collateral source rule in Wisconsin

2012Within our law on damages we have adopted the collateral source rule, which provides that "a plaintiffs recovery cannot be reduced by payments or benefits from other sources." Koffman, 246 Wis. 2d 31, ¶ 29 ; accord Fischer, 333 Wis. 2d 503, ¶ 30 ; Leitinger, 302 Wis. 2d 110, ¶ 26 ; Ellsworth, 235 Wis. 2d 678, ¶¶ 6-7 .

2011As our supreme court has stated in the past, the collateral source rule exists to ensure that "[t]he tortfeasor who is legally responsible for causing injury is not relieved of his [or her] obligation to the victim simply because the victim had the foresight to arrange, or [the] good fortune to receive, benefits from a collateral source for injuries and expenses." Paulson, 263 Wis. 2d 520, ¶ 30 (quoting Koffman v. Leichtfuss, 2001 WI 111, ¶ 29 , 246 Wis. 2d 31 , 630 N.W.2d 201 ). ¶ 9.

2012Within our law on damages we have adopted the collateral source rule, which provides that "a plaintiffs recovery cannot be reduced by payments or benefits from other sources." Koffman, 246 Wis. 2d 31, ¶ 29 ; accord Fischer, 333 Wis. 2d 503, ¶ 30 ; Leitinger, 302 Wis. 2d 110, ¶ 26 ; Ellsworth, 235 Wis. 2d 678, ¶¶ 6-7 .

2011The collateral-source rule is an equitable doctrine that prevents a tortfeasor from benefiting if a plaintiff gets money from either: (1) an entity obligated to reimburse the plaintiff for damages sustained as the result of something the tortfeasor did (an insurance company, for example, that pays for medical expenses the plaintiff incurred as the result of something the tortfeasor did), or (2) a volunteer that helps the plaintiff with expenses (a charity, for example, that buys food and pays rent for a plaintiff unable to work as the result of something the tortfeasor did), see Fischer v. Ste

2011When applicable, the collateral source rule provides that a personal injury plaintiffs recovery "is not to be reduced by the amount of compensation received from other sources, i.e., sources 'collateral' to the defendant." Lambert v. Wrensch, 135 Wis. 2d 105 , 111 n.5, 399 N.W.2d 369 (1987) (citation omitted).

2011When applicable, the collateral source rule provides that a personal injury plaintiffs recovery "is not to be reduced by the amount of compensation received from other sources, i.e., sources 'collateral' to the defendant." Lambert v. Wrensch, 135 Wis. 2d 105 , 111 n.5, 399 N.W.2d 369 (1987) (citation omitted).

2007See also Koffman, 246 Wis. 2d 31, 29 (citing Payne v. Bilco Co., 54 Wis. 2d 424, 433 , 195 N.W.2d 641 (1972) (The collateral source rule prevents any payments made on the plaintiffs behalf or gratuitous benefits received by the plaintiff from inuring to the benefit of a defendant-tortfeasor.).

2007See also Koffman, 246 Wis. 2d 31, 29 (citing Payne v. Bilco Co., 54 Wis. 2d 424, 433 , 195 N.W.2d 641 (1972) (The collateral source rule prevents any payments made on the plaintiffs behalf or gratuitous benefits received by the plaintiff from inuring to the benefit of a defendant-tortfeasor.).

1999See Jindra v. Diederich Flooring, 181 Wis. 2d 579, 595 , 511 N.W.2d 855, 860 (1994). *555 We conclude, therefore, that the existence of a sub-rogated claim for Medical Assistance payments does not affect the application of the collateral source rule to Ellsworth's claim for the customary and reasonable value of medical services rendered.

1999See Jindra v. Diederich Flooring, 181 Wis. 2d 579, 595 , 511 N.W.2d 855, 860 (1994). *555 We conclude, therefore, that the existence of a sub-rogated claim for Medical Assistance payments does not affect the application of the collateral source rule to Ellsworth's claim for the customary and reasonable value of medical services rendered.

1994This language, however, was explicitly limited by this court in Rixmann v. Somerset Public Schools, 83 Wis. 2d 571, 577, 579 , 266 N.W.2d 326 (1978). 5 Rixmann made it clear that "Heifetz should not be interpreted as holding that under all circumstances subrogation occurs when an injured party's insurer makes a payment to him and, concomitantly, that the collateral source rule has been abandoned." Rixmann, 83 Wis. 2d at 579 . 6 Heifetz must be distinguished from the present situation on other grounds as well.

