collateral source rule in Delaware

2026A plaintiff may recover damages under the collateral source rule “for the reasonable value of medical services, even if the plaintiff has received complete recompense for those services from a source other than the tortfeasor.”21 Thus, the “general rule is that the plaintiff’s damages may not be reduced because of payments for treatment paid for by medical insurance to which the tortfeasor did not contribute.”22 However, “the doctrine . . . does permit the tortfeasor to obtain 17 Id. ¶ 4. 18 Mitchell v. Haldar, 883 A.2d 32, 37 (Del. 2005) (citing The Propeller Monticello v. Mollison, 58 U.S. 1

2015The Superior Court relied on our decision in State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company v. Nalbone, which held that the plaintiff was not allowed to seek a damage award that included compensation for lost wages when she was receiving reimbursement for those losses from her employer’s disability plan. 13 The Superior Court found that Nalbone qualified the collateral source rule by requiring the court to examine the 12 Mitchell v. Halder, 883 A.2d 32, 37 (Del. 2006) (quoting Yarrington v. Thornburg, 205 A.2d 1, 2 (Del. 1964)). 13 State Farm Mut.

2023Feb. 12, 2016) (recognizing that “Delaware courts generally find the Restatement of Laws to be persuasive authority on many topics”); Stayton v. Delaware Health Corp., 117 A.3d 521, 533-34 (Del. 2015) (explaining that “Delaware has followed the Restatement (Second) of Torts in its application of the collateral source rule”); In re Peierls Family Inter Vivos Trusts, 77 A.3d 249, 255 (Del. 2013) (explaining that “[w]hen confronted with a choice-of-law issue, Delaware courts adhere to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws”); Falconi v. Coombs & Coombs, Inc., 902 A.2d 1094, 1099 (Del. 2006)

2017Regardless, Plaintiff failed 30 see S.<aymn v_ Delaware main Corp., 117 A.3d 521, 522-25 (Del. 2016). 31 The distinction between co-payments and medical payments covered by Plaintiff’ s insurance company is rendered immaterial to this Court’s damages determination under the collateral source rule.

2026A plaintiff may recover damages under the collateral source rule “for the reasonable value of medical services, even if the plaintiff has received complete recompense for those services from a source other than the tortfeasor.”21 Thus, the “general rule is that the plaintiff’s damages may not be reduced because of payments for treatment paid for by medical insurance to which the tortfeasor did not contribute.”22 However, “the doctrine . . . does permit the tortfeasor to obtain 17 Id. ¶ 4. 18 Mitchell v. Haldar, 883 A.2d 32, 37 (Del. 2005) (citing The Propeller Monticello v. Mollison, 58 U.S. 1

2017By operation of the rule in those circumstances, the plaintiff is able to recover amounts that are paid by no one.”); see also Mi'tchell v. Haldar, 883 A.2d 32, 39 (Del. 2005) (“[Defendant] contends, however, that the Superior Court correctly ruled [plaintiff] could not recover the full amounts of his medical bills unless those amounts were actually paid by Blue-Cross. [Defendant’s] argument reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the proper application of the collateral source rule to a tortfeasor's responsibility to pay the full reasonable value of the necessary medical treatment caused b

2015Co. v. Nalbone, 569 A.2d 71 (Del. 1989). 6 consideration that had been paid by the plaintiff before awarding a double recovery. “[I]f a Plaintiff has paid consideration for recovery from a collateral source,” the Superior Court reasoned, “then the double recovery is permissible.”14 But because Stayton “did not contract with her health provider to accept reduced payments from Medicare for her medical expenses,” the court found the collateral source rule did not apply.15 After examining several cases addressing the question of whether the full amount of medical expenses, including amounts paid f

2014The contract law inspired principle articulated in State Farm, and followed by Mitchell, operates as a limitation on the collateral source rule in that, “the extent to which the collateral source rule should be applied to permit double recovery should 6 883 A.2d 32, 38 . 7 569 A.2d 71, 75 (Del. 1989). 8 Id. 9 883 A.2d 32, 39 . 10 Id. 11 Id. 5 Stayton v. DE Health Corp., et. al.

