collateral source rule in California

2026A. Collateral Source Doctrine The collateral source rule provides that when “an injured party receives some compensation for his injuries from a source wholly independent of the tortfeasor, such payment should not be deducted from the damages which the plaintiff would otherwise collect from the tortfeasor.” (Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1, 6 .) Helfend explains that the rule “expresses a policy judgment in favor of encouraging citizens to purchase and maintain insurance for personal injuries and for other eventualities.

2026(Smock v. State of California (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 883 , 886–887.) However, as noted by our Supreme Court in Helfend, “[t]here are many sorts of collateral sources and a great variety of contexts in which the ‘rule’ might be applied.” (Helfend, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 6, fn. 3 ; see Roto Chevrolet v. Superior Court, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 249, fn. 8 [“the rule bends to the needs of equity and fairness”].) We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s application of the collateral source rule to preclude an offset of damages.

2017As we discussed above, the collateral source rule “provides that if an injured party received some compensation for his injuries from a source wholly independent of the tortfeasor, such payment should not be deducted from the damages which the plaintiff would otherwise collect from the tortfeasor.” (Hrnjak v. Graymar, Inc. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 725, 729 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 623 , 484 P.2d 599 ]; see Helfend v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1, 6, 13-14 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 173 , 465 P.2d 61 ].) In enacting section 3333.1, the Legislature did not totally abrogate the collateral source ru

2017As we discussed above, the collateral source rule “provides that if an injured party received some compensation for his injuries from a source wholly independent of the tortfeasor, such payment should not be deducted from the damages which the plaintiff would otherwise collect from the tortfeasor.” (Hrnjak v. Graymar, Inc. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 725, 729 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 623 , 484 P.2d 599 ]; see Helfend v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1, 6, 13-14 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 173 , 465 P.2d 61 ].) In enacting section 3333.1, the Legislature did not totally abrogate the collateral source ru

2025The collateral source rule states that ‘if an injured party receives some compensation for his injuries from a source wholly independent of the tortfeasor, such payment should not be deducted from the damages which the plaintiff would otherwise collect from the tortfeasor.’ [Citation.] Put another way, ‘Payments made to or benefits conferred on the injured party from other sources [(i.e., those unconnected to the defendant)] are not credited against the tortfeasor’s liability, although they cover all or a part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable.’ [Citation.] The rule thus dictates

2024“The collateral source rule states that ‘if an injured party receives some compensation for his injuries from a source wholly independent of the tortfeasor, such payment should not be deducted from the damages which the plaintiff would otherwise collect from the tortfeasor.’ [Citation.] Put another way, ‘Payments made to or benefits conferred on the injured party from other sources [i.e., those unconnected to the defendant] are not credited against the tortfeasor’s liability, although they cover all or a part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable.’ [Citation.] The rule thus dictates t

2013In determining tort damages, the collateral source rule provides “that if an injured party receives some compensation for his injuries from a source wholly independent of the tortfeasor, such payment should not be deducted from the damages which the plaintiff would otherwise collect from the tortfeasor.” (Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1, 6 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 173 , 465 P.2d 61 ].) The collateral source rule “operates both as a substantive rule of damages and as a rule of evidence.” (Arambula v. Wells (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1015 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 584 ].) As part of

2013In determining tort damages, the collateral source rule provides “that if an injured party receives some compensation for his injuries from a source wholly independent of the tortfeasor, such payment should not be deducted from the damages which the plaintiff would otherwise collect from the tortfeasor.” (Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1, 6 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 173 , 465 P.2d 61 ].) The collateral source rule “operates both as a substantive rule of damages and as a rule of evidence.” (Arambula v. Wells (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1015 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 584 ].) As part of

2025The collateral source rule states that ‘if an injured party receives some compensation for his injuries from a source wholly independent of the tortfeasor, such payment should not be deducted from the damages which the plaintiff would otherwise collect from the tortfeasor.’ [Citation.] Put another way, ‘Payments made to or benefits conferred on the injured party from other sources [(i.e., those unconnected to the defendant)] are not credited against the tortfeasor’s liability, although they cover all or a part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable.’ [Citation.] The rule thus dictates

