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24 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Alabama v. Whitegreen2 sentences2013Under all of the circumstances known to them, the police had reasonable suspicion, the requisite “minimal level of objective justification,” INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 , 104 S.Ct. 1758, 1763 , 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984), for conducting a brief investigatory detention of defendant “to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information.” State v. Fauria, 393 So.2d 688, 690 (La.1981); see White, 496 U.S. at 330 , 110 S.Ct. at 2416 (“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with info 2013Under all of the circumstances known to them, the police had reasonable suspicion, the requisite “minimal level of objective justification,” INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 , 104 S.Ct. 1758, 1763 , 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984), for conducting a brief investigatory detention of defendant “to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information.” State v. Fauria, 393 So.2d 688, 690 (La.1981); see White, 496 U.S. at 330 , 110 S.Ct. at 2416 (“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with info | 3 | 6 |
State v. Morgangreen2 sentences2016“Although reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires some minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.” State v. Morgan, 09-2352, p. 4 (La.3/15/11), 59 So.3d 403, 406 (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989)). 2015As noted by the Court in State v. Morgan, 2009-2352, p. 4 (La.3/15/11), 59 So.3d 403 , 406: “Although reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires some minimal level of objective justification for making the stop. [United States v.] Sokolow, 490 U.S. [1] at 7, 109 S.Ct. [1581] at 1585 [ 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) ].” As per Morgan , factors to be considered include the time of day and location of the stop, as well as the defendant’s actions prior to the stop. | 2 | 5 |
In Re WINSHIPgreen2 sentences2010See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (“[T]he Due Process Clause [of the federal constitution] protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”). 2010See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (“[T]he Due Process Clause [of the federal constitution] protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.”). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Sokolowgreen2 sentences2016“Although reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires some minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.” State v. Morgan, 09-2352, p. 4 (La.3/15/11), 59 So.3d 403, 406 (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989)). 2016“Although reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires some minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.” State v. Morgan, 09-2352, p. 4 (La.3/15/11), 59 So.3d 403, 406 (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989)). | 1 | 8 |
State v. Fauriagreen1 sentence2013Under all of the circumstances known to them, the police had reasonable suspicion, the requisite “minimal level of objective justification,” INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 , 104 S.Ct. 1758, 1763 , 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984), for conducting a brief investigatory detention of defendant “to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information.” State v. Fauria, 393 So.2d 688, 690 (La.1981); see White, 496 U.S. at 330 , 110 S.Ct. at 2416 (“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with info | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Malley v. Briggs
green
2 sentences2021This demanding standard protects " all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." District of Columbia v. Wesby, -- U.S.--, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 , 199 L.Ed.2d 453 ( 2018) ( oting Malley v. u Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 , 106 S. Ct. 1092 , 89 L.Ed.2d 271 ( 1986)). 2021This demanding standard protects " all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." District of Columbia v. Wesby, -- U.S.--, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 , 199 L.Ed.2d 453 ( 2018) ( oting Malley v. u Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 , 106 S. Ct. 1092 , 89 L.Ed.2d 271 ( 1986)). | 2 | 2021–2021 |
District of Columbia v. Wesby
green
2 sentences2021This demanding standard protects " all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." District of Columbia v. Wesby, -- U.S.--, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 , 199 L.Ed.2d 453 ( 2018) ( oting Malley v. u Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 , 106 S. Ct. 1092 , 89 L.Ed.2d 271 ( 1986)). 2021This demanding standard protects " all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." District of Columbia v. Wesby, -- U.S.--, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 , 199 L.Ed.2d 453 ( 2018) ( oting Malley v. u Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 , 106 S. Ct. 1092 , 89 L.Ed.2d 271 ( 1986)). | 2 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Bailey
green
2 sentences2008State v. Bailey, 511 So.2d 1248 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1987), writ denied, 519 So.2d 132 ( [La.]1988). 1997State v. Bailey, 511 So.2d 1248 (La.App. 2d Cir.1987), writ denied, 519 So.2d 132 (1988). | 2 | 1997–2008 |
State v. Bailey
green
