collateral source rule in Georgia

2024“The collateral source rule, stated simply, is that the receipt of benefits or mitigation of loss from sources other than the defendant will not operate to diminish the plaintiff’s recovery of damages.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Polito v. Holland, 258 Ga. 54, 55 (3) ( 365 SE2d 273 ) (1988).

2024“The collateral source rule, stated simply, is that the receipt of benefits or mitigation of loss from sources other than the defendant will not operate to diminish the plaintiff’s recovery of damages.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Polito v. Holland, 258 Ga. 54, 55 (3) ( 365 SE2d 273 ) (1988).

2025Andrews’ holding is in conflict with many cases from the Supreme Court of Georgia interpreting and applying the collateral source rule to prevent offsets due to payments from a collateral source.4 See, e.g., Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1324 v. Roberts, 263 Ga. 405, 406-408 (1) ( 434 SE2d 450 ) (1993); Denton v. Con-Way Southern Express, 261 Ga. 41 ( 402 SE2d 269 ) (1991), overruled on other grounds by Grissom v. Gleason, 262 Ga. 374 ( 418 SE2d 27 ) (1992); City of Rome v. Rhodes, 134 Ga. 650 ( 68 SE 330 ) (1910); Western & Atlantic R. v. Meigs, 74 Ga. 857 (1885).

2025Andrews’ holding is in conflict with many cases from the Supreme Court of Georgia interpreting and applying the collateral source rule to prevent offsets due to payments from a collateral source.4 See, e.g., Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1324 v. Roberts, 263 Ga. 405, 406-408 (1) ( 434 SE2d 450 ) (1993); Denton v. Con-Way Southern Express, 261 Ga. 41 ( 402 SE2d 269 ) (1991), overruled on other grounds by Grissom v. Gleason, 262 Ga. 374 ( 418 SE2d 27 ) (1992); City of Rome v. Rhodes, 134 Ga. 650 ( 68 SE 330 ) (1910); Western & Atlantic R. v. Meigs, 74 Ga. 857 (1885).

1981While we recognize the collateral source rule in Georgia, Insurance Co. of N. A. v. Fowler, 148 Ga. App. 509, 511 (2) ( 251 SE2d 594 ) (1978), it is not applicable here because Doyle contracted this right away under the stipulation and agreement with Liberty Mutual and Rich’s.

1981While we recognize the collateral source rule in Georgia, Insurance Co. of N. A. v. Fowler, 148 Ga. App. 509, 511 (2) ( 251 SE2d 594 ) (1978), it is not applicable here because Doyle contracted this right away under the stipulation and agreement with Liberty Mutual and Rich’s.

1992See McGlohon v. Ogden, 251 Ga. 625 ( 308 SE2d 541 ) (1983); see generally OCGA § 33-34-3.

1992See McGlohon v. Ogden, 251 Ga. 625 ( 308 SE2d 541 ) (1983); see generally OCGA § 33-34-3.

1990Additionally, the trial court disallowed evidence that plaintiff had received $30,000 from Georgia Power on grounds that apportionment is inappropriate since Georgia Power and the county would not be jointly and severally liable for creation of a nuisance ( Gilson v. Mitchell, 131 Ga. App. 321, 328-329 ( 205 SE2d 421 )), and that the new collateral source rule allowing evidence of third-party payments was not in force when plaintiff's cause of action arose, citing Bennett v. Haley, 132 Ga. App. 512 ( 208 SE2d 302 ); and see Polito v. Holland, 258 Ga. 54 (5) ( 365 SE2d 273 ).

1990Additionally, the trial court disallowed evidence that plaintiff had received $30,000 from Georgia Power on grounds that apportionment is inappropriate since Georgia Power and the county would not be jointly and severally liable for creation of a nuisance ( Gilson v. Mitchell, 131 Ga. App. 321, 328-329 ( 205 SE2d 421 )), and that the new collateral source rule allowing evidence of third-party payments was not in force when plaintiff's cause of action arose, citing Bennett v. Haley, 132 Ga. App. 512 ( 208 SE2d 302 ); and see Polito v. Holland, 258 Ga. 54 (5) ( 365 SE2d 273 ).