1994This language, however, was explicitly limited by this court in Rixmann v. Somerset Public Schools, 83 Wis. 2d 571, 577, 579 , 266 N.W.2d 326 (1978). 5 Rixmann made it clear that "Heifetz should not be interpreted as holding that under all circumstances subrogation occurs when an injured party's insurer makes a payment to him and, concomitantly, that the collateral source rule has been abandoned." Rixmann, 83 Wis. 2d at 579 . 6 Heifetz must be distinguished from the present situation on other grounds as well.

2007Along with this, it is said that the collateral source rule encourages the plaintiff to protect himself by the purchase of insurance by making sure he reaps its value. [27] The Ellsworth court, 235 Wis.2d 678, ¶ 7 , 611 N.W.2d 764 , finds support for this argument as far back as a 1927 case, Campbell v. Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370 , 214 N.W. 374 (1927), when the court recognized that any benefit resulting from the injury belongs to the plaintiff, not the one whose wrongful acts caused the injury.

2007Along with this, it is said that the collateral source rule encourages the plaintiff to protect himself by the purchase of insurance by making sure he reaps its value. [27] The Ellsworth court, 235 Wis.2d 678, ¶ 7 , 611 N.W.2d 764 , finds support for this argument as far back as a 1927 case, Campbell v. Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370 , 214 N.W. 374 (1927), when the court recognized that any benefit resulting from the injury belongs to the plaintiff, not the one whose wrongful acts caused the injury.

2012Within our law on damages we have adopted the collateral source rule, which provides that "a plaintiffs recovery cannot be reduced by payments or benefits from other sources." Koffman, 246 Wis. 2d 31, ¶ 29 ; accord Fischer, 333 Wis. 2d 503, ¶ 30 ; Leitinger, 302 Wis. 2d 110, ¶ 26 ; Ellsworth, 235 Wis. 2d 678, ¶¶ 6-7 .

2012Leitinger, 302 Wis. 2d 110, ¶ 31 ("The collateral source rule protects plaintiffs by guarding against the potential misuse of collateral source evidence to deny the plaintiff full recovery to which he is entitled."); see also Fischer, 333 Wis. 2d 503, ¶ 34 .

2012Rather, as this court explained in Lagerstrom , § 893.55(7) merely modifies the evidentiary aspect of the collateral source rule. 285 Wis. 2d 1, ¶ 46 .

2011"Early cases discussing the collateral source rule addressed whether insurance payments or continued wages should reduce an injured plaintiffs damages." Lagerstrom v. Myrtle Werth Hosp., 2005 WI 124, ¶ 126 , 285 Wis. 2d 1 , 700 N.W.2d 201 (Prosser, J., dissenting).

2026“Under the made whole doctrine, the injured party should be the first to tap into the limited pool of funds and recover on any loss,” and “[w]hen someone can not be fully paid, the loss should be borne by the subrogee (the insurer).” Id. ¶27 Along with the collateral source rule, these equitable doctrines “work together to further the goals of ensuring that injured people recover for their loss and that tortfeasors pay for the damages they inflict.” Id., ¶34.

2012Within our law on damages we have adopted the collateral source rule, which provides that "a plaintiffs recovery cannot be reduced by payments or benefits from other sources." Koffman, 246 Wis. 2d 31, ¶ 29 ; accord Fischer, 333 Wis. 2d 503, ¶ 30 ; Leitinger, 302 Wis. 2d 110, ¶ 26 ; Ellsworth, 235 Wis. 2d 678, ¶¶ 6-7 .

2011The collateral source rule operates 'not to prevent the plaintiff from being overcompensated but rather to prevent the tortfeasor from paying twice.'") (citing Flowers v. Komatsu Mining Sys., Inc., 165 F.3d 554, 558 (7th Cir. 1999)); Garrity v. Rural Mut.

2000See Flowers v. Komatsu Mining Sys., Inc., 165 F.3d 554, 558 (7th Cir. 1999) (In employment cases, the trial court has discretion to offset an award if the employer is the source of the funds at issue.). 11 Because it is not before us, we do not consider whether the State is entitled to recoup any of the disability benefits Salveson received as a result of her back and front pay awards.

