24 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Alabama v. Whitegreen2 sentences2007In Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990), Justice White explained the differences in the "reasonable suspicion" and "probable cause" standards: Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause. ¶ 22 Thus, it is the content of i 2007In Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990), Justice White explained the differences in the "reasonable suspicion" and "probable cause" standards: Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause. ¶ 22. | 4 | 4 |
County of Sacramento v. Lewisgreen1 sentence2024See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 , 847 n.8 (1998) (“[I]n a due process challenge to executive action, the threshold question is whether the behavior of the governmental officer is so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.”). ¶9 The behavior of Greenberg and the other officers, as revealed at trial, falls far short of meeting the standard necessary to show a substantive due process violation. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Buchanangreen2 sentences2021See State v. Buchanan, 2011 WI 49, ¶9 , 334 Wis. 2d 379 , 799 N.W.2d 775 (providing that “‘reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause’” (quoted source omitted)). 2021See State v. Buchanan, 2011 WI 49, ¶9 , 334 Wis. 2d 379 , 799 N.W.2d 775 (providing that “‘reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause’” (quoted source omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Easongreen1 sentence2019See id. | 1 | 1 |
Martin v. Kansas Department of Revenuegreen2 sentences2014Dep't of Revenue, 176 P.3d 938, 948 (Kan. 2008) ("[A] police officer must be held to a more demanding standard of legal knowledge than any citizen who may be subject to the officer's exercise of authority. . . . [C]onsequently [we] hold that an officer's mistake of law alone can render a traffic stop violative of the Fourth Amendment. . . ."); State v. Tiffin, 121 P.3d 9, 12 (Or. 2014Dep't of Revenue, 176 P.3d 938, 948 (Kan. 2008) ("[A] police officer must be held to a more demanding standard of legal knowledge than any citizen who may be subject to the officer's exercise of authority. . . . [Consequently [we] hold that an officer's mistake of law alone can render a traffic stop violative of the Fourth Amendment. . . ."); State v. Tiffin, 121 P.3d 9, 12 (Or. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Tiffingreen2 sentences2014Dep't of Revenue, 176 P.3d 938, 948 (Kan. 2008) ("[A] police officer must be held to a more demanding standard of legal knowledge than any citizen who may be subject to the officer's exercise of authority. . . . [C]onsequently [we] hold that an officer's mistake of law alone can render a traffic stop violative of the Fourth Amendment. . . ."); State v. Tiffin, 121 P.3d 9, 12 (Or. 2014Dep't of Revenue, 176 P.3d 938, 948 (Kan. 2008) ("[A] police officer must be held to a more demanding standard of legal knowledge than any citizen who may be subject to the officer's exercise of authority. . . . [Consequently [we] hold that an officer's mistake of law alone can render a traffic stop violative of the Fourth Amendment. . . ."); State v. Tiffin, 121 P.3d 9, 12 (Or. | 1 | 1 |
cluster 7891green2 sentences2009We agree."); United States v. Osborne, 68 F.3d 94, 98-99 (5th Cir. 1995) ("The Second, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have all found that Waller's stringent standard does not apply to partial closures, and have adopted a less demanding test requiring the party seeking the partial closure to show only a 'substantial reason' for the closure. ... 2009We agree."); United States v. Osborne, 68 F.3d 94, 98-99 (5th Cir. 1995) ("The Second, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have all found that Waller's stringent standard does not apply to partial closures, and have adopted a less demanding test requiring the party seeking the partial closure to show only a `substantial reason' for the closure.... | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2009See People v. Jones, 750 N.E.2d 524, 529 (N.Y. 2001) ("We are aware that some courts have recognized that a less demanding standard can be applied to limited closure requests .... 2009See People v. Jones, 96 N.Y.2d 213 , 726 N.Y.S.2d 608 , 750 N.E.2d 524, 529 (2001) ("We are aware that some courts have recognized that a less demanding standard can be applied to limited closure requests.... | 1 | 1 |
Barry Caesar Garcia v. Leann K. Bertsch, Director of the North Dakota Department of Correctionsgreen2 sentences2009We agree."); Garcia v. Bertsch, 470 F.3d 748, 753 (8th Cir. 2006) ("In cases where atrial judge orders a partial closure at the request of one party, courts have required only a 'substantial reason' for the partial closure, instead of the more stringent 'overriding interest' required by Waller.") (citations omitted). 2009We agree."); Garcia v. Bertsch, 470 F.3d 748, 753 (8th Cir.2006) ("In cases where a trial judge orders a partial closure at the request of one party, courts have required only a `substantial reason' for the partial closure, instead of the more stringent `overriding interest' required by Waller . ") (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Simsgreen1 sentence2002See, e.g., People v. Sims, 617 N.E.2d 411, 418 (Ill. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Debra A. E.green2 sentences1999Byrge relies on the supreme court's language in State v. Debra A.E., 188 Wis. 2d 111, 124-25 , 523 N.W.2d 727, 732 (1994): *713 Competency is a contextualized concept; the meaning of competency in the context of legal proceedings changes according to the purpose for which the competency determination is made. 1999Byrge relies on the supreme court's language in State v. Debra A.E., 188 Wis. 2d 111, 124-25 , 523 N.W.2d 727, 732 (1994): *713 Competency is a contextualized concept; the meaning of competency in the context of legal proceedings changes according to the purpose for which the competency determination is made. | 1 | 1 |
