demanding standard in North Carolina

43 North Carolina opinions name it 3 courts 1993–2026 14 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (21)

Case	Followed	Cited
State v. Stylesgreen nc · 2008 · cited in 13 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2010–2026 2 sentences 2026See State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 414 , 665 S.E.2d 438, 440 (2008) (“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause[.]” (citation and quotation marks omitted)); State v. Carrouthers, 200 N.C. 2026See State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 414 , 665 S.E.2d 438, 440 (2008) (“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause[.]” (citation and quotation marks omitted)); State v. Carrouthers, 200 N.C.	11	13
State v. Barnardgreen nc · 2008 · cited in 10 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2009–2026 2 sentences 2021Ed. 2d 570, 576 (2000); see also State v. McClendon, 350 N.C. 630, 636 , 517 S.E.2d 128, 132 (1999). ¶ 15 “Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 247 , 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 (marks omitted), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 914 , 172 L. 2021Ed. 2d 570, 576 (2000); see also State v. McClendon, 350 N.C. 630, 636 , 517 S.E.2d 128, 132 (1999). ¶ 15 “Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 247 , 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 (marks omitted), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 914 , 172 L.	6	10
Illinois v. Wardlowgreen scotus · 2000 · cited in 8 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2009–2024 2 sentences 2024GEORGE Opinion of the Court “a less demanding standard than probable cause” and a “considerably less [demanding standard] than preponderance of the evidence.” (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 , 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000)). 2024GEORGE Opinion of the Court “a less demanding standard than probable cause” and a “considerably less [demanding standard] than preponderance of the evidence.” (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 , 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000)).	5	8
United States v. Sokolowgreen scotus · 1989 · cited in 6 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2010–2026 2 sentences 2010Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 247 , 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 264 , 172 L.Ed.2d 198 (2008), and only requires a "minimal level of objective justification, something more than an `unparticularized suspicion or hunch[,]'" State v. Steen, 352 N.C. 227, 239 , 536 S.E.2d 1, 8 (2000) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1, 10 (1989)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1167 , 121 S.Ct. 1131 , 148 L.Ed.2d 997 (2001). 2010Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 247 , 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 264 , 172 L.Ed.2d 198 (2008), and only requires a "minimal level of objective justification, something more than an `unparticularized suspicion or hunch[,]'" State v. Steen, 352 N.C. 227, 239 , 536 S.E.2d 1, 8 (2000) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1, 10 (1989)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1167 , 121 S.Ct. 1131 , 148 L.Ed.2d 997 (2001).	5	6
United States v. Sharpegreen scotus · 1985 · cited in 3 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022 2 sentences 2022United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 , 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985). 2022United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 , 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985).	3	3
State v. Steengreen nc · 2000 · cited in 3 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010 2 sentences 2010Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 247 , 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 264 , 172 L.Ed.2d 198 (2008), and only requires a "minimal level of objective justification, something more than an `unparticularized suspicion or hunch[,]'" State v. Steen, 352 N.C. 227, 239 , 536 S.E.2d 1, 8 (2000) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1, 10 (1989)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1167 , 121 S.Ct. 1131 , 148 L.Ed.2d 997 (2001). 2010Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 247 , 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 264 , 172 L.Ed.2d 198 (2008), and only requires a "minimal level of objective justification, something more than an `unparticularized suspicion or hunch[,]'" State v. Steen, 352 N.C. 227, 239 , 536 S.E.2d 1, 8 (2000) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1, 10 (1989)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1167 , 121 S.Ct. 1131 , 148 L.Ed.2d 997 (2001).	3	3
