demanding standard in Indiana

2018Therefore, if Officer Sobierajski had obtained information during the traffic stop that gave him reasonable suspicion that Toschlog had drugs in his car, the delay caused by the drug-sniffing dog would be permissible under the Fourth Amendment. [13] Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and: “requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, but it still requires at least a minimal level of objective justification and more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’ of criminal activity.” State v. Schlechty, 926 N.E.2d 1, 7

2018The State offers two responses, both based on Jarman's consent to searches "without a warrant and without probable cause." First, the State contends that Jarman, by giving that consent, "gave officers probable cause (and a warrant) to search him and his property" and "also necessarily gave them reasonable suspicion because that 'is a less demanding standard than probable cause.' " Appellee's Br. p. 7 (quoting State v. Schlechty , 926 N.E.2d 1 , 7 (Ind. 2010), reh'g denied ).

2016Since reasonable suspicion is all that is necessary to support a Terry stop and it is a less demanding standard than probable cause ... [t]he Fourth Amendment requires [only] some minimal level of objective justification for making the stop. [11] Kellems v. State, 842 N.E.2d 352, 355 (Ind.2006) (second and third alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quotations omitted), reh’g granted on other grounds, [12] Dunson contends the Terry stop in this case violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment 2 because “[t]he stopping officers lacked reasonable suspicion to believe [he] was engaged

2015Terry stops have a limited scope and purpose, “not to discover evidence of a crime, but-to allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence ...” Id. at 355. “[S]ince reasonable- suspicion is all that is necessary to support a Terry stop and it is a less demanding standard than probable cause ... [t]he Fourth Amendment requires [only] some minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.” Id. (internal citations omitted). [19] Sergeant Cooley testified at trial that he was notified on dispatch of a suspicious person walking along Mahalasville Road, reported by

2016“Although reasonable suspicion requires more than inchoate and unparticularized hunches, it is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1601-CR-19 | November 7, 2016 Page 7 of 28 showing of ‘considerably less’ proof than that required to establish wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.” Bridgewater v. State, 793 N.E.2d 1097, 1100 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 666 N.E.2d 420, 422 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied).

2016“Although reasonable suspicion requires more than inchoate and unparticularized hunches, it is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing of ‘considerably less’ proof than that required to establish wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.” Bridgewater v. State, 793 N.E.2d 1097, 1100 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), (quoting Cardwell v. State, 666 N.E.2d 420, 422 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied). 13.

2013“Although reasonable suspicion requires more than inchoate and unparticularized hunches, it is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires considerably less proof than that required to establish wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id.; see also Washburn v. State, 868 N.E.2d 594, 598 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (stating that reasonable suspicion requires at least a minimal level of objective justification and must be based on more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch” of criminal activity), trans. denied.

2011Washburn v. State, 868 N.E.2d 594, 601 (Ind.Ct.App.2007) (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990)).

2019See Renzulli , 958 N.E.2d at 1146 .

2012Overstreet v. State, 724 N.E.2d 661, 663 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied. “‘[S]ince reasonable suspicion is all that is necessary to support a Terry stop and it “is a less demanding standard than probable cause … [t]he Fourth Amendment requires [only] ‘some minimal level of objective justification’ for making the stop.”’” State v. Renzulli, 958 N.E.2d 1143, 1148 (Ind. 2011) (citations omitted).

2018Therefore, if Officer Sobierajski had obtained information during the traffic stop that gave him reasonable suspicion that Toschlog had drugs in his car, the delay caused by the drug-sniffing dog would be permissible under the Fourth Amendment. [13] Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and: “requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, but it still requires at least a minimal level of objective justification and more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’ of criminal activity.” State v. Schlechty, 926 N.E.2d 1, 7

2018Therefore, if Officer Sobierajski had obtained information during the traffic stop that gave him reasonable suspicion that Toschlog had drugs in his car, the delay caused by the drug-sniffing dog would be permissible under the Fourth Amendment. [13] Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and: “requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, but it still requires at least a minimal level of objective justification and more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’ of criminal activity.” State v. Schlechty, 926 N.E.2d 1, 7

2017See also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (stating “[w]hen discussing how reviewing courts should make reasonable suspicion determinations, we have said repeatedly that they must look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing”) (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)).