2022Under the collateral source rule, “[w]here a person suffers personal injury or property damage by reason of the wrongful act of another, an action against the wrongdoer for the damages suffered is not precluded nor is the amount of damages reduced by the receipt by him of payment for his loss from a source wholly independent of the wrongdoer.” (Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Starley (1946) 28 Cal.2d 347, 349 ; see Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1, 6 [“The Supreme Court of California has long adhered to the doctrine that if an injured party receives some compensation for

2024The collateral source rule ... does not expand the scope of economic damages to include expenses the plaintiff never incurred.” ( Howell, supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 548–549.) In Corenbaum v. Lampkin (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1308 (Corenbaum), the Court of Appeal considered an issue left open by Howell—that is, whether 7 the full amount billed by a medical provider for past medical services is relevant to the calculation of a tort plaintiff’s future medical expenses.

2024The collateral source rule ... does not expand the scope of economic damages to include expenses the plaintiff never incurred.” ( Howell, supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 548–549.) In Corenbaum v. Lampkin (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1308 (Corenbaum), the Court of Appeal considered an issue left open by Howell—that is, whether 7 the full amount billed by a medical provider for past medical services is relevant to the calculation of a tort plaintiff’s future medical expenses.

2018Admissibility of Medical Providers' Bills to Prove Economic Damages "Before 1988 a plaintiff, relying on the collateral source rule, could recover the full amount of a health provider's charges despite the fact that an insurer or governmental agency had prenegotiated a discounted rate for the services and the plaintiff was not liable for the full amount. ( Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1 , 6, 84 Cal.Rptr. 173 , 465 P.2d 61 .) The collateral source rule states that 'if an injured party receives some compensation for his injuries from a source wholly independent of

2018Admissibility of Medical Providers' Bills to Prove Economic Damages "Before 1988 a plaintiff, relying on the collateral source rule, could recover the full amount of a health provider's charges despite the fact that an insurer or governmental agency had prenegotiated a discounted rate for the services and the plaintiff was not liable for the full amount. ( Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1 , 6, 84 Cal.Rptr. 173 , 465 P.2d 61 .) The collateral source rule states that 'if an injured party receives some compensation for his injuries from a source wholly independent of

2016(Note, California’s Collateral Source Rule and Plaintiff’s Receipt of Uninsured Motorist Benefits (1986) 37 Hastings L.J. 667 , 674-675.) In Lund v. San Joaquin Valley Railroad (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 412 , 71 P.3d 770 ], the California Supreme Court appeared to assume the collateral source rule generally applies to workers’ compensation benefits.

2016(Note, California’s Collateral Source Rule and Plaintiff’s Receipt of Uninsured Motorist Benefits (1986) 37 Hastings L.J. 667 , 674-675.) In Lund v. San Joaquin Valley Railroad (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1 [ 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 412 , 71 P.3d 770 ], the California Supreme Court appeared to assume the collateral source rule generally applies to workers’ compensation benefits.

2017(Barme v. Wood (1984) 37 Cal.3d 174, 178-179 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 816 , 689 P.2d 446 ] (Barme).) Section 3333.1 alters the collateral source rule in medical malpractice cases.

2017(Barme v. Wood (1984) 37 Cal.3d 174, 178-179 [ 207 Cal.Rptr. 816 , 689 P.2d 446 ] (Barme).) Section 3333.1 alters the collateral source rule in medical malpractice cases.

1994Instead Waite focused its analysis on De Cruz v. Reid (1968) 69 Cal.2d 217 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 550 , 444 P.2d 342 ], an application of the collateral source rule in the significantly different workers’ compensation context, where the employer, who might become a defendant, purchases the insurance.

1994Instead Waite focused its analysis on De Cruz v. Reid (1968) 69 Cal.2d 217 [ 70 Cal.Rptr. 550 , 444 P.2d 342 ], an application of the collateral source rule in the significantly different workers’ compensation context, where the employer, who might become a defendant, purchases the insurance.

