collateral source rule in Alaska

2022Estate of Mayer v. Grow, 984 P.2d 509 , 512­ 13 (Alaska 1999) (relationship of assignment to subrogation); Forrer v. State, 471 P.3d 569, 583 (Alaska 2020) (constitutional interpretation). 7 Weston v. AKHappyTime, LLC, 445 P.3d 1015, 1021 (Alaska 2019) (quoting Beaulieu v. Elliott, 434 P.2d 665, 673 (Alaska 1967)). 8 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Ridgeway v. N. Star Terminal & Stevedoring Co., 378 P.2d 647, 650 (Alaska 1963)). -9- 7631 “evidence that the plaintiff was compensated by a collateral source for all or a portion of the damages caused by the defendant’s wrongful act.”9 The A

1995As an example, he cites the collateral source rule, which states that “a tort-feasor is not entitled to have his liability reduced merely because [the] plaintiff was fortunate to have received compensation for his injuries or expenses from a collateral source.” 11 Tolan, 699 P.2d at 1267 (quoting Ridgeway v. North Star Terminal and Stevedoring Co., 378 P.2d 647, 650 (Alaska 1963)).

2022We have once before addressed this issue in Reid.138 In that case an injured claimant argued that AS 09.55.548(b)’s recovery limitation violated equal protection because it unreasonably distinguished between negligent doctors, who were protected by the statute’s recovery limitations, and other tort defendants, who are subject to a different statute modifying the collateral source rule.139 Applying the “fair and substantial” relationship test, we upheld the statute.140 We reasoned that AS 09.55.548(b) was part of a broad package of medical malpractice reforms designed to “control medical malpra

2022In C.J. v. State, Department of Corrections161 and L.D.G., Inc. v. Brown,162 we upheld statutory caps on non-economic damages, deeming them sufficiently related to the legislative purpose of lowering liability insurance premiums.163 But the blunt legislative purpose behind the damages caps — reducing damages awards by limiting compensation for a type of loss viewed as subjective and difficult to measure regardless of whether particular 157 State v. Ostrovsky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1193 (Alaska 1983). 158 Id. (quoting Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 362 (Alaska 1976)). 159 Harris v. Millenium Hotel,

2022In C.J. v. State, Department of Corrections161 and L.D.G., Inc. v. Brown,162 we upheld statutory caps on non-economic damages, deeming them sufficiently related to the legislative purpose of lowering liability insurance premiums.163 But the blunt legislative purpose behind the damages caps — reducing damages awards by limiting compensation for a type of loss viewed as subjective and difficult to measure regardless of whether particular 157 State v. Ostrovsky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1193 (Alaska 1983). 158 Id. (quoting Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 362 (Alaska 1976)). 159 Harris v. Millenium Hotel,

2022Estate of Mayer v. Grow, 984 P.2d 509 , 512­ 13 (Alaska 1999) (relationship of assignment to subrogation); Forrer v. State, 471 P.3d 569, 583 (Alaska 2020) (constitutional interpretation). 7 Weston v. AKHappyTime, LLC, 445 P.3d 1015, 1021 (Alaska 2019) (quoting Beaulieu v. Elliott, 434 P.2d 665, 673 (Alaska 1967)). 8 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Ridgeway v. N. Star Terminal & Stevedoring Co., 378 P.2d 647, 650 (Alaska 1963)). -9- 7631 “evidence that the plaintiff was compensated by a collateral source for all or a portion of the damages caused by the defendant’s wrongful act.”9 The A

2022In C.J. v. State, Department of Corrections161 and L.D.G., Inc. v. Brown,162 we upheld statutory caps on non-economic damages, deeming them sufficiently related to the legislative purpose of lowering liability insurance premiums.163 But the blunt legislative purpose behind the damages caps — reducing damages awards by limiting compensation for a type of loss viewed as subjective and difficult to measure regardless of whether particular 157 State v. Ostrovsky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1193 (Alaska 1983). 158 Id. (quoting Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 362 (Alaska 1976)). 159 Harris v. Millenium Hotel,

2022We have once before addressed this issue in Reid.138 In that case an injured claimant argued that AS 09.55.548(b)’s recovery limitation violated equal protection because it unreasonably distinguished between negligent doctors, who were protected by the statute’s recovery limitations, and other tort defendants, who are subject to a different statute modifying the collateral source rule.139 Applying the “fair and substantial” relationship test, we upheld the statute.140 We reasoned that AS 09.55.548(b) was part of a broad package of medical malpractice reforms designed to “control medical malpra

