7 Hawaii opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Hawaii courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bynum v. Magnogreen2 sentences2024The collateral source rule states “that benefits or payments received on behalf of a plaintiff, from an independent source, will not diminish recovery from the wrongdoer.” Bynum, 106 Hawaiʻi at 86, 101 P.3d at 1154 . 2024Sure, Bynum adopted the collateral source rule from the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 106 Hawaiʻi at 86, 101 P.3d at 1154 . | 3 | 5 |
Sato v. Tawatagreen2 sentences2021"Under the collateral source rule, a 'tortfeasor is not entitled to have its liability reduced by benefits received by the plaintiff from a source wholly independent of and collateral to the tortfeasor[.]'" Sam Teague, Ltd. v. Hawai#i Civil Rights Comm'n, 89 Hawai#i 269, 281, 971 P.2d 1104, 1116 (1999) (quoting Sato v. Tawata, 79 Hawai#i 14, 18, 897 P.2d 941, 945 (1995)). 2004"Under the collateral source rule, a `tortfeasor is not entitled to have its liability reduced by benefits received by the plaintiff from a source wholly independent of and collateral to the tortfeasor[.]'" Sam Teague, Ltd. v. Hawai'i Civil Rights Comm'n, 89 Hawai'i 269, 281 , 971 P.2d 1104, 1116 (1999) (quoting Sato v. Tawata, 79 Hawai'i 14, 18 , 897 P.2d 941, 945 (1995)). | 3 | 3 |
Sam Teague, Ltd. v. Hawai'i Civil Rights Commissiongreen2 sentences2021"Under the collateral source rule, a 'tortfeasor is not entitled to have its liability reduced by benefits received by the plaintiff from a source wholly independent of and collateral to the tortfeasor[.]'" Sam Teague, Ltd. v. Hawai#i Civil Rights Comm'n, 89 Hawai#i 269, 281, 971 P.2d 1104, 1116 (1999) (quoting Sato v. Tawata, 79 Hawai#i 14, 18, 897 P.2d 941, 945 (1995)). 2004"Under the collateral source rule, a `tortfeasor is not entitled to have its liability reduced by benefits received by the plaintiff from a source wholly independent of and collateral to the tortfeasor[.]'" Sam Teague, Ltd. v. Hawai'i Civil Rights Comm'n, 89 Hawai'i 269, 281 , 971 P.2d 1104, 1116 (1999) (quoting Sato v. Tawata, 79 Hawai'i 14, 18 , 897 P.2d 941, 945 (1995)). | 2 | 2 |
Bates v. Hogggreen2 sentences2004See also Bates v. Hogg, [ 22 Kan.App.2d 702 ,] 921 P.2d 249, 253 (1996)(precluding application of the collateral source rule when the provider contracted with Medicaid), restricted by Rose v. [Via Christi Health System, Inc., 276 Kan. 539 ,] 78 P.3d 798, 803 (Kan.2003) (limiting Bates decision to Medicaid only); Griffin v. Louisiana Sheriff's Auto Risk, Ass'n, 802 So.2d 691, 714-15 (La.Ct.App.2001)(distinguishing Suhor, 770 So.2d 422 , and Terrell v. Nanda, 759 So.2d 1026 , and cases decided by the third and fifth Louisiana circuits as having been based on federal law, and concluding that the 2004See also Bates v. Hogg, [ 22 Kan.App.2d 702 ,] 921 P.2d 249, 253 (1996)(precluding application of the collateral source rule when the provider contracted with Medicaid), restricted by Rose v. [Via Christi Health System, Inc., 276 Kan. 539 ,] 78 P.3d 798, 803 (Kan.2003) (limiting Bates decision to Medicaid only); Griffin v. Louisiana Sheriff's Auto Risk, Ass'n, 802 So.2d 691, 714-15 (La.Ct.App.2001)(distinguishing Suhor, 770 So.2d 422 , and Terrell v. Nanda, 759 So.2d 1026 , and cases decided by the third and fifth Louisiana circuits as having been based on federal law, and concluding that the | 1 | 1 |
