speedy trial violation in Colorado

2026Moody v. Corsentino, 843 P.2d 1355, 1363 (Colo. 1993) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)); see also People v. Chavez, 779 P.2d 375, 376 (Colo. 1989) (noting the Barker test also governs the determination of a speedy trial claim under the Colorado Constitution).

2025Moody, 843 P.2d at 1363 (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)); see also People v. Chavez, 779 P.2d 375, 376 (Colo. 1989) (noting the Barker test also governs the determination of a speedy trial claim under the Colorado Constitution).

2026Moody v. Corsentino, 843 P.2d 1355, 1363 (Colo. 1993) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)); see also People v. Chavez, 779 P.2d 375, 376 (Colo. 1989) (noting the Barker test also governs the determination of a speedy trial claim under the Colorado Constitution).

2025Moody, 843 P.2d at 1363 (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)); see also People v. Chavez, 779 P.2d 375, 376 (Colo. 1989) (noting the Barker test also governs the determination of a speedy trial claim under the Colorado Constitution).

2026Moody v. Corsentino, 843 P.2d 1355, 1363 (Colo. 1993) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)); see also People v. Chavez, 779 P.2d 375, 376 (Colo. 1989) (noting the Barker test also governs the determination of a speedy trial claim under the Colorado Constitution).

2025Moody, 843 P.2d at 1363 (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)); see also People v. Chavez, 779 P.2d 375, 376 (Colo. 1989) (noting the Barker test also governs the determination of a speedy trial claim under the Colorado Constitution).

2026See People v. DeGreat, 2020 CO 25, ¶ 17 (“It is well-settled law that the burden of compliance with the speedy trial requirement rests with the prosecution and the trial court.”).

2021DeGreat , ¶ 17 , 461 P.3d at 15 -16 .

2010Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 83 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972); Smail, 631 P.2d at 154 ; see also Chavez, TTY P.2d at 376 (the Barker test also governs the determination of a speedy trial claim made under article II, section 16 of the Colorado Constitution).

1994Id.

2025Id.

2011Gallagher v. District Court, 933 P.2d 583, 592 (Colo.1997) (holding dismissal of charges nee-essary when trial court's unreasonable refusal to try to appoint defense counsel who could appear within the speedy trial period caused the delay); Arledge, 938 P.2d at 167 (finding that recused trial judge acted inappropriately when he obtained a speedy trial waiver instead of immediately dispatching the case for reassignment).

2025See People v. Taylor, 2020 COA 79, ¶ 18 (“The remedy for a speedy trial violation is dismissal of charges with prejudice.”).

2024People v. Taylor, 2020 COA 79, ¶ 18 , 467 P.3d 1272 , 1275.

2011Hills relies on our decision in Tasset v. Yeager, in which we stated "the alleged delay caused by appellee's counsel in rejecting the proposed trial dates is not the type of delay" attributable to the defendant in the speedy trial analysis. 195 Colo. 190, 192 , 576 P.2d 558, 559 (1978).

2011Hills relies on our decision in Tasset v. Yeager, in which we stated "the alleged delay caused by appellee's counsel in rejecting the proposed trial dates is not the type of delay" attributable to the defendant in the speedy trial analysis. 195 Colo. 190, 192 , 576 P.2d 558, 559 (1978).

2008Dodge v. People, 178 Colo. 71, 73 , 495 P.2d 218, 214 (1972); see also Horton v. Suthers, 43 P.3d 611, 616 (Colo.2002) (citing Dodge for the proposition that "an alleged speedy trial violation is not properly asserted in a petition for writ of habeas corpus").

2002For example, we have held *616 that a petitioner's allegation that his confession was coerced is not a justiciable issue in a habeas corpus proceeding, Shearer v. Patterson, 159 Colo. 319, 320 , 411 P.2d 247, 248 (1966); that an alleged speedy trial violation is not properly asserted in a petition for writ of habeas corpus, Dodge v. People, 178 Colo. 71, 73 , 495 P.2d 213, 214 (1972), that an attempt to restore good time credits is not properly asserted in a petition for writ of habeas corpus, Kodama v. Johnson, 786 P.2d 417, 419-20 (Colo.1990), and that an ineffective assistance of counsel cl

2007This contention is more appropriately addressed by the trial court as a speedy trial claim under Barker v. Wingo, supra. See People v. Whittiker, supra, - P.3d at - (citing Rheuark v. Show, 628 F.2d 297 , 303 n. 8 (5th Cir.1980)).

