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14 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sheehan v. Sheehangreen1 sentence2021See Sheehan, 901 S.W.2d at 59 ; City of Lake St. | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc.green1 sentence2005Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999, 1005 (11th Cir.1997). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Alabama v. White
green
2 sentences2008“Reasonable suspicion,” which is a less demanding standard than “probable cause,” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990), is to be determined by reference to the “totality of the circumstances.” Id. (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). 2008“Reasonable suspicion,” which is a less demanding standard than “probable cause,” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990), is to be determined by reference to the “totality of the circumstances.” Id. (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). | 6 | 1999–2013 |
United States v. Cortez
green
2 sentences2008“Reasonable suspicion,” which is a less demanding standard than “probable cause,” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990), is to be determined by reference to the “totality of the circumstances.” Id. (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). 2008“Reasonable suspicion,” which is a less demanding standard than “probable cause,” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990), is to be determined by reference to the “totality of the circumstances.” Id. (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). | 3 | 1999–2008 |
Illinois v. Wardlow
green
2 sentences2013“While ‘reasonable suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a show ing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.” Id. 2012While “reasonable suspicion” is a less demanding standard than probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires “at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 , 120 S.Ct. 673 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000). | 2 | 2012–2013 |
Woods v. Securities & Exchange Commission
green
2 sentences2008State v. Deck, 994 S.W.2d 527, 534 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1009 , 120 S.Ct. 508 , 145 L.Ed.2d 393 (1999). 2000State v. Deck, 994 S.W.2d 527, 534 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 508 , 145 L.Ed.2d 393 (1999). | 2 | 2000–2008 |
Deck v. Missouri
green
2 sentences2008State v. Deck, 994 S.W.2d 527, 534 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1009 , 120 S.Ct. 508 , 145 L.Ed.2d 393 (1999). 2000State v. Deck, 994 S.W.2d 527, 534 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 508 , 145 L.Ed.2d 393 (1999). | 2 | 2000–2008 |
State v. Deck
green
2 sentences2008State v. Deck, 994 S.W.2d 527, 534 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1009 , 120 S.Ct. 508 , 145 L.Ed.2d 393 (1999). 2000State v. Deck, 994 S.W.2d 527, 534 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 508 , 145 L.Ed.2d 393 (1999). | 2 | 2000–2008 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2013“The officer must be able to articulate more than an ‘inchoate and unparticular-ized suspicion or “hunch” ’ of criminal activity.” Id. at 123-24 , 120 S.Ct. 673 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). “[N]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 124 , 120 S.Ct. 673 . 2013“The officer must be able to articulate more than an ‘inchoate and unparticular-ized suspicion or “hunch” ’ of criminal activity.” Id. at 123-24 , 120 S.Ct. 673 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). “[N]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 124 , 120 S.Ct. 673 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Pike
green
1 sentence2013Pike, 162 S.W.3d at 473 . “[Reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause ... [and] can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Sapp v. MORRISON BROTHERS CO.
green
1 sentence2012What compels this demanding standard, and makes such exacting proof a necessity, is that “in Missouri’s state courts as perhaps nowhere else,” nondisclosure claims have become “a powerful weapon in the hands of a verdict loser, plaintiff or defendant....” Sapp, 295 S.W.3d at 476-77 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Sherrill v. Hargett
green
1 sentence2008State v. Deck, 994 S.W.2d 527, 534 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1009 , 120 S.Ct. 508 , 145 L.Ed.2d 393 (1999). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
City of Erie v. Pap's A. M.
green
1 sentence2002Id. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Stacy v. Truman Medical Center
green
1 sentence2000The only requirement under the less demanding standard is that the previous accident “be such as to call defendant’s attention to the dangerous situation that resulted in the litigated accident.” Stacy, 836 S.W.2d at 926 (quoting McCormick on Evidence, § 200 at 848 (4th ed.1992)). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp.
green
1 sentence1999The “clear and convincing evidence standard” is a more demanding standard that the law imposes when it deems the interests at stake to be “ ‘more substantial than mere loss of money.’ ” Rodriguez, 936 S.W.2d at 110 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979)). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Addington v. Texas
green
2 sentences1999The “clear and convincing evidence standard” is a more demanding standard that the law imposes when it deems the interests at stake to be “ ‘more substantial than mere loss of money.’ ” Rodriguez, 936 S.W.2d at 110 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979)). 1999The “clear and convincing evidence standard” is a more demanding standard that the law imposes when it deems the interests at stake to be “ ‘more substantial than mere loss of money.’ ” Rodriguez, 936 S.W.2d at 110 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979)). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.