speedy trial analysis in New Mexico

2026Length of delay 4 {14} The initial Barker factor, the length of delay, serves “a dual function: it acts 5 as a triggering mechanism for considering the four Barker factors if the delay crosses 6 the threshold of being ‘presumptively prejudicial,’ and it is an independent factor to 7 consider in evaluating whether a speedy trial violation has occurred.” Serros, 2016- 8 NMSC-008, ¶ 22 (quoting Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 21, 23 ).

2026See, e.g., State v. Samora, 2016- 8 NMSC-031, ¶ 23, 387 P.3d 230 (“To find a speedy trial violation without a showing 9 of actual prejudice, the Court must find that the three other Barker factors weigh 10 heavily against the [s]tate.” (citing Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 39 )). 11 {41} Judicial insistence on the use of this all-or-nothing, three-factor approach, 12 assuming it to be sound when applied to a typical speedy trial scenario, 5 is 13 unreasonable in the limited circumstances presented here as well as those presented 14 in Stock, where fairness dictates us to be “unwilling to put a great

2025DISCUSSION {2} To determine whether a speedy trial violation has occurred, we consider the four factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972): “(1) the length of delay in bringing the case to trial, (2) the reasons for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay.” State v. Radler, 2019-NMCA-052 , ¶ 7, 448 P.3d 613 (text only) (citation omitted).

2024The victims’ testimony received at trial was sufficient to support the verdicts reached below. {5} Defendant next asserts that his right to a speedy trial was violated and proceeds to argue the four-factor test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). [BIC 19- 25] Defendant did file a motion to dismiss below, relying on the six-month rule from Rule 6-506 NMRA, Rule 7-506 NMRA, and Rule 8-506 NMRA. [1 RP 180] Defendant did not, however, proffer any argument regarding the Barker factors and, instead, his motion to dismiss “was couched in a belief that the six-month rule . . . applied t

2026Prejudice and balancing the Barker factors 10 {39} As for the fourth and final factor, this Court recognized in Serros that, 11 “[o]rdinarily, a defendant bears the burden of proof on this factor by showing 12 ‘particularized prejudice’ when claiming a speedy trial violation.” 2016-NMSC-008 , 13 ¶ 86 (citation omitted).

2026See Serros, 2016-NMSC-008, ¶ 26 (“A delay that scarcely crosses the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim is of little help to a defendant claiming a speedy trial violation.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see, e.g., Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 23-24 (concluding that a delay of just over a month beyond the presumptively prejudicial threshold for simple cases weighed only slightly in favor of defendant).

2023Defendant’s Right to Speedy Trial Was Not Violated 2 {4} In a speedy trial analysis,1 “we give deference to the district court’s factual 3 findings, but we review the weighing and the balancing of the . . . factors de novo.” 4 State v. Spearman, 2012-NMSC-023, ¶ 19 , 283 P.3d 272 (alterations, internal 5 quotation marks, and citation omitted).

2023ORDER THOMSON, Chief Justice. {100} WHEREAS, this matter came on for consideration by the Court upon Defendant’s motion for rehearing and brief in support filed pursuant to Rule 12-404 NMRA, requesting reconsideration of the Court’s opinion in State v. Gurule, 2025-NMSC-010 , 536 P.3d 775 ; {101} WHEREAS, a motion for rehearing “shall state briefly and with particularity, but without argument, the points of law or fact which in the opinion of the movant the court has overlooked or misapprehended,” Rule 12-404(A) (emphasis added); {102} WHEREAS, as grounds for his motion, Defendant’s primary ar

2026But see Ochoa, 2017-NMSC-031, ¶¶ 15, 17 (determining that a two- 5 year delay in a complex case, “while sufficient to trigger the speedy trial analysis, 6 . . . was not extraordinary” and thus weighed only slightly against the state).

