speedy trial claim in Oregon

2023Similarly, this case is not comparable with Harberts, which concerned a lengthy delay that occurred pretrial because the state had taken multiple interlocutory appeals of pretrial rulings and where the court rejected the state’s argument that “no delay caused by interlocutory appeals may be considered in analyzing a defendant’s speedy trial claim under Article I, section 10.” 331 Or at 90 (emphasis omitted).

2023Similarly, this case is not comparable with Harberts, which concerned a lengthy delay that occurred pretrial because the state had taken multiple interlocutory appeals of pretrial rulings and where the court rejected the state’s argument that “no delay caused by interlocutory appeals may be considered in analyzing a defendant’s speedy trial claim under Article I, section 10.” 331 Or at 90 (emphasis omitted).

2017Article I, section 10, provides, in part, that “justice shall be administered * * * without delay [.] ” Under Article I, section 10, “the factors to be considered in evaluating the usual speedy trial claim are: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reasons for the delay and (3) the resulting prejudice to the accused.” State v. Mende, 304 Or 18, 21 , 741 P2d 496 (1987).

2017Article I, section 10, provides, in part, that “justice shall be administered * * * without delay [.] ” Under Article I, section 10, “the factors to be considered in evaluating the usual speedy trial claim are: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reasons for the delay and (3) the resulting prejudice to the accused.” State v. Mende, 304 Or 18, 21 , 741 P2d 496 (1987).

2021The speedy trial rule is designed to (1) protect against “ ‘oppressive pretrial incarceration’ ”; (2) to minimize the accused’s “ ‘anxiety and concern’ ” due to pending crimi- nal charges; and (3) to “ ‘limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.’ ” Harberts, 331 Or at 85 (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 US 514, 532 , 92 S Ct 2182 , 33 L Ed 2d 101 (1972)).

2021The speedy trial rule is designed to (1) protect against “ ‘oppressive pretrial incarceration’ ”; (2) to minimize the accused’s “ ‘anxiety and concern’ ” due to pending crimi- nal charges; and (3) to “ ‘limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.’ ” Harberts, 331 Or at 85 (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 US 514, 532 , 92 S Ct 2182 , 33 L Ed 2d 101 (1972)).

2001See Harberts, 331 Or at 96 n 10 (citing Doggett, 505 US at 651-52 , and Mende, 304 Or at 23-24 , for the proposition that “the length of delay is the ‘triggering mechanism’ for inquiry into the other factors in the speedy-trial analysis and that the length of delay ‘obviously may be a factor in assessing the prejudice factor”).

2000See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 , 112 S.Ct. 2686 , 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992) (applying Barker methodology.) This court has held that delay in and of itself may be sufficient to establish a speedy-trial violation if the delay is so long "that the thought of ordering [a] defendant to trial `shocks the imagination and the conscience,' " Vawter, 236 Or. at 96 , 386 P.2d 915 (quoting United States v. Chase, 135 F.Supp. 230, 233 (N.D.Ill.1955)), or if the delay is caused purposely to hamper the defense, Ivory, 278 Or. at 506 , 564 P.2d 1039 .

2001The issue thus reduces to whether the delay here, which began with the issuance of the complainant’s information against defendant in 1987, violates Article I, section 10. *485 In Harberts , the court, in its review of state and federal speedy trial case law, highlighted the tenets underlying its earlier Article I, section 10, jurisprudence: “This court has held that delay in and of itself may be sufficient to establish a speedy-trial violation if the delay is so long ‘that the thought of ordering [a] defendant to trial “shocks the imagination and the conscience,” ’ Vawter, 236 Or at 96 (quoti

2000This court has held that delay in and of itself may be sufficient to establish a speedy-trial violation if the delay is so long “that the thought of ordering [a] defendant to trial ‘shocks the imagination and the conscience,’ ” Vawter, 236 Or at 96 (quoting United States v. Chase, 135 F Supp 230, 233 (ND 111 1955)), or if the delay is caused purposely to hamper the defense, Ivory, 278 Or at 506 .

2008State v. Harberts, 331 Or 72, 84-88 , 11 P3d 641 (2000); State v. Ivory, 278 Or 499, 501-04 , 564 P2d 1039 (1977) (adopting the United States Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial analysis in Barker v. Wingo, 407 US 514 , 92 S Ct 2182 , 33 L Ed 2d 101 (1972), for purposes of the speedy trial analysis under Article 1, section 10).

2008State v. Harberts, 331 Or 72, 84-88 , 11 P3d 641 (2000); State v. Ivory, 278 Or 499, 501-04 , 564 P2d 1039 (1977) (adopting the United States Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial analysis in Barker v. Wingo, 407 US 514 , 92 S Ct 2182 , 33 L Ed 2d 101 (1972), for purposes of the speedy trial analysis under Article 1, section 10).

2022The decision to forgo the vacation was not affected by the delay[ ] and, therefore, does not affect the speedy trial inquiry.” Emery, 318 Or at 473 (emphasis in original; footnote omit- ted).

2003In light of the reasons for the delay and the lack of prejudice to defendant, we conclude that he was not denied a speedy trial in violation of Article I, section 10. 7 We turn to defendant’s claim under ORS 135.747, which provides: “If a defendant charged with a crime, whose trial has not been postponed upon the application of the defendant or by the consent of the defendant, is not brought to trial within a reasonable period of time, the court shall order the accusatory instrument to be dismissed.” In State v. Emery, 318 Or 460, 470 , 869 P2d 859 (1994), the Supreme Court held that “ORS 135.