Rose v. via Christi Health System, Inc.green2 sentences2004See also Bates v. Hogg, [ 22 Kan.App.2d 702 ,] 921 P.2d 249, 253 (1996)(precluding application of the collateral source rule when the provider contracted with Medicaid), restricted by Rose v. [Via Christi Health System, Inc., 276 Kan. 539 ,] 78 P.3d 798, 803 (Kan.2003) (limiting Bates decision to Medicaid only); Griffin v. Louisiana Sheriff's Auto Risk, Ass'n, 802 So.2d 691, 714-15 (La.Ct.App.2001)(distinguishing Suhor, 770 So.2d 422 , and Terrell v. Nanda, 759 So.2d 1026 , and cases decided by the third and fifth Louisiana circuits as having been based on federal law, and concluding that the 2004See also Bates v. Hogg, [ 22 Kan.App.2d 702 ,] 921 P.2d 249, 253 (1996)(precluding application of the collateral source rule when the provider contracted with Medicaid), restricted by Rose v. [Via Christi Health System, Inc., 276 Kan. 539 ,] 78 P.3d 798, 803 (Kan.2003) (limiting Bates decision to Medicaid only); Griffin v. Louisiana Sheriff's Auto Risk, Ass'n, 802 So.2d 691, 714-15 (La.Ct.App.2001)(distinguishing Suhor, 770 So.2d 422 , and Terrell v. Nanda, 759 So.2d 1026 , and cases decided by the third and fifth Louisiana circuits as having been based on federal law, and concluding that the | 1 | 1 |
Horton v. Channinggreen2 sentences2004Despite the dissent's attempt to limit Sam Teague, dissenting opinion at ___-___, 101 P.3d at 1167-1168 , this court expressly confirmed that under the collateral source rule, the plaintiff does recover additional compensation and arguably is placed in a position better than he or she would be in were the collateral source rule not applied, inasmuch as the wrongdoer should not profit from third party benefits. [17] From the references in the case, such benefits would include Medicare, Ellsworth, 611 N.W.2d at 767 , and Medicaid, id. at 768 . [18] See Horton v. Channing, 698 So.2d 865, 868-69 ( 2004See Horton v. Channing, 698 So.2d 865, 868-69 (Fla.App.1997) (relying on Florida damages statute, Section 768.21, which states that recovery for damages is permitted for ”[m]edical ... expenses due to the decedent’s injury ... that were paid by or an behalf of [a] decedent ”); Hanif 246 Cal.Rptr. at 195-97 (relying on Cal. Civ.Code § 3359, interpreting "reasonable value" as "a term of limitation, not aggrandizement,” and relying on Cal. Civ.Code § 1431.2(b)(1), interpreting medical expenses as "representing actual pecuniary loss’’); Nishiha-ma v. City & County of San Francisco, 93 Cal.App.4th | 1 | 1 |
Hanif v. Housing Authoritygreen2 sentences2004Despite the dissent's attempt to limit Sam Teague, dissenting opinion at ___-___, 101 P.3d at 1167-1168 , this court expressly confirmed that under the collateral source rule, the plaintiff does recover additional compensation and arguably is placed in a position better than he or she would be in were the collateral source rule not applied, inasmuch as the wrongdoer should not profit from third party benefits. [17] From the references in the case, such benefits would include Medicare, Ellsworth, 611 N.W.2d at 767 , and Medicaid, id. at 768 . [18] See Horton v. Channing, 698 So.2d 865, 868-69 ( 2004Despite the dissent's attempt to limit Sam Teague, dissenting opinion at ___-___, 101 P.3d at 1167-1168 , this court expressly confirmed that under the collateral source rule, the plaintiff does recover additional compensation and arguably is placed in a position better than he or she would be in were the collateral source rule not applied, inasmuch as the wrongdoer should not profit from third party benefits. [17] From the references in the case, such benefits would include Medicare, Ellsworth, 611 N.W.2d at 767 , and Medicaid, id. at 768 . [18] See Horton v. Channing, 698 So.2d 865, 868-69 ( | 1 | 1 |
