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43 North Carolina opinions name it 3 courts 1993–2026 14 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Stylesgreen2 sentences2026See State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 414 , 665 S.E.2d 438, 440 (2008) (“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause[.]” (citation and quotation marks omitted)); State v. Carrouthers, 200 N.C. App. 415, 418-19 , 683 S.E.2d 781, 784 (2009) (noting reasonable, articulable suspicion is the standard for an investigatory stop). 2026See State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 414 , 665 S.E.2d 438, 440 (2008) (“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause[.]” (citation and quotation marks omitted)); State v. Carrouthers, 200 N.C. App. 415, 418-19 , 683 S.E.2d 781, 784 (2009) (noting reasonable, articulable suspicion is the standard for an investigatory stop). | 11 | 13 |
Illinois v. Wardlowgreen2 sentences2024See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 , 135 S. Ct. 1609 ; see also State v. Bullock, 370 N.C. 256, 258 , 805 S.E.2d 671, 674 (2017) (“The reasonable suspicion standard is - 10 - “a less demanding standard than probable cause” and a “considerably less [demanding standard] than preponderance of the evidence.” (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 , 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000)). 2024See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 , 135 S. Ct. 1609 ; see also State v. Bullock, 370 N.C. 256, 258 , 805 S.E.2d 671, 674 (2017) (“The reasonable suspicion standard is - 10 - “a less demanding standard than probable cause” and a “considerably less [demanding standard] than preponderance of the evidence.” (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 , 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000)). | 8 | 10 |
State v. Barnardgreen2 sentences2021Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, “an officer may . . . conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 , 145 L. Ed. 2d 570, 576 (2000); see also State v. McClendon, 350 N.C. 630, 636 , 517 S.E.2d 128, 132 (1999). ¶ 15 “Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 247 , 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 (marks omitted), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 914 , 172 L. 2021Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, “an officer may . . . conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 , 145 L. Ed. 2d 570, 576 (2000); see also State v. McClendon, 350 N.C. 630, 636 , 517 S.E.2d 128, 132 (1999). ¶ 15 “Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 247 , 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 (marks omitted), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 914 , 172 L. | 6 | 10 |
United States v. Sokolowgreen2 sentences2010Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 247 , 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 264 , 172 L.Ed.2d 198 (2008), and only requires a "minimal level of objective justification, something more than an `unparticularized suspicion or hunch[,]'" State v. Steen, 352 N.C. 227, 239 , 536 S.E.2d 1, 8 (2000) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1, 10 (1989)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1167 , 121 S.Ct. 1131 , 148 L.Ed.2d 997 (2001). 2010Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 247 , 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 264 , 172 L.Ed.2d 198 (2008), and only requires a "minimal level of objective justification, something more than an `unparticularized suspicion or hunch[,]'" State v. Steen, 352 N.C. 227, 239 , 536 S.E.2d 1, 8 (2000) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1, 10 (1989)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1167 , 121 S.Ct. 1131 , 148 L.Ed.2d 997 (2001). | 5 | 6 |
United States v. Sharpegreen2 sentences2022United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 , 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985). considerably less demanding standard than preponderance of the evidence. 2022United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 , 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985). considerably less demanding standard than preponderance of the evidence. | 3 | 3 |
State v. Steengreen2 sentences2010Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 247 , 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 264 , 172 L.Ed.2d 198 (2008), and only requires a "minimal level of objective justification, something more than an `unparticularized suspicion or hunch[,]'" State v. Steen, 352 N.C. 227, 239 , 536 S.E.2d 1, 8 (2000) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1, 10 (1989)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1167 , 121 S.Ct. 1131 , 148 L.Ed.2d 997 (2001). 2010Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 247 , 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 264 , 172 L.Ed.2d 198 (2008), and only requires a "minimal level of objective justification, something more than an `unparticularized suspicion or hunch[,]'" State v. Steen, 352 N.C. 227, 239 , 536 S.E.2d 1, 8 (2000) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1, 10 (1989)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1167 , 121 S.Ct. 1131 , 148 L.Ed.2d 997 (2001). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Bullockgreen2 sentences2024See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 , 135 S. Ct. 1609 ; see also State v. Bullock, 370 N.C. 256, 258 , 805 S.E.2d 671, 674 (2017) (“The reasonable suspicion standard is - 10 - “a less demanding standard than probable cause” and a “considerably less [demanding standard] than preponderance of the evidence.” (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 , 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000)). 2024See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 , 135 S. Ct. 1609 ; see also State v. Bullock, 370 N.C. 256, 258 , 805 S.E.2d 671, 674 (2017) (“The reasonable suspicion standard is - 10 - “a less demanding standard than probable cause” and a “considerably less [demanding standard] than preponderance of the evidence.” (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 , 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000)). | 2 | 4 |
