collateral source rule in Pennsylvania

2005See id. at 6 (citing Johnson v. Beane, 541 Pa. 449 , 664 A.2d 96, 100 (1995)); 3 accord Beechwoods Flying Service, Inc. v. Al Hamilton Contracting Corp., 504 Pa. 618, 625 , 476 A.2d 350, 353 (1984) (explaining that the collateral source rule was “intended to prevent a wrongdoer from taking advantage of the fortuitous existence of a collateral remedy”).

2005See id. at 6 (citing Johnson v. Beane, 541 Pa. 449 , 664 A.2d 96, 100 (1995)); 3 accord Beechwoods Flying Service, Inc. v. Al Hamilton Contracting Corp., 504 Pa. 618, 625 , 476 A.2d 350, 353 (1984) (explaining that the collateral source rule was “intended to prevent a wrongdoer from taking advantage of the fortuitous existence of a collateral remedy”).

2016M Id. (internal quotations omitted)( citations omined). br, Id. at 1013. 61 JsL at 1013-14. 6x Lobalzo v. Yarolj, I 85 A.2d 557, 560 (Pa. 1962). 69Nigra v. Walsh, 797 A.2d 353 . 361 (Pa. Super. 2002). 25 A.25 because of the violations of the collateral source rule by the defendant.

2016So consider, if you get to that, is that a fair estimation of what she needs or is she getting everything that she needs?" 70 l:iiwl, 797 A.2d at 360 . 71 iQ., at 358. 72 N.T. 9/23/14, 37: 17-38: 12 (emphasis added). 26 A.26 The above comments made by defense counsel, in clear violation of the collateral source rule, suggest to the jury that Jenna had all the care she needed and that she did not require any additional compensation.

2015Generally, “the collateral source rule provides that payments from a collateral source shall not diminish the damages otherwise recoverable from the wrongdoer.” Johnson v. Beane, 541 Pa. 449 , 664 A.2d 96, 100 (1995).

2015Generally, “the collateral source rule provides that payments from a collateral source shall not diminish the damages otherwise recoverable from the wrongdoer.” Johnson v. Beane, 541 Pa. 449 , 664 A.2d 96, 100 (1995).

2021The collateral source rule “prohibits a defendant in a personal injury action from introducing evidence of the plaintiff’s receipt of benefits from a collateral source [(for example, insurance coverage, social security benefits, unemployment compensation, or employee benefits, such as accumulated sick pay)] for the same injuries which are alleged to have been caused by the defendant.’’ Simmons v. Cobb, 906 A.2d 582, 585 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted, emphasis added) (stating, the collateral source rule is intended to protect tort victims). “[T]he primary focus of the collateral source ru

2021The collateral source rule “prohibits a defendant in a personal injury action from introducing evidence of the plaintiff’s receipt of benefits from a collateral source [(for example, insurance coverage, social security benefits, unemployment compensation, or employee benefits, such as accumulated sick pay)] for the same injuries which are alleged to have been caused by the defendant.’’ Simmons v. Cobb, 906 A.2d 582, 585 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted, emphasis added) (stating, the collateral source rule is intended to protect tort victims). “[T]he primary focus of the collateral source ru

2020Ms. Camlin further avers that “[i]n an attempt to mitigate the harm created by the [c]ourt’s erroneous rulings, the jury learned that [she] was the recipient of disability benefits—evidence that would have been otherwise impermissible as a collateral source.” Id. at 62 (citing Collins v. Cement Exp., Inc., 447 A.2d 987, 888 (Pa. Super. 1982) (“The collateral source rule prohibits a defendant in a personal injury action from introducing evidence of the plaintiff’s receipt of benefits from a collateral source for the same injuries which are alleged to have been caused by the defendant.”); Restat

2009She avers that the “set-off’ results in the tortfeasor being relieved of his responsibility for the wrong in violation of the public policy underlying the collateral source rule. 5 ¶24 The collateral source rule is a rule of evidence that was intended to protect tort victims and that “prohibits a defendant in a personal injury action from introducing evidence of the plaintiffs receipt of benefits from a collateral source for the same injuries which are alleged to have been caused by the defendant.” Simmons v. Cobb, 906 A.2d 582, 585 (Pa.Super.2006) (citing Collins v. Cement Express, Inc., 301

2015As our Supreme Court noted in Lobalzo v. Varoli, 409 Pa. 15 , 185 A.2d 557 (1962), in some cases where there is a violation of the collateral source rule, it is impossible to conjecture what influence the erroneously admitted evidence on workmen’s compensation and unemployment compensation, as well as the misleading charge, had in bringing the jury to the conclusion it reached.

2015As our Supreme Court noted in Lobalzo v. Varoli, 409 Pa. 15 , 185 A.2d 557 (1962), in some cases where there is a violation of the collateral source rule, it is impossible to conjecture what influence the erroneously admitted evidence on workmen’s compensation and unemployment compensation, as well as the misleading charge, had in bringing the jury to the conclusion it reached.