Transcraft, Incorporated v. Galvingreen1 sentence1995Application of this heightened standard of care was recently recognized in Transcraft, Inc. v. Galvin, Stalmack, Kirschner & Clark, 39 F.3d 812, 815 (7th Cir. 1994). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Eddie Leroy Andersongreen1 sentence1990The ninth circuit evaluated the results of an in camera hearing to establish probable cause and stated that, where there was no evidence that the informer could have provided testimony relative to a defense on the merits, " [i]f the trial judge is satisfied that an in camera hearing in which neither the defendant nor his attorney participates is adequate to explore the foundations of the informant's information, then no disclosure [of either the name of the informant or the underlying circumstances which made the conclusion seem reliable to government agents] is necessary." United States v. An | 1 | 1 |
Trimble v. Gordongreen2 sentences1978The court acknowledged that: "The more serious problems of proving paternity might justify a more demanding standard for illegitimate children claiming under their fathers' estates than that required either for illegitimate children claiming under their mothers' estates or for legitimate children generally. . . ." Trimble v. Gordon, supra, at 770. 1978The court acknowledged that: “The more serious problems of proving paternity might justify a more demanding standard for illegitimate children claiming under their fathers’ estates than that required either for illegitimate children claiming under their mothers’ estates or for legitimate children generally. . . .” Trimble v. Gordon, supra, at 770. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Poellinger
green
2 sentences2023This court is not the arbiter of the accuracy of dueling experts.5 ¶19 Sullivan emphasizes that the evidence “must be sufficiently strong and convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with the defendant’s innocence in order to meet the demanding standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 502 , 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990). 2023This court is not the arbiter of the accuracy of dueling experts.5 ¶19 Sullivan emphasizes that the evidence “must be sufficiently strong and convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with the defendant’s innocence in order to meet the demanding standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 502 , 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990). | 3 | 2002–2023 |
Schwantes v. State
green
2 sentences2002We stated that, "Regardless of whether the evidence presented at trial to prove guilt is direct or circumstantial, it must be sufficiently strong and convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with the defendant's innocence in order to meet the demanding standard of proof beyond *297 a reasonable doubt." 17 Id. at 502 (citing Schwantes v. State, 127 Wis. 160, 176 , 106 N.W. 237 (1906)). 2002We stated that, "Regardless of whether the evidence presented at trial to prove guilt is direct or circumstantial, it must be sufficiently strong and convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with the defendant's innocence in order to meet the demanding standard of proof beyond *297 a reasonable doubt." 17 Id. at 502 (citing Schwantes v. State, 127 Wis. 160, 176 , 106 N.W. 237 (1906)). | 2 | 1990–2002 |
State v. Imani
green
2 sentences2014Delebreau observes that to waive the right in court, a more demanding inquiry is required, citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), and State v. Imani, 2010 WI 66 , 326 Wis. 2d 179 , 786 N.W.2d 40 . ¶ 16. 2014Delebreau observes that to waive the right in court, a more demanding inquiry is required, citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), and State v. Imani, 2010 WI 66 , 326 Wis. 2d 179 , 786 N.W.2d 40 . ¶ 16. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
United States v. Alfredo Ortega-Ascanio
green
1 sentence2014LaFave states: "[I]t is erroneous for a court to conclude 'that a defendant's reason for seeking to withdraw his plea is not "fair and just" unless the reason renders the plea invalid.'"20 ¶190 The concurrence is not persuasive in abandoning the well-reasoned rationales (in Olish and LaFave, for example) for using a "fair and just reason" standard for withdrawal of a guilty plea prior to sentencing in the present era of more rigorous plea colloquies. 18 5 LaFave et al., supra note 17 , § 21.5(a) at 868. 19 Id. § 21.5(a), at 867. 20 Id. § 21.5(a), at 871-72 (quoting United States v. Ortega-Asca | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Faretta v. California