Alabama v. Whitegreen2 sentences2009In Hughes , the Court held that the anonymous informant’s tip failed to provide reasonable suspicion — “a less demanding standard than probable cause.” White, 496 U.S. at 330 , 110 L. 2009In Hughes , the Court held that the anonymous informant’s tip failed to provide reasonable suspicion — “a less demanding standard than probable cause.” White, 496 U.S. at 330 , 110 L. | 2 | 4 |
State v. McClendongreen2 sentences2021Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, “an officer may . . . conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 , 145 L. Ed. 2d 570, 576 (2000); see also State v. McClendon, 350 N.C. 630, 636 , 517 S.E.2d 128, 132 (1999). ¶ 15 “Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 247 , 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 (marks omitted), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 914 , 172 L. 2021Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, “an officer may . . . conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 , 145 L. Ed. 2d 570, 576 (2000); see also State v. McClendon, 350 N.C. 630, 636 , 517 S.E.2d 128, 132 (1999). ¶ 15 “Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 247 , 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 (marks omitted), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 914 , 172 L. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Carrouthersgreen2 sentences2026See State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 414 , 665 S.E.2d 438, 440 (2008) (“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause[.]” (citation and quotation marks omitted)); State v. Carrouthers, 200 N.C. App. 415, 418-19 , 683 S.E.2d 781, 784 (2009) (noting reasonable, articulable suspicion is the standard for an investigatory stop). 2026See State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 414 , 665 S.E.2d 438, 440 (2008) (“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause[.]” (citation and quotation marks omitted)); State v. Carrouthers, 200 N.C. App. 415, 418-19 , 683 S.E.2d 781, 784 (2009) (noting reasonable, articulable suspicion is the standard for an investigatory stop). | 1 | 1 |
Rodriguez v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2024See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 , 135 S. Ct. 1609 ; see also State v. Bullock, 370 N.C. 256, 258 , 805 S.E.2d 671, 674 (2017) (“The reasonable suspicion standard is - 10 - “a less demanding standard than probable cause” and a “considerably less [demanding standard] than preponderance of the evidence.” (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 , 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000)). 2024See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 , 135 S. Ct. 1609 ; see also State v. Bullock, 370 N.C. 256, 258 , 805 S.E.2d 671, 674 (2017) (“The reasonable suspicion standard is - 10 - “a less demanding standard than probable cause” and a “considerably less [demanding standard] than preponderance of the evidence.” (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 , 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000)). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Arvizured2 sentences2024Extension of the stop must be supported by reasonable suspicion, a determination which “need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 , 122 S. Ct. 744, 753 (2002). 2024Extension of the stop must be supported by reasonable suspicion, a determination which “need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 , 122 S. Ct. 744, 753 (2002). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Minorgreen2 sentences2019Although originally applied to searches of a suspect’s person, the second prong of the Terry analysis has been extended to encompass brief and limited searches of a vehicle, “even after the subject is removed from the vehicle.” State v. Minor, 132 N.C. App. 478, 481 , 512 S.E.2d 483, 485 (1999). 2019Although originally applied to searches of a suspect’s person, the second prong of the Terry analysis has been extended to encompass brief and limited searches of a vehicle, “even after the subject is removed from the vehicle.” State v. Minor, 132 N.C. App. 478, 481 , 512 S.E.2d 483, 485 (1999). | 1 | 1 |
Highland Paving Co. v. First Bankgreen2 sentences2019App. 36, 42 , 742 S.E.2d 287, 292 (2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 2019Notwithstanding this demanding standard, “[d]etermining whether a fiduciary relationship exists requires looking at the particular facts and circumstances of a given case.” Highland Paving Co. v. First Bank, 227 N.C. | 1 | 1 |
Brown ex rel. Estate of Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp. ex rel. Martin-Marietta Corp.green1 sentence2017See Brown, 814 F.3d at 628−29 (concluding that defendant’s contacts with the forum state did not render it essentially at home there where defendant leased the same building in the state for over fifteen years and ran operations at three other leased locations in the state); Cutcher v. Midland Funding, LLC, No. ELH-13-3733, 2014 U.S. Dist. | 1 | 1 |
Carl Summers v. Altarum Institute, Corporationgreen1 sentence2016See also Summers, 740 F.3d at 332 (stating that torn tendons are impairments to the musculoskeletal system); Moore v. Jackson Cnty. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Browngreen1 sentence2012State v. Brown, ____ N.C.App. ____, ____, 713 S.E.2d 246, 248 (2011) (citations, quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets omitted). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Cortezgreen2 sentences2010"A court must consider `the totality of the circumstances— the whole picture' in determining whether a reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop exists." Watkins, 337 N.C. at 441 , 446 S.E.2d at 70 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690, 695 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 629 (1981)). 2010"A court must consider `the totality of the circumstances— the whole picture' in determining whether a reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop exists." Watkins, 337 N.C. at 441 , 446 S.E.2d at 70 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690, 695 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 629 (1981)). | 1 | 1 |
Garrison v. Department of Justicegreen2 sentences2002See Garrison v. Department of Justice, 72 F.3d 1566, 1569 (Fed.Cir.1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 948 , 117 S.Ct. 358 , 136 L.Ed.2d 250 (1996). 2002See Garrison v. Department of Justice, 72 F.3d 1566, 1569 (Fed.Cir.1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 948 , 117 S.Ct. 358 , 136 L.Ed.2d 250 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