Griffin v. Louisiana Sheriff's Auto Riskgreen2 sentences2004See also Bates v. Hogg, [ 22 Kan.App.2d 702 ,] 921 P.2d 249, 253 (1996)(precluding application of the collateral source rule when the provider contracted with Medicaid), restricted by Rose v. [Via Christi Health System, Inc., 276 Kan. 539 ,] 78 P.3d 798, 803 (Kan.2003) (limiting Bates decision to Medicaid only); Griffin v. Louisiana Sheriff's Auto Risk, Ass'n, 802 So.2d 691, 714-15 (La.Ct.App.2001)(distinguishing Suhor, 770 So.2d 422 , and Terrell v. Nanda, 759 So.2d 1026 , and cases decided by the third and fifth Louisiana circuits as having been based on federal law, and concluding that the 2004See also Bates v. Hogg, [ 22 Kan.App.2d 702 ,] 921 P.2d 249, 253 (1996)(precluding application of the collateral source rule when the provider contracted with Medicaid), restricted by Rose v. [Via Christi Health System, Inc., 276 Kan. 539 ,] 78 P.3d 798, 803 (Kan.2003) (limiting Bates decision to Medicaid only); Griffin v. Louisiana Sheriff's Auto Risk, Ass'n, 802 So.2d 691, 714-15 (La.Ct.App.2001)(distinguishing Suhor, 770 So.2d 422 , and Terrell v. Nanda, 759 So.2d 1026 , and cases decided by the third and fifth Louisiana circuits as having been based on federal law, and concluding that the | 1 | 1 |
Terrell v. Nandagreen2 sentences2004See also Bates v. Hogg, [ 22 Kan.App.2d 702 ,] 921 P.2d 249, 253 (1996)(precluding application of the collateral source rule when the provider contracted with Medicaid), restricted by Rose v. [Via Christi Health System, Inc., 276 Kan. 539 ,] 78 P.3d 798, 803 (Kan.2003) (limiting Bates decision to Medicaid only); Griffin v. Louisiana Sheriff's Auto Risk, Ass'n, 802 So.2d 691, 714-15 (La.Ct.App.2001)(distinguishing Suhor, 770 So.2d 422 , and Terrell v. Nanda, 759 So.2d 1026 , and cases decided by the third and fifth Louisiana circuits as having been based on federal law, and concluding that the 2004See also Bates v. Hogg, [ 22 Kan.App.2d 702 ,] 921 P.2d 249, 253 (1996)(precluding application of the collateral source rule when the provider contracted with Medicaid), restricted by Rose v. [Via Christi Health System, Inc., 276 Kan. 539 ,] 78 P.3d 798, 803 (Kan.2003) (limiting Bates decision to Medicaid only); Griffin v. Louisiana Sheriff's Auto Risk, Ass'n, 802 So.2d 691, 714-15 (La.Ct.App.2001)(distinguishing Suhor, 770 So.2d 422 , and Terrell v. Nanda, 759 So.2d 1026 , and cases decided by the third and fifth Louisiana circuits as having been based on federal law, and concluding that the | 1 | 1 |
Roundhouse v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.green2 sentences2004See Pryor v. Webber, 23 Ohio St.2d 104 , 263 N.E.2d 235, 240 (1970) (explaining that the great weight of authority is that the payment of wages, whether the result of a contract or simply a gratuity does not reduce the damages otherwise recoverable); see also Roundhouse v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 604 F.2d 990, 994 (6th Cir.1979) (explaining that the collateral source rule applies even if payments are gratuitous). 2004See Pryor v. Webber, 23 Ohio St.2d 104 , 263 N.E.2d 235, 240 (1970) (explaining that the great weight of authority is that the payment of wages, whether the result of a contract or simply a gratuity does not reduce the damages otherwise recoverable); see also Roundhouse v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 604 F.2d 990, 994 (6th Cir.1979) (explaining that the collateral source rule applies even if payments are gratuitous). | 1 | 1 |
McAmis v. Wallacegreen1 sentence2004Ctr., 564 Pa. 156 , 765 A.2d 786, 790 (2001) (relying on Restatement § 911 cmt. h (1977), which specifically references the reasonable exchange value of "services tortiously obtained by the defendant's fraud or duress, or for the value of services rendered in an attempt to mitigate damages"). [20] See McAmis v. Wallace, 980 F.Supp. 181, 185 (W.D.Va.1997)(mem.) (holding that plaintiff was not entitled to recover amounts "written off" under Virginia law), no longer good law following decision in Acuar v. Letourneau, 260 Va. 180 , 531 S.E.2d 316, 322-23 (2000) (holding that under Virginia law pla | 1 | 1 |