2025Application of the rule is ‘supported by two public policy rationales: favoring the injured party over the culpable tortfeasor and encouraging the public to purchase insurance benefits.’ [Citation.]” (Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 174, 179 , fn. omitted [discussing law journal’s analysis of collateral source rule].) The 22 trial court therefore did not err when it applied the collateral source rule here.

1999II Under the collateral source rule, plaintiffs in personal injury actions can still recover full damages even though they already have received compensation for their injuries from such “collateral sources” as medical insurance. {Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 174, 176 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 522 ].) The idea is that tortfeasors should not recover a windfall from the thrift and foresight of persons who have actually or constructively secured insurance, pension or disability benefits to provide for themselves and their families.

2011(Olsen v. Reid (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 200, 213-214 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 255 ] (conc. opn. of Moore, J.).) The Legislature twice has abrogated or modified the collateral source rule, in the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (Civ.

2011(Olsen v. Reid (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 200, 213-214 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 255 ] (conc. opn. of Moore, J.).) The Legislature twice has abrogated or modified the collateral source rule, in the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (Civ.

2019The collateral source rule generally provides that " 'if an injured party receives some compensation for his injuries from a source wholly independent of the tortfeasor, such payment should not be deducted from the damages which the plaintiff would otherwise collect from the tortfeasor.' " ( Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 541 , 551, 129 Cal.Rptr.3d 325 , 257 P.3d 1130 ( Howell ).) This rule applies to payments from private insurance as well as public benefits. ( Id. at p. 557, 129 Cal.Rptr.3d 325 , 257 P.3d 1130 [private insurance payments]; see Hernandez v. Cali

2019The collateral source rule generally provides that " 'if an injured party receives some compensation for his injuries from a source wholly independent of the tortfeasor, such payment should not be deducted from the damages which the plaintiff would otherwise collect from the tortfeasor.' " ( Howell v. Hamilton Meats & Provisions, Inc. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 541 , 551, 129 Cal.Rptr.3d 325 , 257 P.3d 1130 ( Howell ).) This rule applies to payments from private insurance as well as public benefits. ( Id. at p. 557, 129 Cal.Rptr.3d 325 , 257 P.3d 1130 [private insurance payments]; see Hernandez v. Cali

2013The court in Birkett made an analogy to the collateral source doctrine in tort law in support of the notion that “[t]here is no great novelty” that a “person injured or damaged by the wrongful conduct of another may obtain full recovery from the wrongdoer even after partial or full 15 reimbursement from an independent source.” (Birkett, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 247, fn. 19 .) The Birkett court then went on to explain that in the tort setting, the tortfeasor should not receive a windfall just because the victim “had the thrift and prescience to purchase insurance, and the investment represented

2013The court in Birkett made an analogy to the collateral source doctrine in tort law in support of the notion that “[t]here is no great novelty” that a “person injured or damaged by the wrongful conduct of another may obtain full recovery from the wrongdoer even after partial or full 15 reimbursement from an independent source.” (Birkett, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 247, fn. 19 .) The Birkett court then went on to explain that in the tort setting, the tortfeasor should not receive a windfall just because the victim “had the thrift and prescience to purchase insurance, and the investment represented

1983(See De Cruz v. Reid, supra, 69 Cal.2d 217, 225-226 ; Witt v. Jackson (1961) 57 Cal.2d 57, 71-72 [ 17 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 366 P.2d 641 ]; Turner v. Mannon (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 134, 138-139 [ 45 Cal.Rptr. 831 ]; Dodds v. Bucknum (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 206, 212-213 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 393 ]; see 2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts (1968 Supp.) § 25.22, fns. 5-6, at pp. 153-154.)” ( 2 Cal.3d at p. 8, fn. 7 .) The question this court must decide is whether various payments which plaintiff received came from a cotortfeasor so as to .entitle defendant Bear, Stearns to a pro tanto reduction; or whether such pa