2022However, in Haynes v. Burks, this court stated that the inquiry into the reasonable possibility of prejudice is slightly different depending on whether the speedy-trial claim is made before or after trial. 290 Or 75, 82 , 619 P2d 632 (1980) (a claim that arises before trial “requires a more differentiated consideration of the element of prejudice” Cite as 370 Or 414 (2022) 427 than an appeal of a denial of a motion to dismiss that is raised after trial).

2022However, in Haynes v. Burks, this court stated that the inquiry into the reasonable possibility of prejudice is slightly different depending on whether the speedy-trial claim is made before or after trial. 290 Or 75, 82 , 619 P2d 632 (1980) (a claim that arises before trial “requires a more differentiated consideration of the element of prejudice” Cite as 370 Or 414 (2022) 427 than an appeal of a denial of a motion to dismiss that is raised after trial).

2020In assessing a speedy trial claim under the Sixth Amendment, “a court considers the three factors relevant to the state constitutional analysis (length of the delay, reasons for the delay, and the preju- dice that results from the delay) and also the defendant’s diligence in asserting the right to a speedy trial.” Bayer, 229 Or App at 281-82 .

2014In other words, he cited nothing “beyond that expected when someone is, or might be, the subject of a criminal charge.” State v. Bayer, 229 Or App 267, 281 , 211 P3d 327 , rev den, 347 Or 446 (2009) (concluding that the defendant had not established a speedy trial violation under Article I, section 10).

2014In other words, he cited nothing “beyond that expected when someone is, or might be, the subject of a criminal charge.” State v. Bayer, 229 Or App 267, 281 , 211 P3d 327 , rev den, 347 Or 446 (2009) (concluding that the defendant had not established a speedy trial violation under Article I, section 10).

2011See State v. Bayer, 229 Or.App. 267, 277 , 211 P.3d 327 , rev. den., 347 Or. 446 , 223 P.3d 1054 (2009).

2001The issue thus reduces to whether the delay here, which began with the issuance of the complainant’s information against defendant in 1987, violates Article I, section 10. *485 In Harberts , the court, in its review of state and federal speedy trial case law, highlighted the tenets underlying its earlier Article I, section 10, jurisprudence: “This court has held that delay in and of itself may be sufficient to establish a speedy-trial violation if the delay is so long ‘that the thought of ordering [a] defendant to trial “shocks the imagination and the conscience,” ’ Vawter, 236 Or at 96 (quoti

2000This court has held that delay in and of itself may be sufficient to establish a speedy-trial violation if the delay is so long “that the thought of ordering [a] defendant to trial ‘shocks the imagination and the conscience,’ ” Vawter, 236 Or at 96 (quoting United States v. Chase, 135 F Supp 230, 233 (ND 111 1955)), or if the delay is caused purposely to hamper the defense, Ivory, 278 Or at 506 .

2000Sir Edward Coke’s commentaries on Magna Charta, for example, explained that English judges did “ ‘not suffer! ] the prisoner to be long detained, but at their next coming have given the prisoner full and speedy justice * * * without detaining him long in prison.’ ” See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 US 213, 224 , 87 S Ct 988 , 18 L Ed 2d 1 (1967) (quoting Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England 43 (Brooke, 5th ed, 1797)).

2000Sir Edward Coke’s commentaries on Magna Charta, for example, explained that English judges did “ ‘not suffer! ] the prisoner to be long detained, but at their next coming have given the prisoner full and speedy justice * * * without detaining him long in prison.’ ” See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 US 213, 224 , 87 S Ct 988 , 18 L Ed 2d 1 (1967) (quoting Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England 43 (Brooke, 5th ed, 1797)).

2021See State v. Gonzales-Sanchez, 251 Or App 118, 124, 126 , 282 P3d 19 , rev den, 352 Or 666 (2012) (concluding that the state “made sufficient efforts” to serve the warrant for purposes of a statutory speedy trial claim where it did not have defendant’s out-of-state mailing address and it entered the warrant into two law enforcement databases); State v. Green, 140 Or App 308 , 315 n 9, 915 P2d 460 (1996) (noting that the “unreasonable delay test [for determining whether a prosecution was initiated within the statute of limitations under ORS 131.135] is the same as the speedy trial analysis unde

2021See State v. Gonzales-Sanchez, 251 Or App 118, 124, 126 , 282 P3d 19 , rev den, 352 Or 666 (2012) (concluding that the state “made sufficient efforts” to serve the warrant for purposes of a statutory speedy trial claim where it did not have defendant’s out-of-state mailing address and it entered the warrant into two law enforcement databases); State v. Green, 140 Or App 308 , 315 n 9, 915 P2d 460 (1996) (noting that the “unreasonable delay test [for determining whether a prosecution was initiated within the statute of limitations under ORS 131.135] is the same as the speedy trial analysis unde

2007See State v. Vasquez, 336 Or 598, 612-13 , 88 P3d 271 (2004) (explaining that the period for assessing a speedy trial claim begins when the state initiates criminal charges against a defendant by indictment or its equivalent).

2007See State v. Vasquez, 336 Or 598, 612-13 , 88 P3d 271 (2004) (explaining that the period for assessing a speedy trial claim begins when the state initiates criminal charges against a defendant by indictment or its equivalent).

2005See State v. Clark, 86 Or 464, 468 , 168 P 944 (1917) (so stating); see also ORS 135.745 (authorizing trial court to dismiss prosecution if accusatory instrument not filed within 30 days unless good cause shown); ORS 135.747 (authorizing trial court to dismiss accusatory instrument if defendant not brought to trial within reasonable period of time).

2005See State v. Clark, 86 Or 464, 468 , 168 P 944 (1917) (so stating); see also ORS 135.745 (authorizing trial court to dismiss prosecution if accusatory instrument not filed within 30 days unless good cause shown); ORS 135.747 (authorizing trial court to dismiss accusatory instrument if defendant not brought to trial within reasonable period of time).