2007See Rheuark v. Shaw, supra, 628 F.2d at 303 n. 8.

2025Because the delay exceeded one year, this factor weighs in favor of finding a speedy trial violation and requires us to analyze the remaining three Barker factors. 17 ¶ 42 Second, “delay caused by the defense weighs against the defendant.” Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 90 (2009); see People v. Jamerson, 596 P.2d 764, 768 (1979).

2025Because the delay exceeded one year, this factor weighs in favor of finding a speedy trial violation and requires us to analyze the remaining three Barker factors. 17 ¶ 42 Second, “delay caused by the defense weighs against the defendant.” Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 90 (2009); see People v. Jamerson, 596 P.2d 764, 768 (1979).

2025See Forgette v. People, 2023 CO 4, ¶ 28 (“Waiver is ‘the intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege.’” (quoting People v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶ 39 )). ¶ 27 Similarly, we reject the People’s alternative contention that Mares forfeited any challenge to the error and, presumably, that the error was not plain.7 As noted, a speedy trial violation is not subject to any review for prejudice; the statute mandates reversal. § 18-1-405; Novotny, ¶ 26.

2025See Forgette v. People, 2023 CO 4, ¶ 28 (“Waiver is ‘the intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege.’” (quoting People v. Rediger, 2018 CO 32, ¶ 39 )). ¶ 27 Similarly, we reject the People’s alternative contention that Mares forfeited any challenge to the error and, presumably, that the error was not plain.7 As noted, a speedy trial violation is not subject to any review for prejudice; the statute mandates reversal. § 18-1-405; Novotny, ¶ 26.

2025“The burden of compliance with the speedy trial requirement . . . rests wholly with the [prosecution] and the trial court.” People v. Sherwood, 2021 CO 61 , ¶ 23, 489 P.3d 1233, 1239 . 12 ¶ 35 The speedy trial statute “makes specific provision for the effect of a request for a continuance on the speedy trial calculation.” Duncan, 31 P.3d at 876 .

2025As noted above, section 18-1-405(3) says that, “[i]f a trial date has been fixed by the court, and thereafter the defendant requests and is granted a continuance for trial, the period within which the trial shall be had is extended for an additional six-month period from the date upon which the continuance was granted.” ¶ 36 “[T]he key to interpreting subsection 405(3) is not whether the defendant caused the delay, but whether a continuance was granted at the defendant’s request.” Duncan, 31 P.3d at 876-77 (citation omitted).

2024Each provision of a statute must be construed in harmony with the overall statutory scheme to accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted.” People in Interest of J.M.N., 39 P.3d 1261, 1263 (Colo. App. 2001); see also Martin v. People, 27 P.3d 846, 852 (Colo. 2001) (discussing the principle of statutory construction that specific provisions prevail over general provisions). 10 ¶ 24 The People assert that the speedy trial analysis requires only a determination of whether the trial court correctly applied the open- ended good cause standard found in section 19-2.5-904(3).

2024Each provision of a statute must be construed in harmony with the overall statutory scheme to accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted.” People in Interest of J.M.N., 39 P.3d 1261, 1263 (Colo. App. 2001); see also Martin v. People, 27 P.3d 846, 852 (Colo. 2001) (discussing the principle of statutory construction that specific provisions prevail over general provisions). 10 ¶ 24 The People assert that the speedy trial analysis requires only a determination of whether the trial court correctly applied the open- ended good cause standard found in section 19-2.5-904(3).

2017See Watson v. People, 700 P.2d 544, 549 (Colo. 1985) (reversing the judgment of conviction entered against the defendant by the district court where the speedy trial statute was violated); People v. Castro, 854 P.2d 1262, 1265-66 (Colo. 1993) (affirming the comí; of appeals’ reversal of the defendant’s conviction where the trial court erroneously granted a continuance and the defendant’s right to speedy trial was violated).

2017See Watson v. People, 700 P.2d 544, 549 (Colo. 1985) (reversing the judgment of conviction entered against the defendant by the district court where the speedy trial statute was violated); People v. Castro, 854 P.2d 1262 , 1265–66 (Colo. 1993) (affirming the court of appeals’ reversal of the defendant’s 12 conviction where the trial court erroneously granted a continuance and the defendant’s right to speedy trial was violated).

