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118 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1970–2026 14 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Phillips v. Wardengreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., Phillips v. Warden, 220 Conn. 112, 133 , 595 A.2d 1356 (1991). 2017See, e.g., Phillips v. Warden, 220 Conn. 112, 133 , 595 A.2d 1356 (1991). | 2 | 2 |
Miller v. Commissioner of Correctiongreen2 sentences2021Id. ‘‘As to the first prong, we emphasized in Miller that the clear and convincing standard . . . is a very demanding standard and should be understood as such, particularly when applied to a habeas claim of actual innocence, where the stakes are so important for both the petitioner and the state. . . . [That standard] should operate as a weighty caution upon the minds of all judges, and it forbids relief whenever the evidence is loose, equivocal or contradictory. . . . [The standard requires] extraordinarily high and truly persuasive dem- onstration[s] of actual innocence. . . . ‘‘Moreover, a 2018Miller v. Commissioner of Correction , 242 Conn. 745 , 796, 700 A.2d 1108 (1997) ; Lopinto v. Haines , supra, 185 Conn. at 531 -32 , 441 A.2d 151 . "[The clear *42 and convincing standard's] emphasis on the high probability and the substantial greatness of the probability of the truth of the facts asserted indicates that it is a very demanding standard and should be understood as such .... | 1 | 10 |
State v. Groomesgreen2 sentences2019See, e.g., State v. Groomes, 232 Conn. 455 , 467–68, 656 A.2d 646 (1995). ‘‘Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content [from] that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable to show probable cause.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 468 . ‘‘Reasonable and articulable suspicion is an objective standard that focuses not on the actual state of mind 2019See, e.g., State v. Groomes, 232 Conn. 455 , 467–68, 656 A.2d 646 (1995). ‘‘Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content [from] that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable to show probable cause.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 468 . ‘‘Reasonable and articulable suspicion is an objective standard that focuses not on the actual state of mind | 1 | 5 |
State v. Cofieldgreen2 sentences1994Although the defendant was wearing a purple shirt with reddish stripes, and the complainant had described the suspect as wearing a white shirt with reddish stripes, such a discrepancy does not necessarily undermine the reasonable suspicion of the police officer. "`[R]easonable suspicion is less a demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less re 1994Although the defendant was wearing a purple shirt with reddish stripes, and the complainant had described the suspect as wearing a white shirt with reddish stripes, such a discrepancy does not necessarily undermine the reasonable suspicion of the police officer. "`[R]easonable suspicion is less a demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less re | 1 | 3 |
| State v. Kirk R.green | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Rizzogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Saylesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hathaway v. Coughlingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Myers
green
2 sentences2017Implicit in this very demanding standard is the notion ... that invocation of the plain error doctrine is reserved for occasions requiring the reversal of the judgment under review.... [Thus, a defendant] cannot prevail under [the plain error doctrine] ... unless he demonstrates that the claimed error is both so clear and so harmful that a failure to reverse the judgment would result in manifest injustice." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Myers , 290 Conn. 278 , 289, 963 A.2d 11 (2009). 2017Implicit in this very demanding standard is the notion ... that invocation of the plain error doctrine is reserved for occasions requiring the reversal of the judgment under review.... [Thus, a defendant] cannot prevail under [the plain error doctrine] ... unless he demonstrates that the claimed error is both so clear and so harmful that a failure to reverse the judgment would result in manifest injustice." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Myers , 290 Conn. 278 , 289, 963 A.2d 11 (2009). | 11 | 2009–2017 |
Hennessey v. City of Bridgeport
green
2 sentences2002"Mandamus will issue only if the plaintiff can establish: (1) that the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the performance of a duty by the defendant; (2) that the defendant has no CT Page 4769 discretion with respect to the performance of that duty; and (3) that the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law." "Even satisfaction of this demanding test does not, however, automatically compel issuance of the requested writ of mandamus." Hennessey v. Bridgeport , 213 Conn. 656 , 659 , 569 A.2d 1122 (1990). 2002"Mandamus will issue only if the plaintiff can establish: (1) that the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the performance of a duty by the defendant; (2) that the defendant has no CT Page 4769 discretion with respect to the performance of that duty; and (3) that the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law." "Even satisfaction of this demanding test does not, however, automatically compel issuance of the requested writ of mandamus." Hennessey v. Bridgeport , 213 Conn. 656 , 659 , 569 A.2d 1122 (1990). | 9 | 1992–2014 |
Hanover Hall v. Planning Board
green
2 sentences2001Hackett v. New Britain, 2 Conn. App. 225 , 229 , 477 A.2d 148 , cert. denied, 194 Conn. 805 , 482 A.2d 710 (1984). 2001Hackett v. New Britain , 2 Conn. App. 225 , 229 , 477 A.2d 148 , cert. denied, 194 Conn. 805 , 482 A.2d 710 (1984). | 9 | 1990–2001 |
Jackson v. Jackson
green
2 sentences2001Hackett v. New Britain, 2 Conn. App. 225 , 229 , 477 A.2d 148 , cert. denied, 194 Conn. 805 , 482 A.2d 710 (1984). 2001Hackett v. New Britain , 2 Conn. App. 225 , 229 , 477 A.2d 148 , cert. denied, 194 Conn. 805 , 482 A.2d 710 (1984). | 9 | 1990–2001 |
Hackett v. City of New Britain
green
2 sentences2001Hackett v. New Britain , 2 Conn. App. 225 , 229 , 477 A.2d 148 , cert. denied, 194 Conn. 805 , 482 A.2d 710 (1984). 2001Hackett v. New Britain , 2 Conn. App. 225 , 229 , 477 A.2d 148 , cert. denied, 194 Conn. 805 , 482 A.2d 710 (1984). | 9 | 1990–2001 |
In Re Giovanni C.
