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8 Hawaii opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Hawaii courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lepere v. United Public Workers, Local 646green2 sentences1999The primary purpose of Rule 11 is to “set a more demanding standard for establishing the propriety of court filings,” Lepere v. United Public Workers, Local 646, AFL-CIO, 77 Hawai'i 471, 473-74 , 887 P.2d 1029, 1031-32 (1995), and “deter baseless filings.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 , 110 S.Ct. 2447 , 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990). 1999The primary purpose of Rule 11 is to “set a more demanding standard for establishing the propriety of court filings,” Lepere v. United Public Workers, Local 646, AFL-CIO, 77 Hawai'i 471, 473-74 , 887 P.2d 1029, 1031-32 (1995), and “deter baseless filings.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 , 110 S.Ct. 2447 , 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990). | 2 | 2 |
Bostic v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.green2 sentences2026Corp., 439 S.W.3d 332, 340, 350 (Tex. 2014) (requiring reliable expert testimony that plaintiff’s exposure “more than doubled” his risk of disease, as a less demanding standard would result in “industry-wide liability” and negate plaintiff’s burden to prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence); Allison v. McGhan Med. 2026Corp., 439 S.W.3d 332, 340, 350 (Tex. 2014) (requiring reliable expert testimony that plaintiff’s exposure “more than doubled” his risk of disease, as a less demanding standard would result in “industry-wide liability” and negate plaintiff’s burden to prove causation by a preponderance of the evidence); Allison v. McGhan Med. | 1 | 1 |
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfelgreen2 sentences2008Id. at 491-93, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (emphases added). . 2008Id. at 491-93, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (emphases added). [3] Specifically, the trial court concluded with regard to the public purpose of Condemnation 2: 97. | 1 | 1 |
Marshall v. Marshallgreen2 sentences2004As the Court said, “[t]he ... serious problems of proving paternity might justify a more demanding standard for illegitimate children ... than that required either for illegitimate children claiming under their mothers’ estates or for legitimate children generally.” Id. at 770 , 97 S.Ct. 1459 ; see also id. at 771 , 97 S.Ct. 1459 (“Our previous decisions demonstrate a sensitivity to the lurking problems with respect to proof of paternity .... ”); id. at 773 , 97 S.Ct. 1459 (“Evidence of paternity may take a variety of forms, some creating more significant problems of inaccuracy and inefficienc 2004As the Court said, "[t]he ... serious problems of proving paternity might justify a more demanding standard for illegitimate children ... than that required either for illegitimate children claiming under their mothers' estates or for legitimate children generally." Id. at 770 , 97 S.Ct. 1459 ; see also id. at 771 , 97 S.Ct. 1459 ("Our previous decisions demonstrate a sensitivity to the lurking problems with respect to proof of paternity...."); id. at 773 , 97 S.Ct. 1459 ("Evidence of paternity may take a variety of forms, some creating more significant problems of inaccuracy and inefficiency | 1 | 1 |
Buck v. Milesgreen2 sentences2004See also Buck, 89 Hawai'i at 250 , 971 P.2d at 723 (“The primary purpose of Rule 11 is to ‘set a more demanding standard for establishing the propriety of court filings [.] ” (Quoting Lepere v. United Pub. 2004See also Buck, 89 Hawai'i at 250 , 971 P.2d at 723 (“The primary purpose of Rule 11 is to ‘set a more demanding standard for establishing the propriety of court filings [.] ” (Quoting Lepere v. United Pub. | 1 | 1 |
Petersen Ex Rel. Petersen v. City & County of Honolulugreen2 sentences2004“Thus, in the proper case we have both the power and the duty to order a new trial either where the evidence is insufficient to support a verdict or where a verdict is clearly against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Petersen v. City and County of Honolulu, 53 Haw. 440, 442 , 496 P.2d 4, 7 (1972). [A]lthough Hawaii courts have not expressly defined the term . “manifest weight,” it appeal’s to be a demanding standard ... premised upon the weight of the evidence: A ... court may set aside a jury verdict when it appears to be so manifestly against the weight of the evidence as to indicate bi 2004“Thus, in the proper case we have both the power and the duty to order a new trial either where the evidence is insufficient to support a verdict or where a verdict is clearly against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Petersen v. City and County of Honolulu, 53 Haw. 440, 442 , 496 P.2d 4, 7 (1972). [A]lthough Hawaii courts have not expressly defined the term . “manifest weight,” it appeal’s to be a demanding standard ... premised upon the weight of the evidence: A ... court may set aside a jury verdict when it appears to be so manifestly against the weight of the evidence as to indicate bi | 1 | 1 |
