10 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1978–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
District of Columbia v. Jacksongreen2 sentences2024See also District of Columbia v. Jackson, 451 A.2d 867, 871 (D.C. 1982) (noting that the collateral source rule is most commonly applied when the source of the benefit is “truly [] not connected in any way with the tortfeasor”). 2003It is worth noting again here that in this jurisdiction, the collateral source rule is applicable when payment comes from a source wholly independent of the tortfeasor or when plaintiff "contracts] for the prospect of double recovery.” District of Columbia v. Jackson, 451 A.2d 867, 873 (1982). | 3 | 4 |
Designers of Georgetown v. EC Keys & Sonsgreen1 sentence2024See id. | 1 | 1 |
Caglioti v. District Hospital Partners, LPgreen1 sentence2024Partners, Lp, 933 A.2d 800, 815 (D.C. 2007) (quoting Jacobs v. H.L. | 1 | 1 |
Bushong v. Byung Kyu Parkgreen2 sentences2008"The collateral source rule provides, as a general proposition, that an injured party may recover full compensatory damages from a tortfeasor regardless of the payment of any amount of those damages by an independent party (a ‘collateral source’), such as an insurance carrier.” Bushong v. Park, 837 A.2d 49, 57 (D.C.2003) (emphasis added). 2008"The collateral source rule provides, as a general proposition, that an injured party may recover full compensatory damages from a tortfeasor regardless of the payment of any amount of those damages by an independent party (a ‘collateral source’), such as an insurance carrier.” Bushong v. Park, 837 A.2d 49, 57 (D.C.2003) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Jacobs v. HL Rust Companygreen1 sentence2007Rust Co., 353 A.2d 6, 7 (D.C.1976) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Moorhead v. Crozer Chester Medical Centergreen1 sentence2003See 765 A.2d at 788 . | 1 | 1 |
Thomas v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1993See Mark Keshishian & Sons, Inc., v. Washington Square, Inc., supra, 414 A.2d at 841 ; Thomas v. United States, 74 App. D.C. 167, 172-173 , 121 F.2d 905, 910-11 (1941). 1993See Mark Keshishian & Sons, Inc., v. Washington Square, Inc., supra, 414 A.2d at 841 ; Thomas v. United States, 74 App. D.C. 167, 172-173 , 121 F.2d 905, 910-11 (1941). | 1 | 1 |
Mark Keshishian & Sons, Inc. v. Washington Square, Inc.green1 sentence1993See Mark Keshishian & Sons, Inc., v. Washington Square, Inc., supra, 414 A.2d at 841 ; Thomas v. United States, 74 App. D.C. 167, 172-173 , 121 F.2d 905, 910-11 (1941). | 1 | 1 |
Rick E. Clark, & Cross-Appellee v. Burlington Northern, Inc., a Corporation, & Cross-Appellantgreen2 sentences1991Title 45 U.S.C. § 55 provides: Any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself from any liability created by this chapter, shall to that extent be void: Provided, That in any such action brought against any such common carrier under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this chapter, such common carrier may setoff therein any sum it has contributed or paid to any insurance, relief benefit, or indemnity that may have been paid to the injured employee or the person entitled thereto on account of the in 1991Title 45 U.S.C. § 55 provides: Any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself from any liability created by this chapter, shall to that extent be void: Provided, That in any such action brought against any such common carrier under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this chapter, such common carrier may setoff therein any sum it has contributed or paid to any insurance, relief benefit, or indemnity that may have been paid to the injured employee or the person entitled thereto on account of the in | 1 | 1 |
Edward W. Blake v. Delaware and Hudson Railway Companygreen2 sentences1991In Blake v. Delaware & Hudson Ry., 484 F.2d 204, 207 (2d Cir.1973), Judge Friendly noted in his concurring opinion that the collateral source rule has come under increasing criticism, and he found that it had led to a "shockingly unjust" result in that case, in which plaintiff was allowed to recover the bulk of his hospital bills even though they were paid by the railroad and not by him. . 1991In a concurring opinion in Blake , Judge Friendly castigated the collateral source rule, noting that it had come under increasing criticism, but acknowledged that "[w]hat constrains me nevertheless to concur [in holding that double payment is required by the employer since the employer had not manifested its intent that the benefits were in the form of an indemnity] is that here we are governed not by federal common law but by statute.” Id. at 207 (Friendly, J., concurring) (citing Bangor & Aroostook R. | 1 | 1 |
Ina M. Overton v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1982The collateral source rule most commonly is applied when the source of the benefit is truly "collateral," i.e., not connected in any way with the tortfeasor. [4] A source of benefits also will be deemed collateral, however and the victim will be entitled to both the benefit and the judgmenteven when the tortfeasor has provided or contributed to those benefits, so long as the victim has contracted for the benefits. [5] For example, when the United States *872 is the tortfeasor and the victim, as a result of the tortious injury, receives Social Security or Medicare benefits from a fund to whi 1982Courts have held credits to be available, for example, with respect to veterans' disability benefits, [8] Medicare payments from a fund to which the victim did not contribute, [9] medical care provided by the Veterans' Administration, [10] and insurance policies which were not fringe benefits of employment. [11] *873 In sum, "[a] plaintiff may invoke the collateral source rule ... either [1] when the payment in question came from a source wholly independent of the liable party or [2] when the plaintiff may be said to have contracted for the prospect of a `double recovery.'" Overton, 619 F.2d a | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hardi v. Mezzanotte
green
1 sentence2024That said, the collateral source rule also does not apply to the remaining personal property claims or the deductible because the Mancusos did not receive payment on those claims from an independent third party, see Hardi, 818 A.2d at 984 , and, as discussed supra, the Mancusos did not subrogate their rights to these 23 claims to Progressive. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
McAmis v. Wallace
green
2 sentences2003In McAmis , a federal court held that the collateral source rule does not permit a plaintiff to recover medical expenses written-off by her health care providers pursuant to a contract with Medicaid, since she did not incur the written-off amounts. 980 F.Supp. at 185-86 . 2003The court reasoned that under Virginia law before the collateral source rule applies, the injured party must “establish personal liability, at some time, for that amount.” Id. at 185 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Acuar v. Letourneau
green
1 sentence2003Id. at 322-23 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Bangor & Aroostook R. v. Jones
neutral
2 sentences1991Co. v. Jones, 36 F.2d 886 (1st Cir.1929)). 1991Co. v. Jones, 36 F.2d 886 (1st Cir.1929)). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Ora Greene Hudson, Administratrix of the Estate of Garland Hudson, Deceased v. David Lazarus, Samuel Juster and Calvin Juster
green
1 sentence1978This well-developed exception to the general law is called the collateral source rule and has been adopted in this jurisdiction in Hudson v. Lazarus, 95 U.S.App.D.C. 16 , 217 F.2d 344 (1954). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Eichel v. New York Central Railroad
green
2 sentences1978In Eichel v. New York Central Railroad Company, 375 U.S. 253 , 84 S.Ct. 316 , 11 L.Ed.2d 307 (1963), an employee of the Railroad was injured by the negligence of the defendant Railroad. 1978In Eichel v. New York Central Railroad Company, 375 U.S. 253 , 84 S.Ct. 316 , 11 L.Ed.2d 307 (1963), an employee of the Railroad was injured by the negligence of the defendant Railroad. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.