demanding standard in Illinois

2021“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).

2021Although it is a more demanding standard than the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity needed to initiate an investigative stop (Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)), probable cause “ ‘does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities’ ” (Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231-32 (1983) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981))).

2026“Although ‘reasonable, articulable suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than probable cause, an officer’s suspicion must amount to more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch” ’ of criminal activity.” Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)).

2026The officer must have a “reasonable, articulable suspicion” that criminal activity is afoot, which is a less demanding standard than probable cause but “must amount to more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

2026“Although ‘reasonable, articulable suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than probable cause, an officer’s suspicion must amount to more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch” ’ of criminal activity.” Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)).

2022People v. Love, 199 Ill. 2d 269, 275 , 769 N.E.2d 10, 14 (2002). ¶ 25 Our supreme court has stated: “Pursuant to Terry, a police officer may conduct a brief, investigatory stop of a person where the officer reasonably believes that the person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime. [Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).] The officer must have a ‘reasonable, articulable suspicion’ that criminal activity is afoot. [Citation.] Although ‘reasonable, articulable suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than probable cause, an officer’s suspicion must amount to more than an ‘inchoate and unpar

2025The finding, as required by section 110-6.1(i- 5), is “a less demanding standard than what is required at the detention hearing, though both are concerned with fundamentally the same question.” Id. ¶ 22 Under the recent Supreme Court decision in People v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626 , “when the parties to a pretrial detention hearing proceed solely by proffer, the reviewing court is not bound by the circuit court’s factual findings and may therefore conduct its own independent de novo review of the proffered evidence and evidence otherwise documentary in nature.” People v. -5- No. 1-24-2240B Morgan

2025Instead, as required by section 110-6.1(i-5), the finding at a continued detention hearing is “a less demanding standard than what is required at the detention hearing, though both are concerned with fundamentally the same question.” People v. Thomas, 2024 IL App (1st) 240479, ¶ 14 .

2022While “reasonable, articulable suspicion” constitutes a less demanding standard than probable cause, the “officer’s suspicion must amount to more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch” ’ of criminal activity.” Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 ).

2020App. 3d 669, 675 (2004). ¶ 19 “While ‘reasonable suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop. [Citation.] The officer must be able to articulate more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch” ’ of criminal activity. [Citation.]” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123-24 .

2019See Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999 , 1008 n.62 (Alaska 2008) (rejecting Supreme Court’s heightened standard of “clearest proof” in evaluating whether a law is punitive in effect); Gonzalez v. State, 980 N.E.2d 312 , 316 n.3 (Ind. 2013) (same); Starkey v. Oklahoma Department of Corrections, 2013 OK 43, ¶¶ 44-45 , 305 P.3d 1004 (Okla. 2013) (undertaking neutral evaluation of act’s purpose and effects to determine whether it has punitive effects). ¶ 30 Because we have determined that the burdens imposed on those subject to SORA’s statutory scheme are not punitive so as to override the legislature’s i

2019See Doe v. State , 189 P.3d 999 , 1008 n.62 (Alaska 2008) (rejecting Supreme Court's heightened standard of "clearest proof" in evaluating whether a law is punitive in effect); Gonzalez v. State , 980 N.E.2d 312 , 316 n.3 (Ind. 2013) (same); Starkey v. Oklahoma Department of Corrections , 2013 OK 43 , ¶¶ 44-45, 305 P.3d 1004 (Okla. 2013) (undertaking neutral evaluation of act's purpose and effects to determine whether it has punitive effects). ¶ 30 Because we have determined that the burdens imposed on those subject to SORA's statutory scheme are not punitive so as to override the legislature'

2015Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 573 ("Wyeth failed to demonstrate that it was impossible for it to comply with both federal and state requirements"); see also Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 581 ("Wyeth has not persuaded us").

2015Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 573 ("Wyeth failed to demonstrate that it was impossible for it to comply with both federal and state requirements"); see also Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 581 ("Wyeth has not persuaded us").