Pinckney v. Warrengreen2 sentences2004Furthermore, its requirements provide "a more demanding standard," in the area of proof of paternity, as the Court advised in Trimble, 430 U.S. at 770 , 97 S.Ct. 1459 ; see also Pinckney v. Warren, 344 S.C. 382 , 544 S.E.2d 620, 626 (2001) (discussing the development of the Mitchell standard, and explaining that its strict requirements "promote stability and prevent both fraudulent challenges to, and fraudulent assertions of, paternity"). 2004Furthermore, its requirements provide "a more demanding standard," in the area of proof of paternity, as the Court advised in Trimble, 430 U.S. at 770 , 97 S.Ct. 1459 ; see also Pinckney v. Warren, 344 S.C. 382 , 544 S.E.2d 620, 626 (2001) (discussing the development of the Mitchell standard, and explaining that its strict requirements "promote stability and prevent both fraudulent challenges to, and fraudulent assertions of, paternity"). | 1 | 1 |
Trimble v. Gordongreen2 sentences2004Although an absolute bar was inappropriate, "[t]he more serious problems of proving paternity might justify a more demanding standard for illegitimate children claiming under their fathers' estates than that required either for illegitimate children claiming under their mothers' estates or for legitimate children generally." Id. at 770 , 97 S.Ct. 1459 (emphasis added). 2004Although an absolute bar was inappropriate, "[t]he more serious problems of proving paternity might justify a more demanding standard for illegitimate children claiming under their fathers' estates than that required either for illegitimate children claiming under their mothers' estates or for legitimate children generally." Id. at 770 , 97 S.Ct. 1459 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Legault v. Zambaranogreen1 sentence2004Workers, Local 646, 77 Hawai'i 471, 474 , 887 P.2d 1029, 1032 (1995).) (Emphasis added.)); Legault v. Zambarano, 105 F.3d 24, 27-28 (1st Cir.1997) (holding that a letter to an opposing party was a “paper” for purposes of FRCP Rule 11 where the attorney writing the letter sent a copy to the presiding judge in the case). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Baffordgreen1 sentence1995Cf. Adams, 76 Hawai'i at 414-15 , 879 P.2d at 519-20 (applying a more demanding standard of “manifest injustice” to Adams’s postsen-tence motion to withdraw his no contest plea because the prosecutor breached the plea agreement). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Miller v. Pfizer, Inc.green2 sentences2026Corp., 184 F.3d 1300 , 1315 n.16 (11th Cir. 1999) (applying Georgia law) (breast-implant case; relative risk of 2.0 is the threshold for an inference of specific causation; relative risk of 1.24 is insufficient); but see In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying New York law) (holding that plaintiff could provide sufficient evidence of causation without proving a doubling in the incidence of disease); Miller v. Pfizer, Inc., 196 F.Supp.2d 1062, 1079 (D. 2026Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1315 n.16 (11th Cir. 1999) (applying Georgia law) (breast-implant case; relative risk of 2.0 is the threshold for an inference of specific causation; relative risk of 1.24 is insufficient); but see In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying New York law) (holding that plaintiff could provide sufficient evidence of causation without proving a doubling in the incidence of disease); Miller v. Pfizer, Inc., 196 F.Supp.2d 1062, 1079 (D. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Joint Eastern & Southern District Asbestos Litigation.green2 sentences2026Corp., 184 F.3d 1300 , 1315 n.16 (11th Cir. 1999) (applying Georgia law) (breast-implant case; relative risk of 2.0 is the threshold for an inference of specific causation; relative risk of 1.24 is insufficient); but see In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying New York law) (holding that plaintiff could provide sufficient evidence of causation without proving a doubling in the incidence of disease); Miller v. Pfizer, Inc., 196 F.Supp.2d 1062, 1079 (D. 2026Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1315 n.16 (11th Cir. 1999) (applying Georgia law) (breast-implant case; relative risk of 2.0 is the threshold for an inference of specific causation; relative risk of 1.24 is insufficient); but see In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying New York law) (holding that plaintiff could provide sufficient evidence of causation without proving a doubling in the incidence of disease); Miller v. Pfizer, Inc., 196 F.Supp.2d 1062, 1079 (D. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Allison v. McGhan Medical Corp.
