demanding standard in New Jersey

2026In State v. Goldsmith, our Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that "[a]lthough reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, '[n]either "inarticulate hunches" nor an arresting officer's subjective good A-0945-23 11 faith can justify infringement of a citizen's constitutionally guaranteed rights. '" 251 N.J. 384 , 399 (2022) (second alteration in original) (quoting Stovall, 170 N.J. at 372 ).

2026"Although reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, '[n]either A-0309-23 8 "inarticulate hunches" nor an arresting officer's subjective good faith can justify infringement of a citizen's constitutionally guaranteed rights.'" State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509 , 527 (2022) (quoting State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 372 (2002) (Coleman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).

2026"Determining whether reasonable and articulable suspicion exists . . . is a highly fact-intensive inquiry that demands evaluation of the 'totality of circumstances surrounding the police-citizen encounter, balancing the State's interest in effective law enforcement against the individual's right to be protected from unwarranted and/or overbearing police intrusions.'" Id. at 528 (quoting State v. Privott, 203 N.J. 16, 25-26 (2010)).

2024An investigative stop or detention does not offend the Federal or State Constitution, and no warrant is needed, "if it is based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." Although reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, "[n]either 'inarticulate hunches' nor an arresting officer's subjective good faith can justify infringement of a citizen's constitutionally guaranteed rights." Determining whether reasonable and articulable suspicion exists for an inv

2022L. 1994, c. 49, § 5; see also, Lowe v. Zarghami, 158 N.J. 606, 625 (1999) (noting that "[t]he Legislature enacted a more demanding standard when the TCA was amended in 1994 . . . .").

2021L. 1994, c. 49, § 5; see also Lowe v. Zarghami, 158 N.J. 606, 625 (1999) (“The Legislature enacted a more demanding standard when the [Tort Claims Act] was amended in 1994 . . . .”). 22 prepare a defense”; (3) “to afford the public entity a chance to correct the conditions or practices which gave rise to the claim”; and (4) to inform the State “in advance as to the indebtedness or liability that it may be expected to meet.” [Beauchamp, 164 N.J. at 121-22 (first two quotations from 1972 Task Force cmt. on N.J.S.A. 59:8-3; second two quotations from Fuller v. Rutgers, State Univ., 154 N.J.

2026Rather, reasonable suspicion must arise from the totality of the circumstances "in view of [the] officer's experience and knowledge, taken together with rational inferences drawn from [the] facts." State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 504 (1986).

2026Rather, reasonable suspicion must arise from the totality of the circumstances "in view of [the] officer's experience and knowledge, taken together with rational inferences drawn from th[e] facts." State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 504 (1986).

2025See D.D., 213 N.J. at 148 .

2024See D.D., 213 N.J. at 148 (citing Lowe v. Zarghami, 158 N.J. 606, 625 (1999)).

2024Reasonable suspicion "is a less demanding standard than probable cause." Ibid.

2024Reasonable suspicion "is a less demanding standard than probable cause." Ibid.

2017Furthermore: [r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause. [Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2416 , 110 L.

2017Furthermore: [r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause. [Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2416 , 110 L.

2025The reasonable suspicion required to conduct an investigatory stop "is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, [but] the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000).

2024The reasonable suspicion required to make a stop under the Fourth Amendment "is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, [but] the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000).

2022But as the Court recently stressed in Nyema, A-0875-19 11 [a]lthough reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, "[n]either 'inarticulate hunches' nor an arresting officer's subjective good faith can justify infringement of a citizen's constitutionally guaranteed rights." State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 372 (2002) (Coleman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1 , 7–8 (1997)); accord State v. Alessi, 240 N.J. 501 , 518 (2020).

2022An investigative stop or detention, however, does not offend the Federal or State Constitution, and no warrant is needed, “if it is based on ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,’ give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 126 (2002) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). 22 Although reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, “[n]either ‘inarticulate hunches’ nor an arresting officer’s subjective good faith can justify infringement of a citizen’s con

2025Reasonable suspicion "is a less demanding standard than probable cause." Ibid.

2024An investigative stop or detention does not offend the Federal or State Constitution, and no warrant is needed, "if it is based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." Although reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, "[n]either 'inarticulate hunches' nor an arresting officer's subjective good faith can justify infringement of a citizen's constitutionally guaranteed rights." Determining whether reasonable and articulable suspicion exists for an inv

2007Reasonable suspicion requires objective justification, Elders, supra, 386 N.J.Super. at 224 , 899 A. 2d 1037 , but "`is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.'" State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 370 , 788 A. 2d 746 (2002) (quoting United States v. Valentine, 232 F. 3d 350, 353 (3d Cir.2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1014 , 121 S.Ct. 1748 , 149 L.Ed. 2d 670 (2001)).