2012In Voge v. Anderson, 181 Wis. 2d 726 , 512 N.W.2d 749 (1994), the plaintiffs insurer had waived its subrogation rights, id. at 728 , and the court held that the collateral source rule was still applicable.

2012In Voge v. Anderson, 181 Wis. 2d 726 , 512 N.W.2d 749 (1994), the plaintiffs insurer had waived its subrogation rights, id. at 728 , and the court held that the collateral source rule was still applicable.

2005"We hold the collateral-source rule is not limited to paid-for benefits but applies to gratuitous medical services provided or paid for by the state." Id. at 245 (citing 22 Am.

2005"We hold the collateral-source rule is not limited to paid-for benefits but applies to gratuitous medical services provided or paid for by the state." Id. at 245 (citing 22 Am.

2022Co., 2003 WI 99, ¶30 , 263 Wis. 2d 520 , 665 N.W.2d 774 (under the collateral source rule, a “tortfeasor who is legally responsible for causing injury is not relieved of [the tortfeasor’s] obligation to the victim simply because the victim had the foresight to arrange, or the good fortune to receive, benefits from a collateral source for injuries and expenses.” (emphasis added; internal quotation marks and quoted source omitted)); see also Blumenfeld v. Jeans, 2011 WI App 107, ¶4 , 336 Wis. 2d 430 , 804 N.W.2d 692 (“[T]he collateral source rule provides that a personal injury plaintiff’s recov

2022Co., 2003 WI 99, ¶30 , 263 Wis. 2d 520 , 665 N.W.2d 774 (under the collateral source rule, a “tortfeasor who is legally responsible for causing injury is not relieved of [the tortfeasor’s] obligation to the victim simply because the victim had the foresight to arrange, or the good fortune to receive, benefits from a collateral source for injuries and expenses.” (emphasis added; internal quotation marks and quoted source omitted)); see also Blumenfeld v. Jeans, 2011 WI App 107, ¶4 , 336 Wis. 2d 430 , 804 N.W.2d 692 (“[T]he collateral source rule provides that a personal injury plaintiff’s recov

1994Co. v. Cleveland, 124 Wis. 2d 258, 266 , 369 N.W.2d 168, 173 (Ct. App. 1985) (tortfeasor is liable to plaintiff for past medical bills and past wage loss where plaintiff had already recovered for such damages from his own insurer); Sambs v. City of Brookfield, 95 Wis. 2d 1, 19 , 289 N.W.2d 308, 317 (Ct. App. 1979) (tortfeasor is liable to plaintiff for past medical and hospital expenses despite fact that plaintiff had not been obligated to pay those expenses), rev'd on other grounds, 97 Wis. 2d 356 , 293 N.W.2d 504 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1035 (1980). [6] We note, too, that the collater

1994Co. v. Cleveland, 124 Wis. 2d 258, 266 , 369 N.W.2d 168, 173 (Ct. App. 1985) (tortfeasor is liable to plaintiff for past medical bills and past wage loss where plaintiff had already recovered for such damages from his own insurer); Sambs v. City of Brookfield, 95 Wis. 2d 1, 19 , 289 N.W.2d 308, 317 (Ct. App. 1979) (tortfeasor is liable to plaintiff for past medical and hospital expenses despite fact that plaintiff had not been obligated to pay those expenses), rev'd on other grounds, 97 Wis. 2d 356 , 293 N.W.2d 504 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1035 (1980). [6] We note, too, that the collater

1994Rixmann notes that, "[t]here can be little doubt that confusion exists as to the operation of subrogation and the collateral source rule in personal injury cases, [citations omitted], Much of this confusion can be traced to language found in the opinion of Heifetz v. Johnson, 61 Wis. 2d 111 , 211 N.W.2d 834 (1973)." Rixmann, 83 Wis. 2d at 576 .

1994Rixmann notes that, "[t]here can be little doubt that confusion exists as to the operation of subrogation and the collateral source rule in personal injury cases, [citations omitted], Much of this confusion can be traced to language found in the opinion of Heifetz v. Johnson, 61 Wis. 2d 111 , 211 N.W.2d 834 (1973)." Rixmann, 83 Wis. 2d at 576 .