2014Id. at 10 (“In the absence of a determination that Dr. Vakili was a joint tortfeasor, under the collateral source rule, the Medical Center had no right to a credit because the payment by Dr. Vakili to the Mullins constituted compensation from an independent source.”).

2014After weighing the policy issues raised by the rule, the Delaware Supreme Court held that “the collateral source rule resolves what may be competing equities in favor of the innocent injured plaintiff receiving a windfall, rather than an admitted or adjudged tortfeasor bearing less than the full cost of his or her negligent conduct.” Id.

2010Bennett v. Gordon, 770 A.2d 517, 520 (Del.2001) (holding that absent specific legislative direction we "are not free to impose limits on recovery, or dilute the force of the collateral source rule.”); Nalbone, 569 A.2d at 73 (noting that several states have directly modified the collateral source rule by enacting statutes that limit the extent of double recovery or windfall results). 33 .

2005Farrell v. Gordon, 770 A.2d 517 (Del.2001). 7 .

2024The collateral source rule “resolves what may be competing equities in favor of the innocent injured plaintiff receiving a windfall, rather than an admitted or adjudged tortfeasor bearing less than the full cost of his or her negligent conduct.” In re Rural/Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 102 A.3d 205, 244 (Del.

2024The collateral source rule “resolves what may be competing equities in favor of the innocent injured plaintiff receiving a windfall, rather than an admitted or adjudged tortfeasor bearing less than the full cost of his or her negligent conduct.” In re Rural/Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 102 A.3d 205, 244 (Del.

2023Feb. 12, 2016) (recognizing that “Delaware courts generally find the Restatement of Laws to be persuasive authority on many topics”); Stayton v. Delaware Health Corp., 117 A.3d 521, 533-34 (Del. 2015) (explaining that “Delaware has followed the Restatement (Second) of Torts in its application of the collateral source rule”); In re Peierls Family Inter Vivos Trusts, 77 A.3d 249, 255 (Del. 2013) (explaining that “[w]hen confronted with a choice-of-law issue, Delaware courts adhere to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws”); Falconi v. Coombs & Coombs, Inc., 902 A.2d 1094, 1099 (Del. 2006)

2023Co. v. Kenner, 570 A.2d 1172 , 1175–76 (Del. 1990). 68 Frank v. Horizon Assurance Co., 553 A.2d 1199, 1205 (Del. 1989). 19 an employer’s subrogation rights.69 That focus on contractual expectations is consistent with both the WCA and the UIM statute, which are based on benefits secured by contract rather than the fault-based analysis fundamental to tort cases.70 Under this contractual analysis, the extent to which the collateral source rule should be applied to permit double recovery depends on “the contractual expectations that underlie the collateral source payment.”71 As we previously expla

2023Feb. 12, 2016) (recognizing that “Delaware courts generally find the Restatement of Laws to be persuasive authority on many topics”); Stayton v. Delaware Health Corp., 117 A.3d 521, 533-34 (Del. 2015) (explaining that “Delaware has followed the Restatement (Second) of Torts in its application of the collateral source rule”); In re Peierls Family Inter Vivos Trusts, 77 A.3d 249, 255 (Del. 2013) (explaining that “[w]hen confronted with a choice-of-law issue, Delaware courts adhere to the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws”); Falconi v. Coombs & Coombs, Inc., 902 A.2d 1094, 1099 (Del. 2006)

2017See Jagger, 93 A.3d at 659 .

2017See Smith v. Mahoney, 150 A.3d 1200, 1202 (Del. 2016) (“When a plaintiff claims medical expenses as damages in a personal injury Suit, we have applied the collateral source rule to gratuitous write-offs by physicians and to payments by private health insurers. ln those situations, our prior decisions have allowed the plaintiff to present to the jury the standard cost of the healthcare services instead of the amount actually paid the provider.

2017See Smith v. Mahoney, 150 A.3d 1200, 1202 (Del. 2016) (“When a plaintiff claims medical expenses as damages in a personal injury Suit, we have applied the collateral source rule to gratuitous write-offs by physicians and to payments by private health insurers. ln those situations, our prior decisions have allowed the plaintiff to present to the jury the standard cost of the healthcare services instead of the amount actually paid the provider.

2016See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 374 , 91 S.Ct. 780 (holding that indigent plaintiffs were unconstitutionally denied access to divorce courts by imposition of filing fees they were unable to pay); A.J. ex rel.