2017See Watson v. People, 700 P.2d 544, 549 (Colo. 1985) (reversing the judgment of conviction entered against the defendant by the district court where the speedy trial statute was violated); People v. Castro, 854 P.2d 1262, 1265-66 (Colo. 1993) (affirming the comí; of appeals’ reversal of the defendant’s conviction where the trial court erroneously granted a continuance and the defendant’s right to speedy trial was violated).

2017See Watson v. People, 700 P.2d 544, 549 (Colo. 1985) (reversing the judgment of conviction entered against the defendant by the district court where the speedy trial statute was violated); People v. Castro, 854 P.2d 1262 , 1265–66 (Colo. 1993) (affirming the court of appeals’ reversal of the defendant’s 12 conviction where the trial court erroneously granted a continuance and the defendant’s right to speedy trial was violated).

2014See United States v. Alston, 412 A.2d 351, 357 (D.C.1980) (Sixth Amendment does not guarantee that "the speedy trial clock continues to run during the pendency" of appeals); see also State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281 , 660 P.2d 1208, 1225-26 (1983); Lopez v. State, 105 Nev. 68 , 769 P.2d 1276, 1288-89 (1989).

2014See United States v. Alston, 412 A.2d 351, 357 (D.C.1980) (Sixth Amendment does not guarantee that "the speedy trial clock continues to run during the pendency" of appeals); see also State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281 , 660 P.2d 1208, 1225-26 (1983); Lopez v. State, 105 Nev. 68 , 769 P.2d 1276, 1288-89 (1989).

2014Most courts addressing the issue have adopted a modified version of the four-factor speedy trial analysis articulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)-an "ad hoe" balancing test that weighs the "(length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant." See Hawkins, 78 F.3d at 350-51 ; Chatman v. Mancill, 280 Ga. 253 , 626 S.E.2d 102, 107 (2006); State v. Berrmam, 360 N.C. 209 , 624 S.E.2d 350, 860 (2006); Bhutto v. State, 114 P.3d 1252, 1267 (Wyo.2005). 47 Other courts have rejected the Bark

2014Most courts addressing the issue have adopted a modified version of the four-factor speedy trial analysis articulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)-an "ad hoe" balancing test that weighs the "(length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant." See Hawkins, 78 F.3d at 350-51 ; Chatman v. Mancill, 280 Ga. 253 , 626 S.E.2d 102, 107 (2006); State v. Berrmam, 360 N.C. 209 , 624 S.E.2d 350, 860 (2006); Bhutto v. State, 114 P.3d 1252, 1267 (Wyo.2005). 47 Other courts have rejected the Bark

2014See United States v. Alston, 412 A.2d 351, 357 (D.C.1980) (Sixth Amendment does not guarantee that "the speedy trial clock continues to run during the pendency" of appeals); see also State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281 , 660 P.2d 1208, 1225-26 (1983); Lopez v. State, 105 Nev. 68 , 769 P.2d 1276, 1288-89 (1989).

2014Most courts addressing the issue have adopted a modified version of the four-factor speedy trial analysis articulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)-an "ad hoe" balancing test that weighs the "(length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant." See Hawkins, 78 F.3d at 350-51 ; Chatman v. Mancill, 280 Ga. 253 , 626 S.E.2d 102, 107 (2006); State v. Berrmam, 360 N.C. 209 , 624 S.E.2d 350, 860 (2006); Bhutto v. State, 114 P.3d 1252, 1267 (Wyo.2005). 47 Other courts have rejected the Bark

2014Most courts addressing the issue have adopted a modified version of the four-factor speedy trial analysis articulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)-an "ad hoe" balancing test that weighs the "(length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant." See Hawkins, 78 F.3d at 350-51 ; Chatman v. Mancill, 280 Ga. 253 , 626 S.E.2d 102, 107 (2006); State v. Berrmam, 360 N.C. 209 , 624 S.E.2d 350, 860 (2006); Bhutto v. State, 114 P.3d 1252, 1267 (Wyo.2005). 47 Other courts have rejected the Bark

2014Most courts addressing the issue have adopted a modified version of the four-factor speedy trial analysis articulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)-an "ad hoe" balancing test that weighs the "(length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant." See Hawkins, 78 F.3d at 350-51 ; Chatman v. Mancill, 280 Ga. 253 , 626 S.E.2d 102, 107 (2006); State v. Berrmam, 360 N.C. 209 , 624 S.E.2d 350, 860 (2006); Bhutto v. State, 114 P.3d 1252, 1267 (Wyo.2005). 47 Other courts have rejected the Bark