demanding standard in Tennessee

2024If an officer lacks probable cause, a traffic stop will still be constitutional if, based on the totality of circumstances, the officer has “a reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that a criminal offense has been or is about to be committed.” State v. Bridges 963 S.W.2d 487, 492 (Tenn. 1997) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d at 630 ; State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 394 (Tenn. 1992)). -7- “Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause . . . .” Id. (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)).

2017The Tennessee Supreme Court has recognized that “[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can - 10 - arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” Id. at 32 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)).

2017The Tennessee Supreme Court has recognized that “[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can - 10 - arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” Id. at 32 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)).

2013Our supreme court has explained that “[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” State v. Pulley, 863 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Tenn. 1993) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)).

2024If an officer lacks probable cause, a traffic stop will still be constitutional if, based on the totality of circumstances, the officer has “a reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that a criminal offense has been or is about to be committed.” State v. Bridges 963 S.W.2d 487, 492 (Tenn. 1997) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d at 630 ; State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 394 (Tenn. 1992)). -7- “Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause . . . .” Id. (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)).

2014Noting that reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than that for determining the existence of probable cause, the Court stated: Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause. 354 S.W.3d 718, 727 (Tenn. 2011) (citing State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 632 (Tenn. 1

2005The more demanding standard, “to correct manifest injustice,” applies to motions, like the defendant’s motion, which are filed after imposition of sentence. 3 This standard is based “upon practical considerations important to the proper administration of justice.” Kadwell v. United States, 315 F.2d 667, 670 (9th Cir.1963).

2005Id. (footnote omitted); see also State v. Evans, 265 Ga. 332 , 454 S.E.2d 468, 473 (1995) (noting that finality considerations require a more demanding standard for post-sentencing withdrawal); State v. Johnson, 182 N.J. 232 , 864 A.2d 400, 403 (2005) (describing manifest injustice as a discretionary determination in which finality considerations are weighed against fairness considerations).

2024If an officer lacks probable cause, a traffic stop will still be constitutional if, based on the totality of circumstances, the officer has “a reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that a criminal offense has been or is about to be committed.” State v. Bridges 963 S.W.2d 487, 492 (Tenn. 1997) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d at 630 ; State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 394 (Tenn. 1992)). -7- “Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause . . . .” Id. (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)).

2013The Tennessee Supreme Court has stated that a “[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause.” Bridges, 963 S.W.2d at 492 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)).

2025Crowe, 168 S.W.3d at 741 (citing Kadwell v. United States, 315 F.2d 667, 670 (9th Cir. 1963)).

2024Crowe, 168 S.W.3d at 741 ; see Tenn. R.

2014Noting that reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than that for determining the existence of probable cause, the Court stated: Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause. 354 S.W.3d 718, 727 (Tenn. 2011) (citing State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 632 (Tenn. 1

2013In other words, reasonable suspicion is “‘something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch . . . [but] considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.’” State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 632 (Tenn. 1997) (quoting Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7-8 ).

2017Noting that reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than that for determining the existence of probable cause, the Court stated: Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause. 354 S.W.3d 718, 727 (Tenn. 2011).

2014Noting that reasonable suspicion is a lower standard than that for determining the existence of probable cause, the Court stated: Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause. 354 S.W.3d 718, 727 (Tenn. 2011) (citing State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 632 (Tenn. 1

2024See also Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Weaver, 750 N.W.2d 71, 90 (Iowa 2008) (stating it is “well established that the speech of lawyers may be curtailed in order to avoid improper influence on pending cases ... to otherwise prevent the obstruction of justice.”).

2024State courts that have addressed lawyer speech outside the courtroom but in a pending case have reasoned that such speech “‘may be regulated under a less demanding standard’ because the lawyer in that role is an officer of the court.” Id. (quoting Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1074–75); see also Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Weaver, 750 N.W.2d 71, 90 (Iowa 2008) (stating it is “well established that the speech of lawyers may be curtailed in order to avoid improper influence on pending cases . . . to otherwise prevent the obstruction of justice.”).

2005Id. (footnote omitted); see also State v. Evans, 265 Ga. 332 , 454 S.E.2d 468, 473 (1995) (noting that finality considerations require a more demanding standard for post-sentencing withdrawal); State v. Johnson, 182 N.J. 232 , 864 A.2d 400, 403 (2005) (describing manifest injustice as a discretionary determination in which finality considerations are weighed against fairness considerations).

2005Id. (footnote omitted); see also State v. Evans, 265 Ga. 332 , 454 S.E.2d 468, 473 (1995) (noting that finality considerations require a more demanding standard for post-sentencing withdrawal); State v. Johnson, 182 N.J. 232 , 864 A.2d 400, 403 (2005) (describing manifest injustice as a discretionary determination in which finality considerations are weighed against fairness considerations).

2005Id. (footnote omitted); see also State v. Evans, 265 Ga. 332 , 454 S.E.2d 468, 473 (1995) (noting that finality considerations require a more demanding standard for post-sentencing withdrawal); State v. Johnson, 182 N.J. 232 , 864 A.2d 400, 403 (2005) (describing manifest injustice as a discretionary determination in which finality considerations are weighed against fairness considerations).