Nishihama v. City & County of San Franciscogreen2 sentences2004Despite the dissent's attempt to limit Sam Teague, dissenting opinion at ___-___, 101 P.3d at 1167-1168 , this court expressly confirmed that under the collateral source rule, the plaintiff does recover additional compensation and arguably is placed in a position better than he or she would be in were the collateral source rule not applied, inasmuch as the wrongdoer should not profit from third party benefits. [17] From the references in the case, such benefits would include Medicare, Ellsworth, 611 N.W.2d at 767 , and Medicaid, id. at 768 . [18] See Horton v. Channing, 698 So.2d 865, 868-69 ( 2004Despite the dissent's attempt to limit Sam Teague, dissenting opinion at ___-___, 101 P.3d at 1167-1168 , this court expressly confirmed that under the collateral source rule, the plaintiff does recover additional compensation and arguably is placed in a position better than he or she would be in were the collateral source rule not applied, inasmuch as the wrongdoer should not profit from third party benefits. [17] From the references in the case, such benefits would include Medicare, Ellsworth, 611 N.W.2d at 767 , and Medicaid, id. at 768 . [18] See Horton v. Channing, 698 So.2d 865, 868-69 ( | 1 | 1 |
Ellsworth v. Schelbrockgreen2 sentences2004See Ellsworth, 611 N.W.2d at 767-69 (concluding that the collateral source rule allows recovery of the reasonable *1156 value of medical services without consideration of gratuitous medical services rendered or payments made by outside sources on the plaintiff's behalf). 2004Inasmuch as Medicare/Medicaid are social legislation programs, we conclude that the collateral source rule applies to prevent the reduction of a plaintiff's award of damages to the discounted amount paid by Medicare/Medicaid. [15] See Haselden v. Davis, 353 S.C. 481 , 579 S.E.2d 293 , 294 n. 3 (2003) (holding that "the collateral source rule applies to Medicaid payments"); Brandon HMA, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 809 So.2d 611, 619 (Miss.2001) (holding, by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, "that Medicaid payments are subject to the collateral source rule"); Ellsworth, 611 N.W.2d at 767 (applying the col | 1 | 1 |
Pryor v. Webbergreen2 sentences2004See Pryor v. Webber, 23 Ohio St.2d 104 , 263 N.E.2d 235, 240 (1970) (explaining that the great weight of authority is that the payment of wages, whether the result of a contract or simply a gratuity does not reduce the damages otherwise recoverable); see also Roundhouse v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 604 F.2d 990, 994 (6th Cir.1979) (explaining that the collateral source rule applies even if payments are gratuitous). 2004See Pryor v. Webber, 23 Ohio St.2d 104 , 263 N.E.2d 235, 240 (1970) (explaining that the great weight of authority is that the payment of wages, whether the result of a contract or simply a gratuity does not reduce the damages otherwise recoverable); see also Roundhouse v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 604 F.2d 990, 994 (6th Cir.1979) (explaining that the collateral source rule applies even if payments are gratuitous). | 1 | 1 |
Brandon HMA, Inc. v. Bradshawgreen2 sentences2004Inasmuch as Medicare/Medicaid are social legislation programs, we conclude that the collateral source rule applies to prevent the reduction of a plaintiff's award of damages to the discounted amount paid by Medicare/Medicaid. [15] See Haselden v. Davis, 353 S.C. 481 , 579 S.E.2d 293 , 294 n. 3 (2003) (holding that "the collateral source rule applies to Medicaid payments"); Brandon HMA, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 809 So.2d 611, 619 (Miss.2001) (holding, by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, "that Medicaid payments are subject to the collateral source rule"); Ellsworth, 611 N.W.2d at 767 (applying the col 2004See Haselden, 579 S.E.2d at 294 n. 3 (holding that "the collateral source rule applies to Medicaid payments"); Ellsworth, 611 N.W.2d at 767 (applying the collateral source rule to medical expenses paid directly by Medicaid); Cates, 361 S.E.2d at 738 (explaining that Medicaid is "social legislation; it is the equivalent of health insurance for the needy" and "is an acceptable collateral source"); Thoreson, 201 N.W.2d at 752 (holding that the collateral source rule applies to Medicare, and "is not limited to paid-for benefits but applies to gratuitous medical services provided or paid for by the | 1 | 1 |