2 sentences2008State v. Bailey, 511 So.2d 1248 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1987), writ denied, 519 So.2d 132 ( [La.]1988). 1997State v. Bailey, 511 So.2d 1248 (La.App. 2d Cir.1987), writ denied, 519 So.2d 132 (1988). | 2 | 1997–2008 |
In Re Sawyer
green
2 sentences2015Collaboration between counsel and the press' as to information affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary measures.” 384 U.S., at 363, 86 S.Ct., at 1522 (emphasis added). [[Image here]] |29We think that the quoted statements from our opinions in In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 , 79 S.Ct. 1376 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1473 (1959), and Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra, rather plainly indicate that the speech of lawyers representing clients in pending cases may be regulated under a less demanding standard than that established for reg 2015Collaboration between counsel and the press' as to information affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary measures.” 384 U.S., at 363, 86 S.Ct., at 1522 (emphasis added). [[Image here]] |29We think that the quoted statements from our opinions in In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 , 79 S.Ct. 1376 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1473 (1959), and Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra, rather plainly indicate that the speech of lawyers representing clients in pending cases may be regulated under a less demanding standard than that established for reg | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart
green
2 sentences2015Collaboration between counsel and the press' as to information affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary measures.” 384 U.S., at 363, 86 S.Ct., at 1522 (emphasis added). [[Image here]] |29We think that the quoted statements from our opinions in In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 , 79 S.Ct. 1376 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1473 (1959), and Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra, rather plainly indicate that the speech of lawyers representing clients in pending cases may be regulated under a less demanding standard than that established for reg 2015Collaboration between counsel and the press' as to information affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy of disciplinary measures.” 384 U.S., at 363, 86 S.Ct., at 1522 (emphasis added). [[Image here]] |29We think that the quoted statements from our opinions in In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 , 79 S.Ct. 1376 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1473 (1959), and Sheppard v. Maxwell, supra, rather plainly indicate that the speech of lawyers representing clients in pending cases may be regulated under a less demanding standard than that established for reg | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Delgado
green
2 sentences2013Under all of the circumstances known to them, the police had reasonable suspicion, the requisite “minimal level of objective justification,” INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 , 104 S.Ct. 1758, 1763 , 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984), for conducting a brief investigatory detention of defendant “to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information.” State v. Fauria, 393 So.2d 688, 690 (La.1981); see White, 496 U.S. at 330 , 110 S.Ct. at 2416 (“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with info 2013Under all of the circumstances known to them, the police had reasonable suspicion, the requisite “minimal level of objective justification,” INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 , 104 S.Ct. 1758, 1763 , 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984), for conducting a brief investigatory detention of defendant “to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information.” State v. Fauria, 393 So.2d 688, 690 (La.1981); see White, 496 U.S. at 330 , 110 S.Ct. at 2416 (“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with info | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Barbara Jean Johnson, Cross-Appellant v. Offshore Express, Inc., Cross-Appellee
green
2 sentences1997"To establish the requisite proximate cause in an unseaworthiness claim, a plaintiff must prove that the unseaworthy condition played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury and that the injury was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the unseaworthiness." Id. at 1354 . 1997"There is a more demanding standard of causation in an unseaworthiness claim than in a Jones Act negligence claim." Johnson, 845 F.2d at 1354 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Harold E. Alverez, Cross-Appellee v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc., Cross-Appellant
green
1 sentence1992Alverez, supra . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance
green
2 sentences1986It is quite true that Glona v. American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Co., 391 U.S. 73 , 88 S.Ct. 1515 , 20 L.Ed.2d 441 (1968) stated as a matter of equal protection the biological mother of a child born out of wedlock must be allowed to bring an action for wrongful death if she is “plainly” the mother of the child. 1986It is quite true that Glona v. American Guarantee and Liability Insurance Co., 391 U.S. 73 , 88 S.Ct. 1515 , 20 L.Ed.2d 441 (1968) stated as a matter of equal protection the biological mother of a child born out of wedlock must be allowed to bring an action for wrongful death if she is “plainly” the mother of the child. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.