2025In doing so, “[w]e defer to the district court’s factual findings in considering a speedy trial claim, but weigh each factor de novo.” State v. Ochoa, 2017-NMSC-031 , ¶ 4, 406 P.3d 505 . “[F]actual findings of a district court are entitled to substantial deference and will be reversed only for clear error.” State v. Gurule, 2025-NMSC-010 , ¶ 20, ___ P.3d ___ (S-1-SC-37879, Dec. 7, 2023) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[W]hen a district court considers the Barker factors and supporting factual findings are not clearly in error, the district court’s judgment of how opposing con

2025See State v. Samora, 2016-NMSC-031, ¶ 23 , 387 P.3d 230 (“To find a speedy trial violation without a showing of actual prejudice, the Court must find that the three other Barker factors weigh heavily against the [s]tate.”).

2024See Samora, 2016-NMSC-031, ¶ 23 (“To find a speedy trial violation without a showing of actual prejudice, the Court must find that the three other Barker factors weigh heavily against the [s]tate.”).

2026See Garza, 2009-NMSC-038 , 10 ¶ 13 (“This analysis specifically rejects inflexible, bright-line approaches to 11 analyzing a speedy trial claim.”); see also Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 , 12 655 (1992) (recognizing that “excessive delay presumptively compromises the 13 reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify,” 14 and acknowledging that “affirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not essential 15 to every speedy trial claim”). 6 The Court of Appeals in Stock made no mention of the presumed prejudice standard, apparently as a resu

2023As to the third factor—the assertion of the right—the defendant need only show that they have “asserted [their] right, and not acquiesced to the delay.” Id. {47} This approach is consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992), a case relied on by Garza, where the Court found a speedy trial violation based on excessive delay attributed to the negligence of the state, weighing heavily in favor of the defendant on the first two factors.

2017See State v. Plouse, 2003-NMCA-048, ¶ 42 , 133 N.M. 495 , 3 64 P.3d 522 (“We give due deference to the district court’s findings as to the level of 4 complexity.”), abrogated on other grounds by Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 47-48 . 5 The parties also agree that the delay of 23 months exceeded the 15-month benchmark 6 for cases of intermediate complexity, and thus a speedy trial analysis is triggered.

2017See State v. Plouse, 2003-NMCA-048, ¶ 42 , 133 N.M. 495 , 3 64 P.3d 522 (“We give due deference to the district court’s findings as to the level of 4 complexity.”), abrogated on other grounds by Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 47-48 . 5 The parties also agree that the delay of 23 months exceeded the 15-month benchmark 6 for cases of intermediate complexity, and thus a speedy trial analysis is triggered.

2015Citing Salandre v. State, 1991-NMSC-016 , 111 12 N.M. 422 , 806 P.2d 562 , Defendant asserts that “[i]n order to show there has been no 13 prejudice, the State must show there has been no anxiety and concern.” [MIO 10] 14 Defendant has conflated the significance of “presumptive prejudice” and “actual 15 prejudice.” The former is simply the term that has been assigned to the threshold, 16 mechanical inquiry that triggers the speedy trial analysis.

2015Citing Salandre v. State, 1991-NMSC-016 , 111 N.M. 12 422, 806 P.2d 562 , he asserts that “the State must show there has been no anxiety and 13 concern.” Defendant has conflated the significance of “presumptive prejudice” and 14 “actual prejudice.” The former is simply the term that has been assigned to the 15 threshold, mechanical inquiry that triggers the speedy trial analysis.

2024See State v. Coffin, 1999-NMSC-038, ¶ 57 , 128 N.M. 192 , 991 P.2d 477 (“[W]e have determined that the [district] court is in the best position to determine the complexity of a case.”); Flores, 2015-NMCA-081, ¶ 6 (stating that the appellate courts give deference to the district court as to the level of complexity of the case). {11} Accordingly, the threshold for triggering a speedy trial analysis in this simple case was twelve months from the date Defendant’s speedy trial rights attached.