2017See also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (stating “[w]hen discussing how reviewing courts should make reasonable suspicion determinations, we have said repeatedly that they must look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing”) (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)).

2016“Although reasonable suspicion requires more than inchoate and unparticularized hunches, it is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1601-CR-19 | November 7, 2016 Page 7 of 28 showing of ‘considerably less’ proof than that required to establish wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.” Bridgewater v. State, 793 N.E.2d 1097, 1100 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 666 N.E.2d 420, 422 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied).

2016“Although reasonable suspicion requires more than inchoate and unparticularized hunches, it is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing of ‘considerably less’ proof than that required to establish wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.” Bridgewater v. State, 793 N.E.2d 1097, 1100 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), (quoting Cardwell v. State, 666 N.E.2d 420, 422 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied). 13.

2008"Although reasonable suspicion requires more than inchoate and unparticularized hunches, it is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires considerably less proof than that required to establish wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence." State v. Lefevers, 844 N.E.2d 508, 515 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied.

2008“Although reasonable suspicion requires more than inchoate and unparticularized hunches, it is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires considerably less proof than that required to establish wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id.

2017See also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (stating “[w]hen discussing how reviewing courts should make reasonable suspicion determinations, we have said repeatedly that they must look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing”) (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)).

2017See also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 , 122 S.Ct. 744 , 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (stating “[w]hen discussing how reviewing courts should make reasonable suspicion determinations, we have said repeatedly that they must look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing”) (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)).

2017See id. at 517 ; S. Shore Baseball, LLC v. DeJesus, 11 N.E.3d 903 , 910–11 (Ind. 2014) (citing Yost as adopting the Restatement’s test).

2017See id. at 517 ; S. Shore Baseball, LLC v. DeJesus, 11 N.E.3d 903, 910-11 (Ind. 2014) (citing Yost as adopting the Restatement’s test).

2017See id. at 517 ; S. Shore Baseball, LLC v. DeJesus, 11 N.E.3d 903 , 910–11 (Ind. 2014) (citing Yost as adopting the Restatement’s test).

2017See id. at 517 ; S. Shore Baseball, LLC v. DeJesus, 11 N.E.3d 903, 910-11 (Ind. 2014) (citing Yost as adopting the Restatement’s test).

2016Dunson acknowledges that “information obtained by one investigating officer may be relied upon by other law enforcement officials called upon to assist in the investigation of a suspect” under the theory of “collective knowledge.” Id, However, he contends that Officer Faulk’s radio broadcast that Dunson “ ‘may be involved’ is not specific and articulable enough to support the finding that the stopping offers had a reasonable suspicion that Dunson was involved in criminal activity,” Id, at 10. [13] Our supreme .court has stated: “Information obtained by one officer may be relied upon by other l

2015“Reasonable suspicion . . . is satisfied where the facts known to the officer at the moment of the stop, together with the reasonable inferences arising from such facts, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe that criminal activity has occurred or is about to occur.” Billingsly v. State, 980 N.E.2d 402, 408 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

2012Shell v. State, 927 N.E.2d 413, 419 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

2011In Indiana, the Court of Appeals has held that an anonymous tip, or a tip from an unidentified informant, "can supply information that gives police reasonable suspicion." Bogetti v. State, 723 N.E.2d 876, 879 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000).

2011In Indiana, the Court of Appeals has held that an anonymous tip, or a tip from an unidentified informant, “can supply information that gives police reasonable suspicion.” Bogetti v. State, 723 N.E.2d 876, 879 (Ind.Ct.App.2000).

2011See Booth, 839 N.E.2d at 1172 .

2010Thus, a reviewing court must examine "the totality of cireumstances of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing." Bannister, 904 N.E.2d at 1255-56 (quotations omitted).

2009See Membres v. State, 889 N.E.2d 265, 280 (Ind.2008) (" 'Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause[,] not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.' ") (citation omitted, alteration original).

2007Eshelman v. State, 859 N.E.2d 744, 748 (Ind.Ct.App.2007), trans. denied (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24 , 120 S.Ct. 673 , 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000)).