8 West Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 1985–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Alabama v. Whitegreen2 sentences2015The reasonable suspicion standard is “a less demanding standard than probable cause[.]” Id. at 432 , 452 S.E.2d at 890 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)). 1994In determining that the police had sufficient information to make the stop, the Supreme Court put the case in the context of a stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and applied a reasonable-suspicion standard. 8 The Supreme Court characterized reasonable suspicion as “a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from informati | 1 | 2 |
Addington v. Texasgreen2 sentences2025In criminal cases, the demanding standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt applies because a person who is presumed to be innocent is facing total loss of liberty.26 In contrast, the clear and convincing evidence standard is required in exceptional civil cases, such as a court order limiting or terminating parental rights to the custody of minor children,27 or 24 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488 . 25 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 26 Id. 27 Syl. 2025In criminal cases, the demanding standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt applies because a person who is presumed to be innocent is facing total loss of liberty.26 In contrast, the clear and convincing evidence standard is required in exceptional civil cases, such as a court order limiting or terminating parental rights to the custody of minor children,27 or 24 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488 . 25 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 26 Id. 27 Syl. | 1 | 1 |
In re Willisgreen1 sentence2025Pt. 6, In re Willis, 157 W. | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2022Va. 521 , 490 S.E.2d 340 (1997). 7 Strict scrutiny “is the most demanding test known to constitutional law.” City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 509 (1997); see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 , 7 I hasten to point out that the United States Supreme Court has specifically rejected any federal constitutional right to an education. | 1 | 1 |
City of Boerne v. Floresred1 sentence2022Va. 521 , 490 S.E.2d 340 (1997). 7 Strict scrutiny “is the most demanding test known to constitutional law.” City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 509 (1997); see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 , 7 I hasten to point out that the United States Supreme Court has specifically rejected any federal constitutional right to an education. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cookgreen2 sentences2004See, e.g., State v. Cook, 204 W.Va. 591 , 515 S.E.2d 127 (1999) (reversing conviction based on insufficiency of the evidence since the State did not carry its burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in defense of her husband when she shot the husband’s attacker). 2004See, e.g., State v. Cook, 204 W.Va. 591 , 515 S.E.2d 127 (1999) (reversing conviction based on insufficiency of the evidence since the State did not carry its burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in defense of her husband when she shot the husband’s attacker). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Cortezgreen2 sentences1994The Supreme Court then went on to state that when evaluating whether or not particular facts establish reasonable suspicion, one must examine the “ ‘totality of the circumstances,’ ” which includes both the “quantity and quality” of the information known by the police. 496 U.S. at 330 , 110 S.Ct. at 2416 , 110 L.Ed.2d at 309 , quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690, 695 , 66 L.Ed.2d at 621, 629 (1981). 1994The Supreme Court then went on to state that when evaluating whether or not particular facts establish reasonable suspicion, one must examine the “ ‘totality of the circumstances,’ ” which includes both the “quantity and quality” of the information known by the police. 496 U.S. at 330 , 110 S.Ct. at 2416 , 110 L.Ed.2d at 309 , quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690, 695 , 66 L.Ed.2d at 621, 629 (1981). | 1 | 1 |
Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc.green2 sentences1994See New York Times Co., supra and Crump v. Beckley Newspaper, Inc., 173 W.Va. 699 , 320 S.E.2d 70 (1983). 1994See New York Times Co., supra and Crump v. Beckley Newspaper, Inc., 173 W.Va. 699 , 320 S.E.2d 70 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
New Jersey v. T. L. O.green2 sentences1985In interpreting the meaning of our state constitution's "thorough and efficient education" clause, this Court noted in Syllabus Point 2 of Pauley , that, "The provisions of the Constitution of the State of West Virginia may, in certain instances, require higher standards of protection than afforded by the Federal Constitution." This proposition was also recognized in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. ___ , ___ n.10, 105 S.Ct. 733 , 745 N.10, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 , 736 n. 10 (1985), where the United States Supreme Court conceded that, "[N]ew Jersey may insist on a more demanding standard under its own C 1985In interpreting the meaning of our state constitution's "thorough and efficient education" clause, this Court noted in Syllabus Point 2 of Pauley , that, "The provisions of the Constitution of the State of West Virginia may, in certain instances, require higher standards of protection than afforded by the Federal Constitution." This proposition was also recognized in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. ___ , ___ n.10, 105 S.Ct. 733 , 745 N.10, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 , 736 n. 10 (1985), where the United States Supreme Court conceded that, "[N]ew Jersey may insist on a more demanding standard under its own C | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Morrissey v. Brewer
green
1 sentence2025In criminal cases, the demanding standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt applies because a person who is presumed to be innocent is facing total loss of liberty.26 In contrast, the clear and convincing evidence standard is required in exceptional civil cases, such as a court order limiting or terminating parental rights to the custody of minor children,27 or 24 Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488 . 25 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 26 Id. 27 Syl. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Nix v. Whiteside
green
2 sentences2022The United States Supreme Court has carved out at least two 15 The United States Supreme Court has stated that “breach of an ethical standard does not necessarily make out a denial of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance to counsel.” Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165 , 106 S. Ct. 988, 993 , 89 L. 2022The United States Supreme Court has carved out at least two 15 The United States Supreme Court has stated that “breach of an ethical standard does not necessarily make out a denial of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of assistance to counsel.” Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 165 , 106 S. Ct. 988, 993 , 89 L. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Cathe v. Doddridge County Board of Education
green
1 sentence2022Va. 521 , 490 S.E.2d 340 (1997). 7 Strict scrutiny “is the most demanding test known to constitutional law.” City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 509 (1997); see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 , 7 I hasten to point out that the United States Supreme Court has specifically rejected any federal constitutional right to an education. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Stuart
green
2 sentences2015The reasonable suspicion standard is “a less demanding standard than probable cause[.]” Id. at 432 , 452 S.E.2d at 890 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)). 2015The reasonable suspicion standard is “a less demanding standard than probable cause[.]” Id. at 432 , 452 S.E.2d at 890 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences1994In determining that the police had sufficient information to make the stop, the Supreme Court put the case in the context of a stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and applied a reasonable-suspicion standard. 8 The Supreme Court characterized reasonable suspicion as “a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from informati 1994In determining that the police had sufficient information to make the stop, the Supreme Court put the case in the context of a stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and applied a reasonable-suspicion standard. 8 The Supreme Court characterized reasonable suspicion as “a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from informati | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.