demanding standard in Iowa

2019To establish reasonable suspicion 2 sufficient to justify the traffic stop, “the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the officer reasonably believed criminal activity was afoot based on ‘specific and articulable facts . . . taken together with rational inferences from those 2 “Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause . . . .” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).

2018“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause,” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990), and Ahmetovic does not argue the officers lacked the reasonable suspicion necessary to justify encountering him and his driver in the McDonald’s parking lot.

2025This “is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” Kreps, 650 N.W.2d at 642 (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)).

2018While it was possible Murillo had another, not unlawful reason for disingenuously claiming he could not unlock the center console, " 'reasonable suspicion' is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence." Illinois v.Wardlow , 528 U.S. 119 , 123 (2000).

2017In making choices regarding ambiguous phrases and determining whether and how to fill legislative gaps, Iowa courts are free to depart from what are often very narrow and cramped approaches of federal law. 23 For example, in Goodpaster, we rejected United States Supreme Court precedent that, contrary to the ICRA, declared the Americans with Disabilities Act must be “interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled.” 849 N.W.2d at 10 (quoting Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197 , 122 S. Ct. at 691 ); see Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488 , 119 S. Ct. at 2149 .

2017In making choices regarding ambiguous phrases and determining whether and how to fill legislative gaps, Iowa courts are free to depart from what are often very narrow and cramped approaches of federal law. 23 For example, in Goodpaster, we rejected United States Supreme Court precedent that, contrary to the ICRA, declared the Americans with Disabilities Act must be “interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled.” 849 N.W.2d at 10 (quoting Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197 , 122 S. Ct. at 691 ); see Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488 , 119 S. Ct. at 2149 .

2016State v. Butler, 415 N.W.2d 634, 635-36 (Iowa 1987).

2014See, e.g., State v. Butler, 415 N.W.2d 634, 636 (Iowa 1987) (holding rare burglar’s tool used by the defendant in previous crimes and the tool used in the case on appeal were sufficiently similar to permit prior-bad-acts evidence for the purpose of proving identity); State v. Walsh, 318 N.W.2d 184 , 186–87 (Iowa 1982) (finding sufficient similarity between circumstances of a homicide the defendant was previously convicted of and the homicide for which 16 defendant was on trial to admit evidence for the purpose of proving identity).

2025Actual innocence is a demanding standard, requiring “clear and convincing evidence that, despite the evidence of guilt supporting the conviction, no reasonable fact finder could convict the applicant.” Dewberry, 941 N.W.2d at 5 (quoting Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 797 (Iowa 2018)).

2019Schmidt adopted this demanding standard because “an applicant bringing a freestanding claim of actual innocence is claiming he or she is factually and actually innocent, despite a fair, constitutionally compliant trial or plea colloquy free of constitutional defects.” Id. (emphasis added).

2022“Evidence is ‘clear and convincing’ when there are no ‘serious or substantial doubts as to the correctness or conclusions of law drawn from the 26 evidence.’ ” In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010) (quoting In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000) (en banc)).

2022“Evidence is ‘clear and convincing’ when there are no ‘serious or substantial doubts as to the correctness or conclusions of law drawn from the 26 evidence.’ ” In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010) (quoting In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000) (en banc)).

2022“Evidence is ‘clear and convincing’ when there are no ‘serious or substantial doubts as to the correctness or conclusions of law drawn from the 26 evidence.’ ” In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010) (quoting In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000) (en banc)).

2022“Evidence is ‘clear and convincing’ when there are no ‘serious or substantial doubts as to the correctness or conclusions of law drawn from the 26 evidence.’ ” In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010) (quoting In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000) (en banc)).

2019The prior acts must be “strikingly similar” to the subject offense or “unique in nature.” Id. (quoting In re J.A.L., 694 N.W.2d 748, 753 (Iowa 2005)).

2017“To permit the inference that similar acts establish the same person committed both acts, we have required that the other acts must be ‘strikingly similar’ or of a ‘unique nature.’” Putman, 848 N.W.2d at 11 (quoting In re J.A.L., 694 N.W.2d 748, 753 (Iowa 2005)).

2016Instead, we have emphasized that in order to show waiver, the state must satisfy the demanding test of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.

2016Instead, we have emphasized that in order to show waiver, the state must satisfy the demanding test of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S. Ct. 1019, 1023 , 82 L.

2016The decision of the Boynton court, which established a demanding standard for misconduct that has been cited widely in unemployment insurance cases across the country, was powered by the beneficial purpose of the statute, which the court noted was “to cushion the effect of unemployment by a series of benefit payments.” Boynton, 296 N.W. at 639 ; see also Bridgestone/Firestone, 570 N.W.2d at 96 ; Roberts, 356 N.W.2d at 221 .

2016The decision of the Boynton court, which established a demanding standard for misconduct that has been cited widely in unemployment insurance cases across the country, was powered by the beneficial purpose of the statute, which the court noted was “to cushion the effect of unemployment by a series of benefit payments.” Boynton, 296 N.W. at 639 ; see also Bridgestone/Firestone, 570 N.W.2d at 96 ; Roberts, 356 N.W.2d at 221 .