2025See Mims, supra, 372 Ga. App. at 780- 783 (2) (amount plaintiff received from its own insurer did not warrant an offset from the final judgment against defendants); Wardlaw, supra, 297 Ga. App. at 244-245 (same); see also Hoeflick, supra, 282 Ga. App. at 124-125 (1) (collateral source rule applied to bar consideration of payments made by the plaintiff’s own insurer).

2025See Mims, supra, 372 Ga. App. at 780- 783 (2) (amount plaintiff received from its own insurer did not warrant an offset from the final judgment against defendants); Wardlaw, supra, 297 Ga. App. at 244-245 (same); see also Hoeflick, supra, 282 Ga. App. at 124-125 (1) (collateral source rule applied to bar consideration of payments made by the plaintiff’s own insurer).

2025See Mims, supra, 372 Ga. App. at 780- 783 (2) (amount plaintiff received from its own insurer did not warrant an offset from the final judgment against defendants); Wardlaw, supra, 297 Ga. App. at 244-245 (same); see also Hoeflick, supra, 282 Ga. App. at 124-125 (1) (collateral source rule applied to bar consideration of payments made by the plaintiff’s own insurer).

2025Cf. Wardlaw, supra, 297 Ga. App. at 244 (“An exception [to the collateral source rule] arises when the claimant assigns his cause of action to the insurer, at which point any 6 (rejecting the argument that the plaintiff would receive a double recovery so long as the payments from the collateral source were not made by the defendant or on the defendant’s behalf); see also Mims, supra, 372 Ga. App. at 782-783 (2) (relying on Wardlaw to reject argument that a double recovery would result).

2017See Coon, 335 Ga. App. at 283-285 ; id. at 285 n. 19 (McMillian, J., concurring specially).

2017See Coon, 335 Ga. App. at 283-285 ; id. at 285 n. 19 (McMillian, J., concurring specially).

2017See generally Broda v. Dziwura, 286 Ga. 507, 508 ( 689 SE2d 319 ) (2010) (“a tortfeasor cannot diminish his liability based on payments made by a non-tortfeasor”).

2017See generally Broda v. Dziwura, 286 Ga. 507, 508 ( 689 SE2d 319 ) (2010) (“a tortfeasor cannot diminish his liability based on payments made by a non-tortfeasor”).

2013Controlling the nature and scope of cross-examination is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion.”8 The Defendants contend that because the collateral-source rule only precludes cross-examination regarding insurance in order to prevent admission of evidence of payments by a third-party for tortious injury, the trial court erred by denying their motion to cross-examine Knighten about his previous work history as an automobile insurance adjuster based on that rule.9 While it may be the case that such questioning 8 (Foot

2013Controlling the nature and scope of cross-examination is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion.”8 The Defendants contend that because the collateral-source rule only precludes cross-examination regarding insurance in order to prevent admission of evidence of payments by a third-party for tortious injury, the trial court erred by denying their motion to cross-examine Knighten about his previous work history as an automobile insurance adjuster based on that rule.9 While it may be the case that such questioning 8 (Foot

2013See Harper v. Barge Air Conditioning, 313 Ga. App. 474, 480 (2) ( 722 SE2d 84 ) (2011) (“the collateral-source rule bars the defendant from presenting any evidence as to payments of expenses of a tortious injury paid for by a third party and taking any credit toward the defendant’s liability and damages for such payments”) (punctuation omitted).

2013See Harper v. Barge Air Conditioning, 313 Ga. App. 474, 480 (2) ( 722 SE2d 84 ) (2011) (“the collateral-source rule bars the defendant from presenting any evidence as to payments of expenses of a tortious injury paid for by a third party and taking any credit toward the defendant’s liability and damages for such payments”) (punctuation omitted).

1997“The collateral source rule has never applied so as to require an insurance company to pay ‘duplicate damages’ to a claimant. [Cit.]” Orndorff v. Brown, 197 Ga. App. 591, 592 (1) ( 399 SE2d 77 ) (1990).