Masaki v. Columbia Casualty Co.green2 sentences2004Co., 48 Haw. 136, 142 , 395 P.2d 927, 930 (1964) (citing Kopp v. Home Mut. 2004Co., 48 Haw. 136, 142 , 395 P.2d 927, 930 (1964) (citing Kopp v. Home Mut. | 1 | 1 |
Wolfe v. Whipplegreen2 sentences2004Id. (quoting Wolfe v. Whipple, 112 Ill.App.2d 255 , 251 N.E.2d 77, 82 (1970)). 2004Id. (quoting Wolfe v. Whipple, 112 Ill.App.2d 255 , 251 N.E.2d 77, 82 (1970)). | 1 | 1 |
Dyet v. McKinleygreen2 sentences2004Such cases have based their decisions on essentially two grounds: (1) no one incurs liability for any charges above the Medicare/Medicaid payments, [14] see Suhor v. Lagasse, 770 So.2d 422, 427 (La.Ct.App.2000); Terrell v. Nanda, 759 So.2d 1026, 1031 (La.Ct.App.2000); Hanif v. Housing Auth., 200 Cal.App.3d 635 , 246 Cal.Rptr. 192, 195-97 (Ca.App.1988); Dyet v. McKinley, 139 Idaho 526 , 81 P.3d 1236, 1239 (2003), and (2) because no consideration is exchanged, Medicare/Medicaid discounts are not "benefits of the bargain" received by beneficiaries as a result of obtaining Medicare/Medicaid insura 2004Such cases have based their decisions on essentially two grounds: (1) no one incurs liability for any charges above the Medicare/Medicaid payments, [14] see Suhor v. Lagasse, 770 So.2d 422, 427 (La.Ct.App.2000); Terrell v. Nanda, 759 So.2d 1026, 1031 (La.Ct.App.2000); Hanif v. Housing Auth., 200 Cal.App.3d 635 , 246 Cal.Rptr. 192, 195-97 (Ca.App.1988); Dyet v. McKinley, 139 Idaho 526 , 81 P.3d 1236, 1239 (2003), and (2) because no consideration is exchanged, Medicare/Medicaid discounts are not "benefits of the bargain" received by beneficiaries as a result of obtaining Medicare/Medicaid insura | 1 | 1 |
Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transport Corp.green2 sentences2004Co., 56 Wis.2d 231 , 201 N.W.2d 745, 752 (Wis.1972) (holding that the collateral source rule applies to Medicare, and "is not limited to paid-for benefits but applies to gratuitous medical services provided or paid for by the state"); see also Restatement § 920A cmt. c (explaining that "social legislation benefits" are subject to the collateral source rule); cf. Sato, 79 Hawai'i at 18 , 897 P.2d at 945 (referring to the collateral source rule and HRS § 386-8 in prohibiting evidence of compensation benefits for the sole purpose of reducing the amount of the plaintiff's recovery). 2004Co., 56 Wis.2d 231 , 201 N.W.2d 745, 752 (Wis.1972) (holding that the collateral source rule applies to Medicare, and "is not limited to paid-for benefits but applies to gratuitous medical services provided or paid for by the state"); see also Restatement § 920A cmt. c (explaining that "social legislation benefits" are subject to the collateral source rule); cf. Sato, 79 Hawai'i at 18 , 897 P.2d at 945 (referring to the collateral source rule and HRS § 386-8 in prohibiting evidence of compensation benefits for the sole purpose of reducing the amount of the plaintiff's recovery). | 1 | 1 |