2014Ed. 2d 301, 309 (1990) (explaining that “[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause”); State v. Lewis, 675 N.W.2d 516, 525 (Iowa 2004) (“The reasonable and articulable suspicion standard . . . is less than probable cause.”).

2014Ed. 2d 301, 309 (1990) (explaining that “[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause”); State v. Lewis, 675 N.W.2d 516, 525 (Iowa 2004) (“The reasonable and articulable suspicion standard . . . is less than probable cause.”).

2009Sirek v. Fairfield Snowbowl, Inc., 166 Ariz. 183 , 800 P.2d 1291, 1295 (Ct.App.1990) (requiring intention to immunize for negligent acts be clearly and explicitly stated); Turnbough v. Ladner, 754 So.2d 467, 470 (Miss.1999) (finding general exculpatory provision inadequate and noting release of acts of a party’s own negligence must be expressed in “specific and unmistakable terms”); Gross v. Sweet, 49 N.Y.2d 102 , 424 N.Y.S.2d 365 , 400 N.E.2d 306, 309-10 (N.Y.1979) (noting that while the word “negligence” need not specifically be used, words conveying a similar import must appear). 2 The appr

2009Sirek v. Fairfield Snowbowl, Inc., 800 P.2d 1291, 1295 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (requiring intention to immunize for negligent acts be clearly and explicitly stated); Turnbough v. Ladner, 754 So. 2d 467, 470 (Miss. 1999) (finding general exculpatory provision inadequate and noting release of acts of a party’s own negligence must be 11 expressed in “specific and unmistakable terms”); Gross v. Sweet, 400 N.E.2d 306 , 309–10 (N.Y. 1979) (noting that while the word “negligence” need not specifically be used, words conveying a similar import must appear).2 The approach of these cases is consistent wit

2009Sirek v. Fairfield Snowbowl, Inc., 166 Ariz. 183 , 800 P.2d 1291, 1295 (Ct.App.1990) (requiring intention to immunize for negligent acts be clearly and explicitly stated); Turnbough v. Ladner, 754 So.2d 467, 470 (Miss.1999) (finding general exculpatory provision inadequate and noting release of acts of a party’s own negligence must be expressed in “specific and unmistakable terms”); Gross v. Sweet, 49 N.Y.2d 102 , 424 N.Y.S.2d 365 , 400 N.E.2d 306, 309-10 (N.Y.1979) (noting that while the word “negligence” need not specifically be used, words conveying a similar import must appear). 2 The appr

2009Sirek v. Fairfield Snowbowl, Inc., 166 Ariz. 183 , 800 P.2d 1291, 1295 (Ct.App.1990) (requiring intention to immunize for negligent acts be clearly and explicitly stated); Turnbough v. Ladner, 754 So.2d 467, 470 (Miss.1999) (finding general exculpatory provision inadequate and noting release of acts of a party’s own negligence must be expressed in “specific and unmistakable terms”); Gross v. Sweet, 49 N.Y.2d 102 , 424 N.Y.S.2d 365 , 400 N.E.2d 306, 309-10 (N.Y.1979) (noting that while the word “negligence” need not specifically be used, words conveying a similar import must appear). 2 The appr

2025Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, requiring only “a substantial possibility that criminal conduct has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur.” Id. at 642 (quoting 4 Wayne R.

2025This “is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” Kreps, 650 N.W.2d at 642 (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)).

2021The Board must prove the alleged attorney misconduct by a convincing preponderance of the evidence, which is a more demanding standard than proof by a preponderance of the evidence, but “less [demanding] than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” 8 Id. (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Stansberry, 922 N.W.2d 591, 593 (Iowa 2019)); see also Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Nine, 920 N.W.2d 825 , 827–28 (Iowa 2018).

2020The Board must prove the alleged attorney misconduct by a convincing preponderance of evidence, which is a more demanding standard than proof by a preponderance of the evidence, but “less demanding than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Nine, 920 N.W.2d 825 , 827–28 (Iowa 2018) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Johnson, 884 N.W.2d 772, 777 (Iowa 2016)).

2018Moreover, "reasonable cause may exist to investigate conduct which is subject to a legitimate explanation and turns out to be wholly lawful." State v. Richardson , 501 N.W.2d 495 , 497 (Iowa 1993).

2002An officer may make an investigatory stop with “considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Richardson, 501 N.W.2d 495, 496-97 (Iowa 1993) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 , 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1, 10 (1989)); see also Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123 , 120 S.Ct. at 675-76 , 145 L.Ed.2d at 576 (“ ‘[Reasonable suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence_”); accord Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 , 122 S.Ct. at 751 , 151 L.Ed.2d at 750 .

2014See, e.g., State v. Butler, 415 N.W.2d 634, 636 (Iowa 1987) (holding rare burglar’s tool used by the defendant in previous crimes and the tool used in the case on appeal were sufficiently similar to permit prior-bad-acts evidence for the purpose of proving identity); State v. Walsh, 318 N.W.2d 184 , 186–87 (Iowa 1982) (finding sufficient similarity between circumstances of a homicide the defendant was previously convicted of and the homicide for which 16 defendant was on trial to admit evidence for the purpose of proving identity).