2022We have once before addressed this issue in Reid.138 In that case an injured claimant argued that AS 09.55.548(b)’s recovery limitation violated equal protection because it unreasonably distinguished between negligent doctors, who were protected by the statute’s recovery limitations, and other tort defendants, who are subject to a different statute modifying the collateral source rule.139 Applying the “fair and substantial” relationship test, we upheld the statute.140 We reasoned that AS 09.55.548(b) was part of a broad package of medical malpractice reforms designed to “control medical malpra

2022Estate of Mayer v. Grow, 984 P.2d 509 , 512­ 13 (Alaska 1999) (relationship of assignment to subrogation); Forrer v. State, 471 P.3d 569, 583 (Alaska 2020) (constitutional interpretation). 7 Weston v. AKHappyTime, LLC, 445 P.3d 1015, 1021 (Alaska 2019) (quoting Beaulieu v. Elliott, 434 P.2d 665, 673 (Alaska 1967)). 8 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Ridgeway v. N. Star Terminal & Stevedoring Co., 378 P.2d 647, 650 (Alaska 1963)). -9- 7631 “evidence that the plaintiff was compensated by a collateral source for all or a portion of the damages caused by the defendant’s wrongful act.”9 The A

2022Estate of Mayer v. Grow, 984 P.2d 509 , 512­ 13 (Alaska 1999) (relationship of assignment to subrogation); Forrer v. State, 471 P.3d 569, 583 (Alaska 2020) (constitutional interpretation). 7 Weston v. AKHappyTime, LLC, 445 P.3d 1015, 1021 (Alaska 2019) (quoting Beaulieu v. Elliott, 434 P.2d 665, 673 (Alaska 1967)). 8 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Ridgeway v. N. Star Terminal & Stevedoring Co., 378 P.2d 647, 650 (Alaska 1963)). -9- 7631 “evidence that the plaintiff was compensated by a collateral source for all or a portion of the damages caused by the defendant’s wrongful act.”9 The A

2022We have once before addressed this issue in Reid.138 In that case an injured claimant argued that AS 09.55.548(b)’s recovery limitation violated equal protection because it unreasonably distinguished between negligent doctors, who were protected by the statute’s recovery limitations, and other tort defendants, who are subject to a different statute modifying the collateral source rule.139 Applying the “fair and substantial” relationship test, we upheld the statute.140 We reasoned that AS 09.55.548(b) was part of a broad package of medical malpractice reforms designed to “control medical malpra

2022In C.J. v. State, Department of Corrections161 and L.D.G., Inc. v. Brown,162 we upheld statutory caps on non-economic damages, deeming them sufficiently related to the legislative purpose of lowering liability insurance premiums.163 But the blunt legislative purpose behind the damages caps — reducing damages awards by limiting compensation for a type of loss viewed as subjective and difficult to measure regardless of whether particular 157 State v. Ostrovsky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1193 (Alaska 1983). 158 Id. (quoting Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 362 (Alaska 1976)). 159 Harris v. Millenium Hotel,

2022In C.J. v. State, Department of Corrections161 and L.D.G., Inc. v. Brown,162 we upheld statutory caps on non-economic damages, deeming them sufficiently related to the legislative purpose of lowering liability insurance premiums.163 But the blunt legislative purpose behind the damages caps — reducing damages awards by limiting compensation for a type of loss viewed as subjective and difficult to measure regardless of whether particular 157 State v. Ostrovsky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1193 (Alaska 1983). 158 Id. (quoting Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 362 (Alaska 1976)). 159 Harris v. Millenium Hotel,

2022In C.J. v. State, Department of Corrections161 and L.D.G., Inc. v. Brown,162 we upheld statutory caps on non-economic damages, deeming them sufficiently related to the legislative purpose of lowering liability insurance premiums.163 But the blunt legislative purpose behind the damages caps — reducing damages awards by limiting compensation for a type of loss viewed as subjective and difficult to measure regardless of whether particular 157 State v. Ostrovsky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1193 (Alaska 1983). 158 Id. (quoting Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 362 (Alaska 1976)). 159 Harris v. Millenium Hotel,

2022Estate of Mayer v. Grow, 984 P.2d 509 , 512­ 13 (Alaska 1999) (relationship of assignment to subrogation); Forrer v. State, 471 P.3d 569, 583 (Alaska 2020) (constitutional interpretation). 7 Weston v. AKHappyTime, LLC, 445 P.3d 1015, 1021 (Alaska 2019) (quoting Beaulieu v. Elliott, 434 P.2d 665, 673 (Alaska 1967)). 8 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Ridgeway v. N. Star Terminal & Stevedoring Co., 378 P.2d 647, 650 (Alaska 1963)). -9- 7631 “evidence that the plaintiff was compensated by a collateral source for all or a portion of the damages caused by the defendant’s wrongful act.”9 The A

