demanding standard in Kansas

2005Ed. 2d 301 , 110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990), our Supreme Court in Slater, 267 Kan. at 697 , set forth the following standard for determining whedier reasonable suspicion exists: “ ‘Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard tiran probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less rehable than that required to show probable cause. . . .

2003This court stated the standard for determining reasonable suspicion in State v. Slater, 267 Kan. 694 , Syl. ¶¶ 1, 2, 986 P.2d 1038 (1999): “A law enforcement officer may stop any person in a public place based upon specific and articulable facts raising a reasonable suspicion that such person has committed or is about to commit a crime.” “Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the

2025Ed. 2d 570 (2000).' [State v.] Moore, 283 Kan. [344,] 354-55, 154 P.3d 1 [2007]." Johnson, 293 Kan. at 6 . 5 Deputy Umeck had no reasonable suspicion to stop Carter for an unsafe lane change.

2011Ed. 2d 570 (2000).’ Moore, 283 Kan. at 354-55 .

2020In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, law enforcement must consider the totality of the circumstances, but it is "a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires considerably less than a preponderance of the evidence." State v. Edgar, 296 Kan. 513, 521 , 294 P.3d 251 (2013).

2015There we noted “[reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires considerably less than a preponderance of the evidence.” 296 Kan. at 521 (citing State v. Pollman, 286 Kan. 881 , Syl. ¶ 6, 190 P.3d 234 [2008]).

2020Similarly, the Kansas Supreme Court has found that a mistake of law may not support reasonable suspicion in certain circumstances, noting that a police officer "must be held to a more demanding standard of legal knowledge than any citizen who may be subject to the officer's exercise of authority." Martin v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 285 Kan. 625, 638 , 176 P.3d 938 (2008).

2020Similarly, the Kansas Supreme Court has found that a mistake of law may not support reasonable suspicion in certain circumstances, noting that a police officer "must be held to a more demanding standard of legal knowledge than any citizen who may be subject to the officer's exercise of authority." Martin v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 285 Kan. 625, 638 , 176 P.3d 938 (2008).

2024This is a less demanding standard than the Sixth Amendment constitutional ineffective assistance of counsel standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 80 L.

2024This is a less demanding standard than the Sixth Amendment constitutional ineffective assistance of counsel standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 80 L.

2022Ed. 2d 674 (1984), requiring the movant to show a reasonable probability of a different outcome in the underlying criminal case, or the less demanding test drawn from Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 , 100 S. Ct. 1708 , 64 L.

2022Ed. 2d 674 (1984), requiring the movant to show a reasonable probability of a different outcome in the underlying criminal case, or the less demanding test drawn from Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 , 100 S. Ct. 1708 , 64 L.

2022An officer must have articulable facts sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion to stop a moving vehicle. 253 Kan. at 80 . "'Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause. . . .

2020Sloop, 296 Kan. at 20 .

2020In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, law enforcement must consider the totality of the circumstances, but it is "a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires considerably less than a preponderance of the evidence." State v. Edgar, 296 Kan. 513, 521 , 294 P.3d 251 (2013).

2020Farrar, 43 Kan.

2018State v. DeMarco , 263 Kan. 727 , 734-35, 952 P.2d 1276 (1998).

2018State v. DeMarco , 263 Kan. 727 , 734-35, 952 P.2d 1276 (1998).

2016State v. Akins, 298 Kan. 592 , Syl. ¶ 3, 315 P.3d 868 (2014).

2016State v. Akins, 298 Kan. 592 , Syl. ¶ 3, 315 P.3d 868 (2014).

2015The panel concluded that because reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, “HGN test results may, under appropriate circumstances, be considered as part of the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a law enforcement officer has reasonable suspicion to request a PBT.” 46 Kan.

2015Then, “[bjecause reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause,” the panel made new law in this state, finding “that testimony from a law enforcement officer trained in administering HGN tests may properly be considered as part of the circumstantial evidence used prior to trial in determining whether the totality of circumstances show that a law enforcement officer had reasonable suspicion to request a PBT.” 46 Kan.

2014See State v. Jones, 300 Kan. 630, 646-48 , 333 P.3d 886 (2014); State v. Coleman, 292 Kan. 813, 817-18 , 257 P.3d 320 (2011).

2014See State v. Jones, 300 Kan. 630, 646-48 , 333 P.3d 886 (2014); State v. Coleman, 292 Kan. 813, 817-18 , 257 P.3d 320 (2011).

2012It is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than a preponderance of the evidence.” 291 Kan. 676 , Syl. ¶ 11.

2011Ed. 2d 570 (2000).’ Moore, 283 Kan. at 354-55 .

2007State v. Parker, 282 Kan. 584 , 147 P.3d 115 (2006).

2007State v. Parker, 282 Kan. 584 , 147 P.3d 115 (2006).

2006United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 104 L.

2006United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 104 L.

2006K.S.A. 22-2401(1); Morris, 276 Kan. at 24 , 72 P.3d 570 . *123 "`Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.

2006K.S.A. 22-2401(1); Morris, 276 Kan. at 24 , 72 P.3d 570 . *123 "`Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.

2000State v. Finley, 17 Kan.