2024See State v. Coffin, 1999-NMSC-038, ¶ 57 , 128 N.M. 192 , 991 P.2d 477 (“[W]e have determined that the [district] court is in the best position to determine the complexity of a case.”); Flores, 2015-NMCA-081, ¶ 6 (stating that the appellate courts give deference to the district court as to the level of complexity of the case). {11} Accordingly, the threshold for triggering a speedy trial analysis in this simple case was twelve months from the date Defendant’s speedy trial rights attached.

2023New Mexico adopted the Barker factor analysis in Zurla v. State, 1990-NMSC-011 , 109 N.M. 640 , 789 P.2d 588 . 2 1 “amorphous, slippery, and necessarily relative.” Id. (text only)3 (citation omitted). 2 “Therefore, the substance of the speedy trial right is defined only through an analysis 3 of the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case.” Id. 4 {4} The first step in determining whether there has been a speedy trial violation is 5 to divide the overall trial delay into discrete periods to allow for manageable units 6 of analysis.

2023New Mexico adopted the Barker factor analysis in Zurla v. State, 1990-NMSC-011 , 109 N.M. 640 , 789 P.2d 588 . 2 1 “amorphous, slippery, and necessarily relative.” Id. (text only)3 (citation omitted). 2 “Therefore, the substance of the speedy trial right is defined only through an analysis 3 of the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case.” Id. 4 {4} The first step in determining whether there has been a speedy trial violation is 5 to divide the overall trial delay into discrete periods to allow for manageable units 6 of analysis.

1995As we understand the thrust of that opinion, delay caused by judicial review (appellate or collateral) should not be considered under a speedy-trial claim until the defendant meets “the heavy burden of showing an unreasonable delay caused by the prosecution in that [review], or a wholly unjustifiable delay by the [reviewing] court.” Id. at 316 , 106 S.Ct. at 657 .

1995As we understand the thrust of that opinion, delay caused by judicial review (appellate or collateral) should not be considered under a speedy-trial claim until the defendant meets “the heavy burden of showing an unreasonable delay caused by the prosecution in that [review], or a wholly unjustifiable delay by the [reviewing] court.” Id. at 316 , 106 S.Ct. at 657 .

2016See Taylor, 2015-NMCA-012, ¶¶ 4, 18 (holding that where the defendant asserted the right to a speedy trial in magistrate court, stipulated that the delay caused by the defendant’s motion to continue would not count against the state for the purpose of a speedy trial analysis, and filed a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds the day prior to trial, the defendant adequately asserted the right to a speedy trial right and did not acquiesce to delay); Moreno, 2010-NMCA-044, ¶ 35 (holding that where the defendant made a pro forma assertion of the right to a speedy trial and filed a pro se motio

2016See Taylor, 2015-NMCA-012, ¶¶ 11-12, 16-17 (holding that approximately nineteen months of negligent and administrative delay weighed heavily against the government in a simple case and supported a speedy trial violation in the absence of particularized prejudice); State v. Flores, 2015-NMCA-081, ¶ 37 , 355 P.3d 81 , cert. denied, 2015-NMCERT-008 , 369 P.3d 368 (holding that thirty-six months of negligent and 10 administrative delay attributable to the State in a case with a presumptively prejudicial period of eighteen months supported a speedy trial violation without a particularized showing o

2026See Garza, 2009-NMSC-038 , 10 ¶ 13 (“This analysis specifically rejects inflexible, bright-line approaches to 11 analyzing a speedy trial claim.”); see also Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 , 12 655 (1992) (recognizing that “excessive delay presumptively compromises the 13 reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify,” 14 and acknowledging that “affirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not essential 15 to every speedy trial claim”). 6 The Court of Appeals in Stock made no mention of the presumed prejudice standard, apparently as a resu

