demanding standard in Georgia

2024Compare Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1071-1074 (111 SCt 2720, 115 LE2d 888) (1991) (explaining that “lawyers in pending cases [are] subject to ethical restrictions on speech to which an ordinary citizen would not be” and “the speech of lawyers representing clients in pending cases may be regulated under a less demanding standard than that established for regulation of the press” because lawyers “have special access to information through discovery and client communications,” such that “their extrajudicial statements pose a threat to the fairness of a pending proceeding”).

2024Compare Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1071-1074 (111 SCt 2720, 115 LE2d 888) (1991) (explaining that “lawyers in pending cases [are] subject to ethical restrictions on speech to which an ordinary citizen would not be” and “the speech of lawyers representing clients in pending cases may be regulated under a less demanding standard than that established for regulation of the press” because lawyers “have special access to information through discovery and client communications,” such that “their extrajudicial statements pose a threat to the fairness of a pending proceeding”).

2007See id.; see siso Alabama v. White, 496 U. S. 325, 330 (110 SC 2412, 110 LE2d 301) (1990) (reasonable suspicion can be established “with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause”).

1997“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” Alabama v. White, supra at 330.

2018Likewise, in Sheppard v. Maxwell , 384 U.S. 333 , 361 (VII), 86 S.Ct. 1507 , 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966), the Supreme Court in dicta identified several means by which a trial court in a case involving extensive media coverage might safeguard the rights of the accused, including by "proscrib[ing] extrajudicial statements by any lawyer, party, witness, or court official which divulged prejudicial matters." Most important, the Supreme Court in Gentile squarely held that "the speech of lawyers representing clients in pending cases may be regulated under a less demanding standard than that established fo

2018Likewise, in Sheppard v. Maxwell , 384 U.S. 333 , 361 (VII), 86 S.Ct. 1507 , 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966), the Supreme Court in dicta identified several means by which a trial court in a case involving extensive media coverage might safeguard the rights of the accused, including by "proscrib[ing] extrajudicial statements by any lawyer, party, witness, or court official which divulged prejudicial matters." Most important, the Supreme Court in Gentile squarely held that "the speech of lawyers representing clients in pending cases may be regulated under a less demanding standard than that established fo

2026See Platt v. State, 319 Ga. 1, 12 (2024) (holding that, because two assumed “errors produced very little, if any, harm[,] ... given the strength of the evidence, even if these assumed errors could be considered cumulatively, the cumulative prejudice did not deny [the appellant] a fair trial”); Lofton v. State, 309 Ga. 349 , 367 (2020) (the combined actual and assumed evidentiary errors and deficiencies by counsel did not warrant a new trial, because “even when considered as a whole under the most demanding standard that applies to any of the alleged errors, the cumulative prejudicial effect of

2004To determine what level of scrutiny applies to the ordinance at issue here, we must decide “whether the State’s regulation is related to the suppression of expression.” [Cits.] If the governmental purpose in enacting the regulation is unrelated to the suppression of expression, then the regulation need only satisfy the “less stringent” standard from [United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (88 SC 1673, 20 LE2d 672) (1968)] for evaluating restrictions on symbolic speech. [Cits.] If the government interest is related to the content of the expression, however, then the regulation falls outside th