green
2 sentences2025Its emphasis on the high probability and the substan- tial greatness of the probability of the truth of the facts asserted indicates that it is a very demanding standard and should be understood as such.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis altered; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Giovanni C., 120 Conn. App. 277 , 279–80, 991 A.2d 638 (2010); see also State v. Rizzo, 266 Conn. 171 , 211 n.22, 833 A.2d 363 (2003) (intermediate stan- dard is used when particularly important individual rights are involved). 2025Its emphasis on the high probability and the substan- tial greatness of the probability of the truth of the facts asserted indicates that it is a very demanding standard and should be understood as such.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis altered; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Giovanni C., 120 Conn. App. 277 , 279–80, 991 A.2d 638 (2010); see also State v. Rizzo, 266 Conn. 171 , 211 n.22, 833 A.2d 363 (2003) (intermediate stan- dard is used when particularly important individual rights are involved). | 4 | 2011–2025 |
Lopinto v. Haines
green
2 sentences2018Miller v. Commissioner of Correction , 242 Conn. 745 , 796, 700 A.2d 1108 (1997) ; Lopinto v. Haines , supra, 185 Conn. at 531 -32 , 441 A.2d 151 . "[The clear *42 and convincing standard's] emphasis on the high probability and the substantial greatness of the probability of the truth of the facts asserted indicates that it is a very demanding standard and should be understood as such .... 2018Miller v. Commissioner of Correction , 242 Conn. 745 , 796, 700 A.2d 1108 (1997) ; Lopinto v. Haines , supra, 185 Conn. at 531 -32 , 441 A.2d 151 . "[The clear *42 and convincing standard's] emphasis on the high probability and the substantial greatness of the probability of the truth of the facts asserted indicates that it is a very demanding standard and should be understood as such .... | 4 | 1997–2018 |
Notopoulos v. Statewide Grievance Committee
green
2 sentences2007“Clear and convincing proof is a demanding standard denoting] a degree of belief that lies between the belief that is required to find the truth or existence of the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecution. . . . [The burden] is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) No 2007“Clear and convincing proof is a demanding standard denoting] a degree of belief that lies between the belief that is required to find the truth or existence of the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecution. . . . [The burden] is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) No | 3 | 2007–2024 |
State v. Diaz
green
2 sentences2022Implicit in this very demanding standard is the notion . . . that invocation of the plain error doctrine is reserved for occasions requiring the reversal of the judgment under review. . . . [Thus, an appellant] can- not prevail under [the plain error doctrine] . . . unless [s]he demonstrates that the claimed error is both so clear and so harmful that a failure to reverse the judg- ment would result in manifest injustice.’’ (Internal quo- tation marks omitted.) State v. Diaz, 302 Conn. 93, 101 , 25 A.3d 594 (2011). 2022Implicit in this very demanding standard is the notion . . . that invocation of the plain error doctrine is reserved for occasions requiring the reversal of the judgment under review. . . . [Thus, an appellant] can- not prevail under [the plain error doctrine] . . . unless [s]he demonstrates that the claimed error is both so clear and so harmful that a failure to reverse the judg- ment would result in manifest injustice.’’ (Internal quo- tation marks omitted.) State v. Diaz, 302 Conn. 93, 101 , 25 A.3d 594 (2011). | 3 | 2020–2022 |
Shelton v. Statewide Grievance Committee
green
2 sentences2020Our Supreme Court has stated that the clear and convincing standard is a demanding standard that should operate as a weighty caution upon the minds of all judges, and it forbids relief whenever the evidence is loose, equivocal or con- tradictory.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Shelton v. Statewide Grievance Com- mittee, 85 Conn. App. 440 , 443–44, 857 A.2d 432 (2004), aff’d, 277 Conn. 99 , 890 A.2d 104 (2006). 2020Our Supreme Court has stated that the clear and convincing standard is a demanding standard that should operate as a weighty caution upon the minds of all judges, and it forbids relief whenever the evidence is loose, equivocal or con- tradictory.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Shelton v. Statewide Grievance Com- mittee, 85 Conn. App. 440 , 443–44, 857 A.2d 432 (2004), aff’d, 277 Conn. 99 , 890 A.2d 104 (2006). | 3 | 2015–2020 |