2015The State does not dispute that this substantial delay is 3 sufficient to trigger the speedy trial analysis. 4 Length of Delay 5 {8} “In determining the weight to be given to the length of delay, we consider the 6 extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger 7 judicial examination of the claim.” State v. Stock, 2006-NMCA-140, ¶ 13 , 140 N.M. 8 676, 147 P.3d 885 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2023See State v. Garcia, 2019-NMCA-056 , ¶ 38, 450 P.3d 418 (explaining that this Court has the discretion to review an unpreserved speedy trial argument for fundamental error). {9} We review a speedy trial claim for fundamental error only where there has been a “striking violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial.” State v. Rojo, 1999- NMSC-001, ¶ 53, 126 N.M. 438 , 971 P.2d 829 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2023See State v. Garcia, 2019-NMCA-056 , ¶ 38, 450 P.3d 418 (explaining that this Court has the discretion to review an unpreserved speedy trial argument for fundamental error). {9} We review a speedy trial claim for fundamental error only where there has been a “striking violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial.” State v. Rojo, 1999- NMSC-001, ¶ 53, 126 N.M. 438 , 971 P.2d 829 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2023See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 2016-NMSC-024, ¶ 16 , 376 P.3d 184 (rejecting a speedy trial claim in a case involving a twenty-eight month delay entailing continuous pretrial incarceration, where the factors did not weigh heavily in the defendant’s favor and the defendant failed to demonstrate particularized prejudice); Samora, 2016-NMSC-024 , ¶¶ 22-23 (rejecting a speedy trial argument where the extraordinary length of the delay weighed heavily against the state, but the reasons for the delay weighed only slightly against the state, the defendant did not meaningfully assert his speedy trial righ

2017Where that possibility is realized and the 6 defendant suffers actual prejudice as a result of delay, these guidelines will not 7 preclude the defendant from bringing a motion for a speedy trial violation though the 8 delay may be less than one year.”); see also State v. Smith, 2016-NMSC-007, ¶ 59 , 9 367 P.3d 420 (noting that “[the d]efendant must still show particularized prejudice 10 cognizable under his constitutional right to a speedy trial and demonstrate that, on the 11 whole, the Barker factors weigh in his favor”). 12 {29} Defendant only asserts that he was prejudiced by being in cust

2019If it is presumptively prejudicial, 6 we balance the length of the delay against the remaining three factors to assess 7 whether the constitution has been violated.” State v. Laney, 2003-NMCA-144 , ¶ 8 11, 134 N.M. 648 , 81 P.3d 591 ; see Ochoa, 2017-NMSC-031, ¶ 12 (describing the 9 length of delay as both the threshold question in the speedy trial analysis and one 10 factor to be weighed with the other three Barker factors).

2019If it is presumptively prejudicial, 6 we balance the length of the delay against the remaining three factors to assess 7 whether the constitution has been violated.” State v. Laney, 2003-NMCA-144 , ¶ 8 11, 134 N.M. 648 , 81 P.3d 591 ; see Ochoa, 2017-NMSC-031, ¶ 12 (describing the 9 length of delay as both the threshold question in the speedy trial analysis and one 10 factor to be weighed with the other three Barker factors).

2019See State v. Maddox, 2008-NMSC-062, ¶ 24 , 145 N.M. 242 , 195 P.3d 1254 (“Generally, there is no rule attributing delay resulting from attempted plea negotiations to a specific party and absent some act of bad faith . . . plea negotiations are themselves not a factor to be held against either party” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), abrogated on other grounds by Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 46-47 ; Brown, 2017-NMCA- 046, ¶ 22 (stating plea negotiations generally should not be weighed against either party in a speedy trial analysis); see also Wilson, 2010-NMCA-018, ¶ 33 (“[D]elay fr

2019See State v. Maddox, 2008-NMSC-062, ¶ 24 , 145 N.M. 242 , 195 P.3d 1254 (“Generally, there is no rule attributing delay resulting from attempted plea negotiations to a specific party and absent some act of bad faith . . . plea negotiations are themselves not a factor to be held against either party” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), abrogated on other grounds by Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 46-47 ; Brown, 2017-NMCA- 046, ¶ 22 (stating plea negotiations generally should not be weighed against either party in a speedy trial analysis); see also Wilson, 2010-NMCA-018, ¶ 33 (“[D]elay fr

2024See State v. Coffin, 1999-NMSC-038, ¶ 57 , 128 N.M. 192 , 991 P.2d 477 (“[W]e have determined that the [district] court is in the best position to determine the complexity of a case.”); Flores, 2015-NMCA-081, ¶ 6 (stating that the appellate courts give deference to the district court as to the level of complexity of the case). {11} Accordingly, the threshold for triggering a speedy trial analysis in this simple case was twelve months from the date Defendant’s speedy trial rights attached.

