demanding standard in Washington

2019This standard is reflected 4 No. 50748-0-II in CrR 4.2(f), which requires the trial court to allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea “whenever it appears that the withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” This is a demanding standard, and it requires the defendant to show “‘an injustice that is obvious, directly observable, overt, not obscure.’” State v. Robinson, 172 Wn.2d 783, 796 , 263 P.3d 1233 (2011) (quoting State v. Taylor, 83 Wn.2d 594, 596 , 521 P.2d 699 (1974)).

2019This standard is reflected 4 No. 50748-0-II in CrR 4.2(f), which requires the trial court to allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea “whenever it appears that the withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” This is a demanding standard, and it requires the defendant to show “‘an injustice that is obvious, directly observable, overt, not obscure.’” State v. Robinson, 172 Wn.2d 783, 796 , 263 P.3d 1233 (2011) (quoting State v. Taylor, 83 Wn.2d 594, 596 , 521 P.2d 699 (1974)).

2018This is a demanding standard; under it, the defendant bears the burden of establishing "an injustice that is obvious, directly observable, overt, not obscure." State v. Branch, 129 Wn.2d 635,641 , 919 P.2d 1228 (1996)(quoting State v. Saas, 118 Wn.2d 37, 42 , 820 P.2d 505 (1991)).

2016Under CrR 4.2(f), a court must permit withdrawal of a guilty plea whenever necessary to correct a "manifest injustice." This is a demanding standard, and the defendant bears the burden of establishing that he has suffered "'an injustice that is obvious, directly observable, overt, not obscure.'"3 Ineffective assistance of counsel may constitute a manifest injustice sufficient to permit withdrawal of a guilty plea.4 We review the trial court's decision on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion.5 In order to establish ineffective assistance, Wagner must demonstrate both th

2018This is a demanding standard; under it, the defendant bears the burden of establishing "an injustice that is obvious, directly observable, overt, not obscure." State v. Branch, 129 Wn.2d 635,641 , 919 P.2d 1228 (1996)(quoting State v. Saas, 118 Wn.2d 37, 42 , 820 P.2d 505 (1991)).

2018This is a demanding standard; under it, the defendant bears the burden of establishing "an injustice that is obvious, directly observable, overt, not obscure." State v. Branch, 129 Wn.2d 635,641 , 919 P.2d 1228 (1996)(quoting State v. Saas, 118 Wn.2d 37, 42 , 820 P.2d 505 (1991)).

2018This is a demanding standard; under it, the defendant bears the burden of establishing "an injustice that is obvious, directly observable, overt, not obscure." State v. Branch, 129 Wn.2d 635,641 , 919 P.2d 1228 (1996)(quoting State v. Saas, 118 Wn.2d 37, 42 , 820 P.2d 505 (1991)).

2016Under CrR 4.2(f), a court must permit withdrawal of a guilty plea whenever necessary to correct a "manifest injustice." This is a demanding standard, and the defendant bears the burden of establishing that he has suffered "'an injustice that is obvious, directly observable, overt, not obscure.'"3 Ineffective assistance of counsel may constitute a manifest injustice sufficient to permit withdrawal of a guilty plea.4 We review the trial court's decision on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion.5 In order to establish ineffective assistance, Wagner must demonstrate both th

2023In re Parental Rights to B.P., 186 Wn.2d 292, 313 , 376 P.3d 350 (2016).

2023In re Parental Rights to B.P., 186 Wn.2d 292, 313 , 376 P.3d 350 (2016).

2008Hall, 163 Wn.2d at 355 .

2008Id. at 355 .

2025Manifest injustice is a demanding standard and the defendant must establish that they suffered “‘an injustice that is obvious, directly observable, overt, [and] not obscure.’” Clements, 125 Wn.

2025Clements, 125 Wn.

2019We then reiterated that "[t]he 'clear and convincing' standard is the civil counterpart to 'beyond a reasonable doubt' " and the "phrase 'manifest injustice' represents a demanding standard." Id. at 760 , 600 P.2d 1264 . "[T]o stand on review, the standard range for this offense and this defendant must present, beyond a reasonable doubt, a clear danger to society." Id. ¶ 25 That same year, the Supreme Court addressed the appropriate standard of proof in civil commitment proceedings in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 , 99 S. Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979).

2019We then reiterated that "[t]he 'clear and convincing' standard is the civil counterpart to 'beyond a reasonable doubt' " and the "phrase 'manifest injustice' represents a demanding standard." Id. at 760 , 600 P.2d 1264 . "[T]o stand on review, the standard range for this offense and this defendant must present, beyond a reasonable doubt, a clear danger to society." Id. ¶ 25 That same year, the Supreme Court addressed the appropriate standard of proof in civil commitment proceedings in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 , 99 S. Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979).

