collateral source rule in Connecticut

1997“The types of payments that typically come within the collateral source rule include insurance proceeds, medical benefits, and payments made by an employer pursuant to a statutory compensation scheme.” (Emphasis added.) Rametta v. Stella, 214 Conn. 484, 490 , 572 A.2d 978 (1990); see also Apuzzo v. Seneco, 178 Conn. 230, 233 , 423 A.2d 866 (1979) (holding that unemployment compensation benefits received by plaintiff are collateral source and that defendant could not reduce personal injury damages because of such benefits); Healy v. White, 173 Conn. 438, 448 , 378 A.2d 540 (1977) (holding that

1997“The types of payments that typically come within the collateral source rule include insurance proceeds, medical benefits, and payments made by an employer pursuant to a statutory compensation scheme.” (Emphasis added.) Rametta v. Stella, 214 Conn. 484, 490 , 572 A.2d 978 (1990); see also Apuzzo v. Seneco, 178 Conn. 230, 233 , 423 A.2d 866 (1979) (holding that unemployment compensation benefits received by plaintiff are collateral source and that defendant could not reduce personal injury damages because of such benefits); Healy v. White, 173 Conn. 438, 448 , 378 A.2d 540 (1977) (holding that

1997“The types of payments that typically come within the collateral source rule include insurance proceeds, medical benefits, and payments made by an employer pursuant to a statutory compensation scheme.” (Emphasis added.) Rametta v. Stella, 214 Conn. 484, 490 , 572 A.2d 978 (1990); see also Apuzzo v. Seneco, 178 Conn. 230, 233 , 423 A.2d 866 (1979) (holding that unemployment compensation benefits received by plaintiff are collateral source and that defendant could not reduce personal injury damages because of such benefits); Healy v. White, 173 Conn. 438, 448 , 378 A.2d 540 (1977) (holding that

1997“The types of payments that typically come within the collateral source rule include insurance proceeds, medical benefits, and payments made by an employer pursuant to a statutory compensation scheme.” (Emphasis added.) Rametta v. Stella, 214 Conn. 484, 490 , 572 A.2d 978 (1990); see also Apuzzo v. Seneco, 178 Conn. 230, 233 , 423 A.2d 866 (1979) (holding that unemployment compensation benefits received by plaintiff are collateral source and that defendant could not reduce personal injury damages because of such benefits); Healy v. White, 173 Conn. 438, 448 , 378 A.2d 540 (1977) (holding that

1997That rule is applicable ... in any tort case.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 556-57 , 590 A.2d 914 (1991); see also Gorham v. Farmington Motor Inn, Inc., 159 Conn. 576, 580 , 271 A.2d 94 (1970); 4 Todd v. Malafronte, 3 Conn. App. 16, 23 , 484 A.2d 463 (1984). 5 “Simply stated, the collateral source rule will not allow a tortfeasor to reduce his damage liability resulting from harm caused to another by benefits the injured person received from sources other than the tortfeasor himself or one acting on the tortfeasor’s behalf.

1997That rule is applicable ... in any tort case.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gurliacci v. Mayer, 218 Conn. 531, 556-57 , 590 A.2d 914 (1991); see also Gorham v. Farmington Motor Inn, Inc., 159 Conn. 576, 580 , 271 A.2d 94 (1970); 4 Todd v. Malafronte, 3 Conn. App. 16, 23 , 484 A.2d 463 (1984). 5 “Simply stated, the collateral source rule will not allow a tortfeasor to reduce his damage liability resulting from harm caused to another by benefits the injured person received from sources other than the tortfeasor himself or one acting on the tortfeasor’s behalf.

1997“The types of payments that typically come within the collateral source rule include insurance proceeds, medical benefits, and payments made by an employer pursuant to a statutory compensation scheme.” (Emphasis added.) Rametta v. Stella, 214 Conn. 484, 490 , 572 A.2d 978 (1990); see also Apuzzo v. Seneco, 178 Conn. 230, 233 , 423 A.2d 866 (1979) (holding that unemployment compensation benefits received by plaintiff are collateral source and that defendant could not reduce personal injury damages because of such benefits); Healy v. White, 173 Conn. 438, 448 , 378 A.2d 540 (1977) (holding that