2019As examples of courts following the "benefit of the bargain" approach, Dedmon cites Stayton v. Delaware Health Corp. , 117 A.3d 521 , 531 (Del. 2015) (noting that the collateral source rule applies to "provider write-offs" but declining to extend it to Medicare write-offs, which are not "gratuities" to injured parties but rather bargains made "out of consideration for the taxpayers"), and Bozeman v. State , 879 So. 2d 692 , 705 (La. 2004) ("[W]here the plaintiff pays no enrollment fee, has no wages deducted, and otherwise provides no consideration for the collateral source benefits he receives

2019Dedmon , 535 S.W.3d at 466 ; see also Leitinger v. Van Buren Mgmt., Inc. , 295 Wis.2d 372 , 720 N.W.2d 152 , 158 (Wis. App. 2006) (holding that "a defendant must produce some competent evidence other than what the insurance company paid upon which to base its argument that the amount billed was not the reasonable value of the services" (emphasis in original)).

2019Dedmon , 535 S.W.3d at 466 ; see also Leitinger v. Van Buren Mgmt., Inc. , 295 Wis.2d 372 , 720 N.W.2d 152 , 158 (Wis. App. 2006) (holding that "a defendant must produce some competent evidence other than what the insurance company paid upon which to base its argument that the amount billed was not the reasonable value of the services" (emphasis in original)).

2019Ctr. , 611 F. Supp. 2d 78 , 91 (D.N.H. 2009) (observing that evidence of amounts paid, even if offered only to rebut reasonableness of undiscounted bills, "strikes the court as an end-run around the collateral source rule"); Wills , 323 Ill.Dec. 26 , 892 N.E.2d at 1033 ("Defendants may not ... introduce evidence that the plaintiff's bills were settled for a lesser amount because to do so would undermine the collateral source rule.").

2019Ctr. , 611 F. Supp. 2d 78 , 91 (D.N.H. 2009) (observing that evidence of amounts paid, even if offered only to rebut reasonableness of undiscounted bills, "strikes the court as an end-run around the collateral source rule"); Wills , 323 Ill.Dec. 26 , 892 N.E.2d at 1033 ("Defendants may not ... introduce evidence that the plaintiff's bills were settled for a lesser amount because to do so would undermine the collateral source rule.").

2017This “rule is founded on concern that information about other sources of recovery can prejudice the jury on issues of liability or lead the jury to think that the plaintiff will get a double recovery.” Id. at 327 (citing Loncar v. Gray, 28 P.3d 928, 933 (Alaska 2001)).

2017It also suggests the trial court may have felt violating the collateral source rule without the balancing analysis was permissible absent the words “health insurance.” Cf. Jones, 282 P.3d at 326 (“[C]ollateral source evidence is presumptively prejudicial and should be excluded absent a showing that the evidence is more probative than other available evidence.” (citing Loncar, 28 P.3d at 932-33 )); Liimatta, 45 P.3d at 317 (“When . . . an offer [to admit a collateral source] is made the court should not automatically admit or reject the evidence.

2017So the collateral source rule does not apply in this case. 2 The collateral source rule “exclud[es] evidence of other compensation on the theory that such evidence would affect the jury’s judgment unfavorably to the plaintiff on the issues of liability and damages.” Jones v. Bowie Indus., Inc., 282 P.3d 316, 325 (Alaska 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Tolan v. ERA Helicopters, Inc., 699 P.2d 1265, 1267 (Alaska 1985)).

2017It also suggests the trial court may have felt violating the collateral source rule without the balancing analysis was permissible absent the words “health insurance.” Cf. Jones, 282 P.3d at 326 (“[C]ollateral source evidence is presumptively prejudicial and should be excluded absent a showing that the evidence is more probative than other available evidence.” (citing Loncar, 28 P.3d at 932-33 )); Liimatta, 45 P.3d at 317 (“When . . . an offer [to admit a collateral source] is made the court should not automatically admit or reject the evidence.

2017DISCUSSION Arbuckle argues that the trial court erred by allowing (1) references to his health insurance during cross examination and closing arguments in violation of the collateral source rule and (2) repeated references to his workers’ compensation claims 5 See Todeschi v. Sumitomo Metal Mining Pogo, LLC, 394 P.3d 562, 573 (Alaska 2017) (“[W]e will not disturb a jury verdict if there is a theory which reconciles the apparent inconsistencies.” (quoting Yang v. Yoo, 812 P.2d 210, 215 (Alaska 1991))). 6 Adams v. State, 261 P.3d 758, 764 (Alaska 2011) (quoting Raphael v. State, 994 P.2d 1004, 1

2017So the collateral source rule does not apply in this case. 2 The collateral source rule “exclud[es] evidence of other compensation on the theory that such evidence would affect the jury’s judgment unfavorably to the plaintiff on the issues of liability and damages.” Jones v. Bowie Indus., Inc., 282 P.3d 316, 325 (Alaska 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Tolan v. ERA Helicopters, Inc., 699 P.2d 1265, 1267 (Alaska 1985)).

