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18 Kentucky opinions name it 3 courts 1974–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Baptist Healthcare Systems, Inc. v. Millergreen2 sentences2018Collateral Source Rule As summarized by our Supreme Court, the collateral source rule "allows the plaintiff to (1) seek recovery *646 for the reasonable value of medical services for an injury, and (2) seek recovery for the reasonable value of medical services without consideration of insurance payments made to the injured party." Baptist Healthcare Systems, Inc. v. Miller , 177 S.W.3d 676 , 682 (Ky. 2005). 2009The collateral source rule "allows a plaintiff to (1) seek recovery for the reasonable value of medical services for an injury, and (2) seek recovery for the reasonable value of medical services without consideration of insurance payments made to the injured party." Baptist Healthcare Systems, Inc. v. Miller, 177 S.W.3d 676, 683 (Ky.2005) (citing 22 Am. | 4 | 4 |
Hardaway Management Co. v. Southerlandgreen2 sentences2011In the case before us, there was a valid reason — the collateral source exception did not affect the “strong public policy in this Commonwealth against double recovery for the same elements of loss.” Hardaway Management Co. v. Southerland, 977 S.W.2d 910, 918 (Ky.1998). 2006In Hardaway Management Co. v. Southerland, 977 S.W.2d 910, 918 (Ky.1998), the Supreme Court of Kentucky confirmed the availability of the collateral source rule in statutory discrimination claims: There is a strong public policy in this Commonwealth against double recovery for the same elements of loss. | 3 | 3 |
Taylor v. Jennisongreen2 sentences1998An exception, of course, is the collateral source rule that "damages recoverable for a wrong are not diminished by the fact that the injured party has been wholly or partly indemnified by insurance ( to whose procurement the wrongdoer did not contribute )." Taylor v. Jennison, Ky., 335 S.W.2d 902, 903 (1960) (emphasis added); see also, Burke Enterprises, Inc. v. Mitchell, Ky., 700 S.W.2d 789 (1985). 1998An exception, of course, is the collateral source rule that “damages recoverable for a wrong are not diminished by the fact that the injured party has been wholly or partly indemnified by insurance (to whose procurement the wrongdoer did not contribute).” Taylor v. Jennison, Ky., 335 S.W.2d 902, 903 (1960) (emphasis added); see also, Burke Enterprises, Inc. v. Mitchell, Ky., 700 S.W.2d 789 (1985). | 3 | 3 |
Burke Enterprises, Inc. v. Mitchellgreen2 sentences1998An exception, of course, is the collateral source rule that "damages recoverable for a wrong are not diminished by the fact that the injured party has been wholly or partly indemnified by insurance ( to whose procurement the wrongdoer did not contribute )." Taylor v. Jennison, Ky., 335 S.W.2d 902, 903 (1960) (emphasis added); see also, Burke Enterprises, Inc. v. Mitchell, Ky., 700 S.W.2d 789 (1985). 1998An exception, of course, is the collateral source rule that “damages recoverable for a wrong are not diminished by the fact that the injured party has been wholly or partly indemnified by insurance (to whose procurement the wrongdoer did not contribute).” Taylor v. Jennison, Ky., 335 S.W.2d 902, 903 (1960) (emphasis added); see also, Burke Enterprises, Inc. v. Mitchell, Ky., 700 S.W.2d 789 (1985). | 2 | 3 |
O'BRYAN v. Hedgespethgreen2 sentences2005The collateral source rule first entered Kentucky's jurisprudence in 1901 (not prior to the adoption of our present Constitution, as suggested in O'Bryan v. Hedgespeth, 892 S.W.2d 571, 578 (Ky.1995) — a suggestion no doubt intended as a signal that any legislative attempt to abolish the rule would be challenged as unconstitutional under the so-called "jural rights" doctrine). 2005The collateral source rule first entered Kentucky’s jurisprudence in 1901 (not pri- or to the adoption of our present Constitution, as suggested in O’Bryan v. Hedgespeth, 892 S.W.2d 571, 578 (Ky.1995)—a suggestion no doubt intended as a signal that any legislative attempt to abolish the rule would be challenged as unconstitutional under the so-called “jural rights” doctrine). | 1 | 3 |