2021Ctr., 110 A.3d 1009, 1012 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal dismissed, 128 A.3d 764 (Pa. 2015), wherein this Court ordered a new trial, based on a violation of the collateral source rule, even though the jury found the defendant not liable.

2021Ctr., 110 A.3d 1009, 1012 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal dismissed, 128 A.3d 764 (Pa. 2015), wherein this Court ordered a new trial, based on a violation of the collateral source rule, even though the jury found the defendant not liable.

2015This would include for example, the corpus delicti rule, see Commonwealth v. Fears, 575 Pa. 281 , 836 A.2d 52 (2003); the collateral source rule, see Boudwin v. Yellow Cab Co., 410 Pa. 31 , 188 A.2d 259 (1963); and the parol evidence rule, see Yocca v. Pittsburgh Steelers Sports, Inc., 578 Pa. 479 , 854 A.2d 425 (2004).

2015This would include for example, the corpus delicti rule, see Commonwealth v. Fears, 575 Pa. 281 , 836 A.2d 52 (2003); the collateral source rule, see Boudwin v. Yellow Cab Co., 410 Pa. 31 , 188 A.2d 259 (1963); and the parol evidence rule, see Yocca v. Pittsburgh Steelers Sports, Inc., 578 Pa. 479 , 854 A.2d 425 (2004).

2024See Navarak v. Waite, 216 A.3d 1093, 1101 (Pa. Super. 2019). - 12 - J-A28036-23 As written by the lower court: [Appellants] seem to be arguing that because the court did not provide a blanket prohibition on [Witmer’s] counsel regarding statements and questions regarding Mrs. Fritz’s receipt of [SSDI] that the court erred and violated the collateral source rule. [Appellants] misread the collateral source rule and try to stretch it to include [SSDI] stemming from something other than from the injuries which are alleged to have been caused by [Witmer].

2023“The collateral source rule, which is intended to protect tort victims, “provides that payments from a collateral source shall not diminish the damages otherwise recoverable from the wrongdoer.” Nazarak, 216 A.3d at 1101-02 (emphasis added, citation omitted).

1982The principle supporting the collateral source rule is “ ‘the judicial refusal to credit to the benefit of the wrongdoer money or services received in reparation of the injury caused which emanate from sources other than the wrongdoer.’ ” Feeley v. United States, 337 F.2d 924, 926 (3rd Cir. 1964) quoting Maxwell, The Collateral Source Rule in the American Law of Damages, 46 Minn.L.Rev. 669, 670-671 (1962).

1980But the collateral source rule permits a plaintiff further recovery under certain circumstances, even though he may have suffered no loss, where the law feels that the tortfeasor should not receive the benefit of money or services received in reparation of the injury which emanate from sources other than the wrongdoer: Feeley v. United States, 337 F. 2d 924 (3d Cir. 1964); Thomas v. Penn Central Co., 379 F.Supp. 24 (W.D.

1980The doctrine, however, does permit the tortfeasor to obtain the advantage of payments made by himself or from a fund created by him; in such an instance the payments come, not from a collateral source, but from the defendant himself.” Yarrington v. Thornburg, 58 Del. 152, 155 , 205 A. 2d 1, 2 , 11 A.L.R. 3d 1110, 1113 (1964).

1980The doctrine, however, does permit the tortfeasor to obtain the advantage of payments made by himself or from a fund created by him; in such an instance the payments come, not from a collateral source, but from the defendant himself.” Yarrington v. Thornburg, 58 Del. 152, 155 , 205 A. 2d 1, 2 , 11 A.L.R. 3d 1110, 1113 (1964).

2023Did the trial court err in denying [Appellants’] Motion for a New Trial on the issue of damages where income tax consequences were brought into the trial; [Appellants were] limited to ten minutes for testimony on damages; evidence was introduced as to what was paid for past medical bills in violation of the collateral source rule; the defense expert was permitted to testify that the use of Xolair [a drug that Mr. Garced received as part of his medical treatment] beyond four months was inappropriate though not part of his pretrial report; [Appellants were] precluded from arguing that [Mr. Garce

2023Did the trial court err in denying [Appellants’] Motion for a New Trial on the issue of damages where income tax consequences were brought into the trial; [Appellants were] limited to ten minutes for testimony on damages; evidence was introduced as to what was paid for past medical bills in violation of the collateral source rule; the defense expert was permitted to testify that the use of Xolair [a drug that Mr. Garced received as part of his medical treatment] beyond four months was inappropriate though not part of his pretrial report; [Appellants were] precluded from arguing that [Mr. Garce

2023Did the trial court err in denying [Appellants’] Motion for a New Trial on the issue of damages where income tax consequences were brought into the trial; [Appellants were] limited to ten minutes for testimony on damages; evidence was introduced as to what was paid for past medical bills in violation of the collateral source rule; the defense expert was permitted to testify that the use of Xolair [a drug that Mr. Garced received as part of his medical treatment] beyond four months was inappropriate though not part of his pretrial report; [Appellants were] precluded from arguing that [Mr. Garce

2023Did the trial court err in denying [Appellants’] Motion for a New Trial on the issue of damages where income tax consequences were brought into the trial; [Appellants were] limited to ten minutes for testimony on damages; evidence was introduced as to what was paid for past medical bills in violation of the collateral source rule; the defense expert was permitted to testify that the use of Xolair [a drug that Mr. Garced received as part of his medical treatment] beyond four months was inappropriate though not part of his pretrial report; [Appellants were] precluded from arguing that [Mr. Garce

2023Co., 253 A.3d 682 , 694 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citations omitted). -7- J-A05036-23 Upon review, the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s claim for past medical expenses implicates 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6141 and the collateral source doctrine.

