demanding standard in Florida

2024“In determining whether a police officer possesses a reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances viewed in light of a police officer's experience and background.” State v. Lennon, 963 So. 2d 765, 768 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). “‘Reasonable suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than that for probable cause, and ‘considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by preponderance of the evidence.’” State v. Gonzalez, 682 So. 2d 1168, 1170 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).

2024We do not determine which standard applied; we address only whether law enforcement had reasonable suspicion to detain Rivera because " '[r]easonable suspicion' is a less demanding standard than that for probable cause." See Cruz v. State, 320 So. 3d 695 , 713 (Fla. 2021) (quoting State v. Gonzalez, 682 So. 2d 1168, 1170 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)). 8 In State v. Flores, 932 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006), this court addressed facts both similar and dissimilar to this case in determining that the trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress: The charges against Flores arose out of a controlled

2024“In determining whether a police officer possesses a reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances viewed in light of a police officer's experience and background.” State v. Lennon, 963 So. 2d 765, 768 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). “‘Reasonable suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than that for probable cause, and ‘considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by preponderance of the evidence.’” State v. Gonzalez, 682 So. 2d 1168, 1170 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).

2021“In determining whether a police officer possesses a reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances viewed in light of a police officer’s experience and background.” State v. Lennon, 963 So. 2d 765, 768 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). “ ‘Reasonable suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than that for probable cause, and ‘considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by preponderance of the - 23 - evidence.’ ” State v. Gonzalez, 682 So. 2d 1168, 1170 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).

2013Reasonable suspicion, a less demanding standard than probable cause, may “be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, [and] ... can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990).

2013Reasonable suspicion, a less demanding standard than probable cause, may “be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, [and] ... can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990).

2024“In determining whether a police officer possesses a reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances viewed in light of a police officer's experience and background.” State v. Lennon, 963 So. 2d 765, 768 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). “‘Reasonable suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than that for probable cause, and ‘considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by preponderance of the evidence.’” State v. Gonzalez, 682 So. 2d 1168, 1170 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).

2021“In determining whether a police officer possesses a reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances viewed in light of a police officer’s experience and background.” State v. Lennon, 963 So. 2d 765, 768 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). “ ‘Reasonable suspicion’ is a less demanding standard than that for probable cause, and ‘considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by preponderance of the - 23 - evidence.’ ” State v. Gonzalez, 682 So. 2d 1168, 1170 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).

2012See, e.g., Baptiste v. State, 995 So.2d 285, 291 (Fla.2008) (“ ‘Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.’ ”) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990)).

2011See Baptiste v. State, 995 So.2d 285, 291 (Fla.2008) ("Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause. . . ." (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990))).

2025Based upon that whole picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’” Cresswell v. State, 564 So. 2d 480, 482 (Fla 1990) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 , 417–18 (1981)). “[W]hile reasonable suspicion ‘is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.’’” Hilton, 961 So. 2d at 294 (Fla. 2007) (citing Illino

2013Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, see Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 , 120 S.Ct. 673 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000), but defining exactly what it is has proved difficult, primarily because reasonable suspicion may be the result of many different factors emanating from a vast array of cases with widely differing facts and circumstances.

2025In considering whether an officer had a reasonable suspicion, one looks to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether “the detaining officer [had] ‘a particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)).

2009Although not precisely delineated, the minimal level of justification for an investigatory stop has been described as something more than a “mere hunch.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002).

2007See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). "`Reasonable suspicion' is a less demanding standard than that for probable cause, and `considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by preponderance of the evidence.'" State v. Gonzalez, 682 So.2d 1168, 1170 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).

2007See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). "`Reasonable suspicion' is a less demanding standard than that for probable cause, and `considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by preponderance of the evidence.'" State v. Gonzalez, 682 So.2d 1168, 1170 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).

2002As Justice Souter has noted: "Despite our repeated explanation of the shorthand formulation in these words, the continued use of the term `probability' raises an unjustifiable risk of misleading courts into treating it as akin to the more demanding standard, `more likely than not.'" Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 298 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2002As Justice Souter has noted: "Despite our repeated explanation of the shorthand formulation in these words, the continued use of the term `probability' raises an unjustifiable risk of misleading courts into treating it as akin to the more demanding standard, `more likely than not.'" Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 298 , 119 S.Ct. 1936 , 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2025See United States v. Caesar, 2 F.4th 160 , 170–71 (3d Cir. 2021) (explaining how the facts in an affidavit are assessed under the less demanding standard of Leon to determine whether an officer could reasonably rely on a search warrant). 6 Johnson as he travelled back to his residence and then returned to continue his activities at the other locations shortly thereafter.

2025In describing that standard, we have said that “the petitioner must have a clear legal right to the requested relief, the respondent must have an indisputable legal duty to perform the requested action, and the petitioner must have no other adequate remedy available.” Pleus v. Crist, 14 So. 3d 941, 945 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Huffman v. State, 813 So. 2d 10, 11 (Fla. 2000)); see also State ex rel.

2025Based upon that whole picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’” Cresswell v. State, 564 So. 2d 480, 482 (Fla 1990) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 , 417–18 (1981)). “[W]hile reasonable suspicion ‘is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.’’” Hilton, 961 So. 2d at 294 (Fla. 2007) (citing Illino

2025In describing that standard, we have said that “the petitioner must have a clear legal right to the requested relief, the respondent must have an indisputable legal duty to perform the requested action, and the petitioner must have no other adequate remedy available.” Pleus v. Crist, 14 So. 3d 941, 945 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Huffman v. State, 813 So. 2d 10, 11 (Fla. 2000)); see also State ex rel.

2025Based upon that whole picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’” Cresswell v. State, 564 So. 2d 480, 482 (Fla 1990) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 , 417–18 (1981)). “[W]hile reasonable suspicion ‘is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.’’” Hilton, 961 So. 2d at 294 (Fla. 2007) (citing Illino

2025“Because it is a less demanding standard, reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause.” Glover, 589 U.S. at 380 (internal quotations omitted).

2025It “depends on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Id. (citations omitted). “[S]cientific certainty” is not required.

2022See Russell v. State, 71 So. 27 (Fla. - 19 - 1916); State ex rel.

2019"Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause in that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that -2- required to show probable cause." Carter v. State, 120 So. 3d 207, 209 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013).

2017However, the Court recognized that “the speech of lawyers representing clients in pending eases may be regulated under, a less demanding standard than that established for regulation of the press ....” Id. at 1074 , 111 S.Ct. 2720 ; see also Fla. Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. McCrary, 520 So.2d 32, 35 (Fla. 1988) (distinguishing between a. prohibition on an attorney’s comments and a prior restraint on the press).

2017See, e.g., Laycock v. TMS Logistics, Inc., 209 So.3d 627, 631 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (“[T]he Florida Supreme Court established an exacting standard for certiorari review, always requiring irreparable harm to the petitioner.”); Town of Longboat Key v. Islandside Prop.

2013Id.; State v. D.S., 685 So.2d 41, 43 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996).

2012Mere presence on the property is insufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of trespass and a reasonable suspicion of trespass must be based upon something more than “a mere hunch or guess.” Rochell v. State, 934 So.2d 586, 586 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).