demanding standard in Alaska

1979See Sims v. State Department of Public Welfare, 438 F.Supp. at 1194 (three-judge court); Alsager v. District Court, 406 F.Supp. at 25 ; Caruso v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 167 , 412 P.2d 463, 467 (1966). 20 Clear and convincing proof is a more demanding standard than a mere preponderance of the evidence and is adequate to protect the parent’s substantial interest in his or her child custody rights.

1979See Sims v. State Department of Public Welfare, 438 F.Supp. at 1194 (three-judge court); Alsager v. District Court, 406 F.Supp. at 25 ; Caruso v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 167 , 412 P.2d 463, 467 (1966). 20 Clear and convincing proof is a more demanding standard than a mere preponderance of the evidence and is adequate to protect the parent’s substantial interest in his or her child custody rights.

1979See Sims v. State Department of Public Welfare, 438 F.Supp. at 1194 (three-judge court); Alsager v. District Court, 406 F.Supp. at 25 ; Caruso v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 167 , 412 P.2d 463, 467 (1966). 20 Clear and convincing proof is a more demanding standard than a mere preponderance of the evidence and is adequate to protect the parent’s substantial interest in his or her child custody rights.

1979See Sims v. State Department of Public Welfare, 438 F. Supp. at 1194 (three-judge court); Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. at 25 ; Caruso v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 167 , 412 P.2d 463, 467 (1966). [20] Clear and convincing proof is a more demanding standard than a mere preponderance of the evidence and is adequate to protect the parent's substantial interest in his or her child custody rights.

2026Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs., 311 P.3d 637, 645 (Alaska 2013) (citing AS 47.10.086(a)). 13 Audrey H. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc.

2025Servs., Off. of Child.’s Servs., 483 P.3d 896 , 901 n.13 (Alaska 2021) (“The superior court’s termination order referred to both ‘reasonable efforts’ and ‘active efforts.’ All cases involving Indian children are subject to ICWA’s more stringent ‘active efforts’ requirement.”); Winston J. v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc.

2018Rather, “given the properties that render [a computing device] distinct from the closed containers regularly seen in the physical world, a search of its many files must be done with special care”, and a warrant to conduct such a search must “satisfy a more narrow and demanding standard.”). 8 See United States v. Russian, 848 F.3d 1239, 1245-46 (10th Cir. 2017) (holding that a search warrant for a smart phone was insufficient because it failed to specify the particular material being sought); State v. Henderson, 854 N.W.2d 616 , 632-34 (Neb. 2014) (invalidating a warrant for the search of a cel

2018Rather, “given the properties that render [a computing device] distinct from the closed containers regularly seen in the physical world, a search of its many files must be done with special care”, and a warrant to conduct such a search must “satisfy a more narrow and demanding standard.”). 8 See United States v. Russian, 848 F.3d 1239, 1245-46 (10th Cir. 2017) (holding that a search warrant for a smart phone was insufficient because it failed to specify the particular material being sought); State v. Henderson, 854 N.W.2d 616 , 632-34 (Neb. 2014) (invalidating a warrant for the search of a cel

2018Rather, “given the properties that render [a computing device] distinct from the closed containers regularly seen in the physical world, a search of its many files must be done with special care”, and a warrant to conduct such a search must “satisfy a more narrow and demanding standard.”). 8 See United States v. Russian, 848 F.3d 1239, 1245-46 (10th Cir. 2017) (holding that a search warrant for a smart phone was insufficient because it failed to specify the particular material being sought); State v. Henderson, 854 N.W.2d 616 , 632-34 (Neb. 2014) (invalidating a warrant for the search of a cel

2015No. 5991, 2013 WL 6229377 , at *5 (Alaska App. Nov. 27, 2013). -23- 7058 appeals’s decision in Ryan v. State,49 which in turn was quoting the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Idaho v. Wright.50 Both Wright and Ryan are Confrontation Clause cases.51 They were decided based on the precedent established in Ohio v. Roberts, under which even testimonial hearsay could be admissible against a criminal defendant as long as it fell “within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”52 Both cases considered “residual” hearsay evidence offered by th

2015No. 5991, 2013 WL 6229377 , at *5 (Alaska App. Nov. 27, 2013). -23- 7058 appeals’s decision in Ryan v. State,49 which in turn was quoting the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Idaho v. Wright.50 Both Wright and Ryan are Confrontation Clause cases.51 They were decided based on the precedent established in Ohio v. Roberts, under which even testimonial hearsay could be admissible against a criminal defendant as long as it fell “within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”52 Both cases considered “residual” hearsay evidence offered by th

2015No. 5991, 2013 WL 6229377 , at *5 (Alaska App. Nov. 27, 2013). -23- 7058 appeals’s decision in Ryan v. State,49 which in turn was quoting the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Idaho v. Wright.50 Both Wright and Ryan are Confrontation Clause cases.51 They were decided based on the precedent established in Ohio v. Roberts, under which even testimonial hearsay could be admissible against a criminal defendant as long as it fell “within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”52 Both cases considered “residual” hearsay evidence offered by th