Suhor v. Lagassegreen2 sentences2004See also Bates v. Hogg, [ 22 Kan.App.2d 702 ,] 921 P.2d 249, 253 (1996)(precluding application of the collateral source rule when the provider contracted with Medicaid), restricted by Rose v. [Via Christi Health System, Inc., 276 Kan. 539 ,] 78 P.3d 798, 803 (Kan.2003) (limiting Bates decision to Medicaid only); Griffin v. Louisiana Sheriff's Auto Risk, Ass'n, 802 So.2d 691, 714-15 (La.Ct.App.2001)(distinguishing Suhor, 770 So.2d 422 , and Terrell v. Nanda, 759 So.2d 1026 , and cases decided by the third and fifth Louisiana circuits as having been based on federal law, and concluding that the 2004See also Bates v. Hogg, [ 22 Kan.App.2d 702 ,] 921 P.2d 249, 253 (1996)(precluding application of the collateral source rule when the provider contracted with Medicaid), restricted by Rose v. [Via Christi Health System, Inc., 276 Kan. 539 ,] 78 P.3d 798, 803 (Kan.2003) (limiting Bates decision to Medicaid only); Griffin v. Louisiana Sheriff's Auto Risk, Ass'n, 802 So.2d 691, 714-15 (La.Ct.App.2001)(distinguishing Suhor, 770 So.2d 422 , and Terrell v. Nanda, 759 So.2d 1026 , and cases decided by the third and fifth Louisiana circuits as having been based on federal law, and concluding that the | 1 | 1 |
Moorhead v. Crozer Chester Medical Centergreen2 sentences2004Ctr., 564 Pa. 156 , 765 A.2d 786, 790 (2001) (relying on Restatement § 911 cmt. h (1977), which specifically references the reasonable exchange value of "services tortiously obtained by the defendant's fraud or duress, or for the value of services rendered in an attempt to mitigate damages"). [20] See McAmis v. Wallace, 980 F.Supp. 181, 185 (W.D.Va.1997)(mem.) (holding that plaintiff was not entitled to recover amounts "written off" under Virginia law), no longer good law following decision in Acuar v. Letourneau, 260 Va. 180 , 531 S.E.2d 316, 322-23 (2000) (holding that under Virginia law pla 2004Ctr., 564 Pa. 156 , 765 A.2d 786, 790 (2001) (relying on Restatement § 911 cmt. h (1977), which specifically references the reasonable exchange value of "services tortiously obtained by the defendant's fraud or duress, or for the value of services rendered in an attempt to mitigate damages"). [20] See McAmis v. Wallace, 980 F.Supp. 181, 185 (W.D.Va.1997)(mem.) (holding that plaintiff was not entitled to recover amounts "written off" under Virginia law), no longer good law following decision in Acuar v. Letourneau, 260 Va. 180 , 531 S.E.2d 316, 322-23 (2000) (holding that under Virginia law pla | 1 | 1 |
Haselden v. Davisgreen2 sentences2004Inasmuch as Medicare/Medicaid are social legislation programs, we conclude that the collateral source rule applies to prevent the reduction of a plaintiff's award of damages to the discounted amount paid by Medicare/Medicaid. [15] See Haselden v. Davis, 353 S.C. 481 , 579 S.E.2d 293 , 294 n. 3 (2003) (holding that "the collateral source rule applies to Medicaid payments"); Brandon HMA, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 809 So.2d 611, 619 (Miss.2001) (holding, by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, "that Medicaid payments are subject to the collateral source rule"); Ellsworth, 611 N.W.2d at 767 (applying the col 2004Inasmuch as Medicare/Medicaid are social legislation programs, we conclude that the collateral source rule applies to prevent the reduction of a plaintiff's award of damages to the discounted amount paid by Medicare/Medicaid. [15] See Haselden v. Davis, 353 S.C. 481 , 579 S.E.2d 293 , 294 n. 3 (2003) (holding that "the collateral source rule applies to Medicaid payments"); Brandon HMA, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 809 So.2d 611, 619 (Miss.2001) (holding, by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, "that Medicaid payments are subject to the collateral source rule"); Ellsworth, 611 N.W.2d at 767 (applying the col | 1 | 1 |