Alabama v. Whitegreen scotus · 1990 · cited in 4 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 1993–2009 2 sentences 2009In Hughes , the Court held that the anonymous informant’s tip failed to provide reasonable suspicion — “a less demanding standard than probable cause.” White, 496 U.S. at 330 , 110 L. 2009In Hughes , the Court held that the anonymous informant’s tip failed to provide reasonable suspicion — “a less demanding standard than probable cause.” White, 496 U.S. at 330 , 110 L.	2	4
State v. Bullockgreen nc · 2017 · cited in 2 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2023–2024 2 sentences 2023“The reasonable suspicion standard is a less demanding standard than probable cause and a considerably less [demanding standard] than preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Bullock, 370 N.C. 256, 258 , 805 S.E.2d 671, 674 (2017) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 19, 123 , 145 L. 2023“The reasonable suspicion standard is a less demanding standard than probable cause and a considerably less [demanding standard] than preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Bullock, 370 N.C. 256, 258 , 805 S.E.2d 671, 674 (2017) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 19, 123 , 145 L.	2	2
State v. McClendongreen nc · 1999 · cited in 2 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021 2 sentences 2021Ed. 2d 570, 576 (2000); see also State v. McClendon, 350 N.C. 630, 636 , 517 S.E.2d 128, 132 (1999). ¶ 15 “Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 247 , 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 (marks omitted), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 914 , 172 L. 2021Ed. 2d 570, 576 (2000); see also State v. McClendon, 350 N.C. 630, 636 , 517 S.E.2d 128, 132 (1999). ¶ 15 “Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 247 , 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 (marks omitted), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 914 , 172 L.	2	2
State v. Carrouthersgreen ncctapp · 2009 · cited in 1 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026 2 sentences 2026See State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 414 , 665 S.E.2d 438, 440 (2008) (“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause[.]” (citation and quotation marks omitted)); State v. Carrouthers, 200 N.C. 2026App. 415, 418-19 , 683 S.E.2d 781, 784 (2009) (noting reasonable, articulable suspicion is the standard for an investigatory stop).	1	1
United States v. Arvizugreen scotus · 2002 · cited in 1 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024 2 sentences 2024Extension of the stop must be supported by reasonable suspicion, a determination which “need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 , 122 S. Ct. 744, 753 (2002). 2024Extension of the stop must be supported by reasonable suspicion, a determination which “need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 , 122 S. Ct. 744, 753 (2002).	1	1
Rodriguez v. United Statesgreen scotus · 2015 · cited in 1 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024 2 sentences 2024See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 , 135 S. Ct. 1609 ; see also State v. Bullock, 370 N.C. 256, 258 , 805 S.E.2d 671, 674 (2017) (“The reasonable suspicion standard is - 10 - STATE V. 2024See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 , 135 S. Ct. 1609 ; see also State v. Bullock, 370 N.C. 256, 258 , 805 S.E.2d 671, 674 (2017) (“The reasonable suspicion standard is - 10 - STATE V.	1	1
Highland Paving Co. v. First Bankgreen ncctapp · 2013 · cited in 1 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019 2 sentences 2019Notwithstanding this demanding standard, “[d]etermining whether a fiduciary relationship exists requires looking at the particular facts and circumstances of a given case.” Highland Paving Co. v. First Bank, 227 N.C. 2019App. 36, 42 , 742 S.E.2d 287, 292 (2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted).	1	1
Brown ex rel. Estate of Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp. ex rel. Martin-Marietta Corp.green ca2 · 2016 · cited in 1 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017 1 sentence 2017See Brown, 814 F.3d at 628−29 (concluding that defendant’s contacts with the forum state did not render it essentially at home there where defendant leased the same building in the state for over fifteen years and ran operations at three other leased locations in the state); Cutcher v. Midland Funding, LLC, No. ELH-13-3733, 2014 U.S. Dist.	1	1
Carl Summers v. Altarum Institute, Corporationgreen ca4 · 2014 · cited in 1 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016 1 sentence 2016See also Summers, 740 F.3d at 332 (stating that torn tendons are impairments to the musculoskeletal system); Moore v. Jackson Cnty.	1	1
