collateral source rule in Texas

2019Transfer & Storage Co., 601 S.W.2d 931, 934 (Tex. 1980) (“The theory behind the collateral source rule is that a wrongdoer should not have the benefit of insurance independently procured by the injured party, and to which the wrongdoer was not privy.”).

2019If a payment is within the collateral source rule, “the principle forbidding more than one recovery for the same loss is not applicable.” Mendez, 555 S.W.3d at 114 (quoting Brown, 601 S.W.2d at 936 )). 13 The $11,087.62 payment from Progressive falls under the collateral source rule because Appellee independently contracted with Progressive for insurance on his vehicle and Appellant was not in privity to the insurance policy.

2009“The collateral source rule is both a rule of evidence and damages.” 1 Johnson v. Dallas County, 195 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.); Taylor v. American Fabritech, Inc., 132 S.W.3d 613, 626 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).

2009Fabritech, Inc., 132 S.W.3d 613, 626 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (The collateral source rule precludes a tortfeasor from mentioning payments to the injured party from *482 sources other than the tortfeasor.).

2009Lee-Wright, Inc. v. Hall, 840 S.W.2d 572, 582 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (citing Phillips v. Western Co. of N. Am., 953 F.2d 923, 929 (5th Cir.1992)). 2 Application of the collateral source rule has historically benefitted those with foresight to acquire insurance in advance of injury or at least in advance of treatment.

2009Lee-Wright, Inc. v. Hall, 840 S.W.2d 572, 582 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) ( citing Phillips v. Western Co. of N. Am., 953 F.2d 923, 929 (5th Cir. 1992)). (footnote: 2) Application of the collateral source rule has historically benefitted those with foresight to acquire insurance in advance of injury or at least in advance of treatment.

2026Analysis The collateral-source rule “precludes any reduction in a tortfeasor’s liability because of benefits received by the plaintiff from someone else.” Haygood v. De Escabedo, 356 S.W.3d 390, 394 (Tex. 2011).

2018See Haygood, 356 S.W.3d at 394-95 (defining the collateral-source rule as precluding “any reduction in a tortfeasor’s liability because of benefits received by the plaintiff from someone else”) (emphasis added).

2009“The collateral source rule is both a rule of evidence and damages.” 1 Johnson v. Dallas County, 195 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.); Taylor v. American Fabritech, Inc., 132 S.W.3d 613, 626 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).

2009“The collateral source rule is both a rule of evidence and damages.” Johnson v. Dallas County, 195 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. App.–Dallas 2006, no pet.); Taylor v. American Fabritech, Inc., 132 S.W.3d 613, 626 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).

2009See, e.g., Brown, 601 S.W.2d at 934-36 (insurance); Twin City Fire Insurance Company v. Gibson, 488 S.W.2d 565, 571 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (government benefits); Barlow, 313 S.W.2d at 911 (gratuitous healthcare services by Veterans Administration).

2009See, e.g., Brown, 601 S.W.2d at 934-36 (insurance); Twin City Fire Insurance Company v. Gibson, 488 S.W.2d 565, 571 (Tex.Civ.App.–Amarillo 1972, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (government benefits); Barlow, 313 S.W.2d 1 The dual nature of the collateral source rule may be explained: The substantive component is a rule of damages.

2009Lee-Wright, Inc. v. Hall, 840 S.W.2d 572, 582 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (citing Phillips v. Western Co. of N. Am., 953 F.2d 923, 929 (5th Cir.1992)). 2 Application of the collateral source rule has historically benefitted those with foresight to acquire insurance in advance of injury or at least in advance of treatment.

2009Lee-Wright, Inc. v. Hall, 840 S.W.2d 572, 582 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) ( citing Phillips v. Western Co. of N. Am., 953 F.2d 923, 929 (5th Cir. 1992)). (footnote: 2) Application of the collateral source rule has historically benefitted those with foresight to acquire insurance in advance of injury or at least in advance of treatment.

2009Managers, Inc., 226 S.W.3d 466, 471 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).

2009Managers, Inc., 226 S.W.3d 466, 471 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).

2009Discussion The one-satisfaction rule limits a plaintiff “to but one satisfaction for the injuries sustained by him.” Bradshaw v. Baylor Univ., 126 Tex. 99 , 84 S.W.2d 703, 705 (1935); Crown Life Ins.