1997“The types of payments that typically come within the collateral source rule include insurance proceeds, medical benefits, and payments made by an employer pursuant to a statutory compensation scheme.” (Emphasis added.) Rametta v. Stella, 214 Conn. 484, 490 , 572 A.2d 978 (1990); see also Apuzzo v. Seneco, 178 Conn. 230, 233 , 423 A.2d 866 (1979) (holding that unemployment compensation benefits received by plaintiff are collateral source and that defendant could not reduce personal injury damages because of such benefits); Healy v. White, 173 Conn. 438, 448 , 378 A.2d 540 (1977) (holding that

1991The plaintiff argues that this question violated the collateral source rule even if it was offered to impeach his credibility rather than as substantive evidence of a collateral source. “ 'The basis of our well-established collateral source rule is that a wrongdoer shall not benefit from a windfall from an outside source.’ ” Rametta v. Stella, 214 Conn. 484, 489-90 , 527 A.2d 978 (1990), quoting United Aircraft Corporation v. International Assn. of Machinists, 161 Conn. 79, 101-102 , 285 A.2d 330 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 , 92 S. Ct. 675 , 30 L.

1991The plaintiff argues that this question violated the collateral source rule even if it was offered to impeach his credibility rather than as substantive evidence of a collateral source. “ 'The basis of our well-established collateral source rule is that a wrongdoer shall not benefit from a windfall from an outside source.’ ” Rametta v. Stella, 214 Conn. 484, 489-90 , 527 A.2d 978 (1990), quoting United Aircraft Corporation v. International Assn. of Machinists, 161 Conn. 79, 101-102 , 285 A.2d 330 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 , 92 S. Ct. 675 , 30 L.

1991The plaintiff argues that this question violated the collateral source rule even if it was offered to impeach his credibility rather than as substantive evidence of a collateral source. “ 'The basis of our well-established collateral source rule is that a wrongdoer shall not benefit from a windfall from an outside source.’ ” Rametta v. Stella, 214 Conn. 484, 489-90 , 527 A.2d 978 (1990), quoting United Aircraft Corporation v. International Assn. of Machinists, 161 Conn. 79, 101-102 , 285 A.2d 330 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 , 92 S. Ct. 675 , 30 L.

1991Evidence of an injured person’s income or recovery from loss-reducing sources is ordinarily barred by the collateral source rule. “ ‘The basis of our well-established collateral source rule is that a wrongdoer shall not benefit from a windfall from an outside source.’ ” Rametta v. Stella, 214 Conn. 484, 489-90 , 572 A.2d 978 (1990), quoting United Aircraft Corporation v. International Assn. of Machinists, 161 Conn. 79, 101-102 , 285 A.2d 330 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 , 92 S. Ct. 675 , 30 L.

1991The plaintiff argues that this question violated the collateral source rule even if it was offered to impeach his credibility rather than as substantive evidence of a collateral source. “ 'The basis of our well-established collateral source rule is that a wrongdoer shall not benefit from a windfall from an outside source.’ ” Rametta v. Stella, 214 Conn. 484, 489-90 , 527 A.2d 978 (1990), quoting United Aircraft Corporation v. International Assn. of Machinists, 161 Conn. 79, 101-102 , 285 A.2d 330 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 , 92 S. Ct. 675 , 30 L.

1991Evidence of an injured person’s income or recovery from loss-reducing sources is ordinarily barred by the collateral source rule. “ ‘The basis of our well-established collateral source rule is that a wrongdoer shall not benefit from a windfall from an outside source.’ ” Rametta v. Stella, 214 Conn. 484, 489-90 , 572 A.2d 978 (1990), quoting United Aircraft Corporation v. International Assn. of Machinists, 161 Conn. 79, 101-102 , 285 A.2d 330 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 , 92 S. Ct. 675 , 30 L.

1999"Ordinarily, the fact that the plaintiff has received benefits from a third party . . . [is] inadmissible under the collateral source rule." Baystate Moving Systems, Inc. v. Bowman , 24 Conn. App. 531 , 534 , 590 A.2d 462 (1991).

1999"Ordinarily, the fact that the plaintiff has received benefits from a third party . . . [is] inadmissible under the collateral source rule." Baystate Moving Systems, Inc. v. Bowman , 24 Conn. App. 531 , 534 , 590 A.2d 462 (1991).

2021With the mechanism embodied in § 52-225a in place, ‘‘[e]vidence of an injured person’s income or recovery from loss-reducing sources is ordinarily barred by the collateral source rule.’’ Hammer v. Mount Sinai Hospi- tal, 25 Conn. App. 702, 721 , 596 A.2d 1318 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 933 , 599 A.2d 384 (1991).