Davidson v. Voglergreen2 sentences1995See, e.g., Davidson v. Vogler, Ky., 507 S.W.2d 160, 164 (1974), and, more recently, Burke Enterprises, Inc. v. Mitchell, Ky., 700 S.W.2d 789, 796 (1985), stating that “to depart from the collateral source rule would provide the tortfea-sor a ‘windfall’ to the substantial detriment of the injured party.” There is no legal reason why the tortfeasor or his liability insurance company should receive a “windfall” for benefits to which the plaintiff may be entitled by reason of his own foresight in paying the premium or as part of what he has earned in his employment, and benefits received are usual 1985Whereas some of the statements by our Court in our opinion in Rankin v. Blue Grass Boys Ranch, Inc., Ky., 469 S.W.2d 767 (1971) created temporary confusion as to the precise meaning of the collateral source rule, the case of Davidson v. Vogler, Ky., 507 S.W.2d 160 (1974) clarified our holding in Rankin , and modified Rankin accordingly, citing and reaffirming the rule in Hellmueller Baking Co. v. Risen, supra . | 1 | 2 |
Schwartz v. Hastygreen1 sentence2022“The collateral source rule provides that benefits received by an injured party for his injuries from a source wholly independent of, and collateral to, the tortfeasor will not be deducted from or diminish the damages otherwise recoverable from the tortfeasor.” Schwartz v. Hasty, 175 S.W.3d 621, 626 (Ky. -11- App. 2005) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Christine H. Patterson v. Norfolk and Western Railway Company, a Foreign Corporationgreen1 sentence2011Co., 489 F.2d 303, 308 (6th Cir.1973) (FELA case). | 1 | 1 |
George G. Santa Maria v. Metro-North Commuter Railroadgreen1 sentence2009See Haischer v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 381 Md. 119 , 848 A.2d 620, 629 (2004) (citing Santa Maria v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 81 F.3d 265, 273 (2nd Cir.1996); Gladden v. P. Henderson & Co., 385 F.2d 480 (3rd Cir. 1967); Moses v. Union Pac. | 1 | 1 |
Haischer v. CSX Transportation, Inc.green2 sentences2009See Haischer v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 381 Md. 119 , 848 A.2d 620, 629 (2004) (citing Santa Maria v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 81 F.3d 265, 273 (2nd Cir.1996); Gladden v. P. Henderson & Co., 385 F.2d 480 (3rd Cir. 1967); Moses v. Union Pac. 2009See Haischer v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 381 Md. 119 , 848 A.2d 620, 629 (2004) (citing Santa Maria v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 81 F.3d 265, 273 (2nd Cir.1996); Gladden v. P. Henderson & Co., 385 F.2d 480 (3rd Cir. 1967); Moses v. Union Pac. | 1 | 1 |
Peele v. Gillespiegreen1 sentence2005See Voge v. Anderson, 181 Wis.2d 726 , 512 N.W.2d 749, 751 (1994); Johnson by Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 190 W.Va. 236 , 438 S.E.2d 28, 35 (1993); Hernandez v. Gisonni, 657 So.2d 33, 35 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995); Estate of Rattenni v. Grainger, 298 S.C. 276 , 379 S.E.2d 890 (1989); Peele v. Gillespie, 658 N.E.2d 954, 958 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). | 1 | 1 |
Hernandez v. Gisonnigreen1 sentence2005See Voge v. Anderson, 181 Wis.2d 726 , 512 N.W.2d 749, 751 (1994); Johnson by Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 190 W.Va. 236 , 438 S.E.2d 28, 35 (1993); Hernandez v. Gisonni, 657 So.2d 33, 35 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995); Estate of Rattenni v. Grainger, 298 S.C. 276 , 379 S.E.2d 890 (1989); Peele v. Gillespie, 658 N.E.2d 954, 958 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). | 1 | 1 |
McAmis v. Wallacegreen2 sentences2005McAmis v. Wallace, 980 F.Supp. 181, 185 (W.D.Va.1997). 2005McAmis v. Wallace, 980 F.Supp. 181, 185 (W.D.Va.1997). | 1 | 1 |
McCormack Baron & Associates v. Trudeauxgreen1 sentence2005See McCormack Baron & Associates v. Trudeaux, 885 S.W.2d 708, 710-11 (Ky.App.1994). | 1 | 1 |
Voge v. Andersongreen2 sentences2005See Voge v. Anderson, 181 Wis.2d 726 , 512 N.W.2d 749, 751 (1994); Johnson by Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 190 W.Va. 236 , 438 S.E.2d 28, 35 (1993); Hernandez v. Gisonni, 657 So.2d 33, 35 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995); Estate of Rattenni v. Grainger, 298 S.C. 276 , 379 S.E.2d 890 (1989); Peele v. Gillespie, 658 N.E.2d 954, 958 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). 2005See Voge v. Anderson, 181 Wis.2d 726 , 512 N.W.2d 749, 751 (1994); Johnson by Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 190 W.Va. 236 , 438 S.E.2d 28, 35 (1993); Hernandez v. Gisonni, 657 So.2d 33, 35 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995); Estate of Rattenni v. Grainger, 298 S.C. 276 , 379 S.E.2d 890 (1989); Peele v. Gillespie, 658 N.E.2d 954, 958 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). | 1 | 1 |
