66 Pennsylvania opinions name it 4 courts 1976–2026 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Alabama v. Whitegreen2 sentences2023“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). 2017In evaluating these factors it is useful to note the caution of the Court in Moore, when it quoted: "Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause." Moore, 805 A.2d at 620 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301, 309 ( | 9 | 14 |
Commonwealth v. Davisgreen2 sentences2018As this Court reiterated in Commonwealth v. Davis, 102 A.3d 996 (Pa. Super. 2014): The reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct a Terry frisk and, in fact, all investigative detentions is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause. 2017It is settled that reasonable suspicion necessary for investigative detentions is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause. -6- J-S02024-17 Commonwealth v. Davis, 102 A.3d 996, 1000 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted). | 8 | 9 |
Commonwealth v. Fellgreen2 sentences2018Id. at 999 (quoting Commonwealth v. Fell, 901 A.2d 542, 545 (Pa. Super. 2006) (in turn quoting Arizona v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)). 2015Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause “not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” Commonwealth v. Fell, 901 A.2d 542, 545 (Pa.Super.2006). | 7 | 8 |
Commonwealth v. Emeighgreen2 sentences2019S06038/19 in quantity and quality than that required for probable cause; it can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” Commonwealth v. Emeigh, 905 A.2d 995, 998 (Pa.Super. 2006) (citation omitted). 2018“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause because it can be established by information that is different in quantity and quality than that required for probable cause; it can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” Commonwealth v. Emeigh, 905 A.2d 995, 998 (Pa.Super. 2006) (citation omitted). | 4 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Evansgreen2 sentences2025Commonwealth v. Evans, 661 A.2d 881, 885 (Pa. Super. 1995). 2020Commonwealth v. Evans, 661 A.2d 881, 885 (Pa.Super. 1995). | 3 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Campbellgreen2 sentences2000This Court has noted that: “[reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” Commonwealth v. Campbell, 418 Pa.Super. 391 , 614 A.2d 692, 696 (1992) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990)). 2000This Court has noted that: “[reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” Commonwealth v. Campbell, 418 Pa.Super. 391 , 614 A.2d 692, 696 (1992) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990)). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Mooregreen2 sentences2018"Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause ... in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause." Commonwealth v. Moore , 805 A.2d 616 , 620 (Pa.Super. 2002) (citation omitted). 2018The Moore Court explained, “[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” Id. at 620 (citations omitted). -5- J-S23022-18 must be supported by a reasonable suspicion that the offender is in violation of the conditions of his probation or parole[.]” Arter, 151 | 1 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Butlergreen2 sentences2025“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause[.]” Id. (citation omitted). 2019“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause . . . in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” Commonwealth v. Butler, 194 A.3d 145, 148 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). | 1 | 2 |
Matter of Adoption of David C.green2 sentences1985If he does place himself in such a position, he has no cause to complain when his performance of parental duties is judged by a more demanding standard.” Id., 479 Pa. at 10 , 387 A.2d at 808 . 1985If he does place himself in such a position, he has no cause to complain when his performance of parental duties is judged by a more demanding standard.” Id., 479 Pa. at 10 , 387 A.2d at 808 . | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Wrecksgreen2 sentences2026See Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 2007 PA Super 239 , 931 A.2d 717 (Pa. Super. 2007)(“Anders counsel is not permitted to withdraw unless the appeal is wholly frivolous, but Turner/Finley counsel is permitted to do so if the case lacks merit, even if it is not so anemic as to be deemed wholly frivolous"). -2- J-S01043-26 pervades the issues on appeal. 2026See Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 2007 PA Super 239 , 931 A.2d 717 (Pa. Super. 2007)(“Anders counsel is not permitted to withdraw unless the appeal is wholly frivolous, but Turner/Finley counsel is permitted to do so if the case lacks merit, even if it is not so anemic as to be deemed wholly frivolous"). -2- J-S01043-26 pervades the issues on appeal. | 1 | 1 |