State v. Simpson
green
2 sentences2015Implicit in this very demanding standard is the notion . . . that invocation of the plain error doctrine is reserved for occasions requiring the reversal of the judgment under review. . . . [Thus, a] defendant can- not prevail under [the plain error doctrine] . . . unless he demonstrates that the claimed error is both so clear and so harmful that a failure to reverse the judgment would result in manifest injustice.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Simpson, 286 Conn. 634 , 647–48 n.16, 945 A.2d 449 (2008). ‘‘To prevail on this claim . . . the defendant must establish that it was r 2015Implicit in this very demanding standard is the notion . . . that invocation of the plain error doctrine is reserved for occasions requiring the reversal of the judgment under review. . . . [Thus, a] defendant can- not prevail under [the plain error doctrine] . . . unless he demonstrates that the claimed error is both so clear and so harmful that a failure to reverse the judgment would result in manifest injustice.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Simpson, 286 Conn. 634 , 647–48 n.16, 945 A.2d 449 (2008). ‘‘To prevail on this claim . . . the defendant must establish that it was r | 3 | 2008–2015 |
Fagan v. Connecticut
green
2 sentences2008Implicit in this very demanding standard is the notion, explained previously, that invocation of the plain error doctrine is reserved for occasions requiring the reversal of the judgment under review. . . . [Thus, a] defendant cannot prevail under [the plain error doctrine] . . . unless he demonstrates that the claimed error is both so clear and so harmful that a failure to reverse the judgment would result in manifest injustice.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fagan, 280 Conn. 69, 86-87 , 905 A.2d 1101 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1269 , 127 S. Ct. 1491 , 167 2008Implicit in this very demanding standard is the notion, explained previously, that invocation of the plain error doctrine is reserved for occasions requiring the reversal of the judgment under review. . . . [Thus, a] defendant cannot prevail under [the plain error doctrine] . . . unless he demonstrates that the claimed error is both so clear and so harmful that a failure to reverse the judgment would result in manifest injustice.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fagan, 280 Conn. 69, 86-87 , 905 A.2d 1101 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1269 , 127 S. Ct. 1491 , 167 | 3 | 2007–2008 |
State v. Fagan
green
2 sentences2008Implicit in this very demanding standard is the notion, explained previously, that invocation of the plain error doctrine is reserved for occasions requiring the reversal of the judgment under review. . . . [Thus, a] defendant cannot prevail under [the plain error doctrine] . . . unless he demonstrates that the claimed error is both so clear and so harmful that a failure to reverse the judgment would result in manifest injustice.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fagan, 280 Conn. 69, 86-87 , 905 A.2d 1101 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1269 , 127 S. Ct. 1491 , 167 2008Implicit in this very demanding standard is the notion, explained previously, that invocation of the plain error doctrine is reserved for occasions requiring the reversal of the judgment under review. . . . [Thus, a] defendant cannot prevail under [the plain error doctrine] . . . unless he demonstrates that the claimed error is both so clear and so harmful that a failure to reverse the judgment would result in manifest injustice.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fagan, 280 Conn. 69, 86-87 , 905 A.2d 1101 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1269 , 127 S. Ct. 1491 , 167 | 3 | 2007–2008 |
Blackwell v. Mahmood
green
2 sentences2024Our courts have explained that ‘‘[c]lear and convincing proof is a demanding standard denot[ing] a degree of belief that lies between the belief that is required to find the truth or existence of the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecution.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Blackwell v. Mahmood, 120 Conn. App. 690, 700 , 992 A.2d 1219 (2010). 2024Our courts have explained that ‘‘[c]lear and convincing proof is a demanding standard denot[ing] a degree of belief that lies between the belief that is required to find the truth or existence of the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecution.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Blackwell v. Mahmood, 120 Conn. App. 690, 700 , 992 A.2d 1219 (2010). | 2 | 2024–2024 |
In re Jacob W.
