13 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Joon Kyu Kimgreen2 sentences2008This threshold condition is intended to be a demanding standard and requires the State to show that the ruling “ ‘significantly reduces the likelihood of a successful prosecution.’ ” State v. McLeod, 705 N.W.2d 776, 784 (Minn.2005) (quoting State v. Joon Kyu Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544, 551 (Minn.1987)). 2008This threshold condition is intended to be a demanding standard and requires the State to show that the ruling "`significantly reduces the likelihood of a successful prosecution.'" State v. McLeod, 705 N.W.2d 776, 784 (Minn.2005) (quoting State v. Joon Kyu Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544, 551 (Minn.1987)). | 3 | 3 |
Adams v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2016See id. at 330 , 110 S. Ct. at 2416 ; see also Adams, 407 U.S. at 145-47 , 92 S. Ct. at 1923 - 24. 2016See id. at 330 , 110 S. Ct. at 2416 ; see also Adams, 407 U.S. at 145-47 , 92 S. Ct. at 1923 - 24. | 2 | 2 |
State v. McLeodgreen2 sentences2009The critical-impact test “is intended to be a demanding standard” and requires the state to show that the ruling “ ‘significantly reduces the likelihood of a successful prosecution.’” State v. Rambahal, 751 N.W.2d 84, 89 (Minn.2008) (quoting State v. McLeod, 705 N.W.2d 776, 784 (Minn.2005)). 2008This threshold condition is intended to be a demanding standard and requires the State to show that the ruling “ ‘significantly reduces the likelihood of a successful prosecution.’ ” State v. McLeod, 705 N.W.2d 776, 784 (Minn.2005) (quoting State v. Joon Kyu Kim, 398 N.W.2d 544, 551 (Minn.1987)). | 2 | 2 |
Alabama v. Whitegreen2 sentences2016See id. at 330 , 110 S. Ct. at 2416 ; see also Adams, 407 U.S. at 145-47 , 92 S. Ct. at 1923 - 24. 2016See id. at 330 , 110 S. Ct. at 2416 ; see also Adams, 407 U.S. at 145-47 , 92 S. Ct. at 1923 - 24. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Zantergreen2 sentences1999The critical impact standard is “necessarily a demanding standard.” State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 630 (Minn.1995). 1998It is "necessarily a demanding standard." Id. | 1 | 2 |
State of Minnesota v. Adaiah Deontraie Townsendgreen1 sentence2024The fair-and-just standard is “a less demanding standard than the manifest-injustice standard, but it does not permit withdrawal of a guilty plea for simply any reason.” State v. Townsend, 872 N.W.2d 758, 764 (Minn. App. 2015) (quotation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mooregreen1 sentence2016The standard of review for circumstantial evidence requires an appellate court, first, to “identify the circumstances proved” and, second, to “examine independently the reasonableness of the inferences that might be drawn from the circumstances proved” and “determine whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” State v. Moore, 846 N.W.2d 83, 88 (Minn. 2014) (quotations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Clifford v. Geritom Med, Inc.green2 sentences2016See Clifford v. Geritom Med, Inc., 681 N.W.2d 680, 687 (Minn. 2004) (noting that the new-trial standard is a demanding standard, though it is less rigorous than the standard for granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict). 2016See Clifford v. Geritom Med, Inc., 681 N.W.2d 680, 687 (Minn. 2004) (noting that the new-trial standard is a demanding standard, though it is less rigorous than the standard for granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Theisgreen1 sentence2015This is a less demanding standard than the manifest-injustice standard, but it does not permit withdrawal of “a guilty plea for simply any reason.” State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn.2007) (quotation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rambahalgreen1 sentence2009The critical-impact test “is intended to be a demanding standard” and requires the state to show that the ruling “ ‘significantly reduces the likelihood of a successful prosecution.’” State v. Rambahal, 751 N.W.2d 84, 89 (Minn.2008) (quoting State v. McLeod, 705 N.W.2d 776, 784 (Minn.2005)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rennekegreen2 sentences2008The court of appeals, relying on State v. Renneke, 563 N.W.2d 335, 337 (Minn.App.1997), concluded that the State was not required to show that the district court’s order would have a critical impact on the State’s case because the critical impact requirement applies to pretrial suppression orders, but not to pretrial discovery orders. 2008The court of appeals, relying on State v. Renneke, 563 N.W.2d 335, 337 (Minn.App. 1997), concluded that the State was not required to show that the district court's order would have a critical impact on the State's case because the critical impact requirement applies to pretrial suppression orders, but not to pretrial discovery orders. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Edrozogreen1 sentence1999However, “the critical impact rule does not require that the suppression order render the available proof insufficient as a matter of law, or so weak as to effectively destroy a successful prosecution.” State v. Edrozo, 578 N.W.2d 719, 723 (Minn.1998). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Illinois v. Gates
green
2 sentences2016And corroboration of major portions of the letter’s predictions provides just this probability.” Id. at 246 , 103 S. Ct. at 2336 . 6 Because the corroborated letter in Gates was sufficient to establish probable cause to issue a search warrant, we conclude that the CI’s tip that Coney would be carrying cocaine at a specific place and time in a specific automobile, together with corroboration by the police of most of the details provided in the tip, were sufficient to establish the less demanding standard of reasonable suspicion needed to justify an investigative stop. 2016And corroboration of major portions of the letter’s predictions provides just this probability.” Id. at 246 , 103 S. Ct. at 2336 . 6 Because the corroborated letter in Gates was sufficient to establish probable cause to issue a search warrant, we conclude that the CI’s tip that Coney would be carrying cocaine at a specific place and time in a specific automobile, together with corroboration by the police of most of the details provided in the tip, were sufficient to establish the less demanding standard of reasonable suspicion needed to justify an investigative stop. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
LaValle v. Aqualand Pool Co., Inc.
green
1 sentence2004This is a demanding standard, but it is less rigorous than the standard for granting JNOV, which is “when the evidence is so overwhelming on one side that reasonable minds cannot differ as to the proper outcome.” Id. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.