1983(See De Cruz v. Reid, supra, 69 Cal.2d 217, 225-226 ; Witt v. Jackson (1961) 57 Cal.2d 57, 71-72 [ 17 Cal.Rptr. 369 , 366 P.2d 641 ]; Turner v. Mannon (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 134, 138-139 [ 45 Cal.Rptr. 831 ]; Dodds v. Bucknum (1963) 214 Cal.App.2d 206, 212-213 [ 29 Cal.Rptr. 393 ]; see 2 Harper & James, The Law of Torts (1968 Supp.) § 25.22, fns. 5-6, at pp. 153-154.)” ( 2 Cal.3d at p. 8, fn. 7 .) The question this court must decide is whether various payments which plaintiff received came from a cotortfeasor so as to .entitle defendant Bear, Stearns to a pro tanto reduction; or whether such pa

2010The court acknowledged that, "many other jurisdictions have restricted or repealed [the collateral source rule]," that "[i]n this country most commentators have criticized the rule and called for its early demise" ( Helfend, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 6-7, fns. omitted), and that, in a prior opinion ( City of Salinas v. Souza & McCue Construction Co. (1967) 66 Cal.2d 217 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 337 , 424 P.2d 921 ]), the high court "took note of the academic criticism of the rule, characterized the rule as `punitive,' and held it inapplicable" in the earlier case. ( Helfend , at p. 7.) Nonetheless the high

2010The court acknowledged that, "many other jurisdictions have restricted or repealed [the collateral source rule]," that "[i]n this country most commentators have criticized the rule and called for its early demise" ( Helfend, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 6-7, fns. omitted), and that, in a prior opinion ( City of Salinas v. Souza & McCue Construction Co. (1967) 66 Cal.2d 217 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 337 , 424 P.2d 921 ]), the high court "took note of the academic criticism of the rule, characterized the rule as `punitive,' and held it inapplicable" in the earlier case. ( Helfend , at p. 7.) Nonetheless the high

2026(Smock v. State of California (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 883 , 886–887.) However, as noted by our Supreme Court in Helfend, “[t]here are many sorts of collateral sources and a great variety of contexts in which the ‘rule’ might be applied.” (Helfend, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 6, fn. 3 ; see Roto Chevrolet v. Superior Court, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 249, fn. 8 [“the rule bends to the needs of equity and fairness”].) We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s application of the collateral source rule to preclude an offset of damages.

2016So, courts choose in such cases to benefit the victim.” (Smock v. State of California (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 883, 888 .) As in McKinney v. California Portland Cement Co. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1214 and other cases applying the collateral source rule, Caterpillar’s argument is, in essence, an attempt to avoid paying the full damages for which the jury found it liable because respondents received compensation under Will’s employment benefits.

1994(Acosta v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 19, 25-26 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 465 P.2d 72 ].) 2 No reported decision in *1756 California has decided the question whether the collateral source rule applies to prevent the mitigation of damages in a legal malpractice action. 3 In Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Disk, supra, our Supreme Court engaged in an extensive review of the policy arguments for and against the collateral source rule and reaffirmed its adherence to the rule as it has developed in California.

1994(Acosta v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 19, 25-26 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 184 , 465 P.2d 72 ].) 2 No reported decision in *1756 California has decided the question whether the collateral source rule applies to prevent the mitigation of damages in a legal malpractice action. 3 In Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Disk, supra, our Supreme Court engaged in an extensive review of the policy arguments for and against the collateral source rule and reaffirmed its adherence to the rule as it has developed in California.

2026Co. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 98, 103 .) However, they claim, without citation to any authority, that whether the collateral source rule should apply to a damages award is an issue of law.

2016Co. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 98, 107 [“[T]he overwhelming weight of authority in California and other jurisdictions has rejected the extension of the collateral source rule to breach of contract.”]; see also Bramalea California, Inc. v. Reliable Interiors, Inc. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 468, 472 [“But the collateral source rule applies to tort damages, not to damages for breach of contract.”].) A lawsuit for breach of the implied covenant that a grant of fee simple is conveyed free of encumbrances sounds in contract rather than 21 tort.