Acuar v. Letourneaugreen2 sentences2004Ctr., 564 Pa. 156 , 765 A.2d 786, 790 (2001) (relying on Restatement § 911 cmt. h (1977), which specifically references the reasonable exchange value of "services tortiously obtained by the defendant's fraud or duress, or for the value of services rendered in an attempt to mitigate damages"). [20] See McAmis v. Wallace, 980 F.Supp. 181, 185 (W.D.Va.1997)(mem.) (holding that plaintiff was not entitled to recover amounts "written off" under Virginia law), no longer good law following decision in Acuar v. Letourneau, 260 Va. 180 , 531 S.E.2d 316, 322-23 (2000) (holding that under Virginia law pla 2004Ctr., 564 Pa. 156 , 765 A.2d 786, 790 (2001) (relying on Restatement § 911 cmt. h (1977), which specifically references the reasonable exchange value of "services tortiously obtained by the defendant's fraud or duress, or for the value of services rendered in an attempt to mitigate damages"). [20] See McAmis v. Wallace, 980 F.Supp. 181, 185 (W.D.Va.1997)(mem.) (holding that plaintiff was not entitled to recover amounts "written off" under Virginia law), no longer good law following decision in Acuar v. Letourneau, 260 Va. 180 , 531 S.E.2d 316, 322-23 (2000) (holding that under Virginia law pla | 1 | 1 |
Cates v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2004Inasmuch as Medicare/Medicaid are social legislation programs, we conclude that the collateral source rule applies to prevent the reduction of a plaintiff's award of damages to the discounted amount paid by Medicare/Medicaid. [15] See Haselden v. Davis, 353 S.C. 481 , 579 S.E.2d 293 , 294 n. 3 (2003) (holding that "the collateral source rule applies to Medicaid payments"); Brandon HMA, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 809 So.2d 611, 619 (Miss.2001) (holding, by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, "that Medicaid payments are subject to the collateral source rule"); Ellsworth, 611 N.W.2d at 767 (applying the col 2004See Haselden, 579 S.E.2d at 294 n. 3 (holding that "the collateral source rule applies to Medicaid payments"); Ellsworth, 611 N.W.2d at 767 (applying the collateral source rule to medical expenses paid directly by Medicaid); Cates, 361 S.E.2d at 738 (explaining that Medicaid is "social legislation; it is the equivalent of health insurance for the needy" and "is an acceptable collateral source"); Thoreson, 201 N.W.2d at 752 (holding that the collateral source rule applies to Medicare, and "is not limited to paid-for benefits but applies to gratuitous medical services provided or paid for by the | 1 | 1 |
| Muriel E. Kauffman v. Sidereal Corporation, an Oregon Corporationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Hawaii. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
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|---|---|---|
Pacific Insurance v. Esperanza
green
2 sentences2025Co. Ltd. v. Esperanza, 73 Haw. 403 , 833 P.2d 890 (1992) from Peters v. Weatherwax, 69 Haw. 21 , 731 P.2d 157 (1987)). 6 This concern runs counter to the spirit of the collateral source rule under which “a tortfeasor is not entitled to have its liability reduced by benefits received by the plaintiff from a source wholly independent of and collateral to the tortfeasor” as it robs the injured insured of the benefit of their prudent forethought. 2025Co. Ltd. v. Esperanza, 73 Haw. 403 , 833 P.2d 890 (1992) from Peters v. Weatherwax, 69 Haw. 21 , 731 P.2d 157 (1987)). 6 This concern runs counter to the spirit of the collateral source rule under which “a tortfeasor is not entitled to have its liability reduced by benefits received by the plaintiff from a source wholly independent of and collateral to the tortfeasor” as it robs the injured insured of the benefit of their prudent forethought. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Peters v. Weatherwax
green
