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54 Ohio opinions name it 4 courts 1982–2025 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Alabama v. Whitegreen2 sentences2018As the United States Supreme Court has explained, "[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause." Alabama v. White , 496 U.S. 325 , 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990). 2018As the United States Supreme Court has explained, "[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause." Alabama v. White , 496 U.S. 325 , 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412 , 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990). | 3 | 21 |
United States v. James Howard Laughtongreen2 sentences2021United States v. Laughton, 409 F.3d 744, 748 (6th Cir.2005). 2018Id. at 748 , citing Leon at 914–23. | 2 | 3 |
In re J.C.green2 sentences2024Id.; In re J.C., 2019-Ohio-4815, ¶ 14 (1st Dist.), quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). 2024Hawkins at ¶ 20 .; In re J.C., 2019-Ohio-4815, ¶ 14 (1st Dist.). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Lowmangreen2 sentences2002See, e.g., State v. Lowman (1992), 82 Ohio App.3d 831 , 837 . {¶ 13} Appellant contends the court erred in denying appellant's motion to suppress in that Huron County police officers had no authority to stop appellant for violations that occurred in Sandusky County. {¶ 14} Initially, we note the well settled law which holds that information from a police officer's radio broadcast may provide the basis for an investigative stop even where the stopping officer lacks all of the underlying information which would justify the stop. 2001See, e.g ., State v. Lowman (1992), 82 Ohio App.3d 831 , 837 . | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Sokolowgreen2 sentences2022Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, and “considerably less” than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, but it demands more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’ ” Hawkins at ¶ 20, quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989), quoting Terry at 27 . 2022Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, and “considerably less” than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, but it demands more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’ ” Hawkins at ¶ 20, quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989), quoting Terry at 27 . | 1 | 6 |
Adams v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2017See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-146 , 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (“A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his [or her] identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.”). {¶ 43} “Reasonable suspicion” is a less demanding standard than “probable cause,” not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the 2017See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145-146 , 92 S.Ct. 1921 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (“A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his [or her] identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.”). {¶ 43} “Reasonable suspicion” is a less demanding standard than “probable cause,” not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the | 1 | 3 |
State v. Jenkinsgreen2 sentences1990This court, in State v. Jenkins (1976), 48 Ohio App. 2d 99, at 101 , construed the element of prior calculation and design stated that: "Prior calculation and design sets up a more demanding standard than the old first degree murder standard of 'deliberate and premeditated malice.' Prior calculation and design requires the accused to have killed purposefully after devising a plan or scheme to kill. 1982This court discussed the requirement of prior calculation and design in State v. Jenkins (1976), 48 Ohio App. 2d 99, at 101-102 [ 2 O.O.3d 73 ]: “Prior calculation and design sets up a more demanding standard than the old first degree murder standard of ‘deliberate and premeditated malice.’ Prior calculation and design requires the accused to have killed purposefully after devising a plan or scheme to kill. | 1 | 3 |
Seasons Coal Co. v. City of Clevelandgreen1 sentence2025Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984) (“The underlying rationale of giving deference to the findings of the trial court rests with the knowledge that the trial judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jonesgreen1 sentence2024Id. at ¶ 14, citing State v. Jones, 70 Ohio App.3d 554, 556-557 (2d Dist. 2019), citing Terry at 27 . {¶13} Mr. King challenges the foundation for the Terry stop, emphasizing that smoking marijuana in public and jaywalking are not arrestable offenses. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Maysgreen2 sentences2015See State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406 , 2008-Ohio-4539 , 894 N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 23 ; State v. Erkins, 1st Dist. 2015See State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406 , 2008-Ohio-4539 , 894 N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 23 ; State v. Erkins, 1st Dist. | 1 | 1 |
Baughman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurancegreen1 sentence2007See Baughman , 88 Ohio St.3d at 484 . | 1 | 1 |
