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8 South Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1990–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Alabama v. Whitegreen2 sentences2006The Court also noted that: Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause. 496 U.S. at 330 , 110 S.Ct. at 2416 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 . [¶ 18.] The question here is not whether the tip and corroboration that followed constituted reasonable suspicion to stop Sweedland’s 2006The Court also noted that: Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause. 496 U.S. at 330 , 110 S.Ct. at 2416 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 . [¶ 18.] The question here is not whether the tip and corroboration that followed constituted reasonable suspicion to stop Sweedland’s | 2 | 4 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lalli v. Lalli
green
2 sentences2016Erbe, 457 N.W.2d at 869 (quoting Lalli, 439 U.S. at 265 , 99 S.Ct. at 523 ). [¶40.] Yvette claims that SDCL 29A-2-114(c), which limits her DNA evidence only to proof in Donald’s estate, does not promote the' orderly administration of estates. 2016Erbe, 457 N.W.2d at 869 (quoting Lalli, 439 U.S. at 265 , 99 S.Ct. at 523 ). [¶40.] Yvette claims that SDCL 29A-2-114(c), which limits her DNA evidence only to proof in Donald’s estate, does not promote the' orderly administration of estates. | 2 | 1990–2016 |
District of Columbia v. Wesby
green
2 sentences2021D.C. v. Wesby, __ U.S. __, __, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 , 199 L. 2021D.C. v. Wesby, __ U.S. __, __, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 , 199 L. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
In Re the Estate of Erbe
green
1 sentence2016Erbe, 457 N.W.2d at 869 (quoting Lalli, 439 U.S. at 265 , 99 S.Ct. at 523 ). [¶40.] Yvette claims that SDCL 29A-2-114(c), which limits her DNA evidence only to proof in Donald’s estate, does not promote the' orderly administration of estates. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Raveydts
green
2 sentences2006The Court also noted that: Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause. 496 U.S. at 330 , 110 S.Ct. at 2416 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 . [¶ 18.] The question here is not whether the tip and corroboration that followed constituted reasonable suspicion to stop Sweedland’s 2006The Court also noted that: Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause. 496 U.S. at 330 , 110 S.Ct. at 2416 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 . [¶ 18.] The question here is not whether the tip and corroboration that followed constituted reasonable suspicion to stop Sweedland’s | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Ornelas v. United States
green
2 sentences2006Id. at 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 . [¶ 11.] Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause. 2006Id. at 696, 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 . [¶ 11.] Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Dreps
green
2 sentences1997Although abuse of discretion is a demanding standard of review to overcome, State v. Dreps, 1996 SD 142, ¶8 , 558 N.W.2d 339, 341 , a patient’s hallowed right to preserve private and unrelated matter from disclosure, as well as the relatively simple options available to trial judges for overseeing discovery, make the court’s refusal to exercise its supervisory power a decision against reason and evidence. [¶ 28.] In this case, the court should have arranged for an in camera review of Maynard’s records to ensure only information relevant to the claim against Heeren came to light. 1997Although abuse of discretion is a demanding standard of review to overcome, State v. Dreps, 1996 SD 142, ¶8 , 558 N.W.2d 339, 341 , a patient’s hallowed right to preserve private and unrelated matter from disclosure, as well as the relatively simple options available to trial judges for overseeing discovery, make the court’s refusal to exercise its supervisory power a decision against reason and evidence. [¶ 28.] In this case, the court should have arranged for an in camera review of Maynard’s records to ensure only information relevant to the claim against Heeren came to light. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.