2014See, e.g., State v. Butler, 415 N.W.2d 634, 636 (Iowa 1987) (holding rare burglar’s tool used by the defendant in previous crimes and the tool used in the case on appeal were sufficiently similar to permit prior-bad-acts evidence for purpose of proving identity); State v. Walsh, 318 N.W.2d 184 , 186–87 (Iowa 1982) (finding sufficient similarity between circumstances of a homicide the defendant was previously convicted of and the homicide for which 16 defendant was on trial to admit evidence for purpose of proving identity).

2009Sirek v. Fairfield Snowbowl, Inc., 166 Ariz. 183 , 800 P.2d 1291, 1295 (Ct.App.1990) (requiring intention to immunize for negligent acts be clearly and explicitly stated); Turnbough v. Ladner, 754 So.2d 467, 470 (Miss.1999) (finding general exculpatory provision inadequate and noting release of acts of a party’s own negligence must be expressed in “specific and unmistakable terms”); Gross v. Sweet, 49 N.Y.2d 102 , 424 N.Y.S.2d 365 , 400 N.E.2d 306, 309-10 (N.Y.1979) (noting that while the word “negligence” need not specifically be used, words conveying a similar import must appear). 2 The appr

2009Sirek v. Fairfield Snowbowl, Inc., 166 Ariz. 183 , 800 P.2d 1291, 1295 (Ct.App.1990) (requiring intention to immunize for negligent acts be clearly and explicitly stated); Turnbough v. Ladner, 754 So.2d 467, 470 (Miss.1999) (finding general exculpatory provision inadequate and noting release of acts of a party’s own negligence must be expressed in “specific and unmistakable terms”); Gross v. Sweet, 49 N.Y.2d 102 , 424 N.Y.S.2d 365 , 400 N.E.2d 306, 309-10 (N.Y.1979) (noting that while the word “negligence” need not specifically be used, words conveying a similar import must appear). 2 The appr

2026The statute imposes an outright ban on “any commercially published information or material . . . when such information or material is sexually explicit or features nudity,” Iowa Code § 904 .310A(1), without limiting the ban 21 to a legitimate penological reason, see Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413, 415 (1989).

2026See Chiles v. Salazar, 146 S. Ct. 1010 , 1021 (2026) (“[T]his Court has long held that laws regulating speech based on its subject matter or ‘communicative content’ are ‘presumptively unconstitutional.’ As a general rule, such ‘content-based’ restrictions trigger ‘strict scrutiny,’ a demanding standard that requires the government to prove its restriction on speech is ‘narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.’ ” (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015))); City of Austin v. Reagan Nat’l Advert. of Austin, LLC, 596 U.S. 61, 69 (2022) (“A regulation of speech is fa

2026See Chiles v. Salazar, 146 S. Ct. 1010 , 1021 (2026) (“[T]his Court has long held that laws regulating speech based on its subject matter or ‘communicative content’ are ‘presumptively unconstitutional.’ As a general rule, such ‘content-based’ restrictions trigger ‘strict scrutiny,’ a demanding standard that requires the government to prove its restriction on speech is ‘narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.’ ” (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015))); City of Austin v. Reagan Nat’l Advert. of Austin, LLC, 596 U.S. 61, 69 (2022) (“A regulation of speech is fa

2026See Chiles v. Salazar, 146 S. Ct. 1010 , 1021 (2026) (“[T]his Court has long held that laws regulating speech based on its subject matter or ‘communicative content’ are ‘presumptively unconstitutional.’ As a general rule, such ‘content-based’ restrictions trigger ‘strict scrutiny,’ a demanding standard that requires the government to prove its restriction on speech is ‘narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.’ ” (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015))); City of Austin v. Reagan Nat’l Advert. of Austin, LLC, 596 U.S. 61, 69 (2022) (“A regulation of speech is fa

2025LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.4(b), at 146 (3d ed. 1996)). 2 We have jurisdiction over his appeal.See State v. Skullark, 23 N.W.3d 49, 53 (Iowa 2025) (discussing Iowa Code section 814.6(3)). 5 The officer must “be able to point to specific and articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” State v. Heminover, 619 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Iowa 2000) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).

2025LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.4(b), at 146 (3d ed. 1996)). 2 We have jurisdiction over his appeal.See State v. Skullark, 23 N.W.3d 49, 53 (Iowa 2025) (discussing Iowa Code section 814.6(3)). 5 The officer must “be able to point to specific and articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” State v. Heminover, 619 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Iowa 2000) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).

2021When an attorney’s representation gives rise to a conflict of interest with another client or with the attorney’s own interests, the burden shifts to the attorney “to prove that all . . . transactions were fair and equitable.” Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Qualley, 828 N.W.2d 282, 289 (Iowa 2013) (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Pro.