State v. Browngreen ncctapp · 2011 · cited in 1 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012 1 sentence 2012State v. Brown, ____ N.C.App. ____, ____, 713 S.E.2d 246, 248 (2011) (citations, quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets omitted).	1	1
United States v. Cortezgreen scotus · 1981 · cited in 1 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010 2 sentences 2010"A court must consider `the totality of the circumstances the whole picture' in determining whether a reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop exists." Watkins, 337 N.C. at 441 , 446 S.E.2d at 70 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690, 695 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 629 (1981)). 2010"A court must consider `the totality of the circumstances the whole picture' in determining whether a reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop exists." Watkins, 337 N.C. at 441 , 446 S.E.2d at 70 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690, 695 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621, 629 (1981)).	1	1
Daryel Garrison v. Department of Justicegreen cafc · 1996 · cited in 1 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002	1	1
Schledwitz v. United Statesgreen scotus · 1996 · cited in 1 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002	1	1
Hascall v. United Statesgreen scotus · 1996 · cited in 1 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002	1	1
Kansas Public Employees Retirement System v. Reimer & Koger Associates, Inc.green scotus · 1996 · cited in 1 North Carolina opinions naming this issue, 2002–2002	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (16)

Case	Cited	Years
United States v. Branch green ca4 · 2008 2 sentences 2022“This requires either the driver’s consent or a reasonable suspicion that illegal activity is afoot.” Id. ¶ 17 The reasonable suspicion standard is “a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 414 , 665 S.E.2d 438, 439 (2008) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 , 145 L. 2022“This requires either the driver’s consent or a reasonable suspicion that illegal activity is afoot.” Id. ¶ 17 The reasonable suspicion standard is “a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 414 , 665 S.E.2d 438, 439 (2008) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 , 145 L.	2	2022–2022
State v. Watkins green nc · 1994 2 sentences 2016Investigatory traffic stops "must be based on specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his experience and training." State v. Watkins , 337 N.C. 437 , 441, 446 S.E.2d 67 , 70 (1994). 2016Investigatory traffic stops "must be based on specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his experience and training." State v. Watkins , 337 N.C. 437 , 441, 446 S.E.2d 67 , 70 (1994).	2	2010–2016
cluster 757756 green ca4 · 1998 1 sentence 2018Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331 , 348 (4th Cir. 1998)).	1	2018–2018
State v. Salinas green ncctapp · 2011 1 sentence 2018Only some minimal level of objective justification is required." State v. Salinas , 214 N.C.	1	2018–2018
Terry v. Ohio green scotus · 1968 2 sentences 2017In order to meet this standard, an officer simply must "reasonably ... conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot." Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). 2017In order to meet this standard, an officer simply must "reasonably ... conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot." Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 , 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).	1	2017–2017
State v. Ivey green nc · 2006 2 sentences 2015Defendant relies upon Styles , State v. Ivey, 360 N.C. 562 , 633 S.E.2d 459 (2006), and State v. McRae, 203 N.C.App. 319 , 691 S.E.2d 56 (2010), to support his argument that Officer Newman lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop. 2015Defendant relies upon Styles , State v. Ivey, 360 N.C. 562 , 633 S.E.2d 459 (2006), and State v. McRae, 203 N.C.App. 319 , 691 S.E.2d 56 (2010), to support his argument that Officer Newman lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop.	1	2015–2015
State v. McRae green ncctapp · 2010 2 sentences 2015Defendant relies upon Styles , State v. Ivey, 360 N.C. 562 , 633 S.E.2d 459 (2006), and State v. McRae, 203 N.C.App. 319 , 691 S.E.2d 56 (2010), to support his argument that Officer Newman lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop. 2015Defendant relies upon Styles , State v. Ivey, 360 N.C. 562 , 633 S.E.2d 459 (2006), and State v. McRae, 203 N.C.App. 319 , 691 S.E.2d 56 (2010), to support his argument that Officer Newman lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop.	1	2015–2015