Weatherly v. Flournoygreen1 sentence2005See, e.g., Weatherly v. Flournoy, 929 P.2d 296, 298 (Okla.Ct.App.1996); Paulson v. Allstate Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Johnson Ex Rel. Johnson v. General Motors Corp.green2 sentences2005See Voge v. Anderson, 181 Wis.2d 726 , 512 N.W.2d 749, 751 (1994); Johnson by Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 190 W.Va. 236 , 438 S.E.2d 28, 35 (1993); Hernandez v. Gisonni, 657 So.2d 33, 35 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995); Estate of Rattenni v. Grainger, 298 S.C. 276 , 379 S.E.2d 890 (1989); Peele v. Gillespie, 658 N.E.2d 954, 958 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). 2005See Voge v. Anderson, 181 Wis.2d 726 , 512 N.W.2d 749, 751 (1994); Johnson by Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 190 W.Va. 236 , 438 S.E.2d 28, 35 (1993); Hernandez v. Gisonni, 657 So.2d 33, 35 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995); Estate of Rattenni v. Grainger, 298 S.C. 276 , 379 S.E.2d 890 (1989); Peele v. Gillespie, 658 N.E.2d 954, 958 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). | 1 | 1 |
Koffman v. Leichtfussgreen2 sentences2005See Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 246 Wis.2d 31 , 630 N.W.2d 201, 211 (2001). 2005See Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 246 Wis.2d 31 , 630 N.W.2d 201, 211 (2001). | 1 | 1 |
| Bryan v. Henderson Electric Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Rankin v. Blue Grass Boys Ranch, Inc.
green
2 sentences1985Whereas some of the statements by our Court in our opinion in Rankin v. Blue Grass Boys Ranch, Inc., Ky., 469 S.W.2d 767 (1971) created temporary confusion as to the precise meaning of the collateral source rule, the case of Davidson v. Vogler, Ky., 507 S.W.2d 160 (1974) clarified our holding in Rankin , and modified Rankin accordingly, citing and reaffirming the rule in Hellmueller Baking Co. v. Risen, supra . 1985Whereas some of the statements by our Court in our opinion in Rankin v. Blue Grass Boys Ranch, Inc., Ky., 469 S.W.2d 767 (1971) created temporary confusion as to the precise meaning of the collateral source rule, the case of Davidson v. Vogler, Ky., 507 S.W.2d 160 (1974) clarified our holding in Rankin , and modified Rankin accordingly, citing and reaffirming the rule in Hellmueller Baking Co. v. Risen, supra. In Davidson v. Vogler, supra, after citing the general rule, 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages § 208, p. 291, the court states that to depart from the collateral source rule would provide the tortfe | 3 | 1974–1985 |
Beckner v. Palmore
green
2 sentences2005In allowing the evidence, the Court of Appeals relied on Beckner v. Palmore, 719 S.W.2d 288 (Ky.App.1986), which mandated the same procedure with respect to medical bills previously paid in the form of basic reparation benefits (BRBs). 2005In allowing the evidence, the Court of Appeals relied on Beckner v. Palmore, 719 S.W.2d 288 (Ky.App.1986), which mandated the same procedure with respect to medical bills previously paid in the form of basic reparation benefits (BRBs). | 2 | 2004–2005 |
Peters v. Wooten
green
1 sentence2021Wooten, 297 S.W.3d at 63 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Lanham v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2018We initially noted in dicta that "the collateral source rule does not apply because the reduction involves amounts written-off and never subject to indemnification or paid by a third-party source...." Id. at 675 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Gonzalez v. Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad
green
1 sentence2011Lyons, 684 F.Supp. at 910 ; Gonzalez, 638 F.Supp. at 309-10 ; see also Blake v. Delaware & Hudson Ry. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Rick E. Clark, & Cross-Appellee v. Burlington Northern, Inc., a Corporation, & Cross-Appellant
green
2 sentences2011The courts in both cases also relied on Clark v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 726 F.2d 448 (8th Cir.1984), wherein that court said “the employer’s *822 manifest intent to avoid double liability in offering disability plans must be respected if the collateral source rule is not to swallow up 45 U.S.C. § 55 at the ultimate expense of employees.” 726 F.2d at 451 . 2011The courts in both cases also relied on Clark v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 726 F.2d 448 (8th Cir.1984), wherein that court said “the employer’s *822 manifest intent to avoid double liability in offering disability plans must be respected if the collateral source rule is not to swallow up 45 U.S.C. § 55 at the ultimate expense of employees.” 726 F.2d at 451 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Lyons v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.