2015State v. Bao Sheng Zhao, 157 Wn.2d 188, 197 , 137 P.3d 835 (2006). "[A] 'manifest injustice' is 'an injustice that is obvious, directly observable, overt, [and] not obscure.'" State v. Saas, 118 Wn.2d 37,42 , 820 P.2d 505 (1991) (quoting State v. Taylor, 83 Wn.2d 594, 596 , 521 P.2d 699 (1974)).

2015State v. Zhao, 157 Wn.2d 188, 197 , 137 P.3d 835 (2006).

2015State v. Bao Sheng Zhao, 157 Wn.2d 188, 197 , 137 P.3d 835 (2006). "[A] 'manifest injustice' is 'an injustice that is obvious, directly observable, overt, [and] not obscure.'" State v. Saas, 118 Wn.2d 37,42 , 820 P.2d 505 (1991) (quoting State v. Taylor, 83 Wn.2d 594, 596 , 521 P.2d 699 (1974)).

2015State v. Zhao, 157 Wn.2d 188, 197 , 137 P.3d 835 (2006).

2010See State v. Calvert, 79 Wash.App. 569, 576 , 903 P.2d 1003 (1995) (rejecting a defendant's incompetency claim based on a head injury sustained nine days prior to the plea hearing where neither the defendant's medical records nor the doctor's testimony supported the defendant's claim that he was incompetent when he pleaded guilty); State v. Hystad, 36 Wash.App. 42, 45 , 671 P.2d 793 (1983) (rejecting defendant's unsupported incompetency claim because "defendant's bald claim of methadone-induced confusion does not meet the demanding standard required to show manifest injustice"); State v. Armst

2010App. 42, 45 , 671 P.2d 793 (1983) (rejecting defendant’s unsupported incompetency claim because “defendant’s bald claim of methadone-induced confusion does not meet the demanding standard required to show manifest injustice”); State v. Armstead, 13 Wn.

2010Additionally, the Legislature speaks for the people and we are hesitant to strike a duly enacted statute unless fully convinced, after a searching legal analysis, that the statute violates the constitution. ¶ 12 We later reaffirmed our understanding that a demanding standard is justified because "we assume the Legislature considered the constitutionality of its enactments and afford great deference to its judgment." Tunstall v. Bergeson, 141 Wash.2d 201, 220 , 5 P.3d 691 (2000).

2010Additionally, the Legislature speaks for the people and we are hesitant to strike a duly enacted statute unless fully convinced, after a searching legal analysis, that the statute violates the constitution. ¶12 We later reaffirmed our understanding that a demanding standard is justified because “we assume the Legislature considered the constitutionality of its enactments and afford great deference to its judgment.” Tunstall v. Bergeson, 141 Wn.2d 201, 220 , 5 P.3d 691 (2000).

2010Additionally, the Legislature speaks for the people and we are hesitant to strike a duly enacted statute unless fully convinced, after a searching legal analysis, that the statute violates the constitution. ¶ 12 We later reaffirmed our understanding that a demanding standard is justified because "we assume the Legislature considered the constitutionality of its enactments and afford great deference to its judgment." Tunstall v. Bergeson, 141 Wash.2d 201, 220 , 5 P.3d 691 (2000).

2010Additionally, the Legislature speaks for the people and we are hesitant to strike a duly enacted statute unless fully convinced, after a searching legal analysis, that the statute violates the constitution. ¶12 We later reaffirmed our understanding that a demanding standard is justified because “we assume the Legislature considered the constitutionality of its enactments and afford great deference to its judgment.” Tunstall v. Bergeson, 141 Wn.2d 201, 220 , 5 P.3d 691 (2000).

2010See State v. Calvert, 79 Wash.App. 569, 576 , 903 P.2d 1003 (1995) (rejecting a defendant's incompetency claim based on a head injury sustained nine days prior to the plea hearing where neither the defendant's medical records nor the doctor's testimony supported the defendant's claim that he was incompetent when he pleaded guilty); State v. Hystad, 36 Wash.App. 42, 45 , 671 P.2d 793 (1983) (rejecting defendant's unsupported incompetency claim because "defendant's bald claim of methadone-induced confusion does not meet the demanding standard required to show manifest injustice"); State v. Armst

2010App. 42, 45 , 671 P.2d 793 (1983) (rejecting defendant’s unsupported incompetency claim because “defendant’s bald claim of methadone-induced confusion does not meet the demanding standard required to show manifest injustice”); State v. Armstead, 13 Wn.

2009See, e.g., State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 65 , 720 P.2d 808 (1986) (telephone records and telephone line protected); State v. Boland, 115 Wn.2d 571 , 800 P.2d 1112 (1990) (trash containers outside house protected); State v. Parker, 139 Wn.2d 486 , 987 P.2d 73 (1999) (personal belongings of passenger not subject to search when driver arrested). ¶28 Applying the demanding standard of Strickland , we cannot conclude that trial counsel for Nichols fell below reasonable professional norms by failing to break new ground under article I, § 7.