1995“The collateral source rule has never applied so as to require an insurance company to pay ‘duplicate damages’ to a claimant. [Cit.]” Orndorff v. Brown, 197 Ga. App. 591, 592 (1) ( 399 SE2d 77 ) (1990).

1993See Mallory v. Daniel Lumber Co., [Inc.], 191 Ga. App. 234, 235 (1) ( 381 SE2d 406 ) [(1989)]; Insurance Co. of N. A. v. Fowler, 148 Ga. *406 App. 509, 511 (2) ( 251 SE2d 594 ) [(1978)]; Bituminous Cas.

1993See Mallory v. Daniel Lumber Co., [Inc.], 191 Ga. App. 234, 235 (1) ( 381 SE2d 406 ) [(1989)]; Insurance Co. of N. A. v. Fowler, 148 Ga. *406 App. 509, 511 (2) ( 251 SE2d 594 ) [(1978)]; Bituminous Cas.

2025Andrews’ holding is in conflict with many cases from the Supreme Court of Georgia interpreting and applying the collateral source rule to prevent offsets due to payments from a collateral source.4 See, e.g., Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1324 v. Roberts, 263 Ga. 405, 406-408 (1) ( 434 SE2d 450 ) (1993); Denton v. Con-Way Southern Express, 261 Ga. 41 ( 402 SE2d 269 ) (1991), overruled on other grounds by Grissom v. Gleason, 262 Ga. 374 ( 418 SE2d 27 ) (1992); City of Rome v. Rhodes, 134 Ga. 650 ( 68 SE 330 ) (1910); Western & Atlantic R. v. Meigs, 74 Ga. 857 (1885).

2025Andrews’ holding is in conflict with many cases from the Supreme Court of Georgia interpreting and applying the collateral source rule to prevent offsets due to payments from a collateral source.4 See, e.g., Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1324 v. Roberts, 263 Ga. 405, 406-408 (1) ( 434 SE2d 450 ) (1993); Denton v. Con-Way Southern Express, 261 Ga. 41 ( 402 SE2d 269 ) (1991), overruled on other grounds by Grissom v. Gleason, 262 Ga. 374 ( 418 SE2d 27 ) (1992); City of Rome v. Rhodes, 134 Ga. 650 ( 68 SE 330 ) (1910); Western & Atlantic R. v. Meigs, 74 Ga. 857 (1885).

2024Lawhorne argues that by waiting until the end of trial to give the anti-collateral source charge, instead of giving any kind of instruction at the time of the potential juror’s comment and the pain doctor’s testimony, the court improperly resurrected 8 the issue. “[A] trial court does not err by giving a curative instruction in its closing jury charge rather than contemporaneous with the introduction of the improper testimony, when there was no request for such an instruction at the time the testimony was elicited.” Birdsong v. State, 312 Ga. App. 345, 349 ( 718 SE2d 549 ) (2011).

2024Lawhorne argues that by waiting until the end of trial to give the anti-collateral source charge, instead of giving any kind of instruction at the time of the potential juror’s comment and the pain doctor’s testimony, the court improperly resurrected 8 the issue. “[A] trial court does not err by giving a curative instruction in its closing jury charge rather than contemporaneous with the introduction of the improper testimony, when there was no request for such an instruction at the time the testimony was elicited.” Birdsong v. State, 312 Ga. App. 345, 349 ( 718 SE2d 549 ) (2011).

2024Although the testimony about disability benefits may not have directly violated the collateral source rule given the timing, it was within the trial court’s discretion to give a cautionary instruction because of the testimony’s “likelihood to interject the issue of third-party payments or other irrelevant matters to the jury.” Vol Repairs II v. Knighten, 322 Ga. App. 416, 420-421 (3) ( 745 SE2d 673 ) (2013).

2024Although the testimony about disability benefits may not have directly violated the collateral source rule given the timing, it was within the trial court’s discretion to give a cautionary instruction because of the testimony’s “likelihood to interject the issue of third-party payments or other irrelevant matters to the jury.” Vol Repairs II v. Knighten, 322 Ga. App. 416, 420-421 (3) ( 745 SE2d 673 ) (2013).