2015No. 5991, 2013 WL 6229377 , at *5 (Alaska App. Nov. 27, 2013). -23- 7058 appeals’s decision in Ryan v. State,49 which in turn was quoting the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Idaho v. Wright.50 Both Wright and Ryan are Confrontation Clause cases.51 They were decided based on the precedent established in Ohio v. Roberts, under which even testimonial hearsay could be admissible against a criminal defendant as long as it fell “within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”52 Both cases considered “residual” hearsay evidence offered by th

2015No. 5991, 2013 WL 6229377 , at *5 (Alaska App. Nov. 27, 2013). -23- 7058 appeals’s decision in Ryan v. State,49 which in turn was quoting the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Idaho v. Wright.50 Both Wright and Ryan are Confrontation Clause cases.51 They were decided based on the precedent established in Ohio v. Roberts, under which even testimonial hearsay could be admissible against a criminal defendant as long as it fell “within a firmly rooted hearsay exception” or bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”52 Both cases considered “residual” hearsay evidence offered by th

2015The United States Supreme Court disapproved the Ohio v. Roberts approach in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), which established that “hearsay evidence may violate a defendant’s right of confrontation even though that evidence might be admissible under the hearsay rules.” Clark v. State, 199 P.3d 1203, 1210 (Alaska App. 2009).

2011See Romero v. Cox, 166 P.3d 4, 8 (Alaska 2007) ("[We judge a pro se litigant's [appellate] briefing by a less demanding standard." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 4 .

2007Co. of N.Y., 803 P.2d 406, 410 (Alaska 1990) (citations omitted). [7] Peterson v. Ek, 93 P.3d 458 , 464 n. 9 (Alaska 2004) (stating that "[w]e judge a pro se litigant's performance by a less demanding standard"); Gates v. City of Tenakee Springs, 822 P.2d 455, 460 (Alaska 1991) (treating as abandoned claims of pro se litigant raised below but only cursorily or not at all on appeal). [8] Shepherd's statement of points on appeal, filed when she commenced her appeal, included this appellate contention: "2.

2007Peterson v. Ek, 93 P.3d 458 , 464 n. 9 (Alaska 2004) (stating that "[wle judge a pro se litigant's performance by a less demanding standard"); Gates v. City of Tenakee Springs, 822 P.2d 455, 460 (Alaska 1991) (treating as abandoned claims of pro se litigant raised below but only cursorily or not at all on appeal). .

2007Co. of N.Y., 803 P.2d 406, 410 (Alaska 1990) (citations omitted). [7] Peterson v. Ek, 93 P.3d 458 , 464 n. 9 (Alaska 2004) (stating that "[w]e judge a pro se litigant's performance by a less demanding standard"); Gates v. City of Tenakee Springs, 822 P.2d 455, 460 (Alaska 1991) (treating as abandoned claims of pro se litigant raised below but only cursorily or not at all on appeal). [8] Shepherd's statement of points on appeal, filed when she commenced her appeal, included this appellate contention: "2.

2004Breck v. Ulmer, 745 P.2d 66, 75 (Alaska 1987).

2001Offices Comm'n, 570 P.2d 469, 480 (Alaska 1977). [34] Pharr v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 638 P.2d 666, 670 (Alaska 1981) (quoting Oliver, 636 P.2d at 1167 ); see also Doe v. Alaska Superior Court, Third Judicial Dist., 721 P.2d 617, 629 (Alaska 1986). [35] See Alaska Wildlife Alliance v. Rue, 948 P.2d 976, 980 (Alaska 1997); Jones v. Jennings, 788 P.2d 732, 737-38 (Alaska 1990). [36] See Valley Hosp., 948 P.2d at 969 & n. 10. [37] See 1972 Senate Journal 865 (May 5, 1972). [38] SJR 68am, 1972 Senate Journal 970-71 (May 17, 1972). [39] H.

2001In contrast, Justice Souter, separately concurring, accepted without question "the power of a State's highest court to construe its domestic statute and to apply a demanding standard when ruling on its facial constitutionality." 530 U.S. at 79, 120 S.Ct. 2054 . [22] 505 U.S. 833 , 112 S.Ct. 2791 , 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992). [23] See id. at 894, 898 , 112 S.Ct. 2791 . [24] Id. at 894 , 112 S.Ct. 2791 . [25] 948 P.2d 963 (Alaska 1997). [26] Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975). [27] Woods & Rohde, Inc. v. State, Dep't of Labor, 565 P.2d 138, 150 (Alaska 1977). [28] See, e.g., State v. Jo

2001In contrast, Justice Souter, separately concurring, accepted without question "the power of a State's highest court to construe its domestic statute and to apply a demanding standard when ruling on its facial constitutionality." 530 U.S. at 79, 120 S.Ct. 2054 . [22] 505 U.S. 833 , 112 S.Ct. 2791 , 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992). [23] See id. at 894, 898 , 112 S.Ct. 2791 . [24] Id. at 894 , 112 S.Ct. 2791 . [25] 948 P.2d 963 (Alaska 1997). [26] Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975). [27] Woods & Rohde, Inc. v. State, Dep't of Labor, 565 P.2d 138, 150 (Alaska 1977). [28] See, e.g., State v. Jo