2 sentences2025Co. Ltd. v. Esperanza, 73 Haw. 403 , 833 P.2d 890 (1992) from Peters v. Weatherwax, 69 Haw. 21 , 731 P.2d 157 (1987)). 6 This concern runs counter to the spirit of the collateral source rule under which “a tortfeasor is not entitled to have its liability reduced by benefits received by the plaintiff from a source wholly independent of and collateral to the tortfeasor” as it robs the injured insured of the benefit of their prudent forethought. 2025Co. Ltd. v. Esperanza, 73 Haw. 403 , 833 P.2d 890 (1992) from Peters v. Weatherwax, 69 Haw. 21 , 731 P.2d 157 (1987)). 6 This concern runs counter to the spirit of the collateral source rule under which “a tortfeasor is not entitled to have its liability reduced by benefits received by the plaintiff from a source wholly independent of and collateral to the tortfeasor” as it robs the injured insured of the benefit of their prudent forethought. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Kealoha.
green
1 sentence2023With respect to restitution, interpreting HRS § 706-646, we hold that (1) restitution is limited to amounts requested by a victim; and (2) the restitution awarded was not for CW’s “reasonable and verified losses” because (a) HRS § 706-646(3) allows for restitution only for amounts “sufficient to reimburse any victim fully for losses” (emphasis added); (b) the collateral source rule does not apply; and (c) even if HRS § 706-646 was ambiguous, the rule of lenity would not allow the restitution awarded here for the reasons already provided. 2 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACI | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Borge, Jr.
green
1 sentence2023Borge, 152 Hawaiʻi at 469, 526 P.3d at 446 . 6 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER further proceedings consistent with this summary disposition order. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Tuialii
green
2 sentences2023With respect to restitution, interpreting HRS § 706-646, we hold that (1) restitution is limited to amounts requested by a victim; and (2) the restitution awarded was not for CW’s “reasonable and verified losses” because (a) HRS § 706-646(3) allows for restitution only for amounts “sufficient to reimburse any victim fully for losses” (emphasis added); (b) the collateral source rule does not apply; and (c) even if HRS § 706-646 was ambiguous, the rule of lenity would not allow the restitution awarded here for the reasons already provided. 2 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACI 2023The collateral source rule does not apply The circuit court applied the ICA’s opinion in Tuialii, 121 Hawaiʻi 135, 214 P.3d 1125 , when it ordered this restitution award. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Olszewski v. Scripps Health
green
2 sentences2004Despite the dissent's attempt to limit Sam Teague, dissenting opinion at ___-___, 101 P.3d at 1167-1168 , this court expressly confirmed that under the collateral source rule, the plaintiff does recover additional compensation and arguably is placed in a position better than he or she would be in were the collateral source rule not applied, inasmuch as the wrongdoer should not profit from third party benefits. [17] From the references in the case, such benefits would include Medicare, Ellsworth, 611 N.W.2d at 767 , and Medicaid, id. at 768 . [18] See Horton v. Channing, 698 So.2d 865, 868-69 ( 2004Despite the dissent's attempt to limit Sam Teague, dissenting opinion at ___-___, 101 P.3d at 1167-1168 , this court expressly confirmed that under the collateral source rule, the plaintiff does recover additional compensation and arguably is placed in a position better than he or she would be in were the collateral source rule not applied, inasmuch as the wrongdoer should not profit from third party benefits. [17] From the references in the case, such benefits would include Medicare, Ellsworth, 611 N.W.2d at 767 , and Medicaid, id. at 768 . [18] See Horton v. Channing, 698 So.2d 865, 868-69 ( | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.