2024See also Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1324 v. Roberts, 263 Ga. 405, 409 (2) ( 434 SE2d 450 ) (1993), citing Peoples Bank of LaGrange v. Ga. Bank & Trust Co., 126 Ga. App. 768, 772 (1) ( 191 SE2d 876 ) (1972) (while collateral source rule does not apply to breach of contract, it does apply to conversion; thus, in Peoples Bank of LaGrange, the Court of Appeals correctly reversed trial court’s grant of summary judgment to plaintiff on defendant’s counterclaim for conversion because “the collateral source rule was applicable to the defendant’s counterclaim in tort and . . . the plaintiff was, t

2024See also Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1324 v. Roberts, 263 Ga. 405, 409 (2) ( 434 SE2d 450 ) (1993), citing Peoples Bank of LaGrange v. Ga. Bank & Trust Co., 126 Ga. App. 768, 772 (1) ( 191 SE2d 876 ) (1972) (while collateral source rule does not apply to breach of contract, it does apply to conversion; thus, in Peoples Bank of LaGrange, the Court of Appeals correctly reversed trial court’s grant of summary judgment to plaintiff on defendant’s counterclaim for conversion because “the collateral source rule was applicable to the defendant’s counterclaim in tort and . . . the plaintiff was, t

2024See Goforth v. Wigley, 178 Ga. App. 558, 560 (2) ( 343 SE2d 788 ) (1986) (evidence of plaintiff’s compensation for a prior vehicle collision was not excludable under the collateral source rule because it was not evidence of receipt of other compensation for vehicle collision being tried).

2024See Goforth v. Wigley, 178 Ga. App. 558, 560 (2) ( 343 SE2d 788 ) (1986) (evidence of plaintiff’s compensation for a prior vehicle collision was not excludable under the collateral source rule because it was not evidence of receipt of other compensation for vehicle collision being tried).

2024Moreover, as this Court has held, “[a] conversion is an intentional tort and will support an award of attorney fees and an award of punitive damages.” Felker v. Chipley, 246 Ga. App. 296, 298 (2) ( 540 SE2d 285 ) (2000).

2024Moreover, as this Court has held, “[a] conversion is an intentional tort and will support an award of attorney fees and an award of punitive damages.” Felker v. Chipley, 246 Ga. App. 296, 298 (2) ( 540 SE2d 285 ) (2000).

2022See generally MCG Health, Inc. v. Kight, 325 Ga. App. 349, 353 (1) ( 750 SE2d 813 ) (2013) (“[U]nder the collateral source rule, [the plaintiff] was entitled to seek full recovery from the tortfeasor of reasonable and necessary hospital charges undiminished by insurance payments or [hospital] ‘write-offs’. . . .”). 6

2022See generally MCG Health, Inc. v. Kight, 325 Ga. App. 349, 353 (1) ( 750 SE2d 813 ) (2013) (“[U]nder the collateral source rule, [the plaintiff] was entitled to seek full recovery from the tortfeasor of reasonable and necessary hospital charges undiminished by insurance payments or [hospital] ‘write-offs’. . . .”). 6

2018See, e.g. , Rangel v. Anderson , 202 F.Supp.3d 1361 , 1372-1373 (II) (S.D.

2016See OCGA § 9-11-42 (b) (“The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue, or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues.”); Parks v. Consolidated Freightways, 187 Ga. App. 576, 577 (1) ( 370 SE2d 827 ) (1988) (“Severance is largely a matter of discretion for the trial judge, and absent clear and manifest abuse of that discretion, it will not be interfered with on appeal.” (punctuation omitted)).

2016See OCGA § 9-11-42 (b) (“The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue, or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues.”); Parks v. Consolidated Freightways, 187 Ga. App. 576, 577 (1) ( 370 SE2d 827 ) (1988) (“Severance is largely a matter of discretion for the trial judge, and absent clear and manifest abuse of that discretion, it will not be interfered with on appeal.” (punctuation omitted)).