2026The tortfeasor should not garner the benefits of his victim’s providence.” (Id. at pp. 9–10, fn. omitted.) The collateral source rule “ ‘operates both as a substantive rule of damages and as a rule of evidence.’ ” (Rotolo Chevrolet v. Superior Court (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 242, 245 .) B.

2026(Smock v. State of California (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 883 , 886–887.) However, as noted by our Supreme Court in Helfend, “[t]here are many sorts of collateral sources and a great variety of contexts in which the ‘rule’ might be applied.” (Helfend, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 6, fn. 3 ; see Roto Chevrolet v. Superior Court, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 249, fn. 8 [“the rule bends to the needs of equity and fairness”].) We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s application of the collateral source rule to preclude an offset of damages.

1994Allen and Swafford, relying upon Waite v. Godfrey (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 760 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 881 ], contend the collateral source rule does not apply because this case involves joint tortfeasors.

1994Allen and Swafford, relying upon Waite v. Godfrey (1980) 106 Cal.App.3d 760 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 881 ], contend the collateral source rule does not apply because this case involves joint tortfeasors.

1994In Lewis v. County of Contra Costa (1955) 130 Cal.App.2d 176 [ 278 P.2d 756 ], the court held the collateral source rule prohibited evidence that at the time of the accident plaintiff had accumulated sufficient sick leave to cover the period of his disablement.

1994In Lewis v. County of Contra Costa (1955) 130 Cal.App.2d 176 [ 278 P.2d 756 ], the court held the collateral source rule prohibited evidence that at the time of the accident plaintiff had accumulated sufficient sick leave to cover the period of his disablement.

2014Co. (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 33, 41 (Ferraro), disapproved on other grounds in Goodman v. Lozano (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1327, 1330, 1336-1337 .) In reaching our decision, we see no merit to appellant’s argument that his receipt of an insurance payment was inadmissible under the collateral source rule in the circumstances of this case.

2014While the court in Helfend made clear that a plaintiff is not to be penalized for his own providence, it also emphasized that ‘[i]n reaffirming our adherence to the collateral source rule in this tort case involving a plaintiff with collateral payments from 12 his insurance coverage, we do not suggest that the tortfeasor be required to pay doubly for his wrong — once to the injured party and again to reimburse the plaintiff’s collateral source . . . .’ (Helfend . . ., supra, 2 Cal.3d [at p.] 11, fn. 15.)” (Ferraro, supra, 102 Cal.App.3d at p. 46 .) “Despite the unusual posture — a suit by [an

2011A. Junction Ry. (1943) 22 Cal.2d 111, 131 [ 137 P2d 441 ].) In Helfend , this court engaged in an extensive review of the policy arguments for and against the collateral source rule and reaffirmed its adherence to the rule as it has developed in California.

2011A. Junction Ry. (1943) 22 Cal.2d 111, 131 [ 137 P2d 441 ].) In Helfend , this court engaged in an extensive review of the policy arguments for and against the collateral source rule and reaffirmed its adherence to the rule as it has developed in California.

2013(Id. at p. 555.) Howell approved the general rule from Hanif, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d 635, 640-641 , and Nishihama, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th 298, 306-307 , in this regard. ( Howell, supra, at pp. 553-555 .) Howell also held that limiting a plaintiff‘s recovery in this manner does not contravene the collateral source rule. ( Howell, supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 563-566.) The collateral source rule provides that the damages awarded to an injured plaintiff cannot be reduced by the amount paid on the plaintiff‘s behalf by a source independent of the tortfeasor, such as an insurer.

2013(Id. at p. 555.) Howell approved the general rule from Hanif, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d 635, 640-641 , and Nishihama, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th 298, 306-307 , in this regard. ( Howell, supra, at pp. 553-555 .) Howell also held that limiting a plaintiff‘s recovery in this manner does not contravene the collateral source rule. ( Howell, supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 563-566.) The collateral source rule provides that the damages awarded to an injured plaintiff cannot be reduced by the amount paid on the plaintiff‘s behalf by a source independent of the tortfeasor, such as an insurer.