2017This “rule is founded on concern that information about other sources of recovery can prejudice the jury on issues of liability or lead the jury to think that the plaintiff will get a double recovery.” Id. at 327 (citing Loncar v. Gray, 28 P.3d 928, 933 (Alaska 2001)).

2017DISCUSSION Arbuckle argues that the trial court erred by allowing (1) references to his health insurance during cross examination and closing arguments in violation of the collateral source rule and (2) repeated references to his workers’ compensation claims 5 See Todeschi v. Sumitomo Metal Mining Pogo, LLC, 394 P.3d 562, 573 (Alaska 2017) (“[W]e will not disturb a jury verdict if there is a theory which reconciles the apparent inconsistencies.” (quoting Yang v. Yoo, 812 P.2d 210, 215 (Alaska 1991))). 6 Adams v. State, 261 P.3d 758, 764 (Alaska 2011) (quoting Raphael v. State, 994 P.2d 1004, 1

2017DISCUSSION Arbuckle argues that the trial court erred by allowing (1) references to his health insurance during cross examination and closing arguments in violation of the collateral source rule and (2) repeated references to his workers’ compensation claims 5 See Todeschi v. Sumitomo Metal Mining Pogo, LLC, 394 P.3d 562, 573 (Alaska 2017) (“[W]e will not disturb a jury verdict if there is a theory which reconciles the apparent inconsistencies.” (quoting Yang v. Yoo, 812 P.2d 210, 215 (Alaska 1991))). 6 Adams v. State, 261 P.3d 758, 764 (Alaska 2011) (quoting Raphael v. State, 994 P.2d 1004, 1

2017DISCUSSION Arbuckle argues that the trial court erred by allowing (1) references to his health insurance during cross examination and closing arguments in violation of the collateral source rule and (2) repeated references to his workers’ compensation claims 5 See Todeschi v. Sumitomo Metal Mining Pogo, LLC, 394 P.3d 562, 573 (Alaska 2017) (“[W]e will not disturb a jury verdict if there is a theory which reconciles the apparent inconsistencies.” (quoting Yang v. Yoo, 812 P.2d 210, 215 (Alaska 1991))). 6 Adams v. State, 261 P.3d 758, 764 (Alaska 2011) (quoting Raphael v. State, 994 P.2d 1004, 1

2017DISCUSSION Arbuckle argues that the trial court erred by allowing (1) references to his health insurance during cross examination and closing arguments in violation of the collateral source rule and (2) repeated references to his workers’ compensation claims 5 See Todeschi v. Sumitomo Metal Mining Pogo, LLC, 394 P.3d 562, 573 (Alaska 2017) (“[W]e will not disturb a jury verdict if there is a theory which reconciles the apparent inconsistencies.” (quoting Yang v. Yoo, 812 P.2d 210, 215 (Alaska 1991))). 6 Adams v. State, 261 P.3d 758, 764 (Alaska 2011) (quoting Raphael v. State, 994 P.2d 1004, 1

2017DISCUSSION Arbuckle argues that the trial court erred by allowing (1) references to his health insurance during cross examination and closing arguments in violation of the collateral source rule and (2) repeated references to his workers’ compensation claims 5 See Todeschi v. Sumitomo Metal Mining Pogo, LLC, 394 P.3d 562, 573 (Alaska 2017) (“[W]e will not disturb a jury verdict if there is a theory which reconciles the apparent inconsistencies.” (quoting Yang v. Yoo, 812 P.2d 210, 215 (Alaska 1991))). 6 Adams v. State, 261 P.3d 758, 764 (Alaska 2011) (quoting Raphael v. State, 994 P.2d 1004, 1

2017It also suggests the trial court may have felt violating the collateral source rule without the balancing analysis was permissible absent the words “health insurance.” Cf. Jones, 282 P.3d at 326 (“[C]ollateral source evidence is presumptively prejudicial and should be excluded absent a showing that the evidence is more probative than other available evidence.” (citing Loncar, 28 P.3d at 932-33 )); Liimatta, 45 P.3d at 317 (“When . . . an offer [to admit a collateral source] is made the court should not automatically admit or reject the evidence.