green
1 sentence2014Delebreau observes that to waive the right in court, a more demanding inquiry is required, citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), and State v. Imani, 2010 WI 66 , 326 Wis. 2d 179 , 786 N.W.2d 40 . ¶ 16. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Libke v. State
green
2 sentences2014LaFave states: "[I]t is erroneous for a court to conclude 'that a defendant's reason for seeking to withdraw his plea is not "fair and just" unless the reason renders the plea invalid.'"20 ¶190 The concurrence is not persuasive in abandoning the well-reasoned rationales (in Olish and LaFave, for example) for using a "fair and just reason" standard for withdrawal of a guilty plea prior to sentencing in the present era of more rigorous plea colloquies. 18 5 LaFave et al., supra note 17 , § 21.5(a) at 868. 19 Id. § 21.5(a), at 867. 20 Id. § 21.5(a), at 871-72 (quoting United States v. Ortega-Asca 2014LaFave states: "[I]t is erroneous for a court to conclude 'that a defendant's reason for seeking to withdraw his plea is not "fair and just" unless the reason renders the plea invalid.'"20 ¶190 The concurrence is not persuasive in abandoning the well-reasoned rationales (in Olish and LaFave, for example) for using a "fair and just reason" standard for withdrawal of a guilty plea prior to sentencing in the present era of more rigorous plea colloquies. 18 5 LaFave et al., supra note 17 , § 21.5(a) at 868. 19 Id. § 21.5(a), at 867. 20 Id. § 21.5(a), at 871-72 (quoting United States v. Ortega-Asca | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Minerva Lopez
green
1 sentence2014LaFave states: "[I]t is erroneous for a court to conclude 'that a defendant's reason for seeking to withdraw his plea is not "fair and just" unless the reason renders the plea invalid.'"20 ¶190 The concurrence is not persuasive in abandoning the well-reasoned rationales (in Olish and LaFave, for example) for using a "fair and just reason" standard for withdrawal of a guilty plea prior to sentencing in the present era of more rigorous plea colloquies. 18 5 LaFave et al., supra note 17 , § 21.5(a) at 868. 19 Id. § 21.5(a), at 867. 20 Id. § 21.5(a), at 871-72 (quoting United States v. Ortega-Asca | 1 | 2014–2014 |
St. Amant v. Thompson
green
2 sentences2008Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 , 88 S.Ct. 1323 , 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968). *749 ś 40 The Supreme Court has recognized that such a demanding standard "may permit recovery in fewer situations than would a rule that publishers must satisfy the standard of the reasonable man or the prudent publisher." Id. 2008The Supreme Court has recognized that such a demanding standard "may permit recovery in fewer situations than would a rule that publishers must satisfy the standard of the reasonable man or the prudent publisher." Id. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Strong
green
2 sentences2006However, the court explained, that determination did not end its analysis: "When the warrantless search involves an intrusion into the body, a more demanding test must be met." Id. at 837 . 2006"We must be satisfied that the method chosen to search [the defendant]'s stomach contents was reasonable." Id. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Anderson
green
2 sentences2004Anderson, 141 Wis. 2d at 662-65 . ¶ 26. 2004Anderson, 141 Wis. 2d at 662-65 . ¶ 26. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Chambers v. Mississippi
green
2 sentences2004We concluded that a less demanding standard would better balance the respective roles of the judge and jury and protect the defendant's constitutional right to present evidence under Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). 2004We concluded that a less demanding standard would better balance the respective roles of the judge and jury and protect the defendant's constitutional right to present evidence under Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
United States v. Terrence Hall
green
1 sentence1999We adopt the reasoning of United States v. Hall, 47 F.3d 1091 (11th Cir. 1995), and conclude that a commercial proprietor must show how affirmative steps were taken to bar the public from the dumpster area in order to validate a claim of an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy regarding trash in the dumpster. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Wolff v. McDonnell
green
1 sentence1977The epitaph for these unvindicated constitutional rights of men and women is certain to include such words as these (Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, at ___, ___, 94 S. Ct. at 2980, 2982 ): "`There is much play in the joints of the Due Process Clause, and we stop short of imposing a more demanding rule...' "`We think that the Constitution should not be read to impose the procedure at the present time...' "`Perhaps as the problems of penal institutions change and correctional goals are reshaped...' "`... [W]e are content for now to leave the continuing development ... to the sound discretion of corre | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.