2023Co., 253 A.3d 682, 694 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citations omitted). -7- J-A05036-23 Upon review, the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s claim for past medical expenses implicates 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6141 and the collateral source doctrine.

2016M Id. (internal quotations omitted)( citations omined). br, Id. at 1013. 61 JsL at 1013-14. 6x Lobalzo v. Yarolj, I 85 A.2d 557, 560 (Pa. 1962). 69Nigra v. Walsh, 797 A.2d 353 . 361 (Pa. Super. 2002). 25 A.25 because of the violations of the collateral source rule by the defendant.

2015This rule “was intended to avoid precluding a claimant from obtaining redress for his or her injury merely because coverage for the injury was provided by some collateral source, e.g. insurance.” Beechwoods Flying Service, Inc. v. Al Hamilton Contracting Corp., 504 Pa. 618 , 476 A.2d 350, 352 (1984); see also id. at 353 (the rule is “intended to prevent a wrongdoer from taking advantage of the fortuitous existence of a collateral remedy”); Denardo v. Carneval, 297 Pa.Super. 484 , 444 A.2d 135, 140 (1982) (“Pennsylvania law is clear; the victim of a tort is entitled to the damages caused by the

2015This rule “was intended to avoid precluding a claimant from obtaining redress for his or her injury merely because coverage for the injury was provided by some collateral source, e.g. insurance.” Beechwoods Flying Service, Inc. v. Al Hamilton Contracting Corp., 504 Pa. 618 , 476 A.2d 350, 352 (1984); see also id. at 353 (the rule is “intended to prevent a wrongdoer from taking advantage of the fortuitous existence of a collateral remedy”); Denardo v. Carneval, 297 Pa.Super. 484 , 444 A.2d 135, 140 (1982) (“Pennsylvania law is clear; the victim of a tort is entitled to the damages caused by the

2006Id. ¶ 9 The trial court denied Appellant’s requests based on the collateral source rule.

2006However, as noted above, in order to constitute reversible error, an evidentiary ruling “must have been harmful or prejudicial to the complaining party.” Hutchinson, supra at 984 .

2005See Lund v. San Joaquin Valley R.R., 31 Cal.4th 1 , 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 412 , 71 P.3d 770, 777 (2003) (acknowledging California’s precedent that collateral source information will only be admitted upon "a persuasive showing that the evidence sought to be introduced is of substantive probative value’’); Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531 , 590 A.2d 914, 929 (1991) (collecting cases and adopting the standard that provides for an exception to the collateral source bar for evidence of malingering by the plaintiff where there is “corroborative evidence and a proper limiting instruction"); Sheffield v. Sup

2005See Lund v. San Joaquin Valley R.R., 31 Cal.4th 1 , 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 412 , 71 P.3d 770, 777 (2003) (acknowledging California’s precedent that collateral source information will only be admitted upon "a persuasive showing that the evidence sought to be introduced is of substantive probative value’’); Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531 , 590 A.2d 914, 929 (1991) (collecting cases and adopting the standard that provides for an exception to the collateral source bar for evidence of malingering by the plaintiff where there is “corroborative evidence and a proper limiting instruction"); Sheffield v. Sup

2005Co., 800 So.2d 197, 203 (Fla.2001) ("Although we did not announce a per se rule of reversal we recognized the inherently damaging effects of the jury hearing collateral source evidence both on the issues of liability and on issues of damages.); Haischer v. CSX Transp., Inc., 381 Md. 119 , 848 A.2d 620 (2004) (permitting certain limited exceptions to the inadmissibility of collateral source evidence in cases under the Federal Employer’s Liabilities Act and the Boiler Inspection Act where the plaintiff claims financial distress due to the injury and such evidence is used for the limited purpose

2005Co., 800 So.2d 197, 203 (Fla.2001) ("Although we did not announce a per se rule of reversal . . ., we recognized the inherently damaging effects of the jury hearing collateral source evidence both on the issues of liability and on issues of damages.); Haischer v. CSX Transp., Inc., 381 Md. 119 , 848 A.2d 620 (2004) (permitting certain limited exceptions to the inadmissibility of collateral source evidence in cases under the Federal Employer's Liabilities Act and the Boiler Inspection Act where the plaintiff claims financial distress due to the injury and such evidence is used for the limited p