2025The finding, as required by section 110-6.1(i- 5), is “a less demanding standard than what is required at the detention hearing, though both are concerned with fundamentally the same question.” Id. ¶ 22 Under the recent Supreme Court decision in People v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626 , “when the parties to a pretrial detention hearing proceed solely by proffer, the reviewing court is not bound by the circuit court’s factual findings and may therefore conduct its own independent de novo review of the proffered evidence and evidence otherwise documentary in nature.” People v. -5- No. 1-24-2240B Morgan

2025The finding, as required by section 110-6.1(i- 5), is “a less demanding standard than what is required at the detention hearing, though both are concerned with fundamentally the same question.” Id. ¶ 22 Under the recent Supreme Court decision in People v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626 , “when the parties to a pretrial detention hearing proceed solely by proffer, the reviewing court is not bound by the circuit court’s factual findings and may therefore conduct its own independent de novo review of the proffered evidence and evidence otherwise documentary in nature.” People v. -5- No. 1-24-2240B Morgan

2022People v. Love, 199 Ill. 2d 269, 275 , 769 N.E.2d 10, 14 (2002). ¶ 25 Our supreme court has stated: “Pursuant to Terry, a police officer may conduct a brief, investigatory stop of a person where the officer reasonably believes that the person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime. [Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).] The officer must have a ‘reasonable, articulable suspicion’ that criminal activity is afoot. [Citation.] Although ‘reasonable, articulable suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than probable cause, an officer’s suspicion must amount to more than an ‘inchoate and unpar

2022People v. Love, 199 Ill. 2d 269, 275 , 769 N.E.2d 10, 14 (2002). ¶ 25 Our supreme court has stated: “Pursuant to Terry, a police officer may conduct a brief, investigatory stop of a person where the officer reasonably believes that the person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime. [Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).] The officer must have a ‘reasonable, articulable suspicion’ that criminal activity is afoot. [Citation.] Although ‘reasonable, articulable suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than probable cause, an officer’s suspicion must amount to more than an ‘inchoate and unpar

2021Jones, 215 Ill. 2d at 270 ; Hackett, 2012 IL 111781, ¶ 20 . “ ‘Although “reasonable, articulable suspicion” is a less demanding standard than probable cause, an officer’s suspicion must amount to more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’ ” of criminal activity.’ ” Dunmire, 2019 IL App (4th) 190316, ¶ 73 (quoting People v. Timmsen, 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 9 , 50 N.E.3d 1092 , quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 ).

2020Jones, 215 Ill. 2d at 270 ; Hackett, 2012 IL 111781, ¶ 20 . “ ‘Although “reasonable, articulable suspicion” is a less demanding standard than probable cause, an officer’s suspicion must amount to more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’ ” of criminal activity.’ ” Dunmire, 2019 IL App (4th) 190316, ¶ 73 (quoting People v. Timmsen, 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 9 , 50 N.E.3d 1092 , quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 ).

2021All told, “[a] reasonable suspicion is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence and ‘obviously less’ than that necessary for probable cause.” Dunmire, 2019 IL App (4th) 190316, ¶ 41 (quoting Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. ___ , ___, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014)). ¶ 16 Be it based on either probable cause or reasonable suspicion, “[a] seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation” may “ ‘become[ ] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete [the] mission’ of issuing a ticket for the violation.” Rodriguez v.

2020All told, “[a] reasonable suspicion is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence and ‘obviously less’ than that necessary for probable cause.” Dunmire, 2019 IL App (4th) 190316, ¶ 41 (quoting Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. ___ , ___, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014)). -6- ¶ 16 Be it based on either probable cause or reasonable suspicion, “[a] seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation” may “ ‘become[ ] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete [the] mission’ of issuing a ticket for the violation.” Rodriguez

2021All told, “[a] reasonable suspicion is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence and ‘obviously less’ than that necessary for probable cause.” Dunmire, 2019 IL App (4th) 190316, ¶ 41 (quoting Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. ___ , ___, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014)). ¶ 16 Be it based on either probable cause or reasonable suspicion, “[a] seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation” may “ ‘become[ ] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete [the] mission’ of issuing a ticket for the violation.” Rodriguez v.

2020All told, “[a] reasonable suspicion is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence and ‘obviously less’ than that necessary for probable cause.” Dunmire, 2019 IL App (4th) 190316, ¶ 41 (quoting Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. ___ , ___, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014)). -6- ¶ 16 Be it based on either probable cause or reasonable suspicion, “[a] seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation” may “ ‘become[ ] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete [the] mission’ of issuing a ticket for the violation.” Rodriguez

2020Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 496 (1985).

2019Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 496 (1985).

2011See Reed, 124 Ill.2d at 512 , 125 Ill.Dec. 316 , 530 N.E.2d 474 . ¶ 89 B.

2011See Reed, 124 Ill.2d at 512 , 125 Ill.Dec. 316 , 530 N.E.2d 474 . ¶ 89 B.

2021Although it is a more demanding standard than the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity needed to initiate an investigative stop (Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)), probable cause “ ‘does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities’ ” (Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231-32 (1983) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981))).

2019“Although ‘reasonable, articulable suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than probable cause, an officer’s suspicion must amount to more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch” ’ of criminal activity.” Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 ).