green
2 sentences2022In the present case, however, and unlike in In re Kelly S., the children already have been deprived of the care, guidance, or control necessary for their well-being and have suffered psychological injury as a result of the respondent’s actions. 8 ‘‘Clear and convincing proof is a demanding standard denot[ing] a degree of belief that lies between the belief that is required to find the truth or existence of the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecution. . . . [The burden] is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of th 2022In the present case, however, and unlike in In re Kelly S., the children already have been deprived of the care, guidance, or control necessary for their well-being and have suffered psychological injury as a result of the respondent’s actions. 8 ‘‘Clear and convincing proof is a demanding standard denot[ing] a degree of belief that lies between the belief that is required to find the truth or existence of the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecution. . . . [The burden] is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of th | 2 | 2022–2022 |
In re Jacob W.
green
2 sentences2022In the present case, however, and unlike in In re Kelly S., the children already have been deprived of the care, guidance, or control necessary for their well-being and have suffered psychological injury as a result of the respondent’s actions. 8 ‘‘Clear and convincing proof is a demanding standard denot[ing] a degree of belief that lies between the belief that is required to find the truth or existence of the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecution. . . . [The burden] is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of th 2022In the present case, however, and unlike in In re Kelly S., the children already have been deprived of the care, guidance, or control necessary for their well-being and have suffered psychological injury as a result of the respondent’s actions. 8 ‘‘Clear and convincing proof is a demanding standard denot[ing] a degree of belief that lies between the belief that is required to find the truth or existence of the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecution. . . . [The burden] is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of th | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Shelton v. Statewide Grievance Committee
neutral
2 sentences2020Our Supreme Court has stated that the clear and convincing standard is a demanding standard that should operate as a weighty caution upon the minds of all judges, and it forbids relief whenever the evidence is loose, equivocal or con- tradictory.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Shelton v. Statewide Grievance Com- mittee, 85 Conn. App. 440 , 443–44, 857 A.2d 432 (2004), aff’d, 277 Conn. 99 , 890 A.2d 104 (2006). 2020Our Supreme Court has stated that the clear and convincing standard is a demanding standard that should operate as a weighty caution upon the minds of all judges, and it forbids relief whenever the evidence is loose, equivocal or con- tradictory.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Shelton v. Statewide Grievance Com- mittee, 85 Conn. App. 440 , 443–44, 857 A.2d 432 (2004), aff’d, 277 Conn. 99 , 890 A.2d 104 (2006). | 2 | 2015–2020 |
In re Mariana A.
green
2 sentences2019If the trial court determines that the petitioner has failed to meet this high burden, it must deny the petition." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Mariana A. , 181 Conn. App. 415 , 427-28, 186 A.3d 83 (2018). 2019If the trial court determines that the petitioner has failed to meet this high burden, it must deny the petition." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Mariana A. , 181 Conn. App. 415 , 427-28, 186 A.3d 83 (2018). | 2 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Moore
green
2 sentences2019Implicit in this very demanding standard is the notion ... that invocation of the plain error doctrine is reserved for occasions requiring the reversal of the judgment under review.... [Thus, an appellant] cannot prevail under [the plain error doctrine] ... unless he demonstrates that the claimed error is both so clear and so harmful that a failure to reverse the judgment would result in manifest injustice." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Moore, 293 Conn. 781 , 823, 981 A.2d 1030 (2009), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 954 , 130 S. Ct. 3386 , 177 L.Ed. 2d 306 (2010). 2019Implicit in this very demanding standard is the notion ... that invocation of the plain error doctrine is reserved for occasions requiring the reversal of the judgment under review.... [Thus, an appellant] cannot prevail under [the plain error doctrine] ... unless he demonstrates that the claimed error is both so clear and so harmful that a failure to reverse the judgment would result in manifest injustice." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Moore, 293 Conn. 781 , 823, 981 A.2d 1030 (2009), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 954 , 130 S. Ct. 3386 , 177 L.Ed. 2d 306 (2010). | 2 | 2011–2019 |
Johnson v. United States
green
2 sentences2019Implicit in this very demanding standard is the notion ... that invocation of the plain error doctrine is reserved for occasions requiring the reversal of the judgment under review.... [Thus, an appellant] cannot prevail under [the plain error doctrine] ... unless he demonstrates that the claimed error is both so clear and so harmful that a failure to reverse the judgment would result in manifest injustice." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Moore, 293 Conn. 781 , 823, 981 A.2d 1030 (2009), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 954 , 130 S. Ct. 3386 , 177 L.Ed. 2d 306 (2010). 2011Implicit in this very demanding standard is the notion . . . that invocation of the plain error doctrine is reserved for occasions requiring the reversal of the judgment under review. . . . [Thus, an appellant] cannot prevail under [the plain error doctrine] . . . unless he demonstrates that the claimed error is both so clear and so harmful that a failure to reverse the judgment would result in manifest injustice." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Moore, 293 Conn. 781, 822-23 , 981 A.2d 1030 (2009), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 3386 , 177 L.Ed.2d 306 (2010). | 2 | 2011–2019 |
Seacor Marine LLC v. Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc.
