demanding standard in Michigan

2025Clear and convincing evidence “is the most demanding standard applied in civil cases” and requires “evidence so clear, direct[,] and weighty” that the fact finder can “come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re ASF, 311 Mich App 420, 429 ; 876 NW2d 253 (2015) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

2025Clear and convincing evidence “is the most demanding standard applied in civil cases” and requires “evidence so clear, direct[,] and weighty” that the fact finder can “come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re ASF, 311 Mich App 420, 429 ; 876 NW2d 253 (2015) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

2025“The clear-and-convincing-evidence standard is the most demanding standard applied in civil cases . . . .” In re Conservatorship of Brody, 321 Mich App 332, 337 ; 909 NW2d 849 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2025“The clear-and-convincing-evidence standard is the most demanding standard applied in civil cases . . . .” In re Conservatorship of Brody, 321 Mich App 332, 337 ; 909 NW2d 849 (2017) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2006The Court rejected the petitioner attorney’s claim that he should be held to the “clear and present danger” standard applicable to the press, and concluded that “the speech of lawyers representing clients in pending cases may be regulated under a less demanding standard than that established for regulation of the press.” Gentile, supra at 1074 .

2006The Court rejected the petitioner attorney's claim that he should be held to the "clear and present danger" standard applicable to the press, and concluded that "the speech of lawyers representing clients in pending cases may be regulated under a less demanding standard than that established for regulation of the press." Gentile, supra at 1074 , 111 S.Ct. 2720 .

2020Id.; Schlup, 513 US at 327 . [Swain, 288 Mich App at 638 (alteration in original).] In considering whether a defendant has satisfied the “actual innocence” standard, an appellate court defers to the trial court’s assessment of new evidence in the context of a holistic judgment about all of the evidence and its likely impact on the jury adhering to the reasonable doubt standard.

2010Id.-, Schlup, 513 US at 327 .

2020However, review of the interviews at the subsequent hearings evidenced that this allegation was not substantiated. 3 MCR 3.977(A)(3) and 3.977(H)(3); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356 ; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). “[T]he clear and convincing evidence standard [is] the most demanding standard applied in civil cases[.]” In re Martin, 450 Mich 204, 227 ; 538 NW2d 399 (1995) (brackets added).

2020However, review of the interviews at the subsequent hearings evidenced that this allegation was not substantiated. 3 MCR 3.977(A)(3) and 3.977(H)(3); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356 ; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). “[T]he clear and convincing evidence standard [is] the most demanding standard applied in civil cases[.]” In re Martin, 450 Mich 204, 227 ; 538 NW2d 399 (1995) (brackets added).

2015The Supreme Court summarized the clear-and-convincing evidence standard: The clear and convincing evidence standard is “the most demanding standard applied in civil cases . . ..” This showing must “ ‘produce 0 in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established, evidence so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable [the fact-finder] to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.’ ” [Id. at 265 (citations omitted; alterations in original).] The Supreme Court concluded

2015It explained, “Although a fit parent is presumed to act in his or her child’s best interests, a court need give the parent’s decision only a ‘presumption of validity’ or ‘some weight.’ That is precisely what MCL 722.25(1) does when it requires clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption.” Id.

2005People v Barnes, 182 Mich 179, 196-199 ; 148 NW 400 (1914); LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law (2d ed), § 3.12, pp 279,282.

2005People v Barnes, 182 Mich 179, 196-199 ; 148 NW 400 (1914); LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law (2d ed), § 3.12, pp 279,282.

2026Wife is correct to point out that the different procedural postures of Kowalesky and this case necessitate different standards of review; however, we are unable to see how an error identified under the clear error standard used in Kowalesky would not also be erroneous under the more demanding standard applicable to review of a domestic arbitration award. 5 Goodwill is defined as “[a] business’s reputation, patronage, and other intangible assets that are considered when appraising the business, [especially] for purchase; the ability to earn income in excess of the income that would be expected

2026Id., citing People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764 ; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).

2026Id., citing People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764 ; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).

2026Id., citing People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764 ; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).

2023Smith Living Trust, 326 Mich App at 386 ; see also In re Conservatorship of Bittner, 312 Mich App 227, 237 ; 879 NW2d 269 (2015) (noting that the clear and convincing evidence standard is “the most demanding standard applied in civil cases” and that clear and convincing proof “produce[s] in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established, evidence so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable [the factfinder] to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”) (quotation

2019In reviewing whether the trial court properly found a statutory ground for termination, “ ‘regard is to be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it.’ ” In re Schadler, 315 Mich App 406, 408-409 ; 890 NW2d 676 (2016), quoting In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337 ; 445 NW2d 161 (1989).

2019In reviewing whether the trial court properly found a statutory ground for termination, “ ‘regard is to be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it.’ ” In re Schadler, 315 Mich App 406, 408-409 ; 890 NW2d 676 (2016), quoting In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337 ; 445 NW2d 161 (1989).