2005Id. (footnote omitted); see also State v. Evans, 265 Ga. 332 , 454 S.E.2d 468, 473 (1995) (noting that finality considerations require a more demanding standard for post-sentencing withdrawal); State v. Johnson, 182 N.J. 232 , 864 A.2d 400, 403 (2005) (describing manifest injustice as a discretionary determination in which finality considerations are weighed against fairness considerations).

2024If an officer lacks probable cause, a traffic stop will still be constitutional if, based on the totality of circumstances, the officer has “a reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that a criminal offense has been or is about to be committed.” State v. Bridges 963 S.W.2d 487, 492 (Tenn. 1997) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d at 630 ; State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 394 (Tenn. 1992)). -7- “Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause . . . .” Id. (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)).

2014Reasonable suspicion, although a less demanding standard than probable cause, requires more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’” Day, 263 S.W.3d at 902 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 ).

2014Reasonable suspicion, although a less demanding standard than probable cause, requires more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’” Day, 263 S.W.3d at 902 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 ).

2013Although reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, see State v. Day, 263 S.W.3d 891, 902 (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. at 330), it requires more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’” Day, 263 S.W.3d at 902 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 27).

2000Id. at 32 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2416 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990)).

2000While recognizing that the reasonable suspicion required for an investigatory stop is a less demanding standard than that required for probable cause, the court concluded that the factors set forth in State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 436 (Tenn.1989), “are helpful in determining whether a tip is sufficiently reliable to support a finding of reasonable suspicion.” Simpson, 968 S.W.2d at 781 . *272 In Jacumin , our supreme court adopted the two-prong test of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 , 89 S.Ct. 584 , 21 L.E

2024Id. at 1074.

2024State courts that have addressed lawyer speech outside the courtroom but in a pending case have reasoned that such speech “‘may be regulated under a less demanding standard’ because the lawyer in that role is an officer of the court.” Id. (quoting Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1074–75); see also Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Weaver, 750 N.W.2d 71, 90 (Iowa 2008) (stating it is “well established that the speech of lawyers may be curtailed in order to avoid improper influence on pending cases . . . to otherwise prevent the obstruction of justice.”).

2024The U.S. Supreme Court views the State’s interest similarly, noting that “[t]he interest of the States in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function of administering justice, and have historically been ‘officers of the courts.’” In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 422 (1978) (quoting Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975)).

2024The U.S. Supreme Court views the State’s interest similarly, noting that “[t]he interest of the States in regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to the primary governmental function of administering justice, and have historically been ‘officers of the courts.’” In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 422 (1978) (quoting Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975)).

2024If an officer lacks probable cause, a traffic stop will still be constitutional if, based on the totality of circumstances, the officer has “a reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that a criminal offense has been or is about to be committed.” State v. Bridges 963 S.W.2d 487, 492 (Tenn. 1997) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d at 630 ; State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 394 (Tenn. 1992)). -7- “Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause . . . .” Id. (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)).

2024If an officer lacks probable cause, a traffic stop will still be constitutional if, based on the totality of circumstances, the officer has “a reasonable suspicion, supported by specific and articulable facts, that a criminal offense has been or is about to be committed.” State v. Bridges 963 S.W.2d 487, 492 (Tenn. 1997) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d at 630 ; State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 394 (Tenn. 1992)). -7- “Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause . . . .” Id. (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)).

2024“Reasonable suspicion is a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the subject of a stop of criminal activity and must be ‘something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” State v. Davis, 484 S.W.3d 138, 150 (Tenn. 2016) (internal citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted).

2019“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause” and “can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause and . . . can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” State v. Keith, 978 S.W.2d 861, 866 (Tenn. 1998) (internal citations omitted). -6- Winsett’s residence was constitutionally reasonable based solely upon Winsett’s status as a parolee, even though officers neither had a search warrant nor sought to obtain a warrant2 prior to searching the residen

2013See Gary v. United States, 499 A.2d 815, 833 (D.C.1985) (“[T]here [is no] logical reason to raise barriers to the jury evaluation of the credibility of a minor in a sex offense where we do not require it in other situations.”).

2013Id. at 763.

2008In contrast to the "preponderance of the evidence standard," clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that the truth of the facts asserted is "highly probable," as opposed to "more probable than not." Teter v. Republic Parking Sys., Inc., 181 S.W.3d 330, 341 (Tenn. 2005) (holding that "the clear and convincing evidence standard requires that the truth be highly probable"); Hibdon v. Grabowski, 195 S.W.3d 48, 62-63 (Tenn.Ct.App.2005). [26] The Tennessee Supreme Court has devised a demanding standard for the types of reprehensible conduct that will trigger a consideration of punitive damages.

2008In contrast to the "preponderance of the evidence standard," clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that the truth of the facts asserted is "highly probable," as opposed to "more probable than not." Teter v. Republic Parking Sys., Inc., 181 S.W.3d 330, 341 (Tenn. 2005) (holding that "the clear and convincing evidence standard requires that the truth be highly probable"); Hibdon v. Grabowski, 195 S.W.3d 48, 62-63 (Tenn.Ct.App.2005). [26] The Tennessee Supreme Court has devised a demanding standard for the types of reprehensible conduct that will trigger a consideration of punitive damages.

2005When reviewing a trial court’s determinations at a suppression hearing, “[q]uestions of credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, and resolution of conflicts in the evidence are matters entrusted to the trial judge as the trier of fact.” State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996).