2021See State v. Flores, 2015-NMCA-081, ¶ 37 , 355 P.3d 81 (reversing convictions because of a speedy trial violation and remanding with instructions to dismiss the charges).

2024See id. ¶ 33 (finding a speedy trial violation because no factor weighed for the state); Vigil-Giron, 2014-NMCA-069, ¶ 69 (same); see also State v. Moreno, 2010-NMCA-044, ¶ 38 , 148 N.M. 253 , 233 P.3d 782 (finding a speedy trial violation when every factor weighed for the defendant even though none weighed heavily).

2024See id. ¶ 33 (finding a speedy trial violation because no factor weighed for the state); Vigil-Giron, 2014-NMCA-069, ¶ 69 (same); see also State v. Moreno, 2010-NMCA-044, ¶ 38 , 148 N.M. 253 , 233 P.3d 782 (finding a speedy trial violation when every factor weighed for the defendant even though none weighed heavily).

2015The State does not dispute that this substantial delay is 3 sufficient to trigger the speedy trial analysis. 4 Length of Delay 5 {8} “In determining the weight to be given to the length of delay, we consider the 6 extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger 7 judicial examination of the claim.” State v. Stock, 2006-NMCA-140, ¶ 13 , 140 N.M. 8 676, 147 P.3d 885 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2014See State v. Stock, 2006-NMCA-140, ¶ 12 , 140 N.M. 676 , 147 P.3d 885 (“When a speedy trial claim is made, the defendant must make a threshold showing that the length of delay is presumptively prejudicial.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {48} The effect of a “triggering date” comports with the notion that pending criminal charges are naturally associated with some degree of stress, anxiety, and adverse social and familial effects, and therefore, until that suffering is protracted beyond the date that it is reasonable to expect a resolution, such suffering will not be weighed

2026Instead, defendants “may rely upon and assert their right to a speedy trial whenever they believe impermissible delay has occurred; whether that delay is the result of a dismissal and refiling or any other cause.” State v. Savedra, 2010-NMSC-025, ¶ 9 , 148 N.M. 301 , 236 P.3d 20 (describing the six- month-rule as “an unnecessary and sometimes counterproductive method for protecting a defendant’s right to a speedy trial”). {12} The factors to be considered in assessing an alleged speedy trial violation in district court, as enumerated in the rule, mirror the Barker factors, with the additional

2026Instead, defendants “may rely upon and assert their right to a speedy trial whenever they believe impermissible delay has occurred; whether that delay is the result of a dismissal and refiling or any other cause.” State v. Savedra, 2010-NMSC-025, ¶ 9 , 148 N.M. 301 , 236 P.3d 20 (describing the six- month-rule as “an unnecessary and sometimes counterproductive method for protecting a defendant’s right to a speedy trial”). {12} The factors to be considered in assessing an alleged speedy trial violation in district court, as enumerated in the rule, mirror the Barker factors, with the additional

2023We begin with 8 the length of delay, considering first whether the length of the delay is sufficiently 9 prejudicial to trigger the remainder of the analysis and next evaluating how to weigh 10 the length of the delay “in the final speedy trial inquiry.” Id. ¶ 20. 11 {5} We calculate the length of delay in the present case from the date of arrest, 12 April 9, 2019. 2 See State v. Urban, 2004-NMSC-007, ¶ 12 , 135 N.M. 279 , 87 P.3d 13 1061.