2016See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 374 , 91 S.Ct. 780 (holding that indigent plaintiffs were unconstitutionally denied access to divorce courts by imposition of filing fees they were unable to pay); A.J. ex rel.

2016Declining to extend the collateral source rule to Medicaid and Medicare write-offs simply caps the amount of damages Smith can recover to the amount the government actually paid for the services. 25 .Although citizens have a right to “meaningful access to the courts,” (Johnson v. State, 442 A.2d 1362, 1364 (Del. 1982)), courts have typically considered court access claims when financial requirements or government misconduct impedes a plaintiff's ability to bring a claim.

2015See Onusko v. Kerr, 880 A.2d 1022, 1024-25 (Del. 2005) (quoting the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A(2) and comment c.(3) for the proposition that “[p]ayments made to or benefits conferred on the injured party from other sources are not credited against the tortfeasor’s liability, although they cover all or part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable. . . .

2015See Onusko v. Kerr, 880 A.2d 1022, 1024-25 (Del.2005) (quoting the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A(2) and comment c.(3) for the proposition that ''[pjayments made to or benefits conferred on the injured party from other sources, are not-credited against the tortfeasor’s liability, although they cover all or part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable....

2015The law does not differentiate between the nature of the benefits, so long as they did not come from the defendant or a person acting for him.32 States that apply the collateral source rule to write-offs “bargained for” by the injured party express concern about granting double recoveries to plaintiffs given rising insurance costs, but on balance believe that applying the rule to bargained-for write-offs honors the insurance arrangement that the plaintiffs have paid consideration for, and encourages the purchase of insurance.33 Respecting 31 See Bynum, 101 P.3d at 1154 (“Comment b to [Restatem

2015See Bozeman v. State, 879 So.2d 692, 704 (La.2004) ("The collateral source rule expresses a policy judgment in favor of encouraging citizens to purchase and maintain insurance for personal injuries and other eventualities.”) (quoting Helfend v. California Rapid Transit District, 2 Cal.3d 1 , 84 Cal.Rptr. 173 , 465 P.2d 61, 66 (1970)); Acuar v. Letourneau, 260 Va. 180 , 531 S.E.2d 316, 322 (2000) ("Those amounts written off are as much of a benefit for which [the plaintiff] paid consideration as are the actual cash payments made by his health insurance carrier to the health care providers.”). .

2015Stayton’s heathcare provider expenses are limited to the amount paid by CMS for her medical care. 52 Laskowski v. Wallis, 205 A.2d 825, 826 (Del. 1964). 25 STRINE, Chief Justice, concurring: I join the excellent opinion of the Court, and write separately only to note that this decision illustrates the wisdom of taking a Hippocratic approach to applying long-standing doctrines that have been extended beyond what was necessary to accomplish their original goal.

2015See Bozeman v. State, 879 So.2d 692, 704 (La.2004) ("The collateral source rule expresses a policy judgment in favor of encouraging citizens to purchase and maintain insurance for personal injuries and other eventualities.”) (quoting Helfend v. California Rapid Transit District, 2 Cal.3d 1 , 84 Cal.Rptr. 173 , 465 P.2d 61, 66 (1970)); Acuar v. Letourneau, 260 Va. 180 , 531 S.E.2d 316, 322 (2000) ("Those amounts written off are as much of a benefit for which [the plaintiff] paid consideration as are the actual cash payments made by his health insurance carrier to the health care providers.”). .

2015See Bozeman v. State, 879 So.2d 692, 704 (La.2004) ("The collateral source rule expresses a policy judgment in favor of encouraging citizens to purchase and maintain insurance for personal injuries and other eventualities.”) (quoting Helfend v. California Rapid Transit District, 2 Cal.3d 1 , 84 Cal.Rptr. 173 , 465 P.2d 61, 66 (1970)); Acuar v. Letourneau, 260 Va. 180 , 531 S.E.2d 316, 322 (2000) ("Those amounts written off are as much of a benefit for which [the plaintiff] paid consideration as are the actual cash payments made by his health insurance carrier to the health care providers.”). .

