demanding standard (Arizona) · Go Syfert
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demanding standard in Arizona

6 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2019 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (3)

CaseFollowedCited
City of L. A. v. Patelgreen
scotus · 2015 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018
1 sentence

2018While it is not impossible, making a successful facial challenge is extremely difficult; indeed, it is "the most difficult challenge to mount successfully." Salerno , 481 U.S. at 745 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 (emphasis added); see also Patel , 135 S.Ct. at 2447, 2451 (concluding that because there were no relevant circumstances under which the subject municipal code was valid, it was facially invalid).

11
United States v. Sokolowgreen
scotus · 1989 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
1 sentence

2015“While ‘reasonable suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than probable cause, and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.” Id. (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).

11
Bird v. Rothmangreen
arizctapp · 1981 · cited in 1 Arizona opinions naming this issue, 1999–1999
2 sentences

1999See also Bird v. Rothman, 128 Ariz. 599 , 627 P.2d 1097 (App.1981) (simple negligence an improper standard upon which to base liability of an attorney to an adverse party).

1999See also Bird v. Rothman, 128 Ariz. 599 , 627 P.2d 1097 (App.1981) (simple negligence an improper standard upon which to base liability of an attorney to an adverse party).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (5)

CaseCitedYears
State v. Estrada green
ariz · 2001
2 sentences

2019"A result is 'absurd if it is so irrational, unnatural, or inconvenient that it cannot be supposed to have been within the intention of persons with ordinary intelligence and discretion.' " State v. Estrada , 201 Ariz. 247 , ¶ 17, 34 P.3d 356 (2001) (quoting Perini Land & Dev.

2019"A result is 'absurd if it is so irrational, unnatural, or inconvenient that it cannot be supposed to have been within the intention of persons with ordinary intelligence and discretion.' " State v. Estrada , 201 Ariz. 247 , ¶ 17, 34 P.3d 356 (2001) (quoting Perini Land & Dev.

12019–2019
United States v. Salerno green
scotus · 1987
2 sentences

2018While it is not impossible, making a successful facial challenge is extremely difficult; indeed, it is "the most difficult challenge to mount successfully." Salerno , 481 U.S. at 745 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 (emphasis added); see also Patel , 135 S.Ct. at 2447, 2451 (concluding that because there were no relevant circumstances under which the subject municipal code was valid, it was facially invalid).

2018While it is not impossible, making a successful facial challenge is extremely difficult; indeed, it is "the most difficult challenge to mount successfully." Salerno , 481 U.S. at 745 , 107 S.Ct. 2095 (emphasis added); see also Patel , 135 S.Ct. at 2447, 2451 (concluding that because there were no relevant circumstances under which the subject municipal code was valid, it was facially invalid).

12018–2018
Wyeth v. Levine green
scotus · 2009
2 sentences

2016Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 573 , 129 S.Ct. 1187 , 173 L.Ed.2d 51 (2009). ¶ 56 We heed the Supreme Court’s warning that “[p]re-emption analysis should not be a freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension with federal objectives, but an inquiry into whether the ordinary meanings of state and federal law conflict.” Id. at 588 , 129 S.Ct. 1187 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2016Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 573 , 129 S.Ct. 1187 , 173 L.Ed.2d 51 (2009). ¶ 56 We heed the Supreme Court’s warning that “[p]re-emption analysis should not be a freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension with federal objectives, but an inquiry into whether the ordinary meanings of state and federal law conflict.” Id. at 588 , 129 S.Ct. 1187 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

12016–2016
Terry v. Ohio green
scotus · 1968
1 sentence

2015“While ‘reasonable suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than probable cause, and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.” Id. (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).

12015–2015
Texas v. Johnson green
scotus · 1989
2 sentences

2005In applying that test, courts must employ “careful consideration of the actual circumstances surrounding” the challenged speech, and recognize that not “every expression of a provocative idea will incite a riot.” Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 , 109 S.Ct. 2533 , 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989). ¶20 The Supreme Court has made plain that very few statements will meet this demanding test.

2005In applying that test, courts must employ “careful consideration of the actual circumstances surrounding” the challenged speech, and recognize that not “every expression of a provocative idea will incite a riot.” Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 , 109 S.Ct. 2533 , 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989). ¶20 The Supreme Court has made plain that very few statements will meet this demanding test.

12005–2005

Where else courts name it

CA 118 (1975–2026) CT 118 (1970–2026) IL 110 (1960–2026) TX 91 (1976–2026) TN 78 (1978–2025) MD 69 (1975–2026) PA 66 (1976–2026) NY 64 (1961–2026) NJ 61 (1975–2026) IA 61 (1979–2026) OH 54 (1982–2025) MI 53 (1995–2026) WA 51 (1974–2025) IN 51 (1983–2025) FL 44 (1986–2025) NC 43 (1993–2026) KS 42 (1992–2026) DC 38 (1970–2024) CO 35 (1986–2026) AL 34 (1991–2026) OR 32 (1974–2025) MA 31 (1979–2025) DE 28 (1991–2025) LA 24 (1986–2025) WI 24 (1977–2024) NM 22 (1992–2022) VA 19 (1980–2015) MO 14 (1999–2021) MN 13 (1995–2024) GA 11 (1978–2026) NH 10 (1989–2021) ID 10 (1977–2022) MT 10 (1978–2025) AK 10 (1979–2026) KY 8 (1996–2025) WV 8 (1985–2025) SD 8 (1990–2021) VT 7 (2000–2020) HI 7 (1995–2008) WY 6 (2003–2019) NV 6 (2014–2017) AZ 6 (1999–2019) VI 5 (2005–2026) OK 5 (1980–2020) AR 4 (1979–2025) SC 4 (2001–2025) ME 4 (1973–2014) ND 3 (1980–2007) RI 2 (2005–2010) NE 2 (1992–2021)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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