2023We begin with 8 the length of delay, considering first whether the length of the delay is sufficiently 9 prejudicial to trigger the remainder of the analysis and next evaluating how to weigh 10 the length of the delay “in the final speedy trial inquiry.” Id. ¶ 20. 11 {5} We calculate the length of delay in the present case from the date of arrest, 12 April 9, 2019. 2 See State v. Urban, 2004-NMSC-007, ¶ 12 , 135 N.M. 279 , 87 P.3d 13 1061.

2020See State v. Grissom, 1987-NMCA-123 , ¶ 34, 106 N.M. 555 , 746 P.2d 661 (recognizing that “[d]elay arising from hearing [the] defendants’ motions, not caused by the prosecution” is not weighed against the prosecution in a speedy trial analysis); see also Serros, 2016-NMSC-008, ¶ 29 (stating that delay caused by the defense weighs against the defendant).

2020See State v. Grissom, 1987-NMCA-123 , ¶ 34, 106 N.M. 555 , 746 P.2d 661 (recognizing that “[d]elay arising from hearing [the] defendants’ motions, not caused by the prosecution” is not weighed against the prosecution in a speedy trial analysis); see also Serros, 2016-NMSC-008, ¶ 29 (stating that delay caused by the defense weighs against the defendant).

2025See State v. Wood, 2022-NMCA-009, ¶ 21 , 504 P.3d 579 (“In a speedy trial analysis, if any one of the three Barker factors does not weigh heavily in favor of a defendant, as is the case here, [the d]efendant must show particularized prejudice in order to prove their speedy trial was violated.”).

2025See State v. Wood, 2022-NMCA-009, ¶ 21 , 504 P.3d 579 (“In a speedy trial analysis, if any one of the three Barker factors does not weigh heavily in favor of a defendant, as is the case here, [the d]efendant must show particularized prejudice in order to prove their speedy trial was violated.”).

2016Because a “trial court [is] familiar with the factual circumstances, the contested issues and available evidence, the local judicial machinery, and reasonable expectations for the discharge of law enforcement and prosecutorial responsibilities,” we defer to the district court’s finding on the question of complexity when that “finding[] . . . [is] supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Manzanares, 1996-NMSC-028 , ¶ 9, 121 N.M. 798 , 918 P.2d 714 . {12} The delay in this case was sufficient to trigger a speedy trial inquiry, see Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 47-48 (stating that a delay of over

2016Because a “trial court [is] familiar with the factual circumstances, the contested issues and available evidence, the local judicial machinery, and reasonable expectations for the discharge of law enforcement and prosecutorial responsibilities,” we defer to the district court’s finding on the question of complexity when that “finding[] . . . [is] supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Manzanares, 1996-NMSC-028 , ¶ 9, 121 N.M. 798 , 918 P.2d 714 . {12} The delay in this case was sufficient to trigger a speedy trial inquiry, see Garza, 2009-NMSC-038, ¶¶ 47-48 (stating that a delay of over

2023Length of Delay {3} Length of delay serves “as a threshold triggering mechanism used to determine whether the delay is presumptively prejudicial so as to continue with a full speedy trial analysis.” State v. Brown, 2017-NMCA-046, ¶ 14 , 396 P.3d 171 (text only) (citation omitted).

2022Length of the Delay {5} The first Barker factor, the “length of the delay,” is “a threshold triggering mechanism used to determine whether the delay is presumptively prejudicial so as to continue with a full speedy trial analysis.” State v. Brown, 2017-NMCA-046, ¶ 14 , 396 P.3d 171 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2015See Marquez, 2001-NMCA-062, ¶ 11 (concluding that the length of delay includes the entire time during which criminal charges were pending against the defendant); see also Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 , 651 - 52 (1992) (“}T]o trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from ‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay}.]” (Emphasis added)).

2015See Marquez, 2001-NMCA-062, ¶ 11 (concluding that the length of delay includes the entire time during which criminal charges were pending against the defendant); see also Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651-52 (1992) (“[T]o trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from ‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay[.]” (Emphasis added)).