2015Its first application in the United States “was apparently more than one hundred fifty years ago in a case ultimately decided by the United States Supreme Court.”22 More than a half century ago, this Court recognized the collateral source rule as “firmly embedded in our law.”23 The collateral source rule is “designed to strike a balance between two competing principles of tort law: (1) a plaintiff is entitled to compensation sufficient to make him whole, but no more; and (2) a defendant is liable for all damages that proximately result from his wrong.” 24 Where a plaintiff receives payments or

2015Its first application in the United States “was apparently more than one hundred fifty years ago in a case ultimately decided by the United States Supreme Court.”22 More than a half century ago, this Court recognized the collateral source rule as “firmly embedded in our law.”23 The collateral source rule is “designed to strike a balance between two competing principles of tort law: (1) a plaintiff is entitled to compensation sufficient to make him whole, but no more; and (2) a defendant is liable for all damages that proximately result from his wrong.” 24 Where a plaintiff receives payments or

2015See Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., 52 Cal.4th 541 , 129 Cal.Rptr.3d 325 , 257 P.3d 1130 , 1133 (2011) (finding the collateral source rule inapplicable to provider write-offs because "[t]hey are neither paid to the providers on the plaintiff's behalf nor paid to the plaintiff in indemnity of his or her expenses”); Stanley v. Walker, 906 N.E.2d 852, 857-58 (Ind.2009) ("[B]ecause no one pays the negotiated reduction, admitting evidence of [write-offs] does not violate the purpose behind the collateral-source rule.

2015See Howell v. Hamilton Meat & Provisions, Inc., 257 P.3d 1130 , 1133 (Cal. 20011) (finding the collateral source rule inapplicable to provider write-offs because “[t]hey are neither paid to the providers on the plaintiff’s behalf nor paid to the plaintiff in indemnity of his or her expenses”); Stanley v. Walker, 906 N.E.2d 852, 857-58 (Ind. 2009) (“[B]ecause no one pays the negotiated reduction, admitting evidence of [write-offs] does not violate the purpose behind the collateral-source rule.

2015See Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc., 52 Cal.4th 541 , 129 Cal.Rptr.3d 325 , 257 P.3d 1130 , 1133 (2011) (finding the collateral source rule inapplicable to provider write-offs because "[t]hey are neither paid to the providers on the plaintiff's behalf nor paid to the plaintiff in indemnity of his or her expenses”); Stanley v. Walker, 906 N.E.2d 852, 857-58 (Ind.2009) ("[B]ecause no one pays the negotiated reduction, admitting evidence of [write-offs] does not violate the purpose behind the collateral-source rule.

2015The tortfeasor does not obtain credit because of payments made by a third party on behalf of the plaintiff.”) (quoting Robinson v. Bates, 112 Ohio St.3d 17 , 857 N.E.2d 1195, 1200 (2006)); Robinson 857 N.E.2d at 1200 ("The collateral source rule does not apply to write-offs of expenses that are never paid....

2015The tortfeasor does not obtain credit because of payments made by a third party on behalf of the plaintiff.”) (quoting Robinson v. Bates, 112 Ohio St.3d 17 , 857 N.E.2d 1195, 1200 (2006)); Robinson 857 N.E.2d at 1200 ("The collateral source rule does not apply to write-offs of expenses that are never paid....

2015Ctr., 564 Pa. 156 , 765 A.2d 786, 791 (2001) (finding the collateral source rule inapplicable to the provider’s write-off, "since that amount was not paid by any collateral source”); Haygood v. De Escabedo, 356 S.W.3d 390, 395 (Tex.2011) ("The benefit of insurance to the insured is the payment of charges to owed to the health care provider.

2015Ctr., 564 Pa. 156 , 765 A.2d 786, 791 (2001) (finding the collateral source rule inapplicable to the provider’s write-off, "since that amount was not paid by any collateral source”); Haygood v. De Escabedo, 356 S.W.3d 390, 395 (Tex.2011) ("The benefit of insurance to the insured is the payment of charges to owed to the health care provider.

2015Thus the fact that the doctor did not charge for his services . . . does not prevent his recovery for the reasonable value of the services.36 (finding the collateral source rule inapplicable to the provider’s write-off, “since that amount was not paid by any collateral source”); Haygood v. De Escabedo, 356 S.W.3d 390, 395 (Tex. 2011) (“The benefit of insurance to the insured is the payment of charges to owed to the health care provider.