2021With the mechanism embodied in § 52-225a in place, ‘‘[e]vidence of an injured person’s income or recovery from loss-reducing sources is ordinarily barred by the collateral source rule.’’ Hammer v. Mount Sinai Hospi- tal, 25 Conn. App. 702, 721 , 596 A.2d 1318 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 933 , 599 A.2d 384 (1991).

2021With the mechanism embodied in § 52-225a in place, ‘‘[e]vidence of an injured person’s income or recovery from loss-reducing sources is ordinarily barred by the collateral source rule.’’ Hammer v. Mount Sinai Hospi- tal, 25 Conn. App. 702, 721 , 596 A.2d 1318 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 933 , 599 A.2d 384 (1991).

2021With the mechanism embodied in § 52-225a in place, ‘‘[e]vidence of an injured person’s income or recovery from loss-reducing sources is ordinarily barred by the collateral source rule.’’ Hammer v. Mount Sinai Hospi- tal, 25 Conn. App. 702, 721 , 596 A.2d 1318 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 933 , 599 A.2d 384 (1991).

2021With the mechanism embodied in § 52-225a in place, ‘‘[e]vidence of an injured person’s income or recovery from loss-reducing sources is ordinarily barred by the collateral source rule.’’ Hammer v. Mount Sinai Hospi- tal, 25 Conn. App. 702, 721 , 596 A.2d 1318 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 933 , 599 A.2d 384 (1991).

2021With the mechanism embodied in § 52-225a in place, ‘‘[e]vidence of an injured person’s income or recovery from loss-reducing sources is ordinarily barred by the collateral source rule.’’ Hammer v. Mount Sinai Hospi- tal, 25 Conn. App. 702, 721 , 596 A.2d 1318 , cert. denied, 220 Conn. 933 , 599 A.2d 384 (1991).

2021On appeal, the defendants cite to Capozziello v. Robinson, 102 Conn. App. 93, 95 , 924 A.2d 876 (2007), for the precept that ‘‘it is a well established rule that the existence of collateral sources should not be revealed to the jury.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) With no further analysis, the defen- dants suggest that the collateral source rule justifies the court’s ruling.8 In response, the plaintiffs argue that evidence of insurance, or more precisely, their lack thereof, was necessary to properly explain why certain medical providers were chosen.

2021On appeal, the defendants cite to Capozziello v. Robinson, 102 Conn. App. 93, 95 , 924 A.2d 876 (2007), for the precept that ‘‘it is a well established rule that the existence of collateral sources should not be revealed to the jury.’’ (Emphasis omitted.) With no further analysis, the defen- dants suggest that the collateral source rule justifies the court’s ruling.8 In response, the plaintiffs argue that evidence of insurance, or more precisely, their lack thereof, was necessary to properly explain why certain medical providers were chosen.

2021See Practice Book § 60-5; cf. Cima v. Sciaretta, 140 Conn. App. 167 , 173 n.5, 58 A.3d 345 (evidentiary claim preserved for appellate review by filing of pretrial motion in limine), cert. denied, 308 Conn. 912 , 61 A.3d 532 (2013). 8 The collateral source rule, codified at General Statutes § 52-225a provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) In any civil action, whether in tort or in contract, wherein the claimant seeks to recover damages resulting from (1) personal injury or wrongful death . . . and wherein liability is admitted or is deter- mined by the trier of fact and damages are awarded to compens

2021See Practice Book § 60-5; cf. Cima v. Sciaretta, 140 Conn. App. 167 , 173 n.5, 58 A.3d 345 (evidentiary claim preserved for appellate review by filing of pretrial motion in limine), cert. denied, 308 Conn. 912 , 61 A.3d 532 (2013). 8 The collateral source rule, codified at General Statutes § 52-225a provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) In any civil action, whether in tort or in contract, wherein the claimant seeks to recover damages resulting from (1) personal injury or wrongful death . . . and wherein liability is admitted or is deter- mined by the trier of fact and damages are awarded to compens

2012We are mindful of the decision in Deas v. Diaz, 121 Conn. App. 826, 837 , 988 A.2d 200 , cert. denied, 298 Conn. 905 , 3 A.3d 69 (2010), in which this court stated: “Looking to the plain language of § 52-216a and the case law that has interpreted it, we conclude that the court’s decision on whether to deny or to grant a motion for remittitur because it is excessive ‘as a matter of law’ is entitled to plenary review on appeal; the court’s decision as to the amount of the remittitur, if ordered, should be analyzed under an abuse of discretion standard, however.” See also J.

