demanding standard (New Hampshire) · Go Syfert
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demanding standard in New Hampshire

10 New Hampshire opinions name it 1 courts 1989–2021 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by New Hampshire courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (9)

CaseFollowedCited
Alabama v. Whitegreen
scotus · 1990 · cited in 5 New Hampshire opinions naming this issue, 1991–2020
2 sentences

2020Furthermore, “[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that it can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” State v. Melanson, 140 N.H. 199, 201 (1995) (brackets omitted) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)).

2020See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990) (“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.”).

45
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paulgreen
scotus · 1963 · cited in 2 New Hampshire opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
2 sentences

2021It requires the party asserting preemption to show that it is “impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements.” Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 1672 (2019) (quotations omitted); see Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) (“A holding of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable and requires no inquiry into congressional design where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility . . . .”).

2021It requires the party asserting preemption to show that it is “impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements.” Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 1672 (2019) (quotations omitted); see Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) (“A holding of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable and requires no inquiry into congressional design where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility . . . .”).

22
Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrechtgreen
scotus · 2019 · cited in 2 New Hampshire opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
2 sentences

2021It requires the party asserting preemption to show that it is “impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements.” Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 1672 (2019) (quotations omitted); see Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) (“A holding of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable and requires no inquiry into congressional design where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility . . . .”).

2021It requires the party asserting preemption to show that it is “impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements.” Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 1672 (2019) (quotations omitted); see Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) (“A holding of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable and requires no inquiry into congressional design where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility . . . .”).

22
State v. Melansongreen
nh · 1995 · cited in 2 New Hampshire opinions naming this issue, 2004–2020
2 sentences

2020Furthermore, “[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that it can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” State v. Melanson, 140 N.H. 199, 201 (1995) (brackets omitted) (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)).

2004Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990); State v. Melanson, 140 N.H. 199, 201 (1995).

22
United States v. Roland Henry, A/K/A Roachgreen
cadc · 1995 · cited in 1 New Hampshire opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
1 sentence

2020“It is enough that they [had] a reasonable basis for believing that their search [would] reduce the danger of harm . . . .” Henry, 48 F.3d at 1284 (quotation omitted).

11
Harllel B. Jones v. Federal Bureau of Investigationgreen
ca6 · 1994 · cited in 1 New Hampshire opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
1 sentence

2012Several circuits have adopted a per se rule, under which all records compiled by law enforcement agencies inherently qualify as records “compiled for law enforcement purposes.” See, e.g., Jones v. F.B.I., 41 F.3d 238, 245-46 (6th Cir. 1994); Williams v. F.B.I., 730 F.2d 882, 883-86 (2d Cir. 1984); Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 472-76 (1st Cir. 1979).

11
John R.. Williams v. Federal Bureau Of Investigationgreen
ca2 · 1984 · cited in 1 New Hampshire opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
1 sentence

2012Several circuits have adopted a per se rule, under which all records compiled by law enforcement agencies inherently qualify as records “compiled for law enforcement purposes.” See, e.g., Jones v. F.B.I., 41 F.3d 238, 245-46 (6th Cir. 1994); Williams v. F.B.I., 730 F.2d 882, 883-86 (2d Cir. 1984); Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 472-76 (1st Cir. 1979).

11
Peter Hanlon Irons v. Griffin B. Bellgreen
ca1 · 1979 · cited in 1 New Hampshire opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
1 sentence

2012Several circuits have adopted a per se rule, under which all records compiled by law enforcement agencies inherently qualify as records “compiled for law enforcement purposes.” See, e.g., Jones v. F.B.I., 41 F.3d 238, 245-46 (6th Cir. 1994); Williams v. F.B.I., 730 F.2d 882, 883-86 (2d Cir. 1984); Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 472-76 (1st Cir. 1979).

11
Jerry Allen Arnold v. D. J. McCarthy Superintendent, California Men's Colonygreen
ca9 · 1978 · cited in 1 New Hampshire opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989
1 sentence

1989See Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1386-87 (9th Cir. 1978) (factor analysis to determine genuine deadlock).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Hampshire. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (2)

CaseCitedYears
Wyeth v. Levine green
scotus · 2009
2 sentences

2021In other words, we consider whether it is impossible for the insurer to comply with both a Board order to reimburse Panaggio and the CSA. 5 “Impossibility pre-emption is a demanding defense.” Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 573 .

2021In other words, we consider whether it is impossible for the insurer to comply with both a Board order to reimburse Panaggio and the CSA. 5 “Impossibility pre-emption is a demanding defense.” Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 573 .

22021–2021
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition green
scotus · 2002
2 sentences

2008First, the Government asserted that “the CPPA [wa]s necessary because pedophiles may use virtual child pornography to seduce children.” Id.

2008First, the Government asserted that "the CPPA [wa]s necessary because pedophiles may use virtual child pornography to seduce children." Id.

12008–2008

Statutes the citing opinions construe

NH § N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 318-B:2 (4)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 118 (1975–2026) CT 118 (1970–2026) IL 110 (1960–2026) TX 91 (1976–2026) TN 78 (1978–2025) MD 69 (1975–2026) PA 66 (1976–2026) NY 64 (1961–2026) NJ 61 (1975–2026) IA 61 (1979–2026) OH 54 (1982–2025) MI 53 (1995–2026) WA 51 (1974–2025) IN 51 (1983–2025) FL 44 (1986–2025) NC 43 (1993–2026) KS 42 (1992–2026) DC 38 (1970–2024) CO 35 (1986–2026) AL 34 (1991–2026) OR 32 (1974–2025) MA 31 (1979–2025) DE 28 (1991–2025) LA 24 (1986–2025) WI 24 (1977–2024) NM 22 (1992–2022) VA 19 (1980–2015) MO 14 (1999–2021) MN 13 (1995–2024) GA 11 (1978–2026) NH 10 (1989–2021) ID 10 (1977–2022) MT 10 (1978–2025) AK 10 (1979–2026) KY 8 (1996–2025) WV 8 (1985–2025) SD 8 (1990–2021) VT 7 (2000–2020) HI 7 (1995–2008) WY 6 (2003–2019) NV 6 (2014–2017) AZ 6 (1999–2019) VI 5 (2005–2026) OK 5 (1980–2020) AR 4 (1979–2025) SC 4 (2001–2025) ME 4 (1973–2014) ND 3 (1980–2007) RI 2 (2005–2010) NE 2 (1992–2021)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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