2015Ctr., 564 Pa. 156 , 765 A.2d 786, 791 (2001) (finding the collateral source rule inapplicable to the provider’s write-off, "since that amount was not paid by any collateral source”); Haygood v. De Escabedo, 356 S.W.3d 390, 395 (Tex.2011) ("The benefit of insurance to the insured is the payment of charges to owed to the health care provider.

2015See Bynum v. Magno, 101 P.3d 1149, 1156 (Haw.2004) ("Because a plaintiff like Joseph is not required to pay the difference between the standard rate and the Medicare/Medicaid payment, that part of such medical services attributable to such difference could be viewed conceptually as gratuitous service to the plaintiff, so as to come within the collateral source rule.”); Wills v. Foster, 229 Ill.2d 393, 323 Ill.Dec. 26 , 892 N.E.2d 1018, 1024 (2008) (citing comment c(3) to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A regarding gratuities, which states "the fact the doctor did not charge for his serv

2015See Bynum v. Magno, 101 P.3d 1149, 1156 (Haw.2004) ("Because a plaintiff like Joseph is not required to pay the difference between the standard rate and the Medicare/Medicaid payment, that part of such medical services attributable to such difference could be viewed conceptually as gratuitous service to the plaintiff, so as to come within the collateral source rule.”); Wills v. Foster, 229 Ill.2d 393, 323 Ill.Dec. 26 , 892 N.E.2d 1018, 1024 (2008) (citing comment c(3) to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A regarding gratuities, which states "the fact the doctor did not charge for his serv

2015See Bozeman v. State, 879 So.2d 692, 704 (La.2004) ("The collateral source rule expresses a policy judgment in favor of encouraging citizens to purchase and maintain insurance for personal injuries and other eventualities.”) (quoting Helfend v. California Rapid Transit District, 2 Cal.3d 1 , 84 Cal.Rptr. 173 , 465 P.2d 61, 66 (1970)); Acuar v. Letourneau, 260 Va. 180 , 531 S.E.2d 316, 322 (2000) ("Those amounts written off are as much of a benefit for which [the plaintiff] paid consideration as are the actual cash payments made by his health insurance carrier to the health care providers.”). .

2015See Bozeman v. State, 879 So.2d 692, 704 (La.2004) ("The collateral source rule expresses a policy judgment in favor of encouraging citizens to purchase and maintain insurance for personal injuries and other eventualities.”) (quoting Helfend v. California Rapid Transit District, 2 Cal.3d 1 , 84 Cal.Rptr. 173 , 465 P.2d 61, 66 (1970)); Acuar v. Letourneau, 260 Va. 180 , 531 S.E.2d 316, 322 (2000) ("Those amounts written off are as much of a benefit for which [the plaintiff] paid consideration as are the actual cash payments made by his health insurance carrier to the health care providers.”). .

2015States that apply the collateral source rule to provider write-offs as they do to third party payments view provider write-offs as benefits conferred on plaintiffs by providers, in the form of services gratuitously rendered at a price below the standard rate. 30 These states emphasize the collateral source rule’s traditional purpose of ensuring that benefits conferred on injured parties by third parties do not end up going to the defendants who injured them, unless the defendants can 29 Yarrington, 205 A.2d at 2 . 30 See Bynum v. Magno, 101 P.3d 1149, 1156 (Haw. 2004) (“Because a plaintiff lik

2015See Bynum v. Magno, 101 P.3d 1149, 1156 (Haw.2004) ("Because a plaintiff like Joseph is not required to pay the difference between the standard rate and the Medicare/Medicaid payment, that part of such medical services attributable to such difference could be viewed conceptually as gratuitous service to the plaintiff, so as to come within the collateral source rule.”); Wills v. Foster, 229 Ill.2d 393, 323 Ill.Dec. 26 , 892 N.E.2d 1018, 1024 (2008) (citing comment c(3) to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A regarding gratuities, which states "the fact the doctor did not charge for his serv

2014The law properly 34 Haselden v. Davis, 579 S.E.2d 293, 296 (S.C. 2003). 35 Harris v. Standard Accident and Ins.