United States Department of Agriculture v. Murrygreen1 sentence2024See U. S. Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 514 (1973) (“We conclude that the deduction taken for the benefit of the parent in the prior year is not a rational measure of the need of a different household with which the child of the tax- deducting parent lives and rests on an irrebuttable presumption often contrary to fact.” (emphasis added)). offenders as sexually violent predators and juvenile offenders as sexually violent delinquent children. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Arvizugreen1 sentence2023Moreover, “reasonable suspicion ‘need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.’” Navarette, 572 U.S. at 403 (2014), quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002). | 1 | 1 |
Hankin v. Hankingreen1 sentence2023Despite this demanding standard, the trial court has the discretion to appoint a receiver when assets are wasted or dissipated, Hankin v. Hankin, 493 A.2d 675, 677 (Pa. 1985), or when a borrower defaults on its loan payments. | 1 | 1 |
Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Liberty Center Venturegreen1 sentence2023See Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Liberty Center Venture, 650 A.2d 887, 890-91 (Pa. Super. 1994) (mortgagee entitled to appointment of receiver where mortgagor unilaterally made payments at interest rate of 10% instead of 14½ and 15% required under notes). | 1 | 1 |
Prado Navarette v. Californiagreen1 sentence2023Moreover, “reasonable suspicion ‘need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.’” Navarette, 572 U.S. at 403 (2014), quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002). | 1 | 1 |
Wolff v. McDonnellgreen1 sentence2021Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566-67 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Spielergreen1 sentence2019Probable cause, the more demanding test, “does not require certainty, but rather exists when criminality is one reasonable inference, not necessarily even the most likely inference.” Commonwealth v. Spieler, 887 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2005). | 1 | 1 |
| Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Wadegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Heppsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Doe v. 2TheMart. Com Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Wimbushgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Eppsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Alexandergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Pickrongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Battygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wyeth v. Levine
green
2 sentences2019We have previously discussed controlling decisional law characterizing impossibility pre-emption as “a demanding defense.” Hasset, 74 A.3d at 210 (quoting Wyeth, 129 S.Ct. at 1199 ). 2013At issue herein is impossibility pre-emption, the type of implied conflict pre-emption that arises when it is impossible to comply with both federal and state law. 4 Kiak, supra. As the Supreme Court recognized in Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 573 , 129 S.Ct. 1187 , 173 L.Ed.2d 51 (2009), “impossibility pre-emption is a demanding defense.” Therein, the Supreme Court held that state claims based upon the failure to warn of the risk of gangrene from delivery of Phenergan via IV-push method were not pre-empted on such a theory because the name-brand manufacturer of the drug could have complied w | 4 | 2009–2019 |
United States v. Cortez
green
2 sentences2000Moreover, we have recognized that we must take into account “ ‘the totality of the circumstances’ ” and “ ‘the fluid nature of events as they were perceived by the officers at the time.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); Commonwealth v. Epps, 415 Pa.Super. 231 , 608 A.2d 1095, 1097 (1992) (respectively)). 2000Moreover, we have recognized that we must take into account “ ‘the totality of the circumstances’ ” and “ ‘the fluid nature of events as they were perceived by the officers at the time.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); Commonwealth v. Epps, 415 Pa.Super. 231 , 608 A.2d 1095, 1097 (1992) (respectively)). | 4 | 1992–2000 |
Adams v. Williams
green
2 sentences1993Adams v. Williams, [ 407 U.S. 143 , 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972)] supra, demonstrates as much. 1993Adams v. Williams, [ 407 U.S. 143 , 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972)] supra, demonstrates as much. | 3 | 1991–1993 |
Commonwealth v. Arter, K., Aplt.
green
2 sentences2018The Moore Court explained, “[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” Id. at 620 (citations omitted). -5- J-S23022-18 must be supported by a reasonable suspicion that the offender is in violation of the conditions of his probation or parole[.]” Arter, 151 2018In accordance with such case law, the following factors, where applicable, may be taken into account: (i) The observations of agents. (ii) Information provided by others. (iii) The activities of the offender. (iv) Information provided by the offender. (v) The experience of agents with the offender. (vi) The experience of agents in similar circumstances. (vii) The prior criminal and supervisory history of the offender. ____________________________________________ 6 In Arter, it was undisputed the parole officer lacked reasonable suspicion for a warrantless search and thus, the seized evidence s | 2 | 2017–2018 |
Kiak v. Crown Equipment Corp.