Ohio v. Freemangreen2 sentences2001The United States Supreme Court, in Alabama v. White (1990), 496 U.S. 325 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 , noted that "[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause," but "like probable cause, [it] is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability." The information's "quantity and quality" must thus be considered under the "`totality of the circumstances' * * * that must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion." See id . at 330, 110 S.Ct. at 2416 ; accord State v. Freeman (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 291 2001The United States Supreme Court, in Alabama v. White (1990), 496 U.S. 325 , 110 S.Ct. 2412 , noted that "[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause," but "like probable cause, [it] is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability." The information's "quantity and quality" must thus be considered under the "`totality of the circumstances' * * * that must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion." See id . at 330, 110 S.Ct. at 2416 ; accord State v. Freeman (1980), 64 Ohio St.2d 291 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Georgegreen2 sentences2000Gates, supra; see, also, State v. George (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 325 , 333-34 , 544 N.E.2d 640 , 648-49 (Wright, J., concurring). 2000Gates, supra; see, also, State v. George (1989), 45 Ohio St.3d 325 , 333-34 , 544 N.E.2d 640 , 648-49 (Wright, J., concurring). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Illinois v. Gates
green
2 sentences2022"Probable cause is determined by examining the historical facts, i.e., the events leading up to a stop or search, 'viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer.'" Godwin, 2006-Ohio-3563 at ¶ 14, quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 (1996). "[P]robable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983). {¶18} The reasonable suspicion standard, on the other hand, 2022"Probable cause is determined by examining the historical facts, i.e., the events leading up to a stop or search, 'viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer.'" Godwin, 2006-Ohio-3563 at ¶ 14, quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 (1996). "[P]robable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983). {¶18} The reasonable suspicion standard, on the other hand, | 3 | 1993–2022 |
United States v. Cortez
green
2 sentences2022The totality of the circumstances must be considered through the “eyes of the reasonable and prudent police officer who must react to events as they unfold.” Hawkins at ¶ 21, quoting State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87-88 , 565 N.E.2d 1271 (1991). {¶16} The officers must have a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” Hawkins at ¶ 19, quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). 2022The totality of the circumstances must be considered through the “eyes of the reasonable and prudent police officer who must react to events as they unfold.” Hawkins at ¶ 21, quoting State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87-88 , 565 N.E.2d 1271 (1991). {¶16} The officers must have a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” Hawkins at ¶ 19, quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). | 2 | 2001–2022 |
State v. Andrews
green
2 sentences2022The totality of the circumstances must be considered through the “eyes of the reasonable and prudent police officer who must react to events as they unfold.” Hawkins at ¶ 21, quoting State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87-88 , 565 N.E.2d 1271 (1991). {¶16} The officers must have a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” Hawkins at ¶ 19, quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). 2022The totality of the circumstances must be considered through the “eyes of the reasonable and prudent police officer who must react to events as they unfold.” Hawkins at ¶ 21, quoting State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87-88 , 565 N.E.2d 1271 (1991). {¶16} The officers must have a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” Hawkins at ¶ 19, quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). | 2 | 2001–2022 |
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams
red
2 sentences2004The narrow interpretation of the disability terms encompassed within our review was necessary as “these terms need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled.” Williams, 534 U.S. at 197 , 122 S.Ct. 681 , 151 L.Ed.2d 615 . 2004The narrow interpretation of the disability terms encompassed within our review was necessary as “these terms need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled.” Williams, 534 U.S. at 197 , 122 S.Ct. 681 , 151 L.Ed.2d 615 . | 2 | 2004–2011 |
David Neely v. Benchmark Family Services
green
1 sentence2024This “is not meant to be a demanding standard.” Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Ornelas v. United States
green
2 sentences2022"Probable cause is determined by examining the historical facts, i.e., the events leading up to a stop or search, 'viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer.'" Godwin, 2006-Ohio-3563 at ¶ 14, quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 (1996). "[P]robable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983). {¶18} The reasonable suspicion standard, on the other hand, 2022"Probable cause is determined by examining the historical facts, i.e., the events leading up to a stop or search, 'viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer.'" Godwin, 2006-Ohio-3563 at ¶ 14, quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 (1996). "[P]robable cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 , 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983). {¶18} The reasonable suspicion standard, on the other hand, | 1 | 2022–2022 |