2009See, e.g., State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d 54, 65 , 720 P.2d 808 (1986) (telephone records and telephone line protected); State v. Boland, 115 Wash.2d 571 , 800 P.2d 1112 (1990) (trash containers outside house protected); and State v. Parker, 139 Wash.2d 486 , 987 P.2d 73 (1999) (personal belongings of passenger not subject to search when driver arrested). ¶ 28 Applying the demanding standard of Strickland , we cannot conclude that trial counsel for Nichols fell below reasonable professional norms by failing to break new ground under article 1, § 7.

2009See, e.g., State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 65 , 720 P.2d 808 (1986) (telephone records and telephone line protected); State v. Boland, 115 Wn.2d 571 , 800 P.2d 1112 (1990) (trash containers outside house protected); State v. Parker, 139 Wn.2d 486 , 987 P.2d 73 (1999) (personal belongings of passenger not subject to search when driver arrested). ¶28 Applying the demanding standard of Strickland , we cannot conclude that trial counsel for Nichols fell below reasonable professional norms by failing to break new ground under article I, § 7.

2009See, e.g., State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d 54, 65 , 720 P.2d 808 (1986) (telephone records and telephone line protected); State v. Boland, 115 Wash.2d 571 , 800 P.2d 1112 (1990) (trash containers outside house protected); and State v. Parker, 139 Wash.2d 486 , 987 P.2d 73 (1999) (personal belongings of passenger not subject to search when driver arrested). ¶ 28 Applying the demanding standard of Strickland , we cannot conclude that trial counsel for Nichols fell below reasonable professional norms by failing to break new ground under article 1, § 7.

2009See, e.g., State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 65 , 720 P.2d 808 (1986) (telephone records and telephone line protected); State v. Boland, 115 Wn.2d 571 , 800 P.2d 1112 (1990) (trash containers outside house protected); State v. Parker, 139 Wn.2d 486 , 987 P.2d 73 (1999) (personal belongings of passenger not subject to search when driver arrested). ¶28 Applying the demanding standard of Strickland , we cannot conclude that trial counsel for Nichols fell below reasonable professional norms by failing to break new ground under article I, § 7.

2009See, e.g., State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 65 , 720 P.2d 808 (1986) (telephone records and telephone line protected); State v. Boland, 115 Wn.2d 571 , 800 P.2d 1112 (1990) (trash containers outside house protected); State v. Parker, 139 Wn.2d 486 , 987 P.2d 73 (1999) (personal belongings of passenger not subject to search when driver arrested). ¶28 Applying the demanding standard of Strickland , we cannot conclude that trial counsel for Nichols fell below reasonable professional norms by failing to break new ground under article I, § 7.

2008Id. at 353-54, 181 P.3d at 802-03 .

2008Hall, 163 Wash.2d at 361 , 181 P.3d 799 .

2006CrR 4.2(f); State v. Marshall, 144 Wn.2d 266, 280-81 , 27 P.3d 192 (2001); State v. Taylor, 83 Wn.2d 594, 597 , 521 P.2d 699 (1974).

2006CrR 4.2(f); State v. Marshall, 144 Wash.2d 266, 280-81 , 27 P.3d 192 (2001); State v. Taylor, 83 Wash.2d 594, 597 , 521 P.2d 699 (1974).

2006CrR 4.2(f); State v. Marshall, 144 Wn.2d 266, 280-81 , 27 P.3d 192 (2001); State v. Taylor, 83 Wn.2d 594, 597 , 521 P.2d 699 (1974).

2006CrR 4.2(f); State v. Marshall, 144 Wash.2d 266, 280-81 , 27 P.3d 192 (2001); State v. Taylor, 83 Wash.2d 594, 597 , 521 P.2d 699 (1974).

2000We must judge the reasonableness of a particular use of force from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, applying a “standard of the moment.” Staats, 139 Wn.2d at 774 .

2000We must judge the reasonableness of a particular use of force from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, applying a "standard of the moment." Staats, 139 Wash.2d at 774 , 991 P.2d 615 .

2025House, 547 U.S. at 538 . 33 No. 39100-1-III In re Pers.

2019A defendant must "introduce 'clear evidence' displacing the presumption that a prosecutor has acted lawfully." Id. (citing Armstrong , 517 U.S. at 463 -65 , 116 S.Ct. 1480 ). ¶ 45 Rather than grapple with this precedent, appellants seem to argue that selective-enforcement claims premised on the free exercise clause should not be subject to the same demanding standard to which all other selective-enforcement claims are subject.

2019An involuntary plea results in a manifest injustice.2 State v. Ross, 129 Wn.2d 279, 284 , 916 P.2d 405 (1996).