1992Ry. & Light *853 Co., 136 Wis. 34, 39 , 116 N.W. 633, 634 (1908), and repeated in Rixmann, 83 Wis. 2d at 578 , 266 N.W.2d at 329 .

1992Ry. & Light *853 Co., 136 Wis. 34, 39 , 116 N.W. 633, 634 (1908), and repeated in Rixmann, 83 Wis. 2d at 578 , 266 N.W.2d at 329 .

2022Co., 2003 WI 99, ¶30 , 263 Wis. 2d 520 , 665 N.W.2d 774 (under the collateral source rule, a “tortfeasor who is legally responsible for causing injury is not relieved of [the tortfeasor’s] obligation to the victim simply because the victim had the foresight to arrange, or the good fortune to receive, benefits from a collateral source for injuries and expenses.” (emphasis added; internal quotation marks and quoted source omitted)); see also Blumenfeld v. Jeans, 2011 WI App 107, ¶4 , 336 Wis. 2d 430 , 804 N.W.2d 692 (“[T]he collateral source rule provides that a personal injury plaintiff’s recov

2022Co., 2003 WI 99, ¶30 , 263 Wis. 2d 520 , 665 N.W.2d 774 (under the collateral source rule, a “tortfeasor who is legally responsible for causing injury is not relieved of [the tortfeasor’s] obligation to the victim simply because the victim had the foresight to arrange, or the good fortune to receive, benefits from a collateral source for injuries and expenses.” (emphasis added; internal quotation marks and quoted source omitted)); see also Blumenfeld v. Jeans, 2011 WI App 107, ¶4 , 336 Wis. 2d 430 , 804 N.W.2d 692 (“[T]he collateral source rule provides that a personal injury plaintiff’s recov

2020See Couillard v. Van Ess, 141 Wis. 2d 459, 463-64 , 415 N.W.2d 554 (Ct. App. 1987). ¶14 Gunderson argues that the collateral source rule was at issue because the jury heard evidence about “possible Social Security payments” to Gunderson. 7 No. 2018AP981 Specifically, Gunderson points to several points in the trial at which counsel and witnesses mentioned questions that Gunderson posed, before the accident in this case, to his healthcare providers about possibly going on disability. ¶15 We conclude that the circuit court properly denied Gunderson’s request for a collateral source rule instructi

2020See Couillard v. Van Ess, 141 Wis. 2d 459, 463-64 , 415 N.W.2d 554 (Ct. App. 1987). ¶14 Gunderson argues that the collateral source rule was at issue because the jury heard evidence about “possible Social Security payments” to Gunderson. 7 No. 2018AP981 Specifically, Gunderson points to several points in the trial at which counsel and witnesses mentioned questions that Gunderson posed, before the accident in this case, to his healthcare providers about possibly going on disability. ¶15 We conclude that the circuit court properly denied Gunderson’s request for a collateral source rule instructi

2012Orlowski, 339 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶ 18, 26 (holding that where plaintiff was injured by negligence of another, collateral source rule prohibits decreasing plaintiffs recovery from her own underinsured motorist carrier for medical expenses written off by medical provider).

2012See, e.g., John's Heating Serv. v. Lamb, 46 P.3d 1024, 1043 (Alaska 2002) ("[The collateral source rule] precludes the introduction of 'evidence of other compensation on the theory that such evidence would affect the jury's judgment unfavorably to the plaintiff on the issues of liability and damages.'" (quoting Tolan v. ERA Helicopters, Inc., 699 P.2d 1265, 1267 (Alaska 1985))); Evans v. Breeden, 330 N.E.2d 116, 118 (Ind. 1975) ("It is held that admission of evidence of benefits from a collateral source tends to prejudice the jury and influence their verdict, not only as to damages, but also a

2012See, e.g., John's Heating Serv. v. Lamb, 46 P.3d 1024, 1043 (Alaska 2002) ("[The collateral source rule] precludes the introduction of 'evidence of other compensation on the theory that such evidence would affect the jury's judgment unfavorably to the plaintiff on the issues of liability and damages.'" (quoting Tolan v. ERA Helicopters, Inc., 699 P.2d 1265, 1267 (Alaska 1985))); Evans v. Breeden, 330 N.E.2d 116, 118 (Ind. 1975) ("It is held that admission of evidence of benefits from a collateral source tends to prejudice the jury and influence their verdict, not only as to damages, but also a