United States v. Di Re
green
2 sentences2021In United PICKAWAY, 20CA05 17 States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587 , 68 S.Ct. 222 , 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948), the United States Supreme Court held that probable cause to search a car does not mean that “a person, by mere presence in a suspected car, loses immunities from search of his person to which he would otherwise be entitled.” Id. at 587, 68 S.Ct. 222 . 2021In United PICKAWAY, 20CA05 17 States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587 , 68 S.Ct. 222 , 92 L.Ed. 210 (1948), the United States Supreme Court held that probable cause to search a car does not mean that “a person, by mere presence in a suspected car, loses immunities from search of his person to which he would otherwise be entitled.” Id. at 587, 68 S.Ct. 222 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Malley v. Briggs
green
2 sentences2020This demanding standard protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 , 106 S.Ct. 1092 , 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). 2020This demanding standard protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 , 106 S.Ct. 1092 , 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Schwendeman
green
2 sentences2020Athens No. 17CA7, 2018-Ohio-240 , 104 N.E.3d 44, ¶ 19 . {¶ 24} Appellant cites the definition of “tend” in support of his argument that a less demanding standard should apply under newly amended R.C. 2901.05. 2020Athens No. 17CA7, 2018-Ohio-240 , 104 N.E.3d 44, ¶ 19 . {¶ 24} Appellant cites the definition of “tend” in support of his argument that a less demanding standard should apply under newly amended R.C. 2901.05. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State ex rel. Husband v. Shanahan (Slip Opinion)
green
1 sentence2020Husband v. Shanahan, 157 Ohio St.3d 148 , 2019-Ohio-1853 , 133 N.E.3d 467 , we overrule that decision as having been incorrectly decided and inconsistent with the clear terms of the Rules of Superintendence. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Ratliff
green
1 sentence2020Id. -5- Butler CA2019-09-161 {¶ 10} The reasonable suspicion standard, on the other hand, is a less demanding standard than probable cause but still requires more than an officer's undeveloped suspicion or hunch. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Warner v. Waste Management, Inc.
green
1 sentence2007Bank (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 67 , 77-78 , citing Warner v. Waste Management, Inc. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 91 , 98 . {¶ 11} The typicality requirement has generally been liberally applied, and the courts have acknowledged that it is not a demanding requirement. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
green
1 sentence2007The United States Supreme Court held that "[t]he States * * * may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages when liability is not based on knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, and the private defamation plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding standard than the New York Times test may recover compensation only for actual injury." Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus; see, also, Horvath , supra, at 19, quoting Thomas H. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Hamilton v. Ohio Savings Bank
green
1 sentence2007Bank (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 67 , 77-78 , citing Warner v. Waste Management, Inc. (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 91 , 98 . {¶ 11} The typicality requirement has generally been liberally applied, and the courts have acknowledged that it is not a demanding requirement. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Barker v. Dayton Walther Corp.
green
2 sentences2004Appellant’s second assignment of error is without merit. {¶ 44} In addition, regardless of the existence or nonexistence of a disability, “the public policy of Ohio proscribing discrimination against persons with physical handicaps does not extend so far as to require an employer to *80 continue the employment of a disabled employee who is unable to perform his [or her] job duties as a result of work-related injury.” Barker v. Dayton Walther Corp. (1989), 56 Ohio App.3d 1, 4 , 564 N.E.2d 738 . 2004Appellant’s second assignment of error is without merit. {¶ 44} In addition, regardless of the existence or nonexistence of a disability, “the public policy of Ohio proscribing discrimination against persons with physical handicaps does not extend so far as to require an employer to *80 continue the employment of a disabled employee who is unable to perform his [or her] job duties as a result of work-related injury.” Barker v. Dayton Walther Corp. (1989), 56 Ohio App.3d 1, 4 , 564 N.E.2d 738 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2002State v. Smith (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 284 , 288 , 574 N.E.2d 510 , cert. denied (1992), 502 U.S. 110 . * * * `[R]easonable suspicion' is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop. 2002State v. Smith (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 284 , 288 , 574 N.E.2d 510 , cert. denied (1992), 502 U.S. 110 . * * * `[R]easonable suspicion' is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
1 sentence2000Id. , citing Terry at 30 . * * * "[R]easonable suspicion' is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.