green
1 sentence2011Lyons, 684 F.Supp. at 910 ; Gonzalez, 638 F.Supp. at 309-10 ; see also Blake v. Delaware & Hudson Ry. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Theodore Gladden v. P. Henderson & Co. v. Lavino Shipping Company, Third-Party
green
1 sentence2009See Haischer v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 381 Md. 119 , 848 A.2d 620, 629 (2004) (citing Santa Maria v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 81 F.3d 265, 273 (2nd Cir.1996); Gladden v. P. Henderson & Co., 385 F.2d 480 (3rd Cir. 1967); Moses v. Union Pac. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
cluster 760824
green
1 sentence2006Contrary to Cundiffs assertion that the tort concept of “collateral source” is inapplicable to this proceeding, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hamlin v. Charter Tp. of Flint, 165 F.3d 426 , 434-5 (6th Cir.1999), clearly explained the rationale for applying that rule to statutory discrimination claims: Applying the collateral source rule in the employment discrimination context prevents the discriminatory employer from avoiding liability and experiencing a windfall, and also promotes the deterrence functions of discrimination statutes. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Propeller Monticello v. Mollison
green
2 sentences2005The collateral source rule originated in English common law and debuted in this country in The Propeller Monticello v. Mollison, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 152 , 15 L.Ed. 68 (1854). 2005The collateral source rule originated in English common law and debuted in this country in The Propeller Monticello v. Mollison, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 152 , 15 L.Ed. 68 (1854). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Estate of Rattenni Ex Rel. Rattenni v. Grainger
green
2 sentences2005See Voge v. Anderson, 181 Wis.2d 726 , 512 N.W.2d 749, 751 (1994); Johnson by Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 190 W.Va. 236 , 438 S.E.2d 28, 35 (1993); Hernandez v. Gisonni, 657 So.2d 33, 35 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995); Estate of Rattenni v. Grainger, 298 S.C. 276 , 379 S.E.2d 890 (1989); Peele v. Gillespie, 658 N.E.2d 954, 958 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). 2005In Estate of Rattenni , the court stated, “[w]e find no persuasive reason to distinguish underinsurance proceeds from other insurance proceeds that are subject to the collateral source rule.” 379 S.E.2d at 890 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Thomas v. Greenview Hospital, Inc.
green
2 sentences2005I note in passing that although the majority cites and quotes Schwartz v. Hasty, 2003-CA-000796-MR, an opinion of the Court of Appeals addressing the collateral source rule in the context of underinsured motorist automobile insurance (and which is currently designated “not final and shall not be cited as authority in any courts of the Commonwealth of Kentucky”), ante, at 683, it ignores Thomas v. Greenview Hospital, Inc., 127 S.W.3d 663 (Ky.App.2004), which addressed the collateral source rule in the context of, coincidentally, Medicare write-offs. “[T]he trial court acted properly in allowing 2005I note in passing that although the majority cites and quotes Schwartz v. Hasty, 2003-CA-000796-MR, an opinion of the Court of Appeals addressing the collateral source rule in the context of underinsured motorist automobile insurance (and which is currently designated “not final and shall not be cited as authority in any courts of the Commonwealth of Kentucky”), ante, at 683, it ignores Thomas v. Greenview Hospital, Inc., 127 S.W.3d 663 (Ky.App.2004), which addressed the collateral source rule in the context of, coincidentally, Medicare write-offs. “[T]he trial court acted properly in allowing | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Edwards v. Land green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Commonwealth v. Reneer green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Ratcliff v. Smith green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.