green
2 sentences2013At issue herein is impossibility pre-emption, the type of implied conflict pre-emption that arises when it is impossible to comply with both federal and state law. 4 Kiak, supra. As the Supreme Court recognized in Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 573 , 129 S.Ct. 1187 , 173 L.Ed.2d 51 (2009), “impossibility pre-emption is a demanding defense.” Therein, the Supreme Court held that state claims based upon the failure to warn of the risk of gangrene from delivery of Phenergan via IV-push method were not pre-empted on such a theory because the name-brand manufacturer of the drug could have complied w 2013At issue herein is impossibility pre-emption, the type of implied conflict pre-emption that arises when it is impossible to comply with both federal and state law. 5 Kiak, supra. As the Supreme Court recognized in Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 573 , 129 S.Ct. 1187 , 173 L.Ed.2d 51 (2009), “[i]mpossibility pre-emption is a demanding defense.” Therein, the Supreme Court held that state claims based upon the failure to warn of the risk of gangrene from delivery of Phenergan via IV-push method were not pre-empted on such a theory because the name-brand manufacturer of the drug could have complied | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Illinois v. Gates
green
2 sentences1993We have held that probable cause means ‘a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found,’ [Gates, 462 U.S., at 238 , 103 S.Ct. at 2332 ], and the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than for probable cause.” Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less 1993We have held that probable cause means ‘a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found,’ [Gates, 462 U.S., at 238 , 103 S.Ct. at 2332 ], and the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obviously less demanding than for probable cause.” Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less | 2 | 1993–1993 |
Commonwealth v. Finley
green
2 sentences2026That relationship ____________________________________________ 2 As addressed below, while counsel has satisfied the procedural requirements of Anders and Santiago, because the instant appeal arises from a denial of PCRA relief, she need only have satisfied the less demanding standard as set forth in Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491 , 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1998), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 379 Pa. Super. 390 , 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988). 2026That relationship ____________________________________________ 2 As addressed below, while counsel has satisfied the procedural requirements of Anders and Santiago, because the instant appeal arises from a denial of PCRA relief, she need only have satisfied the less demanding standard as set forth in Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491 , 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1998), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 379 Pa. Super. 390 , 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Commonwealth v. Turner
green
2 sentences2026That relationship ____________________________________________ 2 As addressed below, while counsel has satisfied the procedural requirements of Anders and Santiago, because the instant appeal arises from a denial of PCRA relief, she need only have satisfied the less demanding standard as set forth in Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491 , 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1998), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 379 Pa. Super. 390 , 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988). 2026That relationship ____________________________________________ 2 As addressed below, while counsel has satisfied the procedural requirements of Anders and Santiago, because the instant appeal arises from a denial of PCRA relief, she need only have satisfied the less demanding standard as set forth in Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491 , 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1998), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 379 Pa. Super. 390 , 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
City of L. A. v. Patel
green
1 sentence2025However, it nonetheless insists this demanding standard is satisfied here pursuant to City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409 (2015). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Hassett v. Dafoe
green
1 sentence2019We have previously discussed controlling decisional law characterizing impossibility pre-emption as “a demanding defense.” Hasset, 74 A.3d at 210 (quoting Wyeth, 129 S.Ct. at 1199 ). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
COM. EX REL. BARNES v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
green
1 sentence2018An investigative detention is justified where "a police officer [is] able to point to 'specific and articulable facts' leading him to suspect criminal activity is afoot." Commonwealth v. Brown , 606 Pa. 198 , 996 A.2d 473 , 477 (2010) (citations omitted). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Brown
green
1 sentence2018An investigative detention is justified where "a police officer [is] able to point to 'specific and articulable facts' leading him to suspect criminal activity is afoot." Commonwealth v. Brown , 606 Pa. 198 , 996 A.2d 473 , 477 (2010) (citations omitted). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Boehm, R. v. Riversource Life Insurance
green
1 sentence2017Moreover, the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof, which is the standard usually applied to remedial legislation, is consistent with the UTPCPL's purpose of protecting the public from fraud and unfair or deceptive business practices. 8 Boehm, 117 A.3d at 322 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Hertzberg v. Zoning Board of Adjustment green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Milne v. Crossett green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Mitchell v. Zoning Hearing Board of the Borough of Mount Penn green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Commonwealth v. Jefferson green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Texas v. Johnson green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Katz v. United States green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Matter of Dandridge green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Matter of Cunningham green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Se-Ling Hosiery, Inc. v. Margulies green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Commonwealth v. Mitchell green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Commonwealth v. Ehredt green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Tosto v. Pennsylvania Nursing Home Loan Agency green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Appeal of Diane B. green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Moyer v. PHILLIPS, MD green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Eisenstadt v. Baird green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Reed v. Reed green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Matter of Estate of Cavill green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Stottlemyer v. Stottlemyer green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Baltimore & OR Co. v. CMWLTH., D. OF L. & I. green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| In Re Adoption of R. I. green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.