green
2 sentences2026Corp., 184 F.3d 1300 , 1315 n.16 (11th Cir. 1999) (applying Georgia law) (breast-implant case; relative risk of 2.0 is the threshold for an inference of specific causation; relative risk of 1.24 is insufficient); but see In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying New York law) (holding that plaintiff could provide sufficient evidence of causation without proving a doubling in the incidence of disease); Miller v. Pfizer, Inc., 196 F.Supp.2d 1062, 1079 (D. 2026Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1315 n.16 (11th Cir. 1999) (applying Georgia law) (breast-implant case; relative risk of 2.0 is the threshold for an inference of specific causation; relative risk of 1.24 is insufficient); but see In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying New York law) (holding that plaintiff could provide sufficient evidence of causation without proving a doubling in the incidence of disease); Miller v. Pfizer, Inc., 196 F.Supp.2d 1062, 1079 (D. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Kelo v. City of New London
green
2 sentences2008In fact, neither did Kennedy, who specifically stated that “[t]his is not the occasion for conjecture as to what sort of cases might justify a more demanding standard,” id., concluding that “no departure from Berman and Midkiff is appropriate here.” Id.; see also supra note 2. 2008In fact, neither did Kennedy, who specifically stated that "[t]his is not the occasion for conjecture as to what sort of cases might justify a more demanding standard," id., concluding that "no departure from Berman and Midkiff is appropriate here." Id.; see also supra note 2. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Troxel v. Granville
green
2 sentences2007Hence, Justice Souter stated that he would affirm the Washington Supreme Court’s judgment because he did “not question the power of a State’s highest court to construe its domestic statute and to apply a demanding standard when ruling on its facial constitutionality....” Id. at 79 , 120 S.Ct. 2054 (footnote omitted). c. 2007Hence, Justice Souter stated that he would affirm the Washington Supreme Court’s judgment because he did “not question the power of a State’s highest court to construe its domestic statute and to apply a demanding standard when ruling on its facial constitutionality....” Id. at 79 , 120 S.Ct. 2054 (footnote omitted). c. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Reed v. Campbell
green
2 sentences2004As the Court said, "[t]he ... serious problems of proving paternity might justify a more demanding standard for illegitimate children ... than that required either for illegitimate children claiming under their mothers' estates or for legitimate children generally." Id. at 770 , 97 S.Ct. 1459 ; see also id. at 771 , 97 S.Ct. 1459 ("Our previous decisions demonstrate a sensitivity to the lurking problems with respect to proof of paternity...."); id. at 773 , 97 S.Ct. 1459 ("Evidence of paternity may take a variety of forms, some creating more significant problems of inaccuracy and inefficiency 2004As the Court said, "[t]he ... serious problems of proving paternity might justify a more demanding standard for illegitimate children ... than that required either for illegitimate children claiming under their mothers' estates or for legitimate children generally." Id. at 770 , 97 S.Ct. 1459 ; see also id. at 771 , 97 S.Ct. 1459 ("Our previous decisions demonstrate a sensitivity to the lurking problems with respect to proof of paternity...."); id. at 773 , 97 S.Ct. 1459 ("Evidence of paternity may take a variety of forms, some creating more significant problems of inaccuracy and inefficiency | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.
yellow
2 sentences1999The primary purpose of Rule 11 is to “set a more demanding standard for establishing the propriety of court filings,” Lepere v. United Public Workers, Local 646, AFL-CIO, 77 Hawai'i 471, 473-74 , 887 P.2d 1029, 1031-32 (1995), and “deter baseless filings.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 , 110 S.Ct. 2447 , 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990). 1999The primary purpose of Rule 11 is to “set a more demanding standard for establishing the propriety of court filings,” Lepere v. United Public Workers, Local 646, AFL-CIO, 77 Hawai'i 471, 473-74 , 887 P.2d 1029, 1031-32 (1995), and “deter baseless filings.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 , 110 S.Ct. 2447 , 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Adams
green
1 sentence1995Cf. Adams, 76 Hawai'i at 414-15 , 879 P.2d at 519-20 (applying a more demanding standard of “manifest injustice” to Adams’s postsen-tence motion to withdraw his no contest plea because the prosecutor breached the plea agreement). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.