2006B "`Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.'" State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 370 , 788 A. 2d 746 (2002) (quoting United States v. Valentine, 232 F. 3d 350, 353 (3d Cir.2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1014 , 121 S.Ct. 1748 , 149 L.Ed. 2d 670 (2001)).

1999Morever, “[t]he concept of reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is not ‘readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.’ ” United States v. Sokolow, supra, 490 U.S. at 7 , 109 S.Ct. at 1585 , 104 L.Ed.2d at 10 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 , 103 S.Ct 2317, 2329 , 76 L.Ed. 2d 527, 544 (1983)).

1999Morever, “[t]he concept of reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is not ‘readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.’ ” United States v. Sokolow, supra, 490 U.S. at 7 , 109 S.Ct. at 1585 , 104 L.Ed.2d at 10 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 , 103 S.Ct 2317, 2329 , 76 L.Ed. 2d 527, 544 (1983)).

1999In fact, “[Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416 , 110 L.Ed2d 301, 309 (1990); accord State in the Interest of H.B., 75 N.J. 243 , 251, 381 A.2d 759 (1977).

1999In fact, “[Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416 , 110 L.Ed2d 301, 309 (1990); accord State in the Interest of H.B., 75 N.J. 243 , 251, 381 A.2d 759 (1977).

2025A motion for Rule 4:49-2 reconsideration of a final order is considered under a more demanding standard that requires a showing "that the challenged order was the result of a 'palpably incorrect or irrational' analysis or of the judge's failure to 'consider' or 'appreciate' competent and probative evidence." Ibid. (quoting Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J.

2024A motion for reconsideration of a final order pursuant to Rule 4:49-2 is considered under a more demanding standard that requires a showing "that the challenged order was the result of a 'palpably incorrect or irrational' analysis or of the judge's failure to 'consider' or 'appreciate' competent and probative evidence." Ibid. (quoting Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J.

2024A-1115-22 14 "The first component of the Terry rule concerns the level of reasonable suspicion that must exist before an 'investigatory stop' legitimately may be undertaken." State v. Thomas, 110 N.J. 673, 678 (1988).

1998Ed. 2d at 309 ; accord Thomas, supra, 110 N.J. at 678 , 542 A. 2d 912 .

2017We can conceive of no reason to impose a more demanding standard when a person's liberty is at stake in a criminal case. 18 A-2023-15T2 See State v. Glissendorf, 329 P.3d 1049, 1051-53 (Ariz. 2014) (adverse inference charge required where State destroys evidence that has a "tendency to exonerate" or is "potentially useful"); Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81, 90 (Del. 1988) (defendant entitled to adverse inference charge where State destroyed a crashed automobile in a vehicular homicide case); Cost v. State, 10 A.3d 184, 196 (Md. 2010) (requiring adverse inference charge where State destroyed "hig

2017We can conceive of no reason to impose a more demanding standard when a person's liberty is at stake in a criminal case. 18 A-2023-15T2 See State v. Glissendorf, 329 P.3d 1049, 1051-53 (Ariz. 2014) (adverse inference charge required where State destroys evidence that has a "tendency to exonerate" or is "potentially useful"); Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81, 90 (Del. 1988) (defendant entitled to adverse inference charge where State destroyed a crashed automobile in a vehicular homicide case); Cost v. State, 10 A.3d 184, 196 (Md. 2010) (requiring adverse inference charge where State destroyed "hig

2017We can conceive of no reason to impose a more demanding standard when a person's liberty is at stake in a criminal case. 18 A-2023-15T2 See State v. Glissendorf, 329 P.3d 1049, 1051-53 (Ariz. 2014) (adverse inference charge required where State destroys evidence that has a "tendency to exonerate" or is "potentially useful"); Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81, 90 (Del. 1988) (defendant entitled to adverse inference charge where State destroyed a crashed automobile in a vehicular homicide case); Cost v. State, 10 A.3d 184, 196 (Md. 2010) (requiring adverse inference charge where State destroyed "hig

2017We can conceive of no reason to impose a more demanding standard when a person's liberty is at stake in a criminal case. 18 A-2023-15T2 See State v. Glissendorf, 329 P.3d 1049, 1051-53 (Ariz. 2014) (adverse inference charge required where State destroys evidence that has a "tendency to exonerate" or is "potentially useful"); Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81, 90 (Del. 1988) (defendant entitled to adverse inference charge where State destroyed a crashed automobile in a vehicular homicide case); Cost v. State, 10 A.3d 184, 196 (Md. 2010) (requiring adverse inference charge where State destroyed "hig