State v. Griffin green nc · 2013 2 sentences 2015"Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence." State v. Griffin, 366 N.C. 473 , 475-76, 749 S.E.2d 444 , 446 (2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 2015"Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence." State v. Griffin, 366 N.C. 473 , 475-76, 749 S.E.2d 444 , 446 (2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted).	1	2015–2015
Als Scan, Incorporated v. Digital Service Consultants, Incorporated green ca4 · 2002 1 sentence 2011ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv., Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707 , 712 (4th Cir. 2002).	1	2011–2011
Slater v. General Services Administration neutral scotus · 2001 1 sentence 2010Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 247 , 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 264 , 172 L.Ed.2d 198 (2008), and only requires a "minimal level of objective justification, something more than an `unparticularized suspicion or hunch[,]'" State v. Steen, 352 N.C. 227, 239 , 536 S.E.2d 1, 8 (2000) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1, 10 (1989)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1167 , 121 S.Ct. 1131 , 148 L.Ed.2d 997 (2001).	1	2010–2010
Clark v. Johnson green scotus · 2001 1 sentence 2010Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 247 , 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 264 , 172 L.Ed.2d 198 (2008), and only requires a "minimal level of objective justification, something more than an `unparticularized suspicion or hunch[,]'" State v. Steen, 352 N.C. 227, 239 , 536 S.E.2d 1, 8 (2000) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1, 10 (1989)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1167 , 121 S.Ct. 1131 , 148 L.Ed.2d 997 (2001).	1	2010–2010
Steen v. North Carolina green scotus · 2001 1 sentence 2010Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 247 , 658 S.E.2d 643, 645 , cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 264 , 172 L.Ed.2d 198 (2008), and only requires a "minimal level of objective justification, something more than an `unparticularized suspicion or hunch[,]'" State v. Steen, 352 N.C. 227, 239 , 536 S.E.2d 1, 8 (2000) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1, 10 (1989)), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1167 , 121 S.Ct. 1131 , 148 L.Ed.2d 997 (2001).	1	2010–2010
State v. Hughes green nc · 2000 2 sentences 2009In Hughes , the Court held that the anonymous informant's tip failed to provide reasonable suspicion "a less demanding standard than probable cause." White, 496 U.S. at 330 , 110 S.Ct. at 2416 , 110 L.Ed.2d at 309 ; Hughes, 353 N.C. at 209 , 539 S.E.2d at 632 . 2009In Hughes , the Court held that the anonymous informant's tip failed to provide reasonable suspicion "a less demanding standard than probable cause." White, 496 U.S. at 330 , 110 S.Ct. at 2416 , 110 L.Ed.2d at 309 ; Hughes, 353 N.C. at 209 , 539 S.E.2d at 632 .	1	2009–2009
State v. Reid green ncctapp · 1991	1	1993–1993
State v. Thompson green nc · 1979	1	1993–1993
Thompson v. North Carolina green scotus · 1979	1	1993–1993

Statutes the citing opinions construe

NC § N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-979 (7) NC § N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95 (7) NC § N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-401 (5) NC § N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-223 (4) NC § N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-129 (4) NC § N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-256 (3) NC § N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1 (3) NC § N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-4.01 (3) NC § N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27 (3) NC § N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-30 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 118 (1975–2026) CT 118 (1970–2026) IL 110 (1960–2026) TX 91 (1976–2026) TN 78 (1978–2025) MD 69 (1975–2026) PA 66 (1976–2026) NY 64 (1961–2026) NJ 61 (1975–2026) IA 61 (1979–2026) OH 54 (1982–2025) MI 53 (1995–2026) WA 51 (1974–2025) IN 51 (1983–2025) FL 44 (1986–2025) NC 43 (1993–2026) KS 42 (1992–2026) DC 38 (1970–2024) CO 35 (1986–2026) AL 34 (1991–2026) OR 32 (1974–2025) MA 31 (1979–2025) DE 28 (1991–2025) LA 24 (1986–2025) WI 24 (1977–2024) NM 22 (1992–2022) VA 19 (1980–2015) MO 14 (1999–2021) MN 13 (1995–2024) GA 11 (1978–2026) NH 10 (1989–2021) ID 10 (1977–2022) MT 10 (1978–2025) AK 10 (1979–2026) KY 8 (1996–2025) WV 8 (1985–2025) SD 8 (1990–2021) VT 7 (2000–2020) HI 7 (1995–2008) WY 6 (2003–2019) NV 6 (2014–2017) AZ 6 (1999–2019) VI 5 (2005–2026) OK 5 (1980–2020) AR 4 (1979–2025) SC 4 (2001–2025) ME 4 (1973–2014) ND 3 (1980–2007) RI 2 (2005–2010) NE 2 (1992–2021)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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