speedy trial claim in Rhode Island

2006Each of these factors must be fully considered, and no one factor "is wholly dispositive of a speedy trial claim nor is the insufficiency of any one factor fatal to the claim." State v. Wheaton, 528 A.2d 1109 , 1112 (R.I. 1987) A. The Length of the Delay The first Barker factor, the length of the delay, "is a threshold consideration that triggers review of the remaining factors — but only if the delay is long enough to be considered `presumptively prejudicial.'" Id. (quoting State v. Verrecchia 766 A.2d 377 , 385 (R.I. 2001)).

2006Each of these factors must be fully considered, and no one factor "is wholly dispositive of a speedy trial claim nor is the insufficiency of any one factor fatal to the claim." State v. Wheaton, 528 A.2d 1109 , 1112 (R.I. 1987) A. The Length of the Delay The first Barker factor, the length of the delay, "is a threshold consideration that triggers review of the remaining factors — but only if the delay is long enough to be considered `presumptively prejudicial.'" Id. (quoting State v. Verrecchia 766 A.2d 377 , 385 (R.I. 2001)).

2015In assessing a speedy-trial claim, this Court employs the familiar four-factor framework set forth by the United States ' Supreme Court in Barker : “(1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion of his [or her] *74 rights, .and (4) the prejudice to. the accused.” Bido , 56 A.8d at 111 (quoting State v. Crocker, 767 A.2d 88, 91 (R.I.2001)).

2012See, e.g., State v. Werner, 831 A.2d 183, 195 (R.I.2003) (affirming the denial of the defendant’s speedy trial claim because, among other reasons, the trial justice correctly referred *113 to the fact that the defendant “for a time had refused to cooperate in the attempt by Rhode Island authorities to have him transferred to Rhode Island pursuant to the [Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act]”); Crocker, 767 A.2d at 91-94 (affirming the trial justice’s determination that the defendant’s conduct was the primary cause of the delay in a case in which the defendant remained absent from the jurisdi

2012In reaching his conclusion, the trial justice first addressed Bido’s speedy-trial claim, using the four-factor speedy-trial framework established by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), and adopted by this Court in Tate v. Howard, 110 R.I. 641, 647-48 , 296 A.2d 19, 23-24 (1972).

2012In reaching his conclusion, the trial justice first addressed Bido’s speedy-trial claim, using the four-factor speedy-trial framework established by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), and adopted by this Court in Tate v. Howard, 110 R.I. 641, 647-48 , 296 A.2d 19, 23-24 (1972).

1992As noted, "[although court congestion is weighed against the state, it is not weighed so heavily as deliberate delay.” Macaskill, 523 A.2d at 885 (citing State v. Austin, 462 A.2d 359, 362 (R.I.1983); State v. Anthony, 448 A.2d 744, 750 (R.I.1982)).

1987Ed. 2d 101 (1972): "(1) length of the delay, (2) reason for the delay, (3) defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and (4) prejudice to the accused.” State v. Anthony, 448 A.2d at 749 .

2012In reaching his conclusion, the trial justice first addressed Bido’s speedy-trial claim, using the four-factor speedy-trial framework established by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), and adopted by this Court in Tate v. Howard, 110 R.I. 641, 647-48 , 296 A.2d 19, 23-24 (1972).

2012In reaching his conclusion, the trial justice first addressed Bido’s speedy-trial claim, using the four-factor speedy-trial framework established by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), and adopted by this Court in Tate v. Howard, 110 R.I. 641, 647-48 , 296 A.2d 19, 23-24 (1972).

2006See State v. Hernandez, 641 A.2d 62 , 68 (R.I. 1994); see also State v. Macaskill, 523 A.2d 883 (R.I. 1987) (holding that the mere assertion that a defendant has suffered "emotional trauma" from awaiting trial is an insufficient basis for a speedy trial violation claim).

1992“When weighing reasons for delay in a speedy-trial claim, the Supreme Court has held that ‘different weights should be assigned to different reasons.’ ” Macaskill, 523 A.2d at 885 (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 531 , 92 S.Ct. at 2192 , 33 L.Ed.2d at 117 ).