2001In contrast, Justice Souter, separately concurring, accepted without question "the power of a State's highest court to construe its domestic statute and to apply a demanding standard when ruling on its facial constitutionality." 530 U.S. at 79, 120 S.Ct. 2054 . [22] 505 U.S. 833 , 112 S.Ct. 2791 , 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992). [23] See id. at 894, 898 , 112 S.Ct. 2791 . [24] Id. at 894 , 112 S.Ct. 2791 . [25] 948 P.2d 963 (Alaska 1997). [26] Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975). [27] Woods & Rohde, Inc. v. State, Dep't of Labor, 565 P.2d 138, 150 (Alaska 1977). [28] See, e.g., State v. Jo

2001Offices Comm'n, 570 P.2d 469, 480 (Alaska 1977). [34] Pharr v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 638 P.2d 666, 670 (Alaska 1981) (quoting Oliver, 636 P.2d at 1167 ); see also Doe v. Alaska Superior Court, Third Judicial Dist., 721 P.2d 617, 629 (Alaska 1986). [35] See Alaska Wildlife Alliance v. Rue, 948 P.2d 976, 980 (Alaska 1997); Jones v. Jennings, 788 P.2d 732, 737-38 (Alaska 1990). [36] See Valley Hosp., 948 P.2d at 969 & n. 10. [37] See 1972 Senate Journal 865 (May 5, 1972). [38] SJR 68am, 1972 Senate Journal 970-71 (May 17, 1972). [39] H.

2001Offices Comm'n, 570 P.2d 469, 480 (Alaska 1977). [34] Pharr v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 638 P.2d 666, 670 (Alaska 1981) (quoting Oliver, 636 P.2d at 1167 ); see also Doe v. Alaska Superior Court, Third Judicial Dist., 721 P.2d 617, 629 (Alaska 1986). [35] See Alaska Wildlife Alliance v. Rue, 948 P.2d 976, 980 (Alaska 1997); Jones v. Jennings, 788 P.2d 732, 737-38 (Alaska 1990). [36] See Valley Hosp., 948 P.2d at 969 & n. 10. [37] See 1972 Senate Journal 865 (May 5, 1972). [38] SJR 68am, 1972 Senate Journal 970-71 (May 17, 1972). [39] H.

2001In contrast, Justice Souter, separately concurring, accepted without question "the power of a State's highest court to construe its domestic statute and to apply a demanding standard when ruling on its facial constitutionality." 530 U.S. at 79, 120 S.Ct. 2054 . [22] 505 U.S. 833 , 112 S.Ct. 2791 , 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992). [23] See id. at 894, 898 , 112 S.Ct. 2791 . [24] Id. at 894 , 112 S.Ct. 2791 . [25] 948 P.2d 963 (Alaska 1997). [26] Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975). [27] Woods & Rohde, Inc. v. State, Dep't of Labor, 565 P.2d 138, 150 (Alaska 1977). [28] See, e.g., State v. Jo

2001In contrast, Justice Souter, separately concurring, accepted without question "the power of a State's highest court to construe its domestic statute and to apply a demanding standard when ruling on its facial constitutionality." 530 U.S. at 79, 120 S.Ct. 2054 . [22] 505 U.S. 833 , 112 S.Ct. 2791 , 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992). [23] See id. at 894, 898 , 112 S.Ct. 2791 . [24] Id. at 894 , 112 S.Ct. 2791 . [25] 948 P.2d 963 (Alaska 1997). [26] Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975). [27] Woods & Rohde, Inc. v. State, Dep't of Labor, 565 P.2d 138, 150 (Alaska 1977). [28] See, e.g., State v. Jo

2001In contrast, Justice Souter, separately concurring, accepted without question "the power of a State's highest court to construe its domestic statute and to apply a demanding standard when ruling on its facial constitutionality." 530 U.S. at 79, 120 S.Ct. 2054 . [22] 505 U.S. 833 , 112 S.Ct. 2791 , 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992). [23] See id. at 894, 898 , 112 S.Ct. 2791 . [24] Id. at 894 , 112 S.Ct. 2791 . [25] 948 P.2d 963 (Alaska 1997). [26] Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975). [27] Woods & Rohde, Inc. v. State, Dep't of Labor, 565 P.2d 138, 150 (Alaska 1977). [28] See, e.g., State v. Jo

2001Offices Comm'n, 570 P.2d 469, 480 (Alaska 1977). [34] Pharr v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 638 P.2d 666, 670 (Alaska 1981) (quoting Oliver, 636 P.2d at 1167 ); see also Doe v. Alaska Superior Court, Third Judicial Dist., 721 P.2d 617, 629 (Alaska 1986). [35] See Alaska Wildlife Alliance v. Rue, 948 P.2d 976, 980 (Alaska 1997); Jones v. Jennings, 788 P.2d 732, 737-38 (Alaska 1990). [36] See Valley Hosp., 948 P.2d at 969 & n. 10. [37] See 1972 Senate Journal 865 (May 5, 1972). [38] SJR 68am, 1972 Senate Journal 970-71 (May 17, 1972). [39] H.