2009Discussion The one-satisfaction rule limits a plaintiff “to but one satisfaction for the injuries sustained by him.” Bradshaw v. Baylor Univ., 126 Tex. 99 , 84 S.W.2d 703, 705 (1935); Crown Life Ins.

2009Brown, 601 S.W.2d at 934-35 ; Finger v. Southern Refrigeration Servs., Inc., 881 S.W.2d 890, 893-94 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied); Payne v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 2:08cv119, 2008 WL 4890760 , at *3, 2008 U.S. Dist.

2009Brown, 601 S.W.2d at 934-35 ; Finger v. Southern Refrigeration Servs., Inc., 881 S.W.2d 890, 893-94 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied); Payne v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc., No. 2:08cv119, 2008 WL 4890760 , at *3, 2008 U.S. Dist.

2009See, e.g., Brown, 601 S.W.2d at 934-36 (insurance); Twin City Fire Insurance Company v. Gibson, 488 S.W.2d 565, 571 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (government benefits); Barlow, 313 S.W.2d at 911 (gratuitous healthcare services by Veterans Administration).

2009See, e.g., Brown, 601 S.W.2d at 934-36 (insurance) ; Twin City Fire Insurance Company v. Gibson, 488 S.W.2d 565, 571 (Tex.Civ.App.–Amarillo 1972, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (government benefits); Barlow, 313 S.W.2d at 911 (gratuitous healthcare services by Veterans Administration).

2009Its focal point is “whether a tort victim has received benefits from a collateral source that cannot be used to reduce the amount of damages owed by a tortfeasor.” Acuar v. Letourneau, 260 Va. 180 , 531 S.E.2d 316, 322 (Va.2000).

2009Its focal point is “whether a tort victim has received benefits from a collateral source that cannot be used to reduce the amount of damages owed by a tortfeasor.” Acuar v. Letourneau, 260 Va. 180 , 531 S.E.2d 316, 322 (Va.2000).

2019Co. of Tex. v. Kidd, 997 S.W.2d 265, 274 (Tex. 1999); see Sky View at Las Palmas, LLC v. Mendez, 555 S.W.3d 101, 114 (Tex. 2018).

2011Mid-Century, 997 S.W.2d at 274 ("The collateral source rule bars a wrongdoer from offsetting his liability by insurance benefits independently procured by the injured party.”); Levi, 59 Tex. at 676 ("The insurer and the defendant are not joint tort-feasors or joint debtors so as to make the payment or satisfaction by the former operate to the benefit of the latter; nor is there any legal privity between the defendant and the insurer so as to give the former the right to avail itself of a payment by the latter.

2009Matbon, Inc. v. Gries, No. 11-06-00258-CV, 2009 WL 94310 at *5-6 (Tex.App.–Eastland Jan. 15, 2009, no pet. h.)(holding that the collateral source rule was not eviscerated by the adoption of section 41.0105).

2009Matbon, Inc. v. Gries, No. 11-06-00258-CV, 2009 WL 94310 at *5-6 (Tex.App.–Eastland Jan. 15, 2009, no pet. h.)(holding that the collateral source rule was not eviscerated by the adoption of section 41.0105).

2009See Dodd v. Lang, 71 Va. Cir. 235, 242-43 , 2006 WL 2257160 (Va.Cir.Ct.2006) (holding as a matter of substantive tort law, the collateral source rule includes debts discharged in bankruptcy).

2009See Dodd v. Lang, 71 Va. Cir. 235, 242-43 , 2006 WL 2257160 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2006) (holding as a matter of substantive tort law, the collateral source rule includes debts discharged in bankruptcy).

1999Azar Nut Co. v. Caille, 720 S.W.2d 685, 688 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1986), citing McLemore v. Broussard, 670 S.W.2d 301 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ), aff'd, 734 S.W.2d 667 (Tex.1987); Texas General Indemnity Co. v. Hamilton, 420 S.W.2d 735 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1967, writ refd n.r.e.); Traders & General Insurance Co. v. Reed, 376 S.W.2d 591 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

1986Traders & General Insurance Company v. Reed, 376 S.W.2d 591, 593 (Tex.Civ.App. — Corpus Christi 1964, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Walker v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 425 S.W.2d 462, 464 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

1982In that suit by a lessor of a theater against the lessee for damages caused by fire, evidence of payments pursuant to insurance procured by the lessee and made payable to the lessor was held to be admissible as being outside of the collateral source rule. 71 S.W.2d at 241 .