2017We can conceive of no reason to impose a more demanding standard when a person's liberty is at stake in a criminal case. 18 A-2023-15T2 See State v. Glissendorf, 329 P.3d 1049, 1051-53 (Ariz. 2014) (adverse inference charge required where State destroys evidence that has a "tendency to exonerate" or is "potentially useful"); Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81, 90 (Del. 1988) (defendant entitled to adverse inference charge where State destroyed a crashed automobile in a vehicular homicide case); Cost v. State, 10 A.3d 184, 196 (Md. 2010) (requiring adverse inference charge where State destroyed "hig

2017We can conceive of no reason to impose a more demanding standard when a person's liberty is at stake in a criminal case. 18 A-2023-15T2 See State v. Glissendorf, 329 P.3d 1049, 1051-53 (Ariz. 2014) (adverse inference charge required where State destroys evidence that has a "tendency to exonerate" or is "potentially useful"); Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81, 90 (Del. 1988) (defendant entitled to adverse inference charge where State destroyed a crashed automobile in a vehicular homicide case); Cost v. State, 10 A.3d 184, 196 (Md. 2010) (requiring adverse inference charge where State destroyed "hig

2017We can conceive of no reason to impose a more demanding standard when a person's liberty is at stake in a criminal case. 18 A-2023-15T2 See State v. Glissendorf, 329 P.3d 1049, 1051-53 (Ariz. 2014) (adverse inference charge required where State destroys evidence that has a "tendency to exonerate" or is "potentially useful"); Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81, 90 (Del. 1988) (defendant entitled to adverse inference charge where State destroyed a crashed automobile in a vehicular homicide case); Cost v. State, 10 A.3d 184, 196 (Md. 2010) (requiring adverse inference charge where State destroyed "hig

2017We can conceive of no reason to impose a more demanding standard when a person's liberty is at stake in a criminal case. 18 A-2023-15T2 See State v. Glissendorf, 329 P.3d 1049, 1051-53 (Ariz. 2014) (adverse inference charge required where State destroys evidence that has a "tendency to exonerate" or is "potentially useful"); Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81, 90 (Del. 1988) (defendant entitled to adverse inference charge where State destroyed a crashed automobile in a vehicular homicide case); Cost v. State, 10 A.3d 184, 196 (Md. 2010) (requiring adverse inference charge where State destroyed "hig

2017We can conceive of no reason to impose a more demanding standard when a person's liberty is at stake in a criminal case. 18 A-2023-15T2 See State v. Glissendorf, 329 P.3d 1049, 1051-53 (Ariz. 2014) (adverse inference charge required where State destroys evidence that has a "tendency to exonerate" or is "potentially useful"); Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81, 90 (Del. 1988) (defendant entitled to adverse inference charge where State destroyed a crashed automobile in a vehicular homicide case); Cost v. State, 10 A.3d 184, 196 (Md. 2010) (requiring adverse inference charge where State destroyed "hig

2017We can conceive of no reason to impose a more demanding standard when a person's liberty is at stake in a criminal case. 18 A-2023-15T2 See State v. Glissendorf, 329 P.3d 1049, 1051-53 (Ariz. 2014) (adverse inference charge required where State destroys evidence that has a "tendency to exonerate" or is "potentially useful"); Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81, 90 (Del. 1988) (defendant entitled to adverse inference charge where State destroyed a crashed automobile in a vehicular homicide case); Cost v. State, 10 A.3d 184, 196 (Md. 2010) (requiring adverse inference charge where State destroyed "hig

2025An investigatory stop must be based on A-2570-23 8 more than an "'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.'" Stovall, 170 N.J. at 357 (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).

1999Morever, “[t]he concept of reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is not ‘readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.’ ” United States v. Sokolow, supra, 490 U.S. at 7 , 109 S.Ct. at 1585 , 104 L.Ed.2d at 10 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 , 103 S.Ct 2317, 2329 , 76 L.Ed. 2d 527, 544 (1983)).

1977“There is this much play in the joints of the Due Process Clause, and we stop short of imposing a more demanding rule with respect to witnesses and documents [in prison disciplinary cases].” White, J., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 567 , 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2979-80 , 41 L.

1977“There is this much play in the joints of the Due Process Clause, and we stop short of imposing a more demanding rule with respect to witnesses and documents [in prison disciplinary cases].” White, J., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 567 , 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2979-80 , 41 L.

2026"Although reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, '[n]either 'inarticulate hunches' nor an arresting officer's subjective good faith can justify infringement of a citizen's constitutionally guaranteed rights.'" State v. Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384 , 399 (2022) (quoting State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 372 (2002)); see also State v. Gibson, 218 N.J. 277, 291-92 (2014) (explaining an officer's hunch, even if later proven correct, does not justify an investigatory stop).

2025Nonetheless, police suspicion "will be found to be reasonable only if it is based on 'some objective manifestation that the person [detained] is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.'" State v. Williams, 410 N.J.