| Kansas Public Employees Retirement System v. Reimer & Koger Associates, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Daryel Garrison v. Department of Justicegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Terry v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2022In order to meet this standard, an officer simply must “reasonably . . . conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” Bullock, 370 N.C. at 258 , 805 S.E.2d at 674 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 , 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)). 2022In order to meet this standard, an officer simply must “reasonably . . . conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” Bullock, 370 N.C. at 258 , 805 S.E.2d at 674 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 , 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)). | 3 | 2017–2022 |
United States v. Branch
green
2 sentences2022“This requires either the driver’s consent or a reasonable suspicion that illegal activity is afoot.” Id. ¶ 17 The reasonable suspicion standard is “a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 414 , 665 S.E.2d 438, 439 (2008) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 , 145 L. Ed. 2d 570, 567 (2000)). 2022“This requires either the driver’s consent or a reasonable suspicion that illegal activity is afoot.” Id. ¶ 17 The reasonable suspicion standard is “a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 414 , 665 S.E.2d 438, 439 (2008) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 , 145 L. Ed. 2d 570, 567 (2000)). | 2 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Watkins
green
2 sentences2016Investigatory traffic stops "must be based on specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his experience and training." State v. Watkins , 337 N.C. 437 , 441, 446 S.E.2d 67 , 70 (1994). 2016Investigatory traffic stops "must be based on specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his experience and training." State v. Watkins , 337 N.C. 437 , 441, 446 S.E.2d 67 , 70 (1994). | 2 | 2010–2016 |
State v. Salinas
green
2 sentences2018Only some minimal level of objective justification is required." State v. Salinas , 214 N.C. App. 408 , 409, 715 S.E.2d 262 , 264 (2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 2018Only some minimal level of objective justification is required." State v. Salinas , 214 N.C. App. 408 , 409, 715 S.E.2d 262 , 264 (2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc.
green
1 sentence2018Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331 , 348 (4th Cir. 1998)). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Ivey
yellow
2 sentences2015Defendant relies upon Styles , State v. Ivey, 360 N.C. 562 , 633 S.E.2d 459 (2006), and State v. McRae, 203 N.C.App. 319 , 691 S.E.2d 56 (2010), to support his argument that Officer Newman lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop. 2015Defendant relies upon Styles , State v. Ivey, 360 N.C. 562 , 633 S.E.2d 459 (2006), and State v. McRae, 203 N.C.App. 319 , 691 S.E.2d 56 (2010), to support his argument that Officer Newman lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. McRae
green
2 sentences2015Defendant relies upon Styles , State v. Ivey, 360 N.C. 562 , 633 S.E.2d 459 (2006), and State v. McRae, 203 N.C.App. 319 , 691 S.E.2d 56 (2010), to support his argument that Officer Newman lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop. 2015Defendant relies upon Styles , State v. Ivey, 360 N.C. 562 , 633 S.E.2d 459 (2006), and State v. McRae, 203 N.C.App. 319 , 691 S.E.2d 56 (2010), to support his argument that Officer Newman lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Griffin
green
2 sentences2015"Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence." State v. Griffin, 366 N.C. 473 , 475-76, 749 S.E.2d 444 , 446 (2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 2015"Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence." State v. Griffin, 366 N.C. 473 , 475-76, 749 S.E.2d 444 , 446 (2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Service Consultants, Inc.
green
1 sentence2011ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv., Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707 , 712 (4th Cir. 2002). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Steen v. North Carolina
green
2 sentences2010Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 247 , 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 264 , 172 L.Ed.2d 198 (2008), and only requires a "minimal level of objective justification, something more than an `unparticularized suspicion or hunch[,]'" State v. Steen, 352 N.C. 227, 239 , 536 S.E.2d 1, 8 (2000) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1, 10 (1989)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1167 , 121 S.Ct. 1131 , 148 L.Ed.2d 997 (2001). 2010Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 247 , 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 264 , 172 L.Ed.2d 198 (2008), and only requires a "minimal level of objective justification, something more than an `unparticularized suspicion or hunch[,]'" State v. Steen, 352 N.C. 227, 239 , 536 S.E.2d 1, 8 (2000) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1, 10 (1989)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1167 , 121 S.Ct. 1131 , 148 L.Ed.2d 997 (2001). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Hughes
green
2 sentences2009In Hughes , the Court held that the anonymous informant's tip failed to provide reasonable suspicion — "a less demanding standard than probable cause." White, 496 U.S. at 330 , 110 S.Ct. at 2416 , 110 L.Ed.2d at 309 ; Hughes, 353 N.C. at 209 , 539 S.E.2d at 632 . 2009In Hughes , the Court held that the anonymous informant's tip failed to provide reasonable suspicion — "a less demanding standard than probable cause." White, 496 U.S. at 330 , 110 S.Ct. at 2416 , 110 L.Ed.2d at 309 ; Hughes, 353 N.C. at 209 , 539 S.E.2d at 632 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Reid green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Thompson v. North Carolina green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| State v. Thompson green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.