green
2 sentences2019Implicit in this very demanding standard is the notion ... that invocation of the plain error doctrine is reserved for occasions requiring the reversal of the judgment under review.... [Thus, an appellant] cannot prevail under [the plain error doctrine] ... unless he demonstrates that the claimed error is both so clear and so harmful that a failure to reverse the judgment would result in manifest injustice." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Moore, 293 Conn. 781 , 823, 981 A.2d 1030 (2009), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 954 , 130 S. Ct. 3386 , 177 L.Ed. 2d 306 (2010). 2011Implicit in this very demanding standard is the notion . . . that invocation of the plain error doctrine is reserved for occasions requiring the reversal of the judgment under review. . . . [Thus, an appellant] cannot prevail under [the plain error doctrine] . . . unless he demonstrates that the claimed error is both so clear and so harmful that a failure to reverse the judgment would result in manifest injustice." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Moore, 293 Conn. 781, 822-23 , 981 A.2d 1030 (2009), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 3386 , 177 L.Ed.2d 306 (2010). | 2 | 2011–2019 |
Estela v. Bristol Hospital, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018"An appellate court addressing a claim of plain error first must determine if the error is indeed plain in the sense that it is patent [or] readily [discernible] on the face of a factually adequate record, [and] also ... obvious in the sense of not debatable.... "[An appellant] cannot prevail under [the plain error doctrine] ... unless he demonstrates that the claimed error is both so clear and so harmful that a failure to reverse the judgment would result in manifest injustice." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Estela v. Bristol Hospital, Inc. , 179 Conn. App. 196 , 1 2018"An appellate court addressing a claim of plain error first must determine if the error is indeed plain in the sense that it is patent [or] readily [discernible] on the face of a factually adequate record, [and] also ... obvious in the sense of not debatable.... "[An appellant] cannot prevail under [the plain error doctrine] ... unless he demonstrates that the claimed error is both so clear and so harmful that a failure to reverse the judgment would result in manifest injustice." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Estela v. Bristol Hospital, Inc. , 179 Conn. App. 196 , 1 | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Cogswell v. American Transit Insurance
green
2 sentences2012Co., 282 Conn. 505, 521-22 , 923 A.2d 638 (2007). 2012Co., 282 Conn. 505, 521-22 , 923 A.2d 638 (2007). | 2 | 2010–2012 |
Chernick v. Johnston
neutral
2 sentences2008“Clear and convincing proof is a demanding standard denotfing] a degree of belief that lies between the belief that is required to find the truth or existence of the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecution. . . . [The burden] is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) C 2008“Clear and convincing proof is a demanding standard denotfing] a degree of belief that lies between the belief that is required to find the truth or existence of the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecution. . . . [The burden] is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) C | 2 | 2007–2008 |
Levine v. Psychiatric Security Review Board
green
2 sentences2008“Clear and convincing proof is a demanding standard denotfing] a degree of belief that lies between the belief that is required to find the truth or existence of the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecution. . . . [The burden] is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) C 2007“Clear and convincing proof is a demanding standard denoting] a degree of belief that lies between the belief that is required to find the truth or existence of the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecution. . . . [The burden] is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ch | 2 | 2007–2008 |
State v. Pagan
green
2 sentences2008“Clear and convincing proof is a demanding standard denotfing] a degree of belief that lies between the belief that is required to find the truth or existence of the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecution. . . . [The burden] is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) C 2007“Clear and convincing proof is a demanding standard denoting] a degree of belief that lies between the belief that is required to find the truth or existence of the [fact in issue] in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecution. . . . [The burden] is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ch | 2 | 2007–2008 |
| Somers v. Statewide Grievance Committee green | 2 | 2006–2006 |
| Alabama v. White green | 2 | 1995–2000 |
| Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Delgado green | 2 | 1997–1999 |
| Kahler v. Kansas green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| BE&K Construction Co. v. National Labor Relations Board green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| State v. Silva green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Texas v. Johnson green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Geisler green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Ruggiero v. Town of East Hartford green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Melillo v. City of New Haven green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Jazlowiecki v. Cyr green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Jackson green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Taylor green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.