17 , 259 A.2d 408, 412-13 (1969) (“it is our opinion that if, in enacting § 45-19-1 [the IOD statute], the legislature had intended to abrogate the collateral source rule, it would have said so in express terms”). | 1 | 1 |
McElwain v. Capotostogreen2 sentences1972See McElwain v. Capotosto, 332 Mass. 1 , 122 N.E.2d 901 (1954); compare Ridilla v. Kerns, D.C. 1972See McElwain v. Capotosto, 332 Mass. 1 , 122 N.E.2d 901 (1954); compare Ridilla v. Kerns, D.C. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Colvin v. Goldenberg
green
2 sentences2004"The rationale of this rule is that the injured person is entitled to be made whole, since it is of no concern of the tort-feasor that someone else completely unconnected with the tort-feasor has aided his victim. . . ." Colvin v. Goldenberg, 108 R.I. at 202 , 273 A.2d at 666 . 2004"The rationale of this rule is that the injured person is entitled to be made whole, since it is of no concern of the tort-feasor that someone else completely unconnected with the tort-feasor has aided his victim. . . ." Colvin v. Goldenberg, 108 R.I. at 202 , 273 A.2d at 666 . | 4 | 1999–2004 |
Bookbinder v. Rotondo
green
2 sentences2013The city maintained that, “[t]o a layman, that raises a suspicion that the plaintiff was interested in remaining out of work for the summer, and the fact she received Worker’s [sic] Compensation benefits during that time made it more tenable for her to do so.” After offering Soucy v. Martin, 121 R.I. 651 , 402 A.2d 1167 (1979), and Bookbinder v. Rotando, 109 R.I. 346 , 285 A.2d 387 (1972), to support its contention that “the [c]ourt is not bound by the Collateral Source Rule to prohibit any mention of [the benefits],” the city requested that the court “take a wait-and-see approach” to determin 2013The city maintained that, “[t]o a layman, that raises a suspicion that the plaintiff was interested in remaining out of work for the summer, and the fact she received Worker’s [sic] Compensation benefits during that time made it more tenable for her to do so.” After offering Soucy v. Martin, 121 R.I. 651 , 402 A.2d 1167 (1979), and Bookbinder v. Rotando, 109 R.I. 346 , 285 A.2d 387 (1972), to support its contention that “the [c]ourt is not bound by the Collateral Source Rule to prohibit any mention of [the benefits],” the city requested that the court “take a wait-and-see approach” to determin | 3 | 1977–2013 |
Perry v. New England Transportation Co.
green
1 sentence1969I. 352, 359, 45 A.2d 481, 485 . | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Coyne v. Campbell
green
1 sentence1966The defendant has urged upon us that the view taken in Coyne v. Campbell, 11 N.Y.2d 372 , is the more sound approach to the problem. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.