2019In reviewing whether the trial court properly found a statutory ground for termination, “ ‘regard is to be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it.’ ” In re Schadler, 315 Mich App 406, 408-409 ; 890 NW2d 676 (2016), quoting In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337 ; 445 NW2d 161 (1989).

2019In reviewing whether the trial court properly found a statutory ground for termination, “ ‘regard is to be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it.’ ” In re Schadler, 315 Mich App 406, 408-409 ; 890 NW2d 676 (2016), quoting In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337 ; 445 NW2d 161 (1989).

2015"Whether the family court properly applied this legal standard is a question of law reviewed for clear legal error." In re Keast, 278 Mich App 415, 423 ; 750 NW2d 643 (2008).

2014“Impossibility pre-emption is a demanding defense,” Wyeth, 555 US at 573 , and requires more than “[t]he existence of a hypothetical or potential conflict,” Rice v Norman Williams Co, 458 US 654, 659 ; 102 S Ct 3294 ; 73 L Ed 2d 1042 (1982).

2014“Impossibility pre-emption is a demanding defense,” Wyeth, 555 US at 573 , and requires more than “[t]he existence of a hypothetical or potential conflict,” Rice v Norman Williams Co, 458 US 654, 659 ; 102 S Ct 3294 ; 73 L Ed 2d 1042 (1982).

2014“Impossibility pre-emption is a demanding defense,” Wyeth, 555 US at 573 , and requires more than “[t]he existence of a hypothetical or potential conflict,” Rice v Norman Williams Co, 458 US 654, 659 ; 102 S Ct 3294 ; 73 L Ed 2d 1042 (1982).

2012Many times the individual does not even realize that s/he is having a flashback and may feel faint or dissociate. [Id. (citation omitted).] Thus, given this possible explanation for the complainant’s hearsay statement in California describing an incident similar to the rape in this case and the prosecution’s representation that it has an expert who would support a theory that the complainant was suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder, defendant has failed to establish that the admission of the complainant’s statement would tend to support the defense theory. 38 Even under the less demand

2012Even under the less demanding standard for establishing a violation of Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 ; 83 S Ct 1194 ; 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963)—which does not apply here because it is undisputed that no Brady violation occurred — “[t]he force of impeachment evidence ... is dimin ished when the witness’s testimony is supported by substantial corroborating evidence or when the impeachment evidence is cumulative or collateral,” United States v Ramos-Gonzalez, 747 F Supp 2d 280, 291 (D PR, 2010), citing United States v Connolly, 504 F3d 206 , 217 n 6 (CA 1, 2007); see also Smith v Cain, 565 US_; 132 S C

2012Even under the less demanding standard for establishing a violation of Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 ; 83 S Ct 1194 ; 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963)—which does not apply here because it is undisputed that no Brady violation occurred — “[t]he force of impeachment evidence ... is dimin ished when the witness’s testimony is supported by substantial corroborating evidence or when the impeachment evidence is cumulative or collateral,” United States v Ramos-Gonzalez, 747 F Supp 2d 280, 291 (D PR, 2010), citing United States v Connolly, 504 F3d 206 , 217 n 6 (CA 1, 2007); see also Smith v Cain, 565 US_; 132 S C

2012Even under the less demanding standard for establishing a violation of Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 ; 83 S Ct 1194 ; 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963)—which does not apply here because it is undisputed that no Brady violation occurred — “[t]he force of impeachment evidence ... is dimin ished when the witness’s testimony is supported by substantial corroborating evidence or when the impeachment evidence is cumulative or collateral,” United States v Ramos-Gonzalez, 747 F Supp 2d 280, 291 (D PR, 2010), citing United States v Connolly, 504 F3d 206 , 217 n 6 (CA 1, 2007); see also Smith v Cain, 565 US_; 132 S C

2006The Pennsylvania court in Commonwealth v Root, 403 Pa 571, 575; 170 A2d 310 (1961), persuasively reasoned: [T]he distinction between murder and involuntary manslaughter does not rest upon a differentiation in causation; it lies in the state of mind of the offender.

1996This issue was not addressed in Moran , where the Court explicitly stated "[t]he voluntariness of the waiver is not at issue." Id. at 421 , 106 S.Ct. at 1140-1141 .

1996Justice Brickley's opinion never mentions the terms "knowing and intelligent," and even goes so far as to state: In sum, voluntariness forms the touchstone of the inquiry concerning the validity of the waivers made while in police custody. [ Id. at 168 , 490 N.W.2d 351 .] Thus, if there is any support for the proposition that the Michigan Constitution requires a more demanding standard, the increased stringency has been engrafted only onto the voluntariness inquiry.

1996Justice Brickley's opinion never mentions the terms "knowing and intelligent," and even goes so far as to state: In sum, voluntariness forms the touchstone of the inquiry concerning the validity of the waivers made while in police custody. [ Id. at 168 , 490 N.W.2d 351 .] Thus, if there is any support for the proposition that the Michigan Constitution requires a more demanding standard, the increased stringency has been engrafted only onto the voluntariness inquiry.