2012We are mindful of the decision in Deas v. Diaz, 121 Conn. App. 826, 837 , 988 A.2d 200 , cert. denied, 298 Conn. 905 , 3 A.3d 69 (2010), in which this court stated: “Looking to the plain language of § 52-216a and the case law that has interpreted it, we conclude that the court’s decision on whether to deny or to grant a motion for remittitur because it is excessive ‘as a matter of law’ is entitled to plenary review on appeal; the court’s decision as to the amount of the remittitur, if ordered, should be analyzed under an abuse of discretion standard, however.” See also J.

2012We are mindful of the decision in Deas v. Diaz, 121 Conn. App. 826, 837 , 988 A.2d 200 , cert. denied, 298 Conn. 905 , 3 A.3d 69 (2010), in which this court stated: “Looking to the plain language of § 52-216a and the case law that has interpreted it, we conclude that the court’s decision on whether to deny or to grant a motion for remittitur because it is excessive ‘as a matter of law’ is entitled to plenary review on appeal; the court’s decision as to the amount of the remittitur, if ordered, should be analyzed under an abuse of discretion standard, however.” See also J.

2002Bay State Moving Systems Inc. v. Bowman , 24 Conn. App. 531 , 534 , 590 A.2d 462 cert. denied, 220 Conn. 904 , 593 A.2d 969 (1991); Acampora v. Ledewitz , 159 Conn. 377 , 384 , 269 A.2d 288 (1970).

2002Bay State Moving Systems Inc. v. Bowman , 24 Conn. App. 531 , 534 , 590 A.2d 462 cert. denied, 220 Conn. 904 , 593 A.2d 969 (1991); Acampora v. Ledewitz , 159 Conn. 377 , 384 , 269 A.2d 288 (1970).

2002In Mack v. LaValley, 55 Conn. App. 150, 167 , 738 A.2d 715 , cert. denied, 251 Conn. 928 , 742 A.2d 363 (1999), this court expressed its understanding of the common-law collateral source rule as follows: “Prior to the enactment of § 52-225a in 1985, Connecticut adhered to the common-law collateral source rule, which provides that ‘a defendant is not entitled to be relieved from paying any part of the compensation due for injuries proximately resulting from his act where payment [for such injuries or damages] comes from a collateral source, wholly independent of him.’ ” (Emphasis added.) In the

2002In Mack v. LaValley, 55 Conn. App. 150, 167 , 738 A.2d 715 , cert. denied, 251 Conn. 928 , 742 A.2d 363 (1999), this court expressed its understanding of the common-law collateral source rule as follows: “Prior to the enactment of § 52-225a in 1985, Connecticut adhered to the common-law collateral source rule, which provides that ‘a defendant is not entitled to be relieved from paying any part of the compensation due for injuries proximately resulting from his act where payment [for such injuries or damages] comes from a collateral source, wholly independent of him.’ ” (Emphasis added.) In the

2002In Mack v. LaValley, 55 Conn. App. 150, 167 , 738 A.2d 715 , cert. denied, 251 Conn. 928 , 742 A.2d 363 (1999), this court expressed its understanding of the common-law collateral source rule as follows: “Prior to the enactment of § 52-225a in 1985, Connecticut adhered to the common-law collateral source rule, which provides that ‘a defendant is not entitled to be relieved from paying any part of the compensation due for injuries proximately resulting from his act where payment [for such injuries or damages] comes from a collateral source, wholly independent of him.’ ” (Emphasis added.) In the

2002In Mack v. LaValley, 55 Conn. App. 150, 167 , 738 A.2d 715 , cert. denied, 251 Conn. 928 , 742 A.2d 363 (1999), this court expressed its understanding of the common-law collateral source rule as follows: “Prior to the enactment of § 52-225a in 1985, Connecticut adhered to the common-law collateral source rule, which provides that ‘a defendant is not entitled to be relieved from paying any part of the compensation due for injuries proximately resulting from his act where payment [for such injuries or damages] comes from a collateral source, wholly independent of him.’ ” (Emphasis added.) In the

2000“Because this [argument] was not briefed by either party, we decline to consider it.” Shew v. Freedom of Information Commission, 245 Conn. 149 , 166 n.20, 714 A.2d 664 (1998).

2000“Because this [argument] was not briefed by either party, we decline to consider it.” Shew v. Freedom of Information Commission, 245 Conn. 149 , 166 n.20, 714 A.2d 664 (1998).

2000Alvarez v. New Haven Register, 249 Conn. 709 , 721 (1999), Stulginski v. Foran, 43 Conn. 244 , 250 (1875).