2015Because Oliveira was bound by his defense counsel’s decisions on scheduling matters, see Hill, 528 U.S. at 115 , 120 S.Ct. 659 , this delay is properly attributed to Oliveira in the speedy-trial analysis, at least until he filed his motion to discharge counsel and for appointment of new counsel in August 2010, see Brillon, 556 U.S. at 92, 94 , 129 S.Ct. 1283 .

2015Because Oliveira was bound by his defense counsel’s decisions on scheduling matters, see Hill, 528 U.S. at 115 , 120 S.Ct. 659 , this delay is properly attributed to Oliveira in the speedy-trial analysis, at least until he filed his motion to discharge counsel and for appointment of new counsel in August 2010, see Brillon, 556 U.S. at 92, 94 , 129 S.Ct. 1283 .

2012See, e.g., State v. Werner, 831 A.2d 183, 195 (R.I.2003) (affirming the denial of the defendant’s speedy trial claim because, among other reasons, the trial justice correctly referred *113 to the fact that the defendant “for a time had refused to cooperate in the attempt by Rhode Island authorities to have him transferred to Rhode Island pursuant to the [Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act]”); Crocker, 767 A.2d at 91-94 (affirming the trial justice’s determination that the defendant’s conduct was the primary cause of the delay in a case in which the defendant remained absent from the jurisdi

2012See, e.g., State v. Werner, 831 A.2d 183, 195 (R.I.2003) (affirming the denial of the defendant’s speedy trial claim because, among other reasons, the trial justice correctly referred *113 to the fact that the defendant “for a time had refused to cooperate in the attempt by Rhode Island authorities to have him transferred to Rhode Island pursuant to the [Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act]”); Crocker, 767 A.2d at 91-94 (affirming the trial justice’s determination that the defendant’s conduct was the primary cause of the delay in a case in which the defendant remained absent from the jurisdi

2012See, e.g., State v. Werner, 831 A.2d 183, 195 (R.I.2003) (affirming the denial of the defendant’s speedy trial claim because, among other reasons, the trial justice correctly referred *113 to the fact that the defendant “for a time had refused to cooperate in the attempt by Rhode Island authorities to have him transferred to Rhode Island pursuant to the [Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act]”); Crocker, 767 A.2d at 91-94 (affirming the trial justice’s determination that the defendant’s conduct was the primary cause of the delay in a case in which the defendant remained absent from the jurisdi

2012These inquiries, while both employing the term "prejudice,” are very different: the fourth Barker factor examines how the delay has prejudiced the accused in terms of the three specific types of prejudice and any presumptive prejudice that may arise from excessive delay, Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 654-56 , 112 S.Ct. 2686 , 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992), while the prejudice prong of the Strickland inquiry examines whether the allegedly constitutionally deficient performance of counsel caused the result of the proceeding to be different from what it would have been if counsel's performance

2006See State v. Hernandez, 641 A.2d 62 , 68 (R.I. 1994); see also State v. Macaskill, 523 A.2d 883 (R.I. 1987) (holding that the mere assertion that a defendant has suffered "emotional trauma" from awaiting trial is an insufficient basis for a speedy trial violation claim).

1995As we stated in the context of a speedy trial inquiry nearly thirty years ago, “ ‘[i]t would seem that appellant is not entitled to blow both hot and cold — to seek dismissal based upon delay * * * while at the same time, requesting and insisting upon further continuance or postponement.’ ” Ramsdell v. Langlois, 100 R.I. 468, 473 , 217 A.2d 83, 86 (1966).

1995As we stated in the context of a speedy trial inquiry nearly thirty years ago, “ ‘[i]t would seem that appellant is not entitled to blow both hot and cold — to seek dismissal based upon delay * * * while at the same time, requesting and insisting upon further continuance or postponement.’ ” Ramsdell v. Langlois, 100 R.I. 468, 473 , 217 A.2d 83, 86 (1966).

1992As noted, "[although court congestion is weighed against the state, it is not weighed so heavily as deliberate delay.” Macaskill, 523 A.2d at 885 (citing State v. Austin, 462 A.2d 359, 362 (R.I.1983); State v. Anthony, 448 A.2d 744, 750 (R.I.1982)).

1984See State v. Baccaire, 470 A.2d at 1150 ; State v. Anthony, 448 A.2d at 750 .