1980The collateral source rule was not applied in Publix Theatres Corporation v. Powell, 123 Tex. 304 , 71 S.W.2d 237 (1934).

2011Mid-Century, 997 S.W.2d at 274 ("The collateral source rule bars a wrongdoer from offsetting his liability by insurance benefits independently procured by the injured party.”); Levi, 59 Tex. at 676 ("The insurer and the defendant are not joint tort-feasors or joint debtors so as to make the payment or satisfaction by the former operate to the benefit of the latter; nor is there any legal privity between the defendant and the insurer so as to give the former the right to avail itself of a payment by the latter.

2006See Texas & Pacific Ry.\ Co. v. Levi & Bro., 59 Tex. 674, 676 (1883) ( quoting Harding, 43 Vt. at 538 ). \ ' var WPFootnote4 = ' A discharge in bankruptcy “ operates as an injunction against the commencement\ or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or\ offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such\ debt is waived.... ” 11 U.S.C.A. § 524 (a)(2) (West 2004). \ ' function WPShow( WPid, WPtext ) { if( bInlineFloats ) eval( "document.all." + WPid + ".style.visibility = 'visible'" ); else { if( floatwnd ==

2008Gore relies primarily on reasoning like that set out in cases such as Moorhead v. Crozer Chester Medical Ctr., 564 Pa. 156 , 765 A.2d 786, 791 (2001), where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found the collateral source rule did not apply to similar discounts because the discounted amount was not paid by any collateral source and was thus "illusory.” 765 A.2d at 791 .

2008Gore relies primarily on reasoning like that set out in cases such as Moorhead v. Crozer Chester Medical Ctr., 564 Pa. 156 , 765 A.2d 786, 791 (2001), where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found the collateral source rule did not apply to similar discounts because the discounted amount was not paid by any collateral source and was thus "illusory.” 765 A.2d at 791 .

2011The collateral source rule has been applied to all manner of benefits, including payments received under a worker’s compensation policy, see Exxon Corp. v. Shuttlesworth, 800 S.W.2d 902, 907-08 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ), income received as part of veterans’ benefits, see Montandon v. Colehour, 469 S.W.2d 222, 229-30 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1971, no writ), and Social Security disability payments, see Traders and Gen.

2004Id . [47] See Doss , 737 S.W.2d at 611–12. [48] The checks made out directly to Taylor were apparently for disability payments. [49] See, e.g., Lee-Wright, Inc. v. Hall , 840 S.W.2d 572, 582 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (Workers’ Compensation benefits); Shuttlesworth , 800 S.W.2d at 907-08 (same); Hall v. Birchfield , 718 S.W.2d 313, 338 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1986) (state provided services free of charge), rev’d on other grounds , 747 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. 1988); Montandon v. Colehour , 469 S.W.2d 222, 229 (Tex. Civ.

2004In Allen , we stated "as to payments made by employers, it is the nature of the payments, not their source, which is determinative of the question of the applicability of the collateral source rule.” Allen, 525 S.W.2d at 306 . 42 .See Doss, 737 S.W.2d at 611-12 .

2004In Allen , we stated “as to payments made by employers, it is the nature of the payments, not their source, which is determinative of the question of the applicability of the collateral source rule.” Allen , 525 S.W.2d at 306 . [42] See Doss , 737 S.W.2d at 611–12.

2016See Castillo v. American Garment Finishers In addition to the absence of an objecfion under section 241, Corp.. 965 S.W.2d 646 , 650 n. 2 (Tex,App,—El Paso 1998, the trial court did not, on its own motion, apply section no writ), In Texas, the collateral source rule has been held 241 to deny all or part of appellee's fee..

2004Appel-lees suggest that the El Paso Court of Appeals opinion in Castillo v. American Garment Finishers Corp., 965 S.W.2d 646 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1998, no pet.), stands for the proposition that a non-participant in Workers' Compensation